Avodah Mailing List

Volume 30: Number 183

Thu, 27 Dec 2012

• 1. hospital guide (saul newman)
• 2. Re: Polygamy (Zev Sero)
• 3. Re: Polygamy (Micha Berger)
• 4. Two Questions About Purchasing Coffee from Non-Certified Establishments (Prof. Levine)
• 5. Follow-up to Two Questions About Purchasing Coffee from Non-Certified Establishments (Prof. Levine)
• 6. Re: Polygamy (hankman)
• 7. Re: Polygamy (Zev Sero)
• 8. Re: Polygamy (Lisa Liel)
• 9. Re: Polygamy (T6...@xaol.com)
• 10. Re: Polygamy (Zev Sero)
• 11. Re: The lifetime of Shammai. What are the dates? (Eliyahu Grossman)
• 12. Re: Mesorah (Meir Shinnar)
• 13. Re: Mesorah (Micha Berger)

http://www.najc.org/pdf/Guide_to_Traditional_Jewish_Observance.pdf

r weiner, a YCT musmach, was former asst rabbi at YICC before
taking the cedars post.....

On 26/12/2012 4:10 PM, Micha Berger wrote:
> The topic of Noachide marriage is in Hilkhos Melakhim 9:5,7-8.

It's also in Hilchos Ishus 1:1, though there's not much detail, but it
does fit the definition: he takes her, and she becomes his wife; he
does not become her anything.  Her status is what changes, not his.

-- 
Zev Sero        "Natural resources are not finite in any meaningful
z...@sero.name    economic sense, mind-boggling though this assertion
                  may be. The stocks of them are not fixed but rather
          are expanding through human ingenuity."
                                     - Julian Simon

On Wed, Dec 26, 2012 at 04:18:22PM -0500, Zev Sero wrote:
> On 26/12/2012 4:10 PM, Micha Berger wrote:
>> The topic of Noachide marriage is in Hilkhos Melakhim 9:5,7-8.
>
> It's also in Hilchos Ishus 1:1, though there's not much detail, but it
> does fit the definition: he takes her, and she becomes his wife; he
> does not become her anything.  Her status is what changes, not his.

Well, the taking has to be mutual "im ratzah hu vehi lisa osah", but
yes, "vesihyeh lo le'ishah".

Tir'u baTov!
-Micha

 From the OU Daf HaKashrus, January 2013


Q: CAN COFFEE BE PURCHASED AT NON-CERTIFIED
RESTAURANTS?
A. It is not possible to make one universal statement about the
kashrus of coffee prepared in a non-certified restaurant because
each establishment is unique. Investigation has shown that theoretically,
coffee served in a restaurant may be kosher even if the
equipment used to prepare the coffee is washed in a sink together
with other non-kosher items. However, there are numerous variables
which impact the Halachic status, such as the introduction
of soap, the temperature of the water, the method of washing (kli
rishon versus kli shaini) etc. Due to the uncertainty and ambiguity
of each situation, as a general rule, the OU does not recommend
the consumption of coffee prepared in a non-kosher restaurant.

Q: CAN COFFEE BE PURCHASED FROM CONVENIENCE
STORES, REST STOPS, AND KIOSKS?
A. In contrast to the response given regarding coffee prepared in
a non-certified restaurant, it would be permissible to purchase a
cup of coffee from a convenience store, rest stop or kiosk. This is
due to the fact that the kashrus concerns noted for the restaurants
are not applicable to an establishment that does not make its own
food or use industrial cleaning devices which tend to reach very
high temperatures.

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See the CRC Guide Starbucks Beverages at 
http://www.crcweb.org/starbucks_intro.php and the links at the bottom.

Yitzchok Levine 
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RAM wrote:
Why may I eat deer but not horse? I've been taught to believe that there is
something harmful about horse, which is not so by deer. It is probably
something spiritual rather that physical, meaning that medical researchers
will probably never find the poison, but we believe horse to be harmful
nevertheless. It has something to do, perhaps, with animals which are
carnivores and predators, or something along those lines, depending on who
one reads.

CM notes:
Horses are neither carnivores or predators.

Kol tuv

Chaim Manaster
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On 26/12/2012 4:23 PM, Micha Berger wrote:
> Well, the taking has to be mutual "im ratzah hu vehi lisa osah", but
> yes, "vesihyeh lo le'ishah".

No, the *agreement* has to be mutual, of course; but the *taking* is
unilateral.  "Machnisah", not "nichneses", let alone "nichnasim". It's
something he is doing to her.


On 26/12/2012 12:01 PM, Lisa Liel wrote:
>> We can prove the exact definition, because the Torah tells us.
>
> No, the Torah doesn't.  Once more, you're making an unsupported claim.

What do you mean, the Torah doesn't tell us how to define marriage?

-- 
Zev Sero
z...@sero.name

On 12/26/2012 4:32 PM, Zev Sero wrote:
> What do you mean, the Torah doesn't tell us how to define marriage?

I mean, the Torah tells us how to define kiddushin, but not marriage.

Lisa

From: Zev Sero <z...@sero.name>
> It is unidirectional, by definition; that there have been a few societies
> that have perverted the concept, or who forgot the concept altogether and
> then came up with their own parallel institution, doesn't change that....

> The only polyandrous society I know of is in Tibet, where it's driven by
> sheer poverty....

The Eskimos used to practice polyandry, I imagine because of a severe
shortage of women, due to a high maternal death rate. I think that two
brothers would share one wife so a man would feel some connection to
her babies: even if he couldn't be sure it was his own child it was at
least his niece or nephew, a blood relative.

Although the Torah's definition of marriage is "one man and one woman"
that is not necessarily "the" definition of marriage across all societies
and all cultures.

PS Some people have claimed that the Torah does not define a marriage
as "one man and one woman" because it permits a man to have more than
one wife. But that does not mean a Torah-defined marriage can consist
of one man and two women! Those two women are not related to each other,
they are not in a marriage consisting of three people! Rather, a man can
have more than one marriage going on at the same time, while the Torah
does not permit a woman to do so.

--Toby Katz
=============

On 26/12/2012 8:08 PM, T6...@xaol.com wrote:
> Although the Torah's definition of marriage is "one man and one woman"
> that is not necessarily "the" definition of marriage across all societies
> and all cultures.

I'm saying it's *the* definition of the concept of marriage that Hashem
created and told Adam and Chava about, and that they passed on to their
descendants.  People didn't invent marriage of their own accord.

Some cultures may have considered brothers, especially twins, to be a
special case, where they are like one person.   Yibum reflects a similar
feeling, that brothers can stand in for each other.  But some other
cultures have simply no concept of marriage at all, and have instead
treated women as property, which can of course be shared with others at
the owners' discretion.  Among the Caribbean buccaneers, for example, the
primary social relationship was between two men who owned all their
property in common, and if one of them was so lucky as to have obtained a
woman she too became community property; that's not a marriage at all.

Some other cultures may simply have forgotten all about marriage, and
invented their own institutions instead, which may have taken all sorts
of forms; but they are not marriage, which is the institution that Adam
and Chava passed down.  One reason we have not forgotten it or any of
its details is because we have had the Torah to remind us, while other
nations had to rely on oral transmission, and if someone questioned it
there was no way they could prove it.  One way in which the Torah
highlights the details of marriage is through the separatge institution
of kiddushin, something that came much later and that only exists for
us, but which *reflects* and is shaped by the structure of marriage itself.
So kiddushin is not marriage, but it can teach us more clearly and
reinforce our knowledge of what marriage is and always was.

-- 
Zev Sero        "Natural resources are not finite in any meaningful
z...@sero.name    economic sense, mind-boggling though this assertion
                  may be. The stocks of them are not fixed but rather
                 are expanding through human ingenuity."
                                            - Julian Simon

From: Eliyahu Grossman <Eliy...@KosherJudaism.com>
Sent: Wednesday, December 26, 2012 1:01 PM
> But I have been unable to find the generally accepted source for Shammai
> (50BCE-30CE).

> I am just looking for the source of this. Does anybody know?

I found the answer that I was looking for in "Iggeret Rav Sherira Gaon". It
cleared a lot of those questions up.

Eliyahu Grossman

The topic is clearly of great importance to RZL, but suggesting I lack intellectual integrity crosses a line, and requires a mecha'a.
I confess I haven't answered all his posts(with BLOCK LETTERS) in full
detail, because I find most of his arguments irrelevant ( he did say he
answered one issue in a post on Sunday, which I can't find.)
The issue here is important, so let me step back and rephrase the beginning the issues as I see them 
1) dual sources of truth.  Rambam was faced with two apparently competing
models of the world, with two different sources of truth ( hopefully fairly
non controversial)
2) rambam held both were true - far more controversial - academics,
especially of the Leo Strauss school, hold his commitment to Torah was
political, while the equivalent Haredi position is that he did not believe
in philosophy - and reflected the same truth (ie not the dual truth model)-
again controversial, but is what he says explicitly (rMB seems to agree so
far, I don't know about RZL, 
Issue of how to reconcile what are, to most observers, highly incompatible
models, and what is legitimate way to reconcile when they apparently
conflict ( as, in this model, they should never truly conflict)

1. In his halachic works - perush  hamishnayot and moreh nevuchim - the
rambam is clear to uphold the value of chochma and kabel ha'emet Mimi
she'omro  - that is a clear statement of the independent value of truth,
outside of tradition, and without needing an explicit warrant from
tradition ( except for the fact that the tradition itself values truth)(
Twersky z"l argues this)

2. The whole stated purpose of the moreh nevuchim is to show that
philosophic truth is compatible with Torah ( Leo Strauss is right here in
arguing that it isn't a book of philosophy per se).  The way to harmonize
the two is by an allegorical understanding.  There, the issues of the roles
of reason and tradition clearly come into,play.  Now, as the raison d'?tre
is to show the compatibility, he will bring many midrashe hazal to support
his position that hazal understood many things as he did.  However, and
this is the crux, he NEVER states that he needs such support - indeed, that
would be counter to his whole epistemology, and he states in several places
that he has no tradition, and no need of tradition for a particular
allegory  (Eg, hakdama to Part 3). 

However, both RZL and RMB argue that the rambam always brings rabbinic proof that a text is to
 Be understood allegorically, and furthermore, this is not merely a
 rhetorical device, but reflects the rambam's belief that such permission
 is necessary. I find such a claim extraordinary, not sustainable by any
 one who actually read the MN - unless he reads it with that understanding
 in mind, using all one's dialectical skills to reconcile pshat with is
 beliefs

Let us actually look at the MN (page references are to Kafih edition)
Introduction Page 6 - one intent is to explain meshalim that seem to the fool as pshat - nowhere is there any mention of requiring rabbinic consent

P 12 - asking that one not explain to another any of the explanations,
except those that are already found in his predecessors - therefore
explicit many of his explanations are not found in his predecessors...

Ch 1 - on tselem and demut - and that demut is an allegorical use based on
man's intellectual comprehension - no statement of hazal brought. ( as this
is the beginning of mn, and relates to the ikkar emuna of eyn lo guf, one
would have even expected him to Marshall rabbinic support here - but
nothing)

Ch 2 -allegorical  understanding of ets hada'at - no statement of hazal brought...


Ch 3 - allegorical understanding of temunah ( utemunat Hashem habit) - no statement of hazal

Ch 4 allegorical understanding of ra'ah, hibit, Vehaza - brings a ma'amar
hazal to support the extended meaning of hibit beyond physical sight -but
not of other two..
Ch 5 - about the need for preparation and humility for those engaging in
these philosophical discussions a- brings one midraSh about nadav and avihu
being burned as a warning for those who rush in - but no midraSh for the
conclusion of the chapter - that all seeing in divine matter is
intellectual comprehension, but for those not at that level, can interprete
it as a perception of a created light - no midrashic  source.  Furthermore,
in his warning about the need for humility and the need for recognition of
one's limitations - he never brings down that therefore one needs to rely (
or defer) to hazal...
So far, most chapters  have no quote from hazal, and even those that do ,
the chapters contain much material not related to a quote..., and clearly
no permission for hazal is sought for what reason proves...

How much more proof? Every chapter?

3) now the rambam realizes there potential incompatibilities between
 philosophy and torah eg,  issue of creation - in rambam's famous statement
 that if necessary he could reinterprete creation,  precisely what he meant
 may be debated - but the presence or absence of rabbinic midrashim is not
 a factor....

4) the rambam also complains in several places of those who abandon what has been proven by reason to follow midrashim...

5. ma'amar techiyat hametim was written specifically about one potential
conflict - physical resurrection -  which made no philosophic sense, and
the rambam was accused of Kefira and denying it.  Therefore, the entire
book is, in a sense, about the limits of harmonization.  As such, facing
such accusations, the book is a defense.  What is notable about the defense
is that he does NOT use RZL's approach - that his allegories are all based
on ma'amre hazal, even though he is defending himself against heresy.	He
does, as expected, frequently use ma'amre hazal to show that the approach
is traditional but, whenever he lacks them, is explicit that he does not
need them - that he is merely doing what any rational individual would do -
reconciling the demands of reason with Torah.

RZL ignores the whole context and polemic, and focuses that the rambam does
use statements of hazal.  All the programmatic statements the rambam makes
that he does not have or need prior authority he limits to the particular
case being cited, arguing that in that case, a midraSh gives license for
broad allegorization.  I think that it is clear that this approach is
against the entire thrust of the rambam as above, and goes against the
plain meaning, and I am not aware of any major traditional commentary on
the rambam who holds like RZL - even though many are discomfited by it.

Again, I find rzl's reading of ma'amar techiyat hametim bizarre.

One could argue that extending rzl's notion that a specific ma'amar hazal
allows broad application of allegory (eg, wrt yemot hamashiach, shmuel's
statement becomes a broad permit to understand tanach and hazal
allegorically, so too ma'amre hazal about olam keminhago noheg allow such
permission - but then we wouldn't  disagree about the existence of such
permission...

The real issue, of course, is the limits of such interpretation - which
ma'amar techiyat hametim clearly understands exists - and there is also a
sense in the mn that beyond some bound, the resulting picture is too
disconnected to the underlying text, although the precise definition is not
given, and there is underlying emuna that that wouldn't happen (and from my
perspective, RZL's position, besides misunderstanding the rambam, reflects
precisely a lack of  emuna - emuna that the Torah is, on a profound level,
in agreement with the world as it reveals itself to us through our minds -
and we need to understand that agreement).  The limit is clearly NOT
determined by the existence of a ma'amar hazal, although clear cut
opposition by hazal would seem a limit.

The rambam's model of philosophic truth is not of much interest to us, and
the issues he faced are not ours ( eg, few today would equate an eternal
world with a mechanistic world) - but the model of resolution remains a
problem - and a beacon to those of us with true emunah


Meir Shinnar

On Wed, Dec 26, 2012 at 11:08:25PM -0500, Meir Shinnar wrote:
: 1. In his halachic works - perush hamishnayot and moreh nevuchim -
: the rambam is clear to uphold the value of chochma and kabel ha'emet
: Mimi she'omro - that is a clear statement of the independent value of
: truth, outside of tradition...

No one is questioning that. What we are questioning is whether the Rambam
would say that Chazal's mesorah on what a pasuq means is any less "ha'emes
mimi she'amro".

Why are you assuming the Rambam would force the pasuq to bow to philosophy
rather than say that since this conflict can only be illusory and I don't
know the way out of the illusion, I yet don't know the answer?

: 2. The whole stated purpose of the moreh nevuchim is to show that
: philosophic truth is compatible with Torah ( Leo Strauss is right
: here in arguing that it isn't a book of philosophy per se). The way
: to harmonize the two is by an allegorical understanding...

This last sentence is your assertion, and the entire topic under debate.

BTW, about Straus's argument... The book is clearly "Scholastic". Its
division into (1) defining terms, (2) theology, (3) man's mission in his
world is typical for the Qalam. Except maybe for the length of cheileq
1. Whether that is "philosophical" or not depends more on how I define
the word "philosophy" than what the Moreh actually is.

It seems from the Rambam's promises, the Moreh is what became of his
intent to describe the essence of Moshe's nevu'ah. I would say that's a
blatantly religious goal, but I think the Rambam himself would object to
saying the two topics differ. He holds that a navi is a super-philosopher,
after all.

: However, both RZL and RMB argue that the rambam always brings rabbinic
: proof that a text is to be understood allegorically, and furthermore,
: this is not merely a rhetorical device, but reflects the rambam's belief
: that such permission is necessary. I find such a claim extraordinary,
: not sustainable by any one who actually read the MN...

Except the Rambam himself makes it throughout the Moreh. I already
listed some places in cheileq 2: peraqim 5, 11, 25 (although we argue
about how to read it), 26, 27, 28, 41 and 67.

I will address cheileq 1 further down, but a preview: he doesn't consider
cheileq 1 to be discussing allegory.

I find that very hard to ignore. The Rambam doesn't just happen to quote
Chazal, he tells you the philosophical theory is acceptable /because/
it is "what the prophets and our Sages say on this point" (ch 27).

Given that it repeatedly comes up in the Moreh, I really don't see how
one can say the reverse -- that someone who actually read the MN could
dismiss the claim that the Rambam didn't consider permission from Chazal
necessary.

Which wasn't actually my claim anyway... I was saying that the Rambam
wouldn't say a pasuq Chazal took literally was allegorical. I didn't
actually assert anything about pesuqim Chazal don't address one way
or the other.


...
: Introduction Page 6 - one intent is to explain meshalim that seem to the
: fool as pshat - nowhere is there any mention of requiring rabbinic consent

Proof from absence? IOW, how do you know he isn't invoking Chazal to know
that the fool is being foolish?

As you yourself note, R' Yosef el-Qafih ("Kapach") assumes that he can
find unstated sources in Chazal for pretty much everything -- if not
actually everything -- in the Moreh. From the mere fact that he does
so.

: P 12 - asking that one not explain to another any of the explanations,
: except those that are already found in his predecessors - therefore
: explicit many of his explanations are not found in his predecessors...

But not necessarily contrary to those ancestors. Or even that such
elaborations are taking new things allegorically.

: Ch 1 - on tselem and demut - and that demut is an allegorical use based
: on man's intellectual comprehension - no statement of hazal brought. ( as
: this is the beginning of mn, and relates to the ikkar emuna of eyn lo
: guf, one would have even expected him to Marshall rabbinic support here -
: but nothing)

One should note that the Rambam tells us that in cheileq 1 he is defining
terms, not finding allegories. If you prefer, defining idioms -- but rarely
does he actually say they are so. In pereq 1, he tells you he is setting
out "al bi'ur inyan tzelem udemus".

I have no reason to believe the Rambam didn't assume Chazal knew that
tzelem doesn't mean demus. After all, he didn't think they were fools.

But he does invoke R' Yishma'el's diberah Torah belashon benei adam to
justify the notion that Hashem wrote in Human idiom, and not in some
hyper-literal communication mode like a programming language.

Also, in 1:1 the Moreh refers you to his proof of incorporeality at
the beginning of cheileq 2 -- where he /does/ invoke that it's the
idea of "our prophets and sages" and not his own.

Either way, I would take cheileq 1 off the table, except if the Rambam
says he is allegorizing rather than defining leshon benei adam.

: How much more proof? Every chapter?

I'm not sure what this rhetorical device is about. When I cited a list
of sources, you didn't seem impressed. Or even address them.

: 3) now the rambam realizes there potential incompatibilities between
: philosophy and torah eg, issue of creation - in rambam's famous
: statement that if necessary he could reinterprete creation, precisely
: what he meant may be debated - but the presence or absence of rabbinic
:  midrashim is not a factor....

Except in 2:26, where he tells you he is being consistent with the
figurative speech our Sages use in order to hide the true meaning
of Maaseh Bereishis.

: 4) the rambam also complains in several places of those who abandon
: what has been proven by reason to follow midrashim...

Because he holds that Medrashim en masse were never intended to be
historical claims. And about that too he cites Chazal as saying so
themselves. But we're talking about pesuqim.

: 5. ma'amar techiyat hametim was written specifically about one potential
: conflict - physical resurrection - which made no philosophic sense,
: and the rambam was accused of Kefira and denying it. Therefore, the
: entire book is, in a sense, about the limits of harmonization...

Which you are denying exist! That anything that doesn't fit should be
harmonized by declaring the Torah allegorical!

You pick out one line that if taken out of context would defeat what you
say is /the/ -- and I would agree is at least "a" -- purpose of the work,
and use it to prove your point?

...
: RZL ignores the whole context and polemic, and focuses that the rambam
: does use statements of hazal...

And that the Rambam in MThM too says he must. Which, after all, is
the point of the work. To show that not every claim of TSBP can bow to
philosophical argument.

: Again, I find rzl's reading of ma'amar techiyat hametim bizarre.

I am saying the same, in reverse.

: The rambam's model of philosophic truth is not of much interest to us,
: and the issues he faced are not ours ( eg, few today would equate an
: eternal world with a mechanistic world) - but the model of resolution
: remains a problem - and a beacon to those of us with true emunah

True emunah is to admit "I don't know" when facing a problem in
something you believe in. Not whittling down your beliefs by saying you
misunderstood an allegory.

As the Rambam does with hakol tzafui vehareshus nesunah.


But I realize I don't understand your thesis. How do you combine:
: 2. The whole stated purpose of the moreh nevuchim is to show that
: philosophic truth is compatible with Torah ( Leo Strauss is right
: here in arguing that it isn't a book of philosophy per se). The way
: to harmonize the two is by an allegorical understanding...

and:
: 5. ma'amar techiyat hametim was written specifically about one potential
: conflict - physical resurrection - which made no philosophic sense,
: and the rambam was accused of Kefira and denying it. Therefore, the
: entire book is, in a sense, about the limits of harmonization...

without asserting that there are limits to allegorization. That one can't
simply take /any/ philosophical proof and allegorize the TSBP into a new
reinterpretation to fit?

Tir'u baTov!
-Micha

-- 
Micha Berger             I have great faith in optimism as a philosophy,
mi...@aishdas.org        if only because it offers us the opportunity of
http://www.aishdas.org   self-fulfilling prophecy.
Fax: (270) 514-1507                              - Arthur C. Clarke


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