Avodah Mailing List

Volume 25: Number 223

Wed, 18 Jun 2008

• 1. Re: Your brother's a Mumar; here's the solution! (Moshe Y. Gluck)
• 2. majority of world Jewry in EY (Eli Turkel)
• 3. Re: Kabbalah and Neuroscience (Micha Berger)
• 4. Re: An old Pshat and a Question About Milchig on Shavuos (Micha Berger)
• 5. Re: D'rabanan vs. D'oraita (Micha Berger)
• 6. Re: Your brother's a Mumar; here's the solution! (Zev Sero)
• 7. Re: A Majority of World Jewry In Eretz Yisroel (Ben Waxman)
• 8. Re: Your brother's a Mumar; here's the solution! (Moshe Y. Gluck)
• 9. Re: Your brother's a Mumar; here's the solution! (Zev Sero)
• 10. Re: Your brother's a Mumar; here's the solution! (Micha Berger)
• 11. Re: Your brother's a Mumar; here's the solution! (Micha Berger)
• 12. Did Tziporah say Lashon Hara? (SBA)

R' Elozor Reich (way back when:
http://www.aishdas.org/avodah/vol23/v23n145.shtml):
> Having an apostate as a brother can present a potential future
> Yibum/Chalitza problem.
> 
> What I can only describe as a "flabbergasting solution" is prescribed in
the
> Oruch Hashulchan, Even ho'Ezer 157. The detailed instructions seem to
> indicate practical advice.

Basically, the AhS says to make the Kiddushin, Nisuin, and all the Bios Al
T'nai that if she is Nofel L'yibum then the whole thing will not be Chal,
and that she will be - L'mafrei'ah - a Pnuyah M'yuchad to him. So, I'm sure
that someone must have already asked this, but why can't this solve the
"Agunah Crisis"? 

KT,
MYG

<<Does a majority of Jews in Eretz Yisroel necessitate the building of Bayis
Shlishi as well as Challoh, Trumoh & Maasrous  D'Oraiso?>>

The lais is "Be-as Kulchem" - it is not clear what kulchem means.
Does every single Jew have to live in EY and one in Bavel reduces it to
a derabban? Some therefore learn that one needs only a majority of Jews
in EY for shemitta to become a deoraisa.
It is important to point out that if it does become a deoraisa then according
to ALL opinions heter mechira no longer works and it is predicated on
safek derabbanan le-kula.
Similar questions might affect other mitzvot hteluyot ba-aretz.

Building the third bet hamikdash is not connected. In fact there is a
disagreement
if this will happen before or after moshiach and if it is by man or G-d.



-- 
Eli Turkel

On Fri, Jun 13, 2008 at 01:54:10PM +0300, Moshe Feldman pointed us to
<http://www.haaretz.com/hasen/spages/992347.html>, "Visions of wondrous
things" by a neurologist, Dr Shahar Arzy. In it, he writes:
: Activation of the brain

: Electrical neuroimaging revealed that different brain activities correlate
: to these tasks. While in the first task (embodied self-location),
: activation was found in the left extrastriate body area (EBA) of the
: brain, the second task (disembodied self-location) was associated with
: activity in the right temporoparietal junction. These findings are
: compatible with the role of these brain mechanisms...

: Into these neuro-cognitive structures they poured their beliefs - beliefs
: that stemmed from their varied spiritual world, in which a very important
: part was ecstatic states and their achievement.

He presumes his conclusion. Dr Arzy believes that the physical phenomenon
is the cause, and the religious content a post-facto explanation given
for the resulting ecstatic experience.

However, the data described in the article is equally consistent with
the notion that the religious experience is real, and the *effect* is
the brain activity. That the brain has the structures to support such
altered states because it is the seat of a soul capable of producing them.

Since he's discussing mequbalim... I would think the Qabbalistic
description of the soul-brain relationship isn't a duality of soul vs
brain in which one causes events in the other. And so neither causality
is entirely true. Rather they are linked in that the soul resides in
higher olamos than the brain. That the tzurah of the activity in the
brain, the process as physically manifest, is the same column of Or as
it impacts olam haasiyah.

Tir'u baTov!
-Micha

-- 
Micha Berger             Spirituality is like a bird: if you tighten
micha@aishdas.org        your grip on it, it chokes; slacken your grip,
http://www.aishdas.org   and it flies away.
Fax: (270) 514-1507                            - Rav Yisrael Salanter

On Sun, Jun 15, 2008 at 06:22:32AM -0400, Samuel Svarc wrote:
: I must say that I'm very surprised. "Not reality"? When you bite into a
: fruit tree's bark you taste any fruity flavors? It was a direct command from
: HKB"H that in reality was disobeyed. If you eliminate the freewill from the
: malachim then instead you're saying that HKB"H is the one who fights with
: himself...

First, it's not we who are eliminating free will, it's baalei mesorah
of significant gravis.

Second, the question of evedence would not be whether we currently have
trees that taste like their fruit (other than esrog trees, which I can
tell you firsthand -- the leaves at least taste like esrogim). It's
whether somsone who might have tasted apple bark had the mal'akhim
complied would have experienced the same taste as from apples.

Third, the medrash as generally explained is that it's about the gap
between an ideal universe and this one. That gap is pinned on the
mal'akhim rebelling, but that could all be part of the mashel -- the
nimshal need only have a gap. Perhaps even we can say that the need for
a gap between real and ideal is why Hashem sends mal'akhim rather than
doing everything Himself.

Similarly, the trees may ideally taste like the fruit, and that is part
of the general gap between real and ideal. Or, the whole subject of tree
tastes could be a stand-in for the mashal's point.

Aside from the Maharal's nimshal whose "teaser" was already posted by RAF
<http://www.aishdas.org/avodah/vol25/v25n222.shtml#07>, here's R' Kook's
take (Orot haTeshuva 6:7; trans. B. Z. Bokser, The Lights of Penitence in
"Rabbi Abraham Isaac Kook," published by Paulist Press in the "Classics
of Western Spirituality" series):
> At the inception of creation it was intended that the tree have the same
> taste as the fruit. All the supportive actions that sustain any general
> worthwhile spiritual goal should by right be experienced in the soul with
> the same feeling of elation and delight as the goal itself is experienced
> when we envision it. But earthly existence, the instability of life,
> the weariness of the spirit when confined in a corporate frame brought
> it about that only the fruition of the final step, which embodies the
> primary ideal, is experienced in its pleasure and splendor. The trees
> that bear the fruit, with all their necessity for the growth of the fruit
> have, however, become coarse matter and have lost their taste. This is
> the failing of the "earth" because of which it was cursed when Adam was
> also cursed for his sin.

The difference between the Maharal and RAYK is slight, and possibly not
in their understanding of the medrash as much as RAYK is building on
his general take on the non-reality of chol and gashmiyus.

Tir'u baTov!
-Micha

-- 
Micha Berger             A person must be very patient
micha@aishdas.org        even with himself.
http://www.aishdas.org         - attributed to R' Nachman of Breslov
Fax: (270) 514-1507

On Thu, Jun 05, 2008 at 11:42pm EDT, Richard Wolpoe wrote:
: FWIW I personally know several frum  Rationalists - including a very
: rational frum Psychotherapist - who find re-incarnation quite rational.

I think a problem is that people tend to conflate a number of very
different distinctions:
    Qabbalah vs Scholasticism
    mysticism vs rationalism
    maximalism vs minimalism

In the days of the rishonim, there were two competing tendencies in
which problems bothered people, and therefore also in how to frame the
answers -- Qabbalah and "Philosophy", by which they meant the use of
Aristotilian and neo-Platonic thought to explain religion (Scholasticism).

Scholasticism is only compatable with rationalism. You wouldn't see much
point in using philosophical tools to understand religion if you weren't
defining religion as something that is to be understood.

I use the word "Scholasticism" rather than the word the rishonim did,
Philosophy, because the mequbalim also used philosophical terms: tzurah,
chomer, atzilus, etc... are all found in Aristotle and Plato as well.
(The Zohar traces that as coming from Yirmiyahu to Socrates, on a trip
to Bavel taken by the latter. FWIW, Wikipedia's entry "Philosophy" notes
the seeds of many elements of Greek Philosophy in the Babylonian text
"Dialogue of Pessimism", including the Socratic Method.)

In contrast, the mystic's faith focuses on the incomprehensible. Religion
that is centered on G-d will have much that is simply beyond
understanding. Rather, the mystic aspires to experience and live religion,
and takes joy, not frustration, in the Divine Mystery.

A rationalist could also believe in experiential religion. Mussar is an
obvious (to me) example. Rav Yisrael defines the goal of life in terms of
perfection of the soul, and perfection of the soul in terms of measurable
attributes of personality and attitude. Mysticism is defined by belief in
mystery causing one to seek experience to the exclusion of understanding.

Thus mystics seek the ecstatic experience and have a "Shir haShirim"
view of life.

In this sense of the term, Breslov is exceedingly mystical. They shun
philosophy. Thinking gets in the way of happiness and thus brings on
despair, which in turn is the road away from productivity in general and
avodas Hashem in particular. The philosophical study of G-d objectifies
Him; and thus interferes with emunah peshutah.

Qabbalah involves many more data points than scholasticism. It teaches of
gilgulim, sephiros, an entire system of olamos and metaphysical causality,
raises issues of parts of the soul, etc, etc, etc... Those could be taken
by a mystic as givens, or by a rationalist as logical consequences of
a few basic postulates. So Qabbalah can be accepted by either the mystic
or the rationalist.

But the number of things Qabbalah requires one to believe makes it sound
like the maximalism vs minimalism distinction would be identical to that
between Qabbalah and Scholasticism. However, what I mean by minimalism is
an unwillingness to accept extraordinory claims. A maximalist would look
at the mesorah, and not even raise questions as to how the universe could
be only 6 days older than civil humanity. The whole world was flooded, and
every species of animal fit on a floor that was 1.4 acres (using CI amos).

But for a rationalist who already found a basis for accepting the reality
of a G-d who can defy nature if He so chooses, maximalism is no less
rationalist than minimalism. Both are fully explanable from the same
first principles. It is no longer an issue of explanatory framework
or which issues bother me, but of whether I believe G-d minimizes His
interferance in the natural order.

Today, it also raises issues of authority. Minimalism requires taking
many more midrashim as necessarily being allegory. Since there is no
formal repository of nimshalim, this requires confidence in autonomy.
Taking words at face value provides far more leadership.


On Fri, Jun 06, 2008 at 08:33am EDT, Rich, Joel wrote:
[Quoting me:]
:> That doesn't help the guy who checked the mezuzah when he was supposed
:> to but because kelapai Shemaya galya that it's pasul, he gets less
:> shemirah. Unless one goes beyond the Ran and says that listening to the
:> chakhamim not only protects, but also provides metaphysical effects.

: That's pretty much the way I've explained it but it's only based on my
: own (very limited) logic - that is, that halachik reality is
: determinative of existential and practical reality, and that halachik
: reality is "kdaat moshe vyisrael" - i.e. halacha as we understand it
: (not as bashamayim) is determinative.  Now, what happens if Rabbi X says
: kosher and Y says treif & followers of each eat from the same pot - I
: suppose the effect (here and bashamayim) is different even though  the
: molecules are the same.

The problem is that although this position makes sense to you or I, it
doesn't help me get to the point of being able to understand, if still
disagree, with those many baalei mesorah who do accord metaphysical
powers to the objects themselves.

Whether Rabbi X vs Rabbi Y is correct depends on how one understands
machloqesin. An eilu va'eilu literalist would say that assuming there
were no errors in process, neither poseiq is really wrong.

I already cited the problem of 2 chatichos shuman, 1 cheilev, if we
understand timtum haleiv as a causal consequence of eating cheilev,
we can't play rov -- and certainly not of all three pieces at three
different times. And yet, it's mutar AFAIK without a warning from anyone.

Now we get into a different realm. If we use a literal eilu va'eilu,
whether as per R' Tzadoq, the Maharal or the constructionist rishonim,
then it would be the pesaq which determines the metaphysical reality
which then causes timtum or not.


On Sun, Jun 08, 2008 at 03:44am GMT, kennethgmiller@juno.com wrote:
: I would that that this applies only if both were Real Rabbis, that is
: to say, with Real Semicha -- which we do not have today.

: Today, they would both be affected the same way, though were can't be
: certain whether it was Rabbi X or Rabbi Y who was correct.

On Fri, Jun 13, 2008 at 12:04am GMT, kennethgmiller@juno.com further
explained in response to a question from RETurkel:
: But when he answers questions about halacha, he is simply telling us
: that according to his view of things, the halacha ought to be this way
: or that way. He does NOT have the authority to *obligate* us follow this
: halacha or that halacha. That authority is given only to Beis Din. (I
: think it is also given to the Av Beis Din, and I think it is a machlokes
: whether or not an individual Musmach has this authority.)

Who said that an obligation to follow a pesaq makes a pesaq more or less
eilu va'eilu? And if it's divrei E-lokim chaim that such meat is kosher,
why would it cause timtum.

It would seem that you're taking a constructionist position and then
identifying the power to define new din with the power to require others
to follow it.

BTW, I think you must follow the BD of your city even if it's a BD of
hedyotos. In general, I think you're mistaken WRT mara deasra. That might
not be because of halachic process as much as the power of minhag hamqom,
or it might be process, or minhag hamaqom might itself be a key element
of that process.


That's quite a bit of extrapolation from a point I opened by saying I
still don't understand. Take with a grain of salt more than the usual
two or three. The questions it raises should be of value, though.

Tir'u baTov!
-Micha

-- 
Micha Berger             When memories exceed dreams,
micha@aishdas.org        The end is near.
http://www.aishdas.org                   - Rav Moshe Sherer
Fax: (270) 514-1507

Moshe Y. Gluck wrote:
> R' Elozor Reich (way back when:
> http://www.aishdas.org/avodah/vol23/v23n145.shtml):
>> Having an apostate as a brother can present a potential future
>> Yibum/Chalitza problem.
>>
>> What I can only describe as a "flabbergasting solution" is prescribed in
> the
>> Oruch Hashulchan, Even ho'Ezer 157. The detailed instructions seem to
>> indicate practical advice.

> Basically, the AhS says to make the Kiddushin, Nisuin, and all the Bios Al
> T'nai that if she is Nofel L'yibum then the whole thing will not be Chal,
> and that she will be - L'mafrei'ah - a Pnuyah M'yuchad to him. So, I'm sure
> that someone must have already asked this, but why can't this solve the
> "Agunah Crisis"? 

Because someone with such a brother knows that the possibility of his
dying before having a child is real, and thus *maybe* it's possible for
him to really make and intend such a tnai.  It's still unlikely, and I'm
sure there are those who dispute this AhS, but I can see that it's at
least within the realm of reason.  But for a couple who are marrying
and in love to take seriously the possibility that the marriage will one
day go sour, and they will start to hate each other, and they will come
to regret this marriage and this bi'ah that they now so enthusiastically
want, I can't accept that this is psychologically possible for anyone.


-- 
Zev Sero               Something has gone seriously awry with this Court's
zev@sero.name          interpretation of the Constitution.
                                                  - Clarence Thomas

Building Bayit Shilshi has nothing to do with the actual numbers of Jews 
living here. After all, Beit Sheini was built with just a small number of 
Jews here.

Ben

> ------------------------------
>
> Message: 8
> Date: Sun, 15 Jun 2008 18:03:23 EDT
> From: RallisW@aol.com

>
> Does a majority of Jews in Eretz Yisroel necessitate the building of Bayis
> Shlishi as well as Challoh, Trumoh & Maasrous  D'Oraiso?
>
> 

R' ZS:
> But for a couple who are marrying
> and in love to take seriously the possibility that the marriage will one
> day go sour, and they will start to hate each other, and they will come
> to regret this marriage and this bi'ah that they now so enthusiastically
> want, I can't accept that this is psychologically possible for anyone.

Couples in love sign prenups all the time. Also, the RCA, for example,
pushes their prenup as a Takanas Harabbim - if you sign it, then those
others who might need it will also sign it, and it will help them. So this
could be the policy also - be Mekadesh Al T'nai, so that those who need it
will not end up being Agunos.

KT,
MYG

Moshe Y. Gluck wrote:
> R' ZS:
>> But for a couple who are marrying
>> and in love to take seriously the possibility that the marriage will one
>> day go sour, and they will start to hate each other, and they will come
>> to regret this marriage and this bi'ah that they now so enthusiastically
>> want, I can't accept that this is psychologically possible for anyone.
> 
> Couples in love sign prenups all the time.

And it's a big question how serious they can possibly be.  But at least
there you have a shtar and witnesses, and devarim shebelev einam devarim.
Here we're talking davka about devarim shebelev.  If the tenai is not
meant seriously it's worthless.  And I don't believe it is possible for
any couple to take it seriously, especially bish'as biah.  Any couple who
make this tenai and mean it, shouldn't be getting married.

-- 
Zev Sero               Something has gone seriously awry with this Court's
zev@sero.name          interpretation of the Constitution.
                                                  - Clarence Thomas

On Wed, Jun 18, 2008 at 01:21:37AM -0400, Zev Sero wrote:
: >Couples in love sign prenups all the time.
: 
: And it's a big question how serious they can possibly be...

The kesuvah itself is a prenup.

:                                                            But at least
: there you have a shtar and witnesses, and devarim shebelev einam devarim.
: Here we're talking davka about devarim shebelev.  If the tenai is not
: meant seriously it's worthless.  And I don't believe it is possible for
: any couple to take it seriously, especially bish'as biah.  Any couple who
: make this tenai and mean it, shouldn't be getting married.

The AhS proposed this idea for avoiding her becoming a yevamah, and RMYG
asked why the same tenai couldn't be used to avoid agunos. I think what
RZS is now saying boils down to ein adam oseh be'ilaso be'ilas zenus,
and not even bitenai.

I think this latter formulation is more tenable than his earlier post
which presumes a young couple in love. Using Shalom Aleichem as a cultural
source, he found it plausible to tell an audience of the AhS's day that
(as the songwriter later put it) "the first day I met you was on our
wedding day..."

And in order to avoid agunos, we would have to say that such a tenai
isn't only possible, but can be presumed doable by every husband during
each and every occasion.

Focusing on what a person is capable of thinking beshe'as ma'aseh is
consistent with the norms of his era, and with a chazaqah to boot. In
the case of avoiding yibum, though, I could see a difference between
the AhS's proposal and the usual ain adam oseh be'ilaso.

The AhS groom trying to avoid her becoming a yevamah to a mumar is
doing it out of concern for his bride. Rather than a denial of love, his
willingness to make his marriage conditional is an expression of it. He
is trying to save her from someone he believes could really keep her an
agunah -- his meshumad brother would would never consent to yibum. But
beshe'as ma'aseh, who could be seriously thinking they would need to
protect her from himself and still be in a state of mind where he would
want to protect her?

And to say we could make this the norm, such that any agunah could be
presumed to have been married al tenai? Impossible.

If I thought it were likely, ironically, the wife of an ignorant man
would have been better off in such a scenario. According to RMF, if
a couple think they were married in a ceremony (eg non-O weddings),
we don't say "ein adam" because we know he was acting al da'as the idea
that they're already married. So, the ignorant husband would never have
in mind that this time it's qidushin. The lamdan, who knows the wedding
was al tenai, might in a moment of passion be thinking that this time
it's unconditional, without tenai.

Tir'u baTov!
-Micha

-- 
Micha Berger             "The worst thing that can happen to a
micha@aishdas.org        person is to remain asleep and untamed."
http://www.aishdas.org          - Rabbi Simcha Zissel Ziv, Alter of Kelm
Fax: (270) 514-1507

I forgot to add:
I also agree with RZS's question about devarim shebeleiv. But this
question is on the AhS's original proposal WRT avoiding yibum. RMYG's
asking that if it would work for yibum, why not for agunah in general
would presume we had an answer.

Tir'u baTov!
-Micha

From: "kennethgmiller@juno.com" 
Rashi (B'haalos'cha 12:1) quotes Rabi Nasan: "Miriam was at Tziporah's side
when they told Moshe, 'Eldad and Medad are having nevuah in the camp.' When
Tziporah heard, she said, 'Oy to their wives! If they get nevuah, they'll
separate from their wives, like my husband separated from me.' That's how
Miriam knew."
Was it Lashon Hara for Tziporah to say this to Miriam? It sure sounds like a
complaint to me.If it was not LH, why not? And if it was, then are there any
Chazals which take Tziporah to task for this?
>>

First of all, it obviously wasn't LH - as there is no mention of her being
punished - unlike Miriam.

Secondly, I see that the Shaarei Ahraon quotes "Eimek Hanetziv" saying that
Tzipporah was definitely not complaining about MR being away from her. Had
she been upset about it, MR would've divorced her to allow her to remarry.

The comment she made to Miriam about feeling sorry for the wives of Eldad
uMedad, was because she felt that not all women would agree to put up with
such a lifestyle.

SBA





------------------------------


Avodah mailing list
Avodah@lists.aishdas.org
http://lists.aishdas.org/listinfo.cgi/avodah-aishdas.org


End of Avodah Digest, Vol 25, Issue 223
***************************************

Send Avodah mailing list submissions to
	avodah@lists.aishdas.org

To subscribe or unsubscribe via the World Wide Web, visit
	http://lists.aishdas.org/listinfo.cgi/avodah-aishdas.org
or, via email, send a message with subject or body 'help' to
	avodah-request@lists.aishdas.org

You can reach the person managing the list at
	avodah-owner@lists.aishdas.org

When replying, please edit your Subject line so it is more specific
than "Re: Contents of Avodah digest..."