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Volume 30: Number 97

Thu, 19 Jul 2012

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Subjects Discussed In This Issue:
Message: 1
From: Liron Kopinsky <liron.kopin...@gmail.com>
Date: Thu, 19 Jul 2012 07:16:41 +0300
Subject:
Re: [Avodah] Bnot tzlafchad


On Thu, Jul 19, 2012 at 12:43 AM, Micha Berger <mi...@aishdas.org> wrote:

> On Wed, Jul 18, 2012 at 11:46:31PM +0300, Liron Kopinsky wrote:
> : Why do we tend to focus on their love of the land when they may not have
> : ever even set foot in it? (presuming the women stayed behind in the
> : fortresses while the men went chalutzim.)
>
> 1- You assume they knew this at the time. Didn't their petition predate
> HQBH splitting the sheivet's nachalah?
>

This does seem to be correct (that they didn't know yet), but it seems like
a pretty cruel trick to say "sure you can enter" and then define "enter" as
where they already are. Especially since Menashe didn't ask for it.

>
> In any case, Benos Tzelafchad ended up marrying "livnei doeihen
> lenashim. Mimishpechos benei Menasheh ben Yoseif hayu lenashim." (Bamidbar
> 36:11-12) Is it possible that peshat here is that the girls didn't inded
> want to settle, and thus married from [the other] families of Menasheh,
> ones that got land from the territory promised to the Avos?
>
> Like RZS said, dodeihin literally would mean they were still in the family
of Machir. That begs the question with what the 2nd pasuk quoted above is
coming to tell us though.


> 2- You demote eiver hayardein more than I would. It has all the laws of
> maaser, terumah, shemittah, arei miqlat. In fact, shemittah deOraisa
> ended with the exile of the shevatim from eiver hayardein even before
> any of the other shevatim were dislocated.
>
> On a Brisker level, looking at halakhah to the exclusion of abstract
> notions of qedushah, the two lands are the same.
>
> I don't think Moshe Rabbeinu felt that way.


> 3- Perhaps this is even why He chose sheivet Menasheh in particular.
> Re'uvein and Gad choose the fertile plains over land in EY. Hashem then
> adds to them half a sheivet, thereby guaranteeing that the new sheivet
> won't lose ties to the original promised land, AND placing in their midst
> an influence which has such ties. Thinking out loud now, wouldn't it make
> the most sense, then, to choose the people who produced Benos Tzelafchad?
>
> It would make sense to choose the other half of the tribe. Give them the
zechut to live in EY proper, and still maintain the family connection.

Kol Tuv,
Liron
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Message: 2
From: Zev Sero <z...@sero.name>
Date: Thu, 19 Jul 2012 09:28:49 -0400
Subject:
Re: [Avodah] Bnot tzlafchad


On 19/07/2012 12:16 AM, Liron Kopinsky wrote:
>
>     In any case, Benos Tzelafchad ended up marrying "livnei doeihen
>     lenashim. Mimishpechos benei Menasheh ben Yoseif hayu lenashim." (Bamidbar
>     36:11-12) Is it possible that peshat here is that the girls didn't inded
>     want to settle, and thus married from [the other] families of Menasheh,
>     ones that got land from the territory promised to the Avos?
>
> Like RZS said, dodeihin literally would mean they were still in the
> family of Machir. That begs the question with what the 2nd pasuk
> quoted above is coming to tell us though.

They did what they were commanded (married within the tribe), and more:
they married within the clan.

-- 
Zev Sero        "Natural resources are not finite in any meaningful
z...@sero.name    economic sense, mind-boggling though this assertion
                  may be. The stocks of them are not fixed but rather
                 are expanding through human ingenuity."
                                            - Julian Simon



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Message: 3
From: "Chana Luntz" <Ch...@kolsassoon.org.uk>
Date: Thu, 19 Jul 2012 12:16:17 +0100
Subject:
Re: [Avodah] The Main Idea of Judaism



I wrote:

<<Here we have a situation where something would be a prohibited act, and
Yael's change of perspective (ie not deriving any pleasure from the
event) changes it into a virtuous act.>>

And RDR:

>It's not a change in perspective.  It's a different physical event. 

This I think is the heart of our disagreement. I do not dispute that a
possible interpretation of what occurred with Yael was absence of pleasure,
but I would dispute that even if that is what the Maharsha, Tosphos et al
are saying, that they considered an absence of pleasure as creating a
different physical event, rather than a change of perspective.

But even before one gets to analysing the words of any of the meforshim,
think the issue through.  If you have a situation where a women (let us say
a married woman) is initially raped (let's say she was asleep and in no way
solicited it) and then woke up and started enjoying it (let's say it was
somebody whom maybe she would have fancied, but would never have done
anything about because she does not believe in committing adultery - I am
trying to make the case a bit believable) - then, according to you the act
would change midway from something where she is blameless to something where
she is blameworthy?

Is that your contention?

That was my point in bringing the gemora in Yerushalmi Sotah.  Ie your
position appears to be (at least somewhat) the hava mina of Rabbi Yochanan -
ie that the woman's enjoyment midway, despite the original force, changed
matters, but the conclusion was to concede that it didn't.  

> As the Maharsha (and three Tosafoses I have subsequently encountered --
I'll cite >the one in Sanhedrin below and it'll point you to the others)
>construes the event, Yael did not enjoy the encounter, even though she
initiated it.  See Tos. Sanhedrin 74b s.v. "V'ha Esther Parhesya havah",
"hana'ah >hashiva k'ma'aseh" (just before the citation of Perek HaMeiniah).

I am not disputing that the Maharasha and Tosphos could be read as
understanding that the reason that Yael was praised was because she did not
enjoy the encounter, but I think you are misreading the various Tosphosim.

The easiest one I think to see the point is the one on Yevamos 103a (d"h
"v'ha") (it's shorter than the one in Sanhedrin a start, and deals solely
with the issue).  What that Tosphos is making clear is that the issue with
Yael is *not* the one raised with Esther, regarding being karka olam (ie
that is *not* the gemora's question) - because it is clear that Yael was not
forced (ie unlike Esther) and indeed solicited the encounter - rather the
gemora's question is, why is she praised above the Imahos?

Similarly in the Tosphos in Sanhedrin that you quoted, they are bringing
Yael to make the point that the text does not question regarding Yael the
way it does regarding Esther, inter alia because it is clear that Yael was
not forced, and Sisera was not in a position to force her, as he was running
away from his pursuers, and rather she enticed him with words to have
relations with her, and hence the focus of the question there is why is Yael
praised so highly (and it can't be that it relates to why Yael did not give
herself over to death, because of the getting of hana'ah, however you want
to translate that, because were that to be the question, it would need to be
asked on Esther too, and it isn't). 

>Admittedly Hazal's explanation of why she didn't enjoy it is cryptic: "d'ka
shadi bah zuhama (Yevamos 103b)",

Well, it is only really cryptic if you insist on understanding hana'ah as
relating to pleasure. That is clearly one way of understanding hana'ah (and
clearly one that jibes better with the modern mind), but it is not the only
one.  An alternative way (although I admit it is a difficult one for the
modern mind, as we do not understand relations this way) is to translate it
as benefit.  Ie there is as a side effect, a (and this is where your
physical reality comes in, although it is not an *act* of the woman)
physical benefit to a woman from relations, they are actually good for her,
even if she does not solicit or want them - but only of course if you don't
get zuhuma in the process.  Once you do, then the side effect benefit goes
out the window and so clearly Yael was more praiseworthy than the Imahos,
who got this side benefit.

>On a more general level I don't understand your point.  The Maharsha
construes the gemara as praising "lishmah" in the sense of "having no
personal >benefit from the act".

Well if you understand it as pleasure, as you originally translated it, then
shelo lishma is doing the act for the sake of the pleasure, and lishma is
doing it, not for the sake of pleasure but for some wider good (there is no
other real alternative, to suggest that she did neither for the sake of the
pleasure, nor for the sake of the wider good to klal Yisrael, but merely lo
ichpat leih is to suggest that she did it because she was totally hefker,
and didn't care  - I really can't see how you can impute that to the
Maharsha).  Similarly if you translate hana'ah as benefit, since she wasn't
doing it for the benefit (since there was none, due to zuhuma) then the
lishma was for the wider good.

You can see that aspect more clearly from the Tosphos on Sanhedrin
discussing the Imahos - shehayu meskavanos l'hivnos m'baalehen - that is why
Yael, who had no such kavana, but rather a kavana purely for the wider good,
was to be so praised.

> The Yerushalmi is discussing whether the raped wife of a cohen needs to
get divorced.  One would expect different criteria for these very different
>contexts.

I brought it both because you argued that the act with enjoyment (or
hana'ah) is not just a different perspective, but an entirely different type
of act, one assur, one as per Yael, mutar - that is your original assertion,
that there cannot be a prohibited act which, with a change in perspective,
becomes a mutar act.  I am bringing you a case where it changes half way,
and while Rav Yochanan has a hava mina that indeed it changes the nature of
the act, and makes it an assur act for the woman, when it was not before, he
accepts in the end that it does not.  

>See the passage in Tosafos I cited above.  Tosafos constures the criterion
to be, not solicitation, but participation, and "hana'ah hashivah
k'ma'ashe".

Now, again I think you are misreading this Tosphos, but to understand this
aspect, you need to go to the gemora in Baba Kama which this is drawn (32a).
The gemora there makes a husband liable for any damage that he does to his
wife during the course of tashmish.  But a query is raised, why is it the
husband's problem and not the wife's, since the husband is permitted to have
tashmish - answer - but it is only the husband who is doing an act - "kavid
ma'aseh", so he is responsible for hurting her, and she bears no liability.

But the problem with that is if you take it too far, as I suggested in my
earlier post, then you ought to get women off scot free from committing
adultery, because they never do any act, it is always the man doing it all.
And yet the pasuk says "v'nichrisu hanefeshos haoseos m'kerev amam" which
implies that only those who do anything will be punished, thus excluding the
women.  And so the gemora answers there in Baba Kama that because both get
hana'ah, then women get punished too, ie for legal purposes it is considered
k'ma'ase, but confirms, for the record, that it is only the man who is
really doing any act - hence he is solely liable for physical injury.

So, tosphos has a problem with the Esther scenario (well not specifically
the Esther scenario, because Achashverosh presumably also gave her zuhuma)
but why isn't this whole question raised on Esther or other women who are
raped the way it is raised on Yael?  After all, if hana'ah is considered
k'ma'aseh then what use is the category of karka olam?  

And their answer is, inter alia, that Yael was *not* raped, she solicited
and orchestrated it, and the opposite, Sisiera was in no position to rape
her, and it is only in those contexts that we raise questions about hana'ah
- however you want to translate it, because there is no karka olam in a
solicitation case.  And that is why you get into the question of motive and
intent.

Note by the way that the Tosphos further up on Nazir 23b (d"h "Tamar") also
supports this understanding, the gemora describes Tamar has having "zinsa"
and Tosphos's comment is "niskavanan l'shem shamayim .." that is why she is
praised - it is her kavana that makes it different from the situation with
Zimri, who also zinsa.


>> Incidentally, the Yalkut Shimoni (#44) disputes R. Yohanan's 
>> contention
> that Yael misbehaved.

...

>""Amar R. Shimon ben Lakish ... shmi me'id bah shelo naga bah oso rasha."
The editor cites VaYikra Rabba 23:10 as a source.  And, indeed, Margalios in
>his notes there (p. 542 note 6) observes that this disagrees with R.
Yohanan.

Oh fine, I thought that you were saying that the Yalkut Shimoni was bringing
R' Yochanan as saying something different.  The Yalkut Shimoni is, of
course, a Yalkut, and it brings loads of completely contrary midrashim and
discussions.  Truth is, however, that it is irrelevant.  The gemora assumes
that there is a concept of an averah lishma - and then brings our Rav
Yochanan to prove that it is actually either greater than a mitzvah shelo
lishma, or at least as good as.

>Here is where I think you are either misconstruing or disagreeing with the
Maharsha.  The gemara accepts that seduction was a means to a good end, but
>doesn't accept that it was "greater than a mitzvah", except for the one
detail that Yael did not personally benefit from it.

>If I understand you correctly, however, you are arguing that Yael's goal
made that event a "good deed".  But part of the Maharsha's point is that the
>event was not technically prohibited.

In a way this gets into the hutra d'chuya discussion.  But consider this
scenario.  Let us say that Yael had relations with Sisera because she found
him overwhelmingly attractive and didn't like her husband much - but the
consequence was that Sisera was weakened and able to be killed.  Now
according to you and your understanding of the Maharsha, is what Yael did
still OK?  If Ok, would she still be praiseworthy?  She would still seem to
have got zuhuma.

A related case, if you want a modern one, might be if somebody wilfully and
deliberately was mechallel shabbas but in doing so saved somebody's life -
best I can come up with - let's say they drove down kikar shabbas on
shabbas, because they hated the religious, and let's say that for whatever
reason they could not be put into the tinuk shenishba category, but because
they were a trained medic, and were there, they were able to do first aid
and save somebody's life who happened to need it, and they did so.  Now in
retrospect the driving on shabbas would seem to be a mutar act, as it
enabled a life to be saved that would not otherwise have been saved, and if
they had intended to drive to save somebody's life, everybody would agree
that it was mutar.  Do you still hold that we can tell, due to retrospect,
that that driving was mutar (feels a bit like shrodinger's cat)?

Note also that your understanding of the Maharsha would seem to suggest that
any woman having relations, even willingly and solicited relations, with
somebody who would give her zuhuma would not be technically prohibited (and
there are billions out there today, so it is quite a heter).  Do you agree
that this would follow from the Maharsha?  Is this indeed your position?
Does it really not matter what is going on somebody's head?

>David Riceman

Regards

Chana




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Message: 4
From: Micha Berger <mi...@aishdas.org>
Date: Thu, 19 Jul 2012 11:11:00 -0400
Subject:
Re: [Avodah] Bnot tzlafchad


My thought which emphasized 36:12's "mimishpechos Menasheh" over pasuq
11's "livnei dodeihen", to say they married Menashites who would get
territory from the promised land is in the Melekhes Machsheves.

See the Haameiq Davar, who says that the whole "tena
lanu achuza *besokh achei avinu*" was a request that they not get
land Mei'eiver haYardein.

Despite that story not happening yet when they approach MRAH in P'
Pinechas. I have no answer.

...
: > On a Brisker level, looking at halakhah to the exclusion of abstract
: > notions of qedushah, the two lands are the same.

: > I don't think Moshe Rabbeinu felt that way.

Why not? MRAH complains about Re'uvein and Gad putting their cattle first,
and makes sure they aren't skipping out on the war. Perhaps there was
even a problem when they made the request, because they did so before
the border was moved. But would half of shevet Menasheh be deprived of
qedushas ha'aretz exactly because they had such a love of it?

Maybe Benos Tzelafchad's primary concern was bedavqa the mitzvos hateluyos
baaretz.

: > 3- Perhaps this is even why He chose sheivet Menasheh in particular.
: > Re'uvein and Gad choose the fertile plains over land in EY. Hashem then
: > adds to them half a sheivet, thereby guaranteeing that the new sheivet
: > won't lose ties to the original promised land, AND placing in their midst
: > an influence which has such ties. Thinking out loud now, wouldn't it make
: > the most sense, then, to choose the people who produced Benos Tzelafchad?

: It would make sense to choose the other half of the tribe. Give them the
: zechut to live in EY proper, and still maintain the family connection.

Which, as I noted above, would justify not taking Menasheh altogether.
The same logic that would ask why the more chovevei Tzion amongst
Menasheh should suffer would ask why Menasheh over some other sheivet?

Tir'u baTov!
-Micha

-- 
Micha Berger             "Man wants to achieve greatness overnight,
mi...@aishdas.org        and he wants to sleep well that night too."
http://www.aishdas.org         - Rav Yosef Yozel Horwitz, Alter of Novarodok
Fax: (270) 514-1507



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Message: 5
From: Micha Berger <mi...@aishdas.org>
Date: Thu, 19 Jul 2012 11:21:13 -0400
Subject:
Re: [Avodah] The Main Idea of Judaism


On Thu, Jul 19, 2012 at 12:16:17PM +0100, Chana Luntz wrote:
: And RDR:
:>It's not a change in perspective.  It's a different physical event. 

: This I think is the heart of our disagreement. I do not dispute that a
: possible interpretation of what occurred with Yael was absence of pleasure,
: but I would dispute that even if that is what the Maharsha, Tosphos et al
: are saying, that they considered an absence of pleasure as creating a
: different physical event, rather than a change of perspective.

The way I was taught Esther qarqa olam haysa was that she physically
didn't move. She passively let Achashveirosh have his way. And that much
of her lack of culpability was due to the lack of maaseh.

Similarly WRT yeihareig ve'al ya'avor. A woman can be subject to gilui
arayos without doing anything. Therefore, it can't be yeihareig ve'al
ya'avor. (And possibly even if she is an active participant, since it's
not the activity that defines the issur. But I'm not insisting on this,
nor is it germaine to my thesis.)

One could understand Ya'el as also making herself qarqa olam in the sense
of not being an active participant. And thus, the gemara is saying that
one can only learn from Yael about an aveirah lishmah where the aveirah
itself has no maaseh either.

Still, as I mentioned when I first wrote the words "aveirah lishmah",
it's a big topic with a lot of rishonim and acharonim. RYGB (CC-ed)
used to raise it quite often in the early days of our chevrah. I wasn't
asserting that aveirah lishmah proves that one can turn an aveirah into a
mitzvah through machashavah, as in some flipside of teshuvah mei'ahavah,
just the much weaker claim that one can't rule it out.

Tir'u baTov!
-Micha

-- 
Micha Berger             When one truly looks at everyone's good side,
mi...@aishdas.org        others come to love him very naturally, and
http://www.aishdas.org   he does not need even a speck of flattery.
Fax: (270) 514-1507                        - Rabbi AY Kook



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Message: 6
From: Liron Kopinsky <liron.kopin...@gmail.com>
Date: Thu, 19 Jul 2012 19:00:21 +0300
Subject:
Re: [Avodah] Bnot tzlafchad


On Thu, Jul 19, 2012 at 6:11 PM, Micha Berger <mi...@aishdas.org> wrote:

> My thought which emphasized 36:12's "mimishpechos Menasheh" over pasuq
> 11's "livnei dodeihen", to say they married Menashites who would get
> territory from the promised land is in the Melekhes Machsheves.
>
> See the Haameiq Davar, who says that the whole "tena
> lanu achuza *besokh achei avinu*" was a request that they not get
> land Mei'eiver haYardein.
>
> Despite that story not happening yet when they approach MRAH in P'
> Pinechas. I have no answer.
>
> ...
> : > On a Brisker level, looking at halakhah to the exclusion of abstract
> : > notions of qedushah, the two lands are the same.
>
> : > I don't think Moshe Rabbeinu felt that way.
>
> Why not? MRAH complains about Re'uvein and Gad putting their cattle first,
> and makes sure they aren't skipping out on the war. Perhaps there was
> even a problem when they made the request, because they did so before
> the border was moved. But would half of shevet Menasheh be deprived of
> qedushas ha'aretz exactly because they had such a love of it?
>

I was referring to Moshe being in the land of Ever Layardein and still
wanting to enter EY and being told "no".


> Maybe Benos Tzelafchad's primary concern was bedavqa the mitzvos hateluyos
> baaretz.
>

At what point did the mitzvot kick in on the other side of the yarden? For
sure after Moshe's death, so maybe there is an intrinsic difference to the
Kedusha of the land before and after. Benot Tzelafchad, even living in the
same place where Moshe was standing, may have gotten what Moshe had wanted
and was denied. If their primary concern was the mitzvot and not a specific
request to not be ever layardein, as you suggested above, then I would
agree with you. But how do you reconcile the request to be specifically not
to be ever layardein and to then get exactly that? Would you suggest that
their request was based on assuming that ever layardein would not receive
full kedushat haaretz, but once that changed (through Rueven/Gad's
request?) they were ok to be on either side?


>
> : > 3- Perhaps this is even why He chose sheivet Menasheh in particular.
> : > Re'uvein and Gad choose the fertile plains over land in EY. Hashem then
> : > adds to them half a sheivet, thereby guaranteeing that the new sheivet
> : > won't lose ties to the original promised land, AND placing in their
> midst
> : > an influence which has such ties. Thinking out loud now, wouldn't it
> make
> : > the most sense, then, to choose the people who produced Benos
> Tzelafchad?
>
> : It would make sense to choose the other half of the tribe. Give them the
> : zechut to live in EY proper, and still maintain the family connection.
>
> Which, as I noted above, would justify not taking Menasheh altogether.
> The same logic that would ask why the more chovevei Tzion amongst
> Menasheh should suffer would ask why Menasheh over some other sheivet?


In more Yeshivish circles (i.e. non-Tziyoni, whatever that means) the
answer I have heard for why Menashe davka was that they were the talmidei
chachamim, and Moshe wanted to make sure that Reuven and Gad had proper
Morei Horaah. This approach seems to not need any specific chibbat tziyon
attributed to that Shevet. I have never heard it said that only the 1/2 of
Menashe that were ever layardein were TC. So if the whole tribe were
potentially fitting for the rabbinic role, why not allow those with a
greater affinity to the land to actually live there?


-- 
Liron Kopinsky
liron.kopin...@gmail.com
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Message: 7
From: David Riceman <drice...@optimum.net>
Date: Thu, 19 Jul 2012 11:32:03 -0400
Subject:
Re: [Avodah] The Main Idea of Judaism


RCL:

<<But even before one gets to analysing the words of any of the 
meforshim, think the issue through. If you have a situation where a 
women (let us say a married woman) is initially raped (let's say she was 
asleep and in no way solicited it) and then woke up and started enjoying 
it (let's say it was somebody whom maybe she would have fancied, but 
would never have done anything about because she does not believe in 
committing adultery - I am trying to make the case a bit believable) - 
then, according to you the act would change midway from something where 
she is blameless to something where she is blameworthy? Is that your 
contention?>>

No, I think there are two loopholes.  The first is passivity, and the 
second is coercion.  R. Yohanan's hava amina in the Yerushalmi is that 
the only legitimate response to coercion is passivity, and his 
conclusion is that one can be coerced into participating.

> <<I am not disputing that the Maharasha and Tosphos could be read as 
> understanding that the reason that Yael was praised was because she 
> did not enjoy the encounter>>

No, she's praised because she was doing it for a positive goal; the lack 
of enjoyment is what makes her act qualitatively different from the acts 
of the Imahos.

Me:
>> <<Admittedly Hazal's explanation of why she didn't enjoy it is cryptic: "d'ka
> shadi bah zuhama (Yevamos 103b)",>>
RCL:
> <<Well, it is only really cryptic if you insist on understanding hana'ah as
> relating to pleasure. That is clearly one way of understanding hana'ah (and
> clearly one that jibes better with the modern mind), but it is not the only
> one.  An alternative way (although I admit it is a difficult one for the
> modern mind, as we do not understand relations this way) is to translate it
> as benefit.  Ie there is as a side effect, a (and this is where your
> physical reality comes in, although it is not an *act* of the woman)
> physical benefit to a woman from relations, they are actually good for her,
> even if she does not solicit or want them - but only of course if you don't
> get zuhuma in the process.  Once you do, then the side effect benefit goes
> out the window and so clearly Yael was more praiseworthy than the Imahos,
> who got this side benefit.>>

  I don't understand the point your making.  Surely she could get both 
benefit and disadvantage from the same encounter, just as she could get 
both pleasure and pain from the same encounter.  It's the absolute lack 
of hana'ah, whether pleasure or benefit, which induces the heter, not 
the net disadvantage.

Incidentally, I still find the concept of zuhama cryptic (more below).
> <<Now, again I think you are misreading this Tosphos, but to 
> understand this aspect, you need to go to the gemora in Baba Kama 
> which this is drawn (32a). The gemora there makes a husband liable for 
> any damage that he does to his wife during the course of tashmish. But 
> a query is raised, why is it the husband's problem and not the wife's, 
> since the husband is permitted to have tashmish - answer - but it is 
> only the husband who is doing an act - "kavid ma'aseh", so he is 
> responsible for hurting her, and she bears no liability.>>

Admittedly this is a plausible reading of the gemara there, but, as you 
say below, it makes no sense.  See Rabbi Heller's comments on the Rosh 
ad. loc. (Pilpula Harifta S.K. reish); he suggests an okimta: that the 
gemara is discussing only the case where she is passive.  And, indeed, 
the language of Tosafos fits Rabbi Heller's okimta.

And this suggests that we're arguing about whether the gemara construes 
passivity as a normative description of how women behave during 
tashmish, as you imply, or whether it's an option, but by no means an 
exclusive option, as I think they imply.  See Rabbi Heller's evidence 
from Massaches Kallah (evidence, if we needed any, that he was a hacham, 
since he cited Masseches Kallah in a halachic context).

> <<But the problem with that is if you take it too far, as I suggested 
> in my earlier post, then you ought to get women off scot free from 
> committing adultery, because they never do any act, it is always the 
> man doing it all.>>
And here you've made it explicit.


<<Note by the way that the Tosphos further up on Nazir 23b (d"h "Tamar") 
also supports this understanding, the gemora describes Tamar has having 
"zinsa" and Tosphos's comment is "niskavanan l'shem shamayim .." that is 
why she is praised - it is her kavana that makes it different from the 
situation with Zimri, who also zinsa.>>

I agree that this is a puzzling gemara: it's especially puzzling 
according to your opinion, since Zimri was male and Tamar was female.  
But there are many other differences - - the one similarity is that 
neither Tamar nor Kozbi was married (even if you think there was zikas 
yibum kodem matan Torah that is at worst a lav).  I'll brood about that 
one some more.
> <<In a way this gets into the hutra d'chuya discussion. But consider 
> this scenario. Let us say that Yael had relations with Sisera because 
> she found him overwhelmingly attractive and didn't like her husband 
> much - but the consequence was that Sisera was weakened and able to be 
> killed. Now according to you and your understanding of the Maharsha, 
> is what Yael did still OK? If Ok, would she still be praiseworthy? She 
> would still seem to have got zuhuma.>>
I'm at a disadvantage here because I don't know what zuhama is.  As I 
implied before, however, I think the gemara's point is that it's not a 
situation where you have to balance advantages and disadvantages - - if 
there is zuhama she won't find him attractive.

> <<A related case, if you want a modern one, might be if somebody 
> wilfully and deliberately was mechallel shabbas but in doing so saved 
> somebody's life>>
See Menachos 64a, H.Shegagos 2:16, "nafal tinok bayam upireis metzudah 
l'ha'alos dagim v'he'elah tinok".  There are four options there (two 
leshonos about what Rabba and Rava were disputing). Again I think this 
is a red herring; the mahlokes there is about whether he needs to bring 
a korban, our gemara is discussing the purity of Yael's action.

<< Note also that your understanding of the Maharsha would seem to 
suggest that any woman having relations, even willingly and solicited 
relations, with somebody who would give her zuhuma would not be 
technically prohibited (and there are billions out there today, so it is 
quite a heter).>>

I agree that that follows; as I said before, I don't know what zuhama 
is, but I think, by definition, no one would voluntarily accept it since 
it implies the absence of any pleasure (or benefit).  So it's not much 
of a heter unless your primary goal is rebellion against God, for which 
there are many more pleasant resources.

<<Does it really not matter what is going on somebody's head?>>

Where did I ever say that? What I said was that I do math for pleasure 
and that is not a kiyum mitzva.  RLL implied that I ought to do math as 
a form of avodas hashem, and I pointed out that that attitude, taken to 
an extreme, deconstructs the central trope of mitzva and aveirah.  You 
cited "gadol aveirah lishmah" as a certified form of such a 
deconstruction, and I showed that the Maharsha demonstrated that it 
wasn't actually referring to an aveirah.

Shogeig vs. meizid, however, clearly are defined by what's in a person's 
head.

David Riceman





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Message: 8
From: Arie Folger <afol...@aishdas.org>
Date: Thu, 19 Jul 2012 03:41:10 -0400
Subject:
[Avodah] Nevuah and Knowing the Future


RMB wrote:
> I don't think the connection is being made between authorship
> and any one shitah in the machloqes about when/if Iyov lived.

Please explain, as it seems to me you contradicted yourself. Do you mean
to say that there is absolutely no connection between the theories of
when Iyov lived and between those regarding ots authorship, or do you
mean thatm as long as the presumed author lived either contemporraneously
with Iyov or afterwards, there is no one-to-one mapping of the different
respective shittot?

IOW, did you mean to say that even if Iyov was miBenei haGolah, the
book was just as likely written by Moshe as it could have been written
by Ezra if Iyov was from among the Egyptians? Or do you mean only that
the latter is totally open while the former would *likely* *imply*
that the author was Ezra, for example?

Shenizke lirot bene'hamat Tsiyon,
--
Arie Folger,
Recent blog posts on http://ariefolger.wordpress.com/
* Toleranz aber ohne Respekt -- zwei Artikel zur Brit Mil
* Ein Volk, eine Gemeinde -- Rckblick auf dem Freitagabend-Anlass
* Die Beschneidung ist im Judentum unentbehrlich
* Joe the Pumber, Guns Control and the Lethal Oppression of the Masses
* Offene Brief an die Redaktion von "Die Zeit"
* Alle sind gleich vor dem Schabbat, dem hochmodernen Ruhetag
* Thoughts on a Polarizing Society
* Do we Owe Respect to Old Bones?



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Message: 9
From: Micha Berger <mi...@aishdas.org>
Date: Thu, 19 Jul 2012 05:59:35 -0400
Subject:
Re: [Avodah] Nevuah and Knowing the Future


On Thu, Jul 19, 2012 at 09:41:14AM +0200, Arie Folger wrote:
: Please explain, as it seems to me you contradicted yourself. Do you
: mean to say that there is absolutely no connection between the
: theories of when Iyov lived and between those regarding ots
: authorship, or do you mean thatm as long as the presumed author lived
: either contemporraneously with Iyov or afterwards, there is no
: one-to-one mapping of the different respective shittot?

I am saying it's not muchrakh. There is only one explicitly stated
opinion about authorship. The sugya about when Iyov lived does open by
linking it to authorship: "'Moshe kasav sifro, uparashas Bil'am, veIayov'
mesayei'a lei leR' Levi bar Lachmah" who is then quoted as saying "Iyov
biymei Moshe hayah."

But...

: IOW, did you mean to say that even if Iyov was miBenei haGolah, the
: book was just as likely written by Moshe as it could have been written
: by Ezra if Iyov was from among the Egyptians? ...

... But, I am not sure saying he was miBenei haGolah is to the exclusion
of saying he was a contemporary of Yotze'ei Mitzrayim or the Shofetim.

First, as I noted on list, R' Elazar is both one of the two amoraim
who said that he lived during the Shofetim and the one who said miBenei
haGolah. Implying that it's not a machloqes.

Second, the middle of the sugya outright says "yeshno le'oso adam
sheshinosav arukhos ke'eitz".

So, it might be that everyone agrees with the opening quote from R'
Leivi bar Lachmah, and the rest of the sugya is showing how miraculously
long Iyov lived.

In which case, it doesn't require invoking nevu'ah to say MRAH wrote
about one of the Benei haGolah.

Admittedly, an aggadic story that makes supernatural claims, like
saying Iyov lived twice as long as normal or living from Galus Mitzrayim
through Purim, can very well be ahistorical mashal. The Rambam, I think,
would insist it *must* be. But RLbL says the derashah that places him
in Moshe's era is mesayei'ah to the statement one the previous amud
about Moshe having written the book. So, if the question of his age
is mythical, ascribing the authorship to Moshe would be part of the
same mythos. Invoking this concept doesn't change my point. Which is,
the book is ascribable to Av haNeviim. Even if on a mythical level.
Iyov and its statement about not being able to find Hashem's "why" for
any given tragedy has to not only be treated like Kesuvim, which should
be enough, but like something more.

But if anyone can turn up a machloqes about authorship, or a source
that insists all these opinions are instead of eachother as opposed
to building on top of prior claims to make one really long lifetime,
I would appreciate their sharing it.

Tir'u baTov!
-Micha

-- 
Micha Berger             A person must be very patient
mi...@aishdas.org        even with himself.
http://www.aishdas.org         - attributed to R' Nachman of Breslov
Fax: (270) 514-1507



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Message: 10
From: Micha Berger <mi...@aishdas.org>
Date: Thu, 19 Jul 2012 13:35:19 -0400
Subject:
Re: [Avodah] Bnot tzlafchad


On Thu, Jul 19, 2012 at 07:00:21PM +0300, Liron Kopinsky wrote:
: I was referring to Moshe being in the land of Ever Layardein and still
: wanting to enter EY and being told "no".

HQBH promised Moshe that he would never enter the promised land.

When Hashem said that, they had already left Qadeish Barneia, their
home for the past 19 years (just under), and were on the final move into
Israel. (See Bamidbar 13:25, 20:1 and Devarim 1:2.)

The southern border of Israel is described as being just south of Qadeish
Barnea (Bamidbar 34:4).

Rashi (Bamidbar 32:8) and Ramban (12:16, 20:1) assert there are two
cities of the same name, one at the sourthern tip of Israel, and the
other at which the Jews camped. And thus, Moshe never entered Israel.

IE and Seforno (20:1) have only one QB, placing it where the midbaros of
TRzin and Paran meet. These rishonim require some answer to what Hashem
meant by excluding Moshe from a land he was already in.

Balebatishly, I could suggest that HQBH told Moshe that he wouldn't
enter Israel from then on.

Or, we could say as RLK is intimating, that until kibush haaretz
there was no qedushas ha'aretz. Physically being in QB in Eretz
Kenaan isn't entering EY.

And if this is so, then the same is true of Eiver haYardein. MRAH
wasn't in Israel even when in Eiver haYardein simply because there
was no Israel for him to be in, yet.

: > Maybe Benos Tzelafchad's primary concern was bedavqa the mitzvos hateluyos
: > baaretz.

: At what point did the mitzvot kick in on the other side of the yarden? For
: sure after Moshe's death, so maybe there is an intrinsic difference to the
: Kedusha of the land before and after....

After the kibush of the mainland. Kedushah rishonah was al yedei kibush,
and the 2-1/2 shavatim weren't allowed to settle their land until after
Yehoshua's wars.

:               . But how do you reconcile the request to be specifically not
: to be ever layardein and to then get exactly that? ...

The Netziv, though, says they didn't -- their nachalah was in the
mainland. This is why they asked for nachalah among "achei avinu", in
EY proper, rather than the land just conquered and was just then being
promised to their grandfather's brothers' families.

Which is why I asked from P' Pinechas, because their first "besokh achei
avinu" was /before/ conquering Eiver haYardein. But the point being,
he overturns your assumption that Tzelfchad, had he lived, would have
gotten land from the other side of the Yardein.

I just found Bamidbar Rabba 21:12 (see also 14:6, 21:11) explicitly says
they got land on both sides of the Yardein. Yaaqov's berakhah to Yoseif
includes "banos tza'adah alei shur", and the wall that the banos are
walking on top of is taken to be the Yardein.

: In more Yeshivish circles (i.e. non-Tziyoni, whatever that means) the
: answer I have heard for why Menashe davka was that they were the talmidei
: chachamim, and Moshe wanted to make sure that Reuven and Gad had proper
: Morei Horaah. This approach seems to not need any specific chibbat tziyon
: attributed to that Shevet...

But that connection isn't mine, it's in the aforementioned Medrash Rabba.
They are introduced by their family line all the way up to Yoseif to
show that they were true daughters of the man who insisted they swear
to returns his bones to EY.

Tir'u baTov!
-Micha

-- 
Micha Berger             The trick is learning to be passionate in one's
mi...@aishdas.org        ideals, but compassionate to one's peers.
http://www.aishdas.org
Fax: (270) 514-1507


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