Avodah Mailing List

Volume 17 : Number 036

Tuesday, May 9 2006

• Re: population of Israel
• Re: Married with aids
• Re: Challah on the table during kiddush
• Re: Challah on the table during kiddush
• Re: Challah on the table during kiddush
• Re: Re: Adoption
• RE: Adoption
• Re: Adoption
• hallel on 16 Nisan
• re: Married Couple with AIDS
• RE: Spilling out drops of wine at the Seder
• Re: Spilling out drops of wine at the Seder

Zev Seror wrote:
> In any case, prosbul doesn't automatically go away, just because shemitta
> becomes de'oraita.

According to many Rishonim this is not true. Pruzbul only works because
shmitta is d'rabbanan, if shmitta was d'oraysa then there would be no
mechanism for Pruzbul to work. There is a lot of lomdus here relating
to how pruzbul works which if I have time I will post.

> [Micha:]
>> I would think this is a textbook halakhah ve'ein morin kein. Since if
>> anyone at all thought we were opening this question in general, one
>> runs the risk of popularizing shichvas zera levatalah where no such
>> heter exists.

> [R Jacob Farkas:]
>>OTOH, there is a possibility that b'maqom saqanah, one may otherwise
>>conclude that there is no Heter. The ramifications can be disastrous.

> Lehuir the Gemara in Yevomos, where the Chachomim argue with rabbi meyer
> who claims that some endangered women might be able to use a Moch. They
> say that she cannot use it even if she is in danger, Umin Shumayim
> yerachamu, Vishomer pesaim hashem.

The endangered women mentioned in the Gemara are women who unlikely to
become pregnant in the first place. The concern is, that if they do,
the results may be catastrophic. The Hakhomim argued that the risk is
minimal (who says she will become preganant, if she does, who says she
will die), enough that one can rely on Shomer P'sa'im hashem.

This scenario (When the husband has AIDS) is one where the danger is
that the woman may herself become infected, a much higher statistical
probability. Would you suggest that Shomer P'sa'im Hashem apply here
as well?

Jacob Farkas

Tamar Weissman <tamarweissman@yahoo.com> writes:
> But shouldn't we at least wait until after Kiddush to bring the  chalot
> out? And what's the source for people being so careful to make  sure
> that the chalot are ON the table during Kiddush?

You want the challa on the table from the time you bentsh lecht so that
the table won't be a bosis for muktza. I suppose you could remove the
challa just before kiddush and then bring it back again but that seems
awkward and maybe disrespectful to the challa. Or you could have
a Siddur or Chumash on the table rather than a challa when you bentsh
lecht, but challa seems the most common thing to have.

--Toby  Katz
=============

<<I know the sources for the more "midrashic" reasons for why we cover
the challah (bushat hachallah and the kufsat tal of the mon). These
seem to be , though, "deeper" explanations for a custom that's clearly
b'diavad in nature. From a simple reading of the gemara, it just seems
to me that the best thing to do would be to just leave the chalot in
the kitchen until after kiddush. >>

RHS records in either Nefesh HaRav or MiPninei HaRav (I forget which)
that RYBS was once invited to a communal Shabbos meal and insisted
that all the Challah loaves be removed from the table before kiddush in
accordance with the Pesachim 100b which you cited. However, I concede
that this custom is not widespread.

The "midrashic" reasons you referred to are, to do them justice, cited
IIRC in the Tur. The busha reason originates, IIRC, in the Yerushalmi.
However, even according to these reasons, I cannot see that there is any
disadvantage to bringing the challos to the table after kiddush. The
Kufsas Tal symbolism can still be re-enacted by keeping the challos
covered b'shaas birkas hamotzi, and the busha to the challa can be
avoided altogether by keeping off the table until after kiddush.

The Rema holds that the shabbos/YT challos should not be partially
"pre-sliced" before the birkas hamotzi (as opposed to bread at an ordinary
meal) lest one accidently break them and lose the mitzva of lechem mishne.
I have never seen anyone do this (ie not partially pre-slice the challos).
Can anyone suggest why? Is it possible that our loaves nowadays are
thicker than at the time of the Rema, so that the risk of breakage
is minimal?

Kol tuv
Dov Kay

From: Tamar Weissman <tamarweissman@yahoo.com>
> I just finished learning Pesachim 100B. It seems according to the
> gemara that l'chatchila we should just bring the chalot out to the
> table after Kiddush is finished....
> I know the sources for the more "midrashic" reasons for why we cover the
> challah (bushat hachallah and the kufsat tal of the mon). These seem to
> be , though, "deeper" explanations for a custom that's clearly b'diavad
> in nature.....

which is what i do. see the gr"a in ma'ase rav.

the next question is then should the challos still be covered during
hamotzi according to the MB and we agreed here that they do.

reuven

From: menucha <menu@inter.net.il>
>> I'm doing my tikkkun leil shavuot on this topic. I was thinking of where
>> there would be nafka minas as to whether adoption is "keilu ylado"
>> literally.

> Aveilut

If i recall correctly, when R Yitzchak Levi's adopted daughter was killed
(l"a) they sat shiva

reuven

"Rich, Joel" <JRich@Segalco.com> wrote:
> I'm doing my tikkkun leil shavuot on this topic. I was thinking of 
> where there would be nafka minas as to whether adoption is "keilu ylado"
> literally.
...
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[R Zev Sero:]
> What sevara is there to say that it's literal? Is there anyone,
> anywhere, who takes it literally? Surely not! In fact, the biggest proof
> that there is not even a sefek sefeka that it could be literal is on
> your list - arayot.

BTW you might also like to think about all the permutations of current
reproductive medicine and the halachik impact:

Artificial insemination - Husband
Artificial insemination - Donor
In-Vitro fertilization (all permutations of whose egg and sperm)
Surrogate Mother (all permutations of whose egg and sperm)

Must the "parents" find out who the donors are?

Who are the halachik parents? Does it matter if sexual intercourse took
place between the "parents"?

These are cutting edge halachik issues for which statements like kilu
ylado and other seemingly medrashic precedent (think about the medrash
that Dina was "originally" conceived by Yaakov and Rachel but was born
to Leah) will likely be examined in greater detail than ever before.

KT
Joel Rich

On Tue, 09 May 2006 00:31:52, "Dr. Josh Backon" <backon@vms.huji.ac.il> wrote:
>Some poskim see adoption as equivalent to the halachic obligation of 
>*pru u'rvu* [procreation] (see: Chochmat Shlomo EVEN HA'EZER Hilchot 
>Ishut 15:3]. On the other hand, the adopted child doesn't engender 
>the halachic prohibitions vis a vis his adopted parents in areas 
>such as arayot, hitting them [drawing blood], cursing them [with the 
>Divine name]; nor do the laws of mourning apply ...
>There are Responsa on how his father's name is to be written in a 
>Get [divorce] and how to be called up to the Torah.

At the risk of opening a can of worms here, since adoption appears to be
a de facto issue in halakha (albeit with halakhic implications once it's
occurred), how would this affect two women who raise a child together,
and who are in every way other than biologically, both the mothers of
the child. Each one refers to her as "my daughter", and the child refers
to her parents as "Ima" and "Mommy".

Leaving aside any questions about what the relationship might be between
the two women, since that's not the question I'm asking, is there any
halakhic reason why this would be considered adoption any less than the
examples R' Josh has given? And how would the child's name be written
on her ketuba (when she gets to that point)?

Lisa

The parsha makes the general introduction "eileh moadei hashem" and then
proceeds to devote a paragraph to each of several holidays. One of
those is "yom hanifchem es haomer", which, in addition to the omer,
includes a special sacrifice of a sheep (plus eimurim). IIRC the gemara
says we don't say hallel on Pesah other than the first day because all
seven days have the same korban. But 16 Nisan has the special sheep
associated with the omer. Why not say hallel?

David Riceman 

Scanned, from Nishmat Avraham, OCR scanning errors uncorrected)

SIMAN 2: TO MARRY A WORTHY WOMAN / §7 q 27
NISHMAT AVRAHAM

Is the doctor obligated to tell a patient's spouse that he or she has
or is a carrier of AIDS?

There is certainly a risk of transmission of the disease over the years
from one to another when the couple lead a normal married life and this
will obviously be greater in younger couples. The affected person will
be considered halachically a rodef and his or her spouse must therefore
be warned of the danger of acquiring a life-threatening disease. Rav
Auerbach zt"l agreed with this.

The only way for such a couple to continue to live together with a
minimal (but not zero) risk is for the husband to wear a condom every
time they are intimate. Will this be permitted or will they have to
divorce? Rav Auerbach zt"l wrote to me that wearing a condom is close
to the transgression of emitting sperm to waste and this is forbidden
whether it is the husband or the wife who has the disease. This is not
to be compared to what is written below regarding the other methods of
preventing a life-threatening pregnancy, which are permitted. Therefore
if either the husband or the wife has AIDS there is no recourse except
divorce.01 I also heard the same ruling from Rav Eliashiv shlita. The
same considerations would apply to someone who is a carrier of any other
serious infective disease that can be transmitted during coitus. See also
below, Siman 5N(2v) page 69 and Choshen Mishpat, Siman 420G, page 274.

Rav Neuwirth shlita told me that the husband is only obligated to give
his wife a get if she demands one. If, however, she wishes to continue
to live with him, accepting the risk involved in married life without
any protection, it is possible that she would be permitted to do so and
certainly if they do not as yet have children. She only puts herself into
possible danger, which might be permitted for their continued marriage
in such special circumstances.

I found this difficult to understand for the Chafetz Chaim1691 asks of
those who smoke: Who permitted you to become so accustomed to smoking?
True that Chazal say1701 that although one is not permitted to injure
onself, nevertheless if he does so he is exempt, but they did say that
he is not permitted to do so. First, the Torah commands:" "And you shall
greatly guard your souls." Then, the whole of creation is Hashem's; He
created us for His honor and in His lovingkindness He gives to each and
every one the necessary strength for his Torah and private world. How can
the slave do whatever he pleases? Surely he belongs to his master? And,
if as a result of smoking he weakens himself, he will surely ultimately
be called to justice for having done so. He took up smoking because
he wished to and not because he was forced to. Therefore, when a person
contemplates deeply about the great wrong that he brings upon his himself,
he will strenghten himself not to become accustomed to smoking.

The Be'er HaGolah1721 also writes that he who endangers himself is like
one who spurns the wishes of his Creator and does not wish to serve Him
or to receive His rewards; there is no greater contemptuous irreverence
than this.

Perhaps, however, one should differentiate between one who knowingly and
unnecessarily endangers himself purely out of desire (as is the case
with smoking), and the question discussed here where the mitzvah of a
continuing marriage and home are the concern. However, Rav Auerbach zt"l
told me that the wife may not endanger herself to preserve the marriage;
and, if the reason that she wishes to preserve the marriage is to have
children, then, on the contrary, she should demand a divorce and marry
someone else to bring healthy children into the world.

On Sun, 7 May 2006 21:47:43 -0400, "S & R Coffer" <rivkyc@sympatico.ca> wrote:
>On May 7, 2006, Jacob Farkas wrote:
>>Rather than running the risk of repeating in great length what was 
>>already discussed in the past few weeks, I will summarize by 
>>pointing out that the Yalqut Shimoni quotes a P'siqta that states 
>>that we don't say Hallel on 7th day Pessah because of Binfol 
>>Oyivkha, see Meshekh Hakhmah [Shemos 12:16 sv. U'vayom Harishon 
>>Miqra Kodesh vGo'], as well as Manos Haleivi [Esther 9:20 sv. 
>>Vayikhtov Mordakhai].
>
>I must confess that I've heard this stated before but have never 
>seen it in Chazal. The Gemara in Eruchin says that we don't say 
>Hallel the last six days of Pesach because they are not chalukin 
>b'korbinosayhem. When you supplied a mareh makom above for Chazal 
>offering an additional reason, I thought I had finally found the 
>source. I looked up the Yalkut where you were mitzayen but 
>unfortunately could not find it. (Just to confirm, in my Yalkut, 
>Shemos 12:16 is in remez #201) Could you perhaps locate the mareh 
>makom in the original pesikta? I'd like to look it up and see if the 
>context supports your contention. The Gemara in Megilla 16 
>definitely states openly that the concept of binfol oyvecha does not 
>apply to umos haOlam so I find it difficult to imagine that there 
>should be a stira in Chazal but I'll wait and see.

I hope this will help. A lot of claims have been made, but sources
that have been cited have in many cases said something quite different
from what their citers have claimed. Numbering-wise, I'm using the
T.E.S. Judaic Bookshelf. Looking at the Yalkut Shimoni and searching on
"binfol", I get numerous hits that refer to this pasuk (and a couple
that refer to "binfol tardema").

YS on Shmot 12, siman 208 talks about why the bechor ha-sh'vi was killed
during makkat bechorot, and says it was because they were happy about all
the evil decrees Pharaoh decreed against us. It cites "binfol oyivcha"
as an explanation of why they got punished.

YS on Vayikra 19, siman 613 (about 2/3 of the way in):
Rabbi Elazar ben Matya says, if there's an issue between you and him,
tell him, and don't sin against him. Therefore, it says, "v'lo tisa
alav heit". In this manner, it says "binfol oyivcha al tismach",
and further on it says "ba'avod reshaim rina". How can both pesukim
be fulfilled? A talmid hacham who defeats you today in halakha, and
something happens to him tomorrow, don't be happy, lest Hashem see, and
it's evil in His eyes. If you see a Jew who desires evil to happen to
his fellow Jew, that's a rasha gamur.

YS on Vayikra 23, siman 654 (from the top):
You find three simchas written by Sukkot: "v'samachta b'chagecha",
"v'hayita ach sameach", "u'smachtem lifnei Hashem Elokeichem shiv'at
yamim". But by Pesach, why you don't find even one simcha written by it?
You find by Pesach that agriculture is judged then, and no one knows
if his harvest will get him through the year or not. *DAVAR ACHER*,
because the Egyptians died then. And so we find that all seven days of
Sukkot, we say Hallel, but on Pesach, we only say Hallel on the first
day and its night. Why? Because "binfol oyivcha al tismach, etc."

YS on Mishlei 24, siman 960:
"Do not rejoice when your enemy falls." And so the Omnipresent
commanded: "ki tir'eh chamor son'acha" and "ki tifga shor oyvecha".
Elokim says, "You aren't better than me. How so? Israel would have been
entitled to say Hallel all seven days of Pesach just as we say it the
seven days of Sukkot, but you only say it the first day. Why is this?
Because the Egyptians were killed and drowned in the sea, and they were
My enemies. And I wrote "binfol oyivcha al tismach". And so you find by
Noach, where He forbade him to have marital relations during the flood.

That's actually the second of two comments on "binfol oyivcha" in siman
960. The first is the one about Rava, which was cited in the article
R' Micha mentioned earlier, and which made the point that there's a
difference between rejoicing before it's a done deal and rejoicing after
it's a done deal. I'd transcribe that as well, but I'm still getting
over this virus, and I'm whipped (and I have to get going to work),
so check it out here:

==========================
http://www.vbm-torah.org/archive/avot/10avot.htm
A gemara in Nedarim (40a) might lead us to construct an entirely
different approach to the pasuk in Mishlei. Rava, who had fallen ill,
requested that his illness be publicized, anticipating that his friends
would pray for his recovery while his enemies would rejoice at the news
of his infirmity. In response to their joy, Rava presumed, Hashem would
relieve his suffering, in accordance with the warning in this pasuk in
Mishlei, 'lest Hashem notice and disapprove, and avert His anger from
him.' Rava's invocation of this verse suggests that the pasuk speaks of
metaphysical realities, rather than halakhic or moral ones. Excess joy
at another's misfortune is not just insensitive; it may prompt Hashem
to reassess the fate of the sufferer. Counting on this dynamic, Rava
coveted the elation of his enemies.

Would this dictum apply to enemies who have already perished? Perhaps
once history has been cemented (after keri'at Yam Suf, for example)
joy may be felt and expressed. Mishlei is not forbidding such conduct
as much as it is warning against "counting our chickens before they
hatch." In a similar vein, Haman may have been warning Mordekhai not
to declare premature victory, as their respective fortunes could still
reverse. Interestingly, the gemara in Sanhedrin (39b), which recounts
the heavenly debate about reciting hallel, does not cite the pasuk in
Mishlei. Though the angles were constrained from reciting hallel, and
the Shulchan Arukh extends this conduct to our celebration of Pesach,
neither actually cites the verse admonishing against celebrating an
enemy's downfall. Quite possibly, then, joy at the death of evildoers
is morally legitimate, but often strategically unwise. Therefore,
retrospectively, after events have been finalized,
the constraints might disappear.
==========================

Bottom line: yes, the Yalkut mentions this idea, but no, it does not
apply to the Mitzrim except while they were actually drowning.

Lisa 

On Sun, May 07, 2006 at 12:37:05AM -0400, S & R Coffer wrote:
:> I would say, though, that you bring a list of ra'ayos that binfol doesn't
:> stand alone without ba'avod resha'im rinah, not that compassion is wrong.
:> IOW, you proved the existence of the other emotion, but did not disprove
:> the idea that we're supposed to feel both.

: I am incapable of experiencing these contradictory emotions simultaneously
: and thus I teitch binfol differently than you.

I don't think this is true, you just haven't noticed. Ever since the eitz
hada'as, every decision is the product of an irbuvyah of motivations,
and every situation met with an irbuvyah of reactions. Ambivalence is
the norm, not the rarity.

For example, ever miss the bus and feel both frustrated and yet relieved
that the problems awaiting you at the office are delayed a bit? Or
enjoyed a piece of cake while feeling guilty for cheating on your diet?

The ubiquity of negi'os in decision making is a recurring theme in
mussar. Fortunately, it's also true lehefech -- rare if ever is the
cheit that doesn't have some positive motive in the mix. But in any case,
the notion of feeling or being driven by two things at once is assumed.
(In addition to its role in Chabad and in RYBS's philosophy, as discussed
earlier this thread.)

On Sun, May 07, 2006 at 09:47:43PM -0400, S & R Coffer wrote:
: How can you have compassion for someone upon his death when his very
: death is supposed to elicit emotions of joy? ...

The Justice of his death should elicit joy "yeish din veyesish Dayan".
More than that, "ba'avod resha'im *rinah*", "rinah" connotes expressed
joy, not just joy (and is in fact a term for a kind of shirah). The
human loss of the death should be mourned.

I saw this simply as two pesuqim that only contradict if you believe that
joy and mourning necessarily contradict. In the case of the inheritor of
a large yerushah, the gemara pasqens he must make the berakhah for both.
They don't contradict. Therefore, there is no need to reinterpret either
in light of each other. Then it turned out that a Rabbeinu Yonah I
learned back in HS said it first -- we're asked to feel both.




On Sun, May 07, 2006 at 08:48:37PM -0500, Lisa Liel wrote:
: What I don't understand, R' Micha, is how you read that article and
: then posted a reference to it as though it supported your position.
: When it clearly does exactly the opposite.

Perhaps because I went to camp with RMT, and therefore see him as a
peer. This brought me to care more about his sources than what he does
with them. Don't skip to the end (which isn't even given as a masqanah
but as one idea among many), and see what he says along the way.

For example, RMT brings the Rabbinu Yonah who says that mal'achim are
enjoined from feeling any joy, whereas we are permitted to place that
sorry within the context of being happy we were saved. He explicitly
tells us, though, thatit is halachically and hashkafically wrong not to
feel that sorrow as well. In RMT's words:
> Rabbenu Yona, in his commentary to Avot, raises yet a third
> factor. Triumphing at others' sorrow -- expressing any form of joy
> over the fall of a Jewish enemy, or reciting hallel at the decline of a
> gentile enemy -- is morally odious and halkhically forbidden. However,
> celebrating Hashem's victory (the death of evil, the cessation of chillul
> Hashem) is not only permissible, but also expected.

RMT provides no source for his 2nd yeish lomar that it's pragmatic advice
rather than RY's understanding that we're mandated to feel both. You're
taking a forum for discussing sevara and hava aminos and using it as
a maskanah rather than looking at the merits of the arguments for each
position. It's just a sevarah to play with in a shiur.

:>Even with RZL's suggestion, we're supposed to feel bad.

: No, we are not. None of the sources you have cited say that we should
: feel bad. None of them...

First, that would be /without/ RZL's suggestion, as he gives a reason
to feel bad.

Second, this is how your argument sounds to those of us on the other side
(judging from RYF's posts, I'm not alone in this impression):

Step 1: You take the idea that there couldn't possibly be a concept of
compassion on one's enemies for granted. And therefore assert there is
no source for it.

Step 2: I found the Beis Yoseif and his sources. You reply that since
it's accepted by everyone otherwise, "obviously" the BY et al meant
something else -- and then push "dochak teretz".

Step 3: Someone brings a second source, which you feel you can now again
freely reintrepret, again bedochaq, since everyone says otherwise. (What
about the BY, the medrash, et al? Well, we already answered that.)

Repeat. (Avraham and Sedom, particularly al pi the MC, the haggados that
do give this reason for spilling wine at the seider, including RSZA and
RYSE, R' alQbatz on the reason for Purim, discussions that rule out the
milchamah as the reason for the first day of Chanukah...)

I would have thought by now you would see that there is in fact a
brouder support for feeling the pain of the death of one's enemies,
and that providing a reinterpretation for each isn't justified.

Or at least, that there is a long and broad mesorah that is different
than your position, even if you hold otherwise.

Or at the very least, that there is a complex picture to draw from
seemingly contradictory stories. That's the most one can conclude from
meqoros that discuss ba'avod resha'im rinah, not that the BY can simply
be taken to say something it doesn't. (E.g. claims of writing something
he, and those he quotes, and those who quote him, etc... didn't mean.)

To me, all those peices build a pattern. You seem be be consistently
denying each peice of the pattern by saying that since the other peices
were already reinterpreted to fit, it's an anomoly in a vacuum.

Case in point:
: Fortunately, the burden of proof isn't on him. It's on someone who
: wants to propose a value that is absent from our tradition.

Absent? Isn't that presuming your conclusion in how you read each source?

Or a more recent example:
> I hope this will help. A lot of claims have been made, but sources
> that have been cited have in many cases said something quite different
> from what their citers have claimed.

What RnLL actually means is that she was able to reinterpret a number
of the sources to be consistent with her assumptions. Not all, nor
are the reinterpretations consistent with later usage of the same
source.

> Bottom line: yes, the Yalkut mentions this idea, but no, it does not
> apply to the Mitzrim except while they were actually drowning.

And yet your understanding is inconsistent with the ShB's and BY's. As
I've set since my first post on this discussion.

We're going in circles. I'm getting off. Besides, RYF is doing a better
job both at substance, and at the tone in which he's presenting it.

-mi

-- 
Micha Berger             Today is the 26th day, which is
micha@aishdas.org        3 weeks and 5 days in/toward the omer.
http://www.aishdas.org   Hod sheb'Netzach: When is domination or taking
Fax: (270) 514-1507         control just a way of abandoning one's self?

*********************


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