Avodah Mailing List

Volume 32: Number 31

Tue, 25 Feb 2014

• 1. Re: Academic Claims of Early Israelite Henotheism (T6...@aol.com)
• 2. Re: Academic Claims of Early Israelite Henotheism (Micha Berger)
• 3. Re: Time for the Deceased (Kenneth Miller)
• 4. Re: Philosophers and philosophy (Kenneth Miller)
• 5. RYBS and SSSJ (Joseph Kaplan)
• 6. Re: RHS on daas torah on non-halachic issues (T6...@mail.aol.com)
• 7. Re: RHS on daas torah on non-halachic issues (Micha Berger)
• 8. Re: RYBS and SSSJ (Micha Berger)
• 9. Re: RHS on daas torah on non-halachic issues (Allan Engel)
• 10. Re: RHS on daas torah on non-halachic issues (T6...@mail.aol.com)
• 11. Re: Academic Claims of Early Israelite Henotheism (Lisa Liel)
• 12. Re: Time for the Deceased (was: Why does Moshe use, logical... (Micha Berger)

 

From: Micha Berger <mi...@aishdas.org>

>>For that,  I would point to the Torah's language coined by someone
whose congregation  really was comprised of honotheists -- Malkitzedeq
(Bereishis 14:19, and used  by Avraham in v. 22). "Keil elyon" is at
worst a statement that the RBSO is  quantitatively superior; but it's
still an objective superiority, not a  henotheist's subjective choice
of god to be loyal to. But more telling is  when he calls G-d the "Qonei
shamayim va'aretz", since that places Him  qualitatively apart from the
other forces people might choose to  worship.

Interestingly, this language found its way into Birkhas Avos. We  still
have "Keil Elyon", but only a paraphrased "Qonei hakol". However,  in
Nusach EY and preserved in the mei'ein Tefillah of Shabbos Maariv  the
phrase is "Keil elyon". We call it Birkhas Avos, and yet make a  point
of calling the Borei in pre-avos language.<<


--  
Micha  Berger            
mi...@aishdas.org         





>>>>>
 
The point you're making is not absolutely clear.  I hope you're not  saying 
that a trace of "henotheism" found its way into the Shmoneh Esrei.   I hope 
you are saying that G-d is above all powers and forces in the  world.  
(Not, "He is above all the other gods.")
 
 

--Toby Katz
..
=============


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On Mon, Feb 24, 2014 at 05:57:06PM -0500, T6...@aol.com wrote:
: The point you're making is not absolutely clear.  I hope you're not  saying 
: that a trace of "henotheism" found its way into the Shmoneh Esrei.   I hope 
: you are saying that G-d is above all powers and forces in the  world.  
: (Not, "He is above all the other gods.")

My poitn was that when you think in Hebrew. "other gods" and "other
forces" aren't distinct ideas. Idolaters' other gods were themselves
forces in the world, and therefore identified with angels, or imagined
forces.

But to get baxk to Birkas Avos.

Malkitzedeq was called by his neighbors the "kohein leKeil elyon".
Arguably the relative term, "the most high G-d" (or: the Highest Force)
means that his admirers were henotheists. While it is true that Hashem
is above all powers, this is true of henotheism as well; in truth it's
faint praise of the One True Creator and Master of existence.

But Malkitzedeq himself also refers to Hashem as the Maker and Owner of
the universe(s), "Qoneih Shamayim va'aretz". (As one would expect from
someone identified with Shaim.) Makitzedeq hiself clearly thought G-d
was unique in kind, not only in magnitude.

Both languages find themselves in birkhas Avos. Keil Elyon and Qonei
haKol -- or in the Mei'ein Sheva of Fri night, the original "Qpmeo
shamayim va'aretz".

Now this in itself raises the question why -- why does birkhas avos refer
to G-d in language that predates the avos? Would you have expected instead
the "Keil Shakai" Hashem tells us charaterizes His recalation to them.
Especially since Keil Elyon can be taken as such faint praise.

Tir'u baTov!
-Micha

-- 
Micha Berger             Feeling grateful  to or appreciative of  someone
mi...@aishdas.org        or something in your life actually attracts more
http://www.aishdas.org   of the things that you appreciate and value into
Fax: (270) 514-1507      your life.         - Christiane Northrup, M.D.

I wrote:

> "Universals" and "particulars" sounds like hashgacha klalis and 
> hashgacha pratis, but those are about what He DOES, not what he 
> KNOWS, right? Surely everyone agrees that He always knows
> everything, no?

R' David Riceman responded:

> "V'habit el amal lo suchal" (Hab. 1:13), "lo hibit aven b'yaakov
> vlo ra'ah amal b'yisrael" (Balak 23:21).  So God doesn't see
> everything.  

Sorry, I just don't see it. It's not saying anything about what He is
*capable* of seeing, chalilah; His capabilities include seeing anything and
everything. Those psukim are talking about what He *chooses* to look at.

"Lo hibit aven b'yaakov" - He doesn't look at Yaakov's faults.
"V'habit el amal lo suchal" is not a statement of His abilities. It is a desperate plea: How can You look at such things?!?!

I really don't think I'm doing any apologetics. I'm just taking the simple meaning of the root word:

"Look up to shamayim" (Bereshis 15:5)
"Look at the copper serpent" (B'midbar 21:9)
"He was afraid to look at G-d" (Shmos 3:6)
"Don't look back!" (Bereshis 19:17)
"You eyes will look ahead" (Mishlei 4:25)
"Look from heaven and see" (Tehillim 80:15)

R' David Riceman continued:

> How does He see things? The hint is in BR 1:1 (ed. Theodor-Albeck
> p. 2 lines 1-5) "mabit baTorah uborei haolam". This is expanded in
> H. Teshuva 5:4 "God knows, not through extradeical knowledge, as
> people do, but through intradeical knowledge, for He and His
> knowledge are one ..." (compare H. Yesodei HaTorah 2:10).

Again, I must apologize for asking you to please dumb this down for me.
Surely you're not suggesting that the Torah is something external to G-d,
which He needed to study in order to figure out how to create the world. So
what *are* you saying?

> So time, in God's perspective, may not be duration, or the fourth 
> dimension.  It may be, instead, that different periods of time 
> represent different concepts.  Every week may represent sefiros,
> and not every forty days may represent the cluster above, but
> certainly the time from RH Ellul to Yom Kippur does.
>
> Time may not be a quantitative idea, it may be a qualitative idea.

I'm totally okay with all of that, because I'm perfectly happy with the
idea that time, from G-d's perspective, might be A or B or C. My problem
was with R' Micha Berger's claim that A or B or C should be EXcluded from
possibility.

Akiva Miller
____________________________________________________________
Do THIS before eating carbs (every time)
1 EASY tip to increase fat-burning, lower blood sugar & decrease fat storage
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R' Micha Berger shared some memories:

> RYBS starts with talking about the wheel, who seems to be saying
> or implying something?! But I pushed on, hoping the footnote would
> make sense if I got the whole picture. It was only reached a long
> word that was obviously foreign that I got was "Kierkegaard" that
> I realized "Hagal" was actually "Hegel"! ... So I grew up
> comfortable with the idea that rabbanim could be utilizing
> non-Jewish philosophy.

Personally, my background in philosophy is almost non-existent. But I've
had a fairly decent education in the sciences. And because of that
background, I am usually pretty confident in my abilities to distinguish
between the scientific ideas which can be harnessed to give great insight
into Torah, and the pseudoscience and/or apikorsus which we must stay far
away from.

By analogy, I can easily see how famous philosophers can be helpful in
figuring out certain things. But like the scientists, philosophers can be
wrong too. There's a BIG difference between *rabbanim* utilizing non-Jewish
philosphy, and *me* utilizing it. I am totally okay with the Rambam or RYBS
studying Aristotle and then passing it on to me, because they know how to
separate Aristotle's pearls from his junk. Me, I don't know how to do that.

> WRT Rambam, like REED, it's not guesswork. The Rambam quite clearly
> credits Aristo. He invokes "qabel es ha'emes mimi she'omro" (into
> to Avos) to justify it.

Perhaps my use of the work "guesswork" was too strong. I *do* understand
that philosophy is a rigorous and difficult field, and I should not
belittle those who are acknowledged experts. All I meant was that they are
fallible, and we should not run to them for their ideas until after OUR
philosophers have given their haskama.

Akiva Miller
____________________________________________________________
Do THIS before eating carbs (every time)
1 EASY tip to increase fat-burning, lower blood sugar & decrease fat storage
http://thirdpartyoffers.juno.com/TGL3131/530bfc645e7327c646e3fst01vuc

I was surprised that RHS described RYBS as having spoken to experts before
allowing participation in SSSJ rallies because my memory (and, yes, I was
around at that time and actually personally involved somewhat in Yeshiva
College students' involvement in SSSJ and Soviet Jewry rallies) was that he
did not publically permit such participation.  Indeed, my recollection is
that he recommended to his students not to protest though, years later, he
told these same students that he regretted that advice.  Glenn Richter, who
knows perhaps more about SSJ and Soviet Jewry rallies than anyone else other
than Ya'akov Birnbaum, has a recollection different than mine, yet closer to
it than to RHS's:  

"When they asked the Rav about public protests for Russian Jews in about
1964, the Rav told them, I determine that I'm not the one to tell you what
to do, but my "psak", my decision is that you should ask the people who are
the experts in the area whether pressure and demonstrations work. So, of
course, they found the right people who said yes."

IOW, RYBS did not consult the experts and then, based on what they told him,
tell the students what they should do; rather, he told them to consult the
experts and then make their decision. 

And RYBS's own words, as quoted by RARR, also makes RHS's statement about
RYBS position on Soviet Jewry rallies and "psak" in these type of matters in
general surprising:

"If one is confused, he can ask for guidance. I have been presented with
such moral questions. I never give a yes or no answer. The questions may
determine the future of the particular individual. I will explainthe options
but tell him that the final choice is his. ... I resent very much that
certain roshei yeshiva and certain teachers want to imposetheir will upon
the boys. It is against the law. Both ways are correct, the options are
correct, and it is up to the individual to make the

decision. I cannot make the decision for him...."

IOW, in these matters, RYBS did NOT paskin; he advised.  Of course, advice
of a man as wise as RYBS must be given very very careful consideration, but,
at the end of the day, as he himself said, "the final choice is his [i.e.,
the person asking the question" and not RYBS's.

 

Joseph 

 

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From: "Joseph Kaplan" <jkap...@tenzerlunin.com>
> I  find it interesting that in the Q&A RHS
> said this about shiduchim:  "People ask me eitzas about shiduchim, I can't
> tell him yes or no. I just  bring out points."  I note he used the word
> "eitzas," not "for a  pesak."  ....

> So, ISTM that the upshot of this is that he was saying that people  should
> speak to a wise person before they make important life decisions and  that
> the wise person should be their rabbi who should make recommendations  and
> not pasken.  FWIW, I agree with the first part, but not because I'm  MO or,
> indeed, not even because I'm Jewish.  It's simply a smart thing  to do.  As
> to the second, sometimes yes and sometimes no or, possibly,  there's someone
> else wiser about such matters.  That's who I'd ask and  that's who I'd tell
> my kids to ask.

The vast majority of charedim would understand da'as Torah in exactly
the same way as your "first part" -- consulting a wise person, a talmid
chacham, rav, rosh yeshiva -- before making major life decisions.
(But they would probably not follow your "second part" -- they would
not consider a secular "wise person" the right one to go to, unless it
was a question about having their car fixed).

Most would understand whatever that rav to say as good advice rather
than a psak. They're not generally asking, "it's mutar to marry this
person?" or "it's assur to marry this person?" They're asking, "Is this
a good idea?" Maybe they would be a bit more inclined to listen than
the MO person would, if they didn't like what the rav, rebbe or rosh
yeshiva advised. But they would not consider it a psak that /must/
be obeyed, nor would they assume that every word out of the rav's
mouth is ruach hakodesh, nor would they assume the rav is infallible.
Most would just think that a person who is steeped in Torah learning
would have better instincts as to what will or what will not be more
conducive to a Torah life, a happy life, a good life (and those three
things are overlapping categories).

From:  Eli Turkel <elitur...@gmail.com>
> Rav Shlomo Zalman Auerbach spent years learning about electricity
> before paskening on it. In contrast, I'd love to know how many
> homosexuals spoke with Rav Moshe Feinstein before he wrote about them
> in Igros Moshe O"C 4:115...
> ...Sorry to say some pasken modern technology questions without knowing
> anything about modern science. In fact RSZA and RMF both had scientists
> that they consulted with when answering technology questions....

> .... The Tzitz Elizer also had a shiur for doctors that led to many of
> his teshuvot. However, other poskim answered medical questions with no
> knowledge of modern medicine.

It is necessary to know something about electricity or about medicine
before you can pasken shailos having to do with electricity or medicine.
It is not necessary to know a sinner personally before you can pasken
that a sin is a sin. At most, if you know what drives him, you can
sympathize with him and understand that he has a very difficult yetzer
hara to overcome. But a sin remains a sin.

Before you can pasken certain hilchos Shabbos, you have to know certain
things about technology -- say, how a car works, or how an elevator
works. But you do not have to personally know someone who is mechallel
Shabbos before you can pasken.

--Toby Katz
..
=============

On Mon, Feb 24, 2014 at 05:52:09PM -0500, T6...@mail.aol.com wrote:
: From: "Joseph Kaplan" <jkap...@tenzerlunin.com>
: > So, ISTM that the upshot of this is that he was saying that people  should
: > speak to a wise person before they make important life decisions and  that
: > the wise person should be their rabbi who should make recommendations  and
: > not pasken...

: The vast majority of charedim would understand da'as Torah in exactly
: the same way as your "first part" -- consulting a wise person, a talmid
: chacham, rav, rosh yeshiva -- before making major life decisions.
: (But they would probably not follow your "second part" -- they would
: not consider a secular "wise person" the right one to go to, unless it
: was a question about having their car fixed).

The thing is, though RJK's reformulation ignore a major limitation in
RHS's original. RHS speaks about getting advice navigating the halachic
implications of each option. Not advice in general, simply because rabbis
are wise. But religious advice because it's impossible to face a decision
that halakhah has nothing to say about, and yet it's likely the issues
are too complex for the rabbi to know enough to say "chayav" or "assur".

RHS is not quite discussing the same thing as chareidi notions of daas
Torah, and RHS would have been clearer had he avoided trying to provide
a new definition for an existing and contentious term.

: Most would understand whatever that rav to say as good advice rather
: than a psak. They're not generally asking, "it's mutar to marry this
: person?" or "it's assur to marry this person?" They're asking, "Is this
: a good idea?" ...

Whereas RHS is indeed connecting it more to issur veheter, but not
so firmly or with such surety that the tzad issur or tzad chiyuv
could be definitely identified.

: Most would just think that a person who is steeped in Torah learning
: would have better instincts as to what will or what will not be more
: conducive to a Torah life, a happy life, a good life (and those three
: things are overlapping categories).

I would have added the need for a moreh derekh, a rav as spiritual advisor,
as opposed to phrasing it in terms of every decision involving halachic
issues povided by a moeh hora'ah / poseiq. RHS opens with the idea that
issur veheter touches everything; I am more comfortable with shitos
that have a range of ought between the "must" and "must not". Or else,
what's lifnim mishuras hadin, neqi'us, perishus, etc...?

But that's me, not RHS. His position is further from what you describe.

But neither of us would expect a rabbi's advice would have anything to
do with happiness. If holiness provides happiness, fine. But if his
discussion of issur or perishus is appropriate for me leads to a road
of nisyonos -- nothing he says would make that outcome less likely.
(But at least more likely to be dealt with constructively.)

:> Rav Shlomo Zalman Auerbach spent years learning about electricity
:> before paskening on it. In contrast, I'd love to know how many
:> homosexuals spoke with Rav Moshe Feinstein before he wrote about them
:> in Igros Moshe O"C 4:115...
...
: It is necessary to know something about electricity or about medicine
: before you can pasken shailos having to do with electricity or medicine.
: It is not necessary to know a sinner personally before you can pasken
: that a sin is a sin...

But you do need to know what drives a sinner to know where he is on
the spectrum of mumar lehach'is to mumar letei'avon. After all, no one
(who takes halakhah seriously) needs a poseiq to tell them that mishkav
zakhar is assur. The question that comes up is how to deal with people
who have the taavah.

IM OC 4:115 presumes that the taavah can't be real and they must be
mumarim lehach'is. That really is hard to support from interviews.

-Micha

-- 
Micha Berger             "'When Adar enters, we increase our joy'
mi...@aishdas.org         'Joy is nothing but Torah.'
http://www.aishdas.org    'And whoever does more, he is praiseworthy.'"
Fax: (270) 514-1507                     - Rav Dovid Lifshitz zt"l

On Mon, Feb 24, 2014 at 05:44:46PM -0500, Joseph Kaplan wrote:
: IOW, in these matters, RYBS did NOT paskin; he advised.  Of course, advice
: of a man as wise as RYBS must be given very very careful consideration, but,
: at the end of the day, as he himself said, "the final choice is his [i.e.,
: the person asking the question" and not RYBS's.

Which is consistent with what RHS wrote as well. See again RAM's
transcripted snippets.

> 1:09:39 - 1:10:12
>> People ask me eitzas about shiduchim, I can't tell him yes or no. I
>> just bring out points - keep this in mind, keep this in mind....

> 1:23:54 - 1:24:53
>> It would be a smart idea if they'd stop giving psakim, and they
>> should give eitzos. They should bring ideas to the shoel: Keep this
>> in mind, keep this in mind. How can they give a psak if they don't
>> know all the details of the case? A lot of times *nobody* knows!
>> The doctors don't know all the facts either. The doctors have to
>> tell the rabbi all the information, and the rabbi gives a psak.
>> ... He should give a recommendation. He should say: Keep this in
>> mind, keep this in mind.,,,

The rabbi can only advise, because he can't know all the details necesary
for a real pesaq. And in fact, "[a] lot of times *nobody* knows!"

So the decision is left to the individual, perhaps the doctor with
the rabbi's advice about which potential halachic gotchas need to be
thought about.

Tir'u baTov!
-Micha

-- 
Micha Berger             Live as if you were living already for the
mi...@aishdas.org        second time and as if you had acted the first
http://www.aishdas.org   time as wrongly as you are about to act now!
Fax: (270) 514-1507            - Victor Frankl, Man's search for Meaning

On 24 February 2014 22:52, <T6...@mail.aol.com> wrote:
>> The vast majority of charedim would understand da'as Torah...
>> Most would understand whatever that rav to say as good advice rather
>> than a psak... nor would they assume that every word out of the rav's
>> mouth is ruach hakodesh, nor would they assume the rav is infallible.

This is not actually true for a very large subset of the 'chareidi' world;
Chassidim, who do consider such advice as a 'psak', do liken the advice to
'Ruach HaKodesh' and do assume infallibility.

There is also much evidence that this mindset is increasingly applicable to
non-Chassidic chareidim.

In a message dated 2/24/2014 9:36:27pm EST,  allan.en...@gmail.com writes:
> This is not actually true for a very large subset of the 'chareidi'  world; 
> Chassidim, who do consider such advice as a 'psak', do liken the advice  to 
> 'Ruach HaKodesh' and do assume infallibility. 

But I don't think chassidim generally use the term "da'as Torah."

--Toby Katz
..
=============

On 2/24/2014 8:17 PM, Micha Berger wrote:
> My poitn was that when you think in Hebrew. "other gods" and "other
> forces" aren't distinct ideas. Idolaters' other gods were themselves
> forces in the world, and therefore identified with angels, or imagined
> forces.

I don't agree.  I agree that it's possible that's how some people felt, 
but it's by no means a given that it was how anyone felt.

> But to get baxk to Birkas Avos.
>
> Malkitzedeq was called by his neighbors the "kohein leKeil elyon".
> Arguably the relative term, "the most high G-d" (or: the Highest Force)
> means that his admirers were henotheists.

And arguably, it didn't mean that.  In Arabic, the word "akbar" is the 
superlative of the stem k-b-r.  Kabar is great, kabir is greater, and 
akbar is greatest.  But Muslims aren't henotheists.  A superlative 
doesn't mean that an actual comparison is being made. It can be saying, 
"Even though there is nothing to compare to Him, He is at the far end of 
any spectrum of greatness or highness, so that no one and nothing 
*could* compare to Him."

Also, the word "Elyon"... you seem to be accepting the English 
translation of "most high", and I don't think that's a given, either.  
It seems to be related to `al or oleh, but it's a relatively rare term.  
Elyon al kol ha-aretz, yet there's certainly no intent to say that 
Hashem is the highest of anything on land.

Lisa

On Tue, Feb 18, 2014 at 01:57:57PM +0000, Kenneth Miller wrote:
:> Pretty much every rishon has done that. Not just for G-d, but for
:> mal'akhim and neshamos -- any thing that has no chomer. Yesodei
:> haTorah pereq 2. Also, much of the Moreh cheileq 1. The idea of
:> physical location without chomer would have been as unthinkable to
:> the Rambam (or the Kuzari, or the Ramban...) as my own assumption
:> that the suggestion wouldn't be on the table.

: Yesodei haTorah 2:3 says that the mal'achim are creations which have
: form, even though they do not have matter...

I cited already from the Moreh 2:6, here's a longer quote:
    We have already stated above that the angels are incorporeal. This
    agrees with the opinion of Aristotle: there is only this difference
    in the names employed--he uses the term "Intelligences," and we
    say instead "angels." His theory is that the Intelligences are
    intermediate beings between the Prime Cause and existing things,
    and that they effect the motion of the spheres, on which motion the
    existence of all things depends. This is also the view we meet with
    in all parts of Scripture: every act of God is described as being
    performed by angels. But "angel" means "messenger"; hence every
    one that is intrusted with a certain mission is an angel. Even the
    movements of the brute creation are sometimes due to the action of
    an angel, when such movements serve the purpose of the Creator, who
    endowed it with the power of performing that movement... [Examples
    from Tankh ellided.]

Angels are non-physical, pure intellects, the metaphysical chain of
causality from the Creator down to the spheres and the physical universe.

(BTW, tzurah/form/morph doesn't mean the same thing as the modern word
"shape".)

But I can't take this stream of thought too far. Part of my argument
is that modern experimental data (and GPS design) show that time,
space and gracity are inseprable. Aristo defines time as a property of
a process, an idea put to rest by Galileo's work on pendulums, showing
a common concept of time shared by different systems. Time as a dimension,
although not in the sapcetime sense (yet). And making metaphysics about
intellect is also intimately tied to Aristo's physics, as Aristo
believed that all motion and change originates with an intellect.
(Intellect imparts an impetus to an object, which responds until the
impetus runs out.)

So, dwelling too heavily on the Rambam's angelology puts us in a
different worldview than the one I'm leveraging. And in fact, it
was developed (mostly by Aristo) to explain a model of physics
that Newton's Laws of intertia and momentum did away with.

...
: In other words, just because something isn't physical, that does NOT
: mean it is outside of time.

Sorry, I don't see that from your first words. A metaphysical chain
of sibah and mesoveiv doesn't require that one come before the other
chronologically.

: My if/then above presumes a basic point, namely that Hashem's awareness
: of past and future in experiential, not informational. We've often
: suggested that Hashem sees the universe as a 4D sculpture, seeing all
: moments in the same glance...

I would not say that, but rather something similar that is yet very
different. We can't know how G-d sees or knows the universe. The
"4D sculpture" models more of the Truth than saying He sees a 3D
movie. A movie is shown to a person by mapping its timeline to his,
and Hashem has no timeline. A sculpture, though, is embedded in the
same spaces as the viewer. Really, the past-to-fugure of a movie
isn't /that/ difference than the left-to-right of a sculprutre. And
Hashem isn't embedded in either. Still, it helps us relate to hakol
tzafui vehareshus nesunah and other dilemmas, so the 4D sculpture
is of use -- as an approximation of an unknowable.

> of relativity. But I've been presuming that when the not-yet-born sees the
> past and future, it is merely informational - he has knowledge of past
> and future, much as a navi does. But this does not place him outside
> of relativity...                  I submit that the not-yet-born is not
> a god, and cannot possibly see the universe as a 4D sculpture the way
> Hashem does.

It is possible that the not-yet-born actually sees something much closer
to the 4D scupture. And thus not be a god, whose "understanding" is
not exactly like any of our models.

But they and the deceased have to be outside relativity, because souls
have no location in space and no velocity. There is nothing that has time
without space, and there is no way to talk about the rate at which time
passes for something (relative to other things) without having a velocity.

: As I recall, when Adam Harishon was created, he too was able to see
: from one end to the other...

Yes, that's a central piece of our qeta from MmE.

On Wed, Feb 19, 2014 at 09:15:08AM -0500, David Riceman wrote:
> I don't follow this deduction.  For the Rambam creation need not be in  
> time (after all, he holds that time itself is a creation).  Could he not  
> be referring to logical priority rather than temporal priority?

I would go beyond just "need not" -- we can actively assert that according
to the Rambam, creation was not in time. Moreh 2:30 says the 6 days are
logical steps, not temporal sequence.

    The true explanation of the first verse of Genesis is as follows: "In
    [creating] a principle God created the beings above and the things
    below." This explanation is in accordance with the theory of the
    Creation. We find that some of our Sages are reported to have held
    the opinion that time existed before the Creation. But this report
    is very doubtful, because the theory that time cannot be imagined
    with a beginning, has been taught by Aristotle, as I showed you,
    and is objectionable. Those who have made this assertion have been
    led to it by a saying of one of our Sages in reference to the terms
    "one day," "a second day." ... I told you that the foundation of
    our faith is the belief that God created the Universe from nothing;
    that time did not exist previously, but was created: for it depends
    on the motion of the sphere, and the sphere has been created.

As aboce, this is because the Rambam followed Aristo's notion that time
is a propery of a process. So, until there were physical things moving,
there could be no time.

The Shem Tov (ad loc) writes (tr RDEindesohn):
    Just as G-d is an absolute unity, His actions are also unified
    and from His organization came out the sequence of Creation. At
    the start time was created simultaneously with the rest of
    Creation. It is incorrect to say that Creation began at the start
    of time. Consequently creation consisted of entities that were
    separate and distinct and prioritized which is not a reflection of
    G-d Who is an absolute unity. Their prioritization is the result of
    their nature as to what their purpose and causal relationship is
    in combining and interacting with other things. Therefore it only
    in describing their level in reality that we say Day One, Day Two
    but not that they were created in this sequence. Thus the Rambams
    explanation rejects the literal meaning of the Torah verses. He
    asserts that everything was created simultaneously. It is only as
    a reflection as to their purpose and importance does the Torah say
    first second and third and the rest of the days.

This is also the Abarbnel's take on the Rambam (9th Q on the opening
of Bereishis):
    The Rambam cited Chazal that the word es indicated that the creation
    on the first day included everything associated with the Heavens
    as well as everything associated with the Earth. He also cited the
    gemora (Chulin 60a) that everything that was created was created
    in its final form. He also cited another statement of Chazal that
    the Heavens and Earth were created simultaneously. Thus the Rambam
    believed that the work of Creation happened all on one day and was
    not divided amongst six days. He claimed that in a single moment
    of creation everything came into existence. He explained that the
    reason for the Torah stating that there were six days of Creation
    was to indicate the different levels of created beings according to
    their natural hierarchy. Thus the Rambam does not understand the
    word day to be a temporal day and he doesnt read Bereishis to be
    describing the chronological sequence of creation....

>> My if/then above presumes a basic point, namely that Hashem's  
>> awareness of past and future in experiential, not informational.

> There's a third option.  God's awareness of past and future could be  
> based on a knowledge of paradigms (admittedly this is closely related to  
> two medieval disputes: do universals exist and does God know  
> particulars).  I strongly recommend Wolfson's essay "Extradeical and  
> Intradeical Interpretations of Platonic Ideas".

A fourth possibility -- "to exist" and "to be known by G-d" are synonymous
phrases. I think this is the Rambam's actual opinion. In Moreh 1:68,
he writes:
    You are acquainted with the well-known principle of the philosophers
    that God is the intellectus, the ens intelligens, and the ens
    intelligibile....
    
Okay, those three words are pretty much opaque, so lets go to
Hebrew translations:
    Ibn Tibon and Shwartz: haseikhel, hamaskil, vehamuskal
    "Kapach" (el-Qafih): hdei'ah, hayodei'ah vehayadu'ah

Both Dr Schwartz and Ribbi el-Qafih have footnotes pointing you to
Aristo's Metaphysics vol XII ch. 7, 9. Schwartz has more than a citation,
explicitly mentioning Aristo's notion of the Creator as "the Thought
which Knows Itself".

Still probably as clear as mud. Maybe snippets from the Rambam's
explanation of how this is an absolute Unity will help:

    ... These three things are in God one and the same, and do
    not in any way constitute a plurality.... I will tell you now what
    has been proved. Man, before comprehending a thing, comprehends it
    in potentia when, however, he comprehends a thing, e.g., the form
    of a certain tree which is pointed out to him, when he abstracts
    its form from its substance, and reproduces the abstract form, an
    act performed by the intellect, he comprehends in reality, and the
    intellect which he has acquired in actuality, is the abstract form
    of the tree in man's mind. For in such a case the intellect is not a
    thing distinct from the thing comprehended. It is therefore clear to
    you that the thing comprehended is the abstract form of the tree, and
    at the same time it is the intellect in action: and that the intellect
    and the abstract form of the tree are not two different things,
    for the intellect in action is nothing but the thing comprehended,
    and that agent by which the form of the tree has been turned into an
    intellectual and abstract object, namely, that which comprehends,
    is undoubtedly the intellect in action. All intellect is identical
    with its action: the intellect in action is not a thing different
    from its action, for the true nature and assence of the intellect is
    comprehension, and you must not think that the intellect in action
    is a thing existing by itself, separate from comprehension...

So humans know "the abstract form of the tree" which is one with our
thinking ability and our thinking action. But HQBH doesn't have sensory
knowledge, He Knows the tree's actual form.

(R' Jack Love, a rebbe-chaver, suggested to me that this might be
the metaphysical explanation of Everett's Many Worlds interpretation
of QM. Two exist is to be known by G-d. Well, G-d would contemplate
every eventuality, so... Problem: Hashem would equally contemplate
the physically impossible, not just every possible value of the wave
function...)

Quoting from the next chapter (1:69), "I have thus explained to you in
what sense God is said to be the Agens, the Form, and the End. This
is the reason why the philosophers not only call Him 'the Maker' but
also 'the Cause'."

It is even possible that sheim havayah is the hi'fil of /hvh/, and
that its peshat is Hashem as Agent.

R Jon Baker (CC-ed, since he fell into lurking) and I were on the same
side of a debate about this on scjm in Nov 2003. He wrote
<http://j.mp/1o3OvRo> (Google Groups archive of Usenet copy):
> If you accept M's apparent three-way identity relationship between
> Knower == Knowledge == Known, how do you define Known so as to avoid the
> apparent panentheism which that identity describes? Or even pantheism -
> if the idea does not posit that the Knower is infinitely greater than
> the Known?

And:
> a) Kalam: the clockmaker.
> b) [The Rambam]: the Creator and he who provides shefa for continued
>    existence, but not identical with the created universe. The electric
>    company - they made the lamp, and need to supply electricity for the
>    lamp to work, if the electricity is cut off, the lamp ceases to work.
> c) Panentheist (Hasidic?): The universe is God's essence, but is
>    nullified beside Him, and has no real existence aside from God's
>    existence....

The intradeical Knowledge of all forms, not only the Platonic Ideal
Forms.

To bring these back to where I started, I'll let an earlier post of RJJB's
in that scjm thread reintroduce Kant <http://j.mp/1gzYwTC>, rather than
staying with the Rambam and Aristo's physics and metaphysics to discuss
something I said given the Maharal and REED, Kant and Einstein (or the
data collected to confirm Einstein):

> I, the knower, have knowledge of the known. Or, to quote Kant
> (Crit. Pur. Reas.)
>: OUR knowledge springs from two fundamental sources of the
>: mind; the first is the capacity of receiving representations
>: (receptivity for impressions), the second is the power of
>: knowing an object through these representations (spontaneity [in
>: the production] of concepts). Through the first an object is given
>: to us, through the second the object is thought in relation to
>: that [given] representation (which is a mere determination of
>: the mind). Intuition and concepts constitute, therefore, the
>: elements of all our knowledge, so that neither concepts without an
>: intuition in some way corresponding to them, nor intuition
>: without concepts, can yield knowledge. Both may be either pure or
>: empirical. When they contain sensation (which presupposes the
>: actual presence of the object), they are empirical. When there is
>: no mingling of sensation with the representation,they are pure.
>: Sensation may be entitled the material of sensible knowledge.
>: Pure intuition, therefore, contains only the form under which [B75]
>: something is intuited; the pure concept only the form of the [A51]
>: thought of an object in general. Pure intuitions or pure
>: concepts alone are possible a priori, empirical intuitions and
>: empirical concepts only a posteriori.

> We have intuition, which is based on sense-experience, and there are
> objects. Our internal representation of the object (the knowledge,
> in M's terminology) is not identical with the object itself (the known).

I know the world as I experience it, Hashem Knows the world as it is,
which may be the cause of the world or actually what existing means.
But -- unlike my knowledge -- could not be caused by the known, since
that would imply that G-d went from able-to-know to actually knowing,
a change. Hashem isn't the consequence of any causes.

Tir'u baTov!
-Micha

-- 
Micha Berger             If you won't be better tomorrow
mi...@aishdas.org        than you were today,
http://www.aishdas.org   then what need do you have for tomorrow?
Fax: (270) 514-1507              - Rebbe Nachman of Breslov


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