Avodah Mailing List

Volume 16 : Number 121

Tuesday, February 7 2006

• RE: Creation & allegory
• Re: the Mabul
• Re: Rape- Sources?
• Re: Rape- Sources?
• Re: Rape- Sources?
• Rape- Sources?
• The Torah's eternal sensitivities (was Rape of Dina)
• Kashrus reliable enough
• Re: Ikkar Ha Din an Chezkas Kashrus
• Re: Kashrus reliable enough

> The Rambam wrote the Moreh for Nevuchim. He says things in the Moreh that
> contradict things in the Yad. It's important to consider the audience.
> I wouldn't have any problem telling someone who was having a hard time
> accepting the Torah that the sequence of the days of creation aren't
> necessarily reflective of the historical order of events. You teach
> people on a level they can handle.

The notion that the rambam wrote the moreh for nevuchim, and is not
his real position, is something sometimes claimed, but is not (IMHO)
seriously sustainable, and is clearly not mashma from the rambam.
The status of lacking questions - of accepting things literally is
specifically rejected by the rambam as not the proper path.

The issue of contradictions to the Yad is far more complex - I recommend
Prof Twersky's book on the yad as a Torah starting point. I would
point out that the yad is sometimes far more radical than the moreh -
eg, Yesode Hatora 1:5 which uses an aristotelian notion of the eternity
of the universe to prove hashem's existence.

> The Rambam "seems to assert" in the Moreh that there won't be korbanot
> l'atid la-vo. That's a direct contradiction to the laws of korbanot
> in the Yad. It's not a contradiction. The Moreh contains apologetics.
> You have to consider the intended audience.

The rambam never "seems to assert" that there won't be korbanot, although
some people have understood him that way. He does present a theory of
taame hamitzvot that make the rational for why korbanot were instituted
one that seems irrelevant to us - but that is quite a leap from the
rationale for institution to arguing that there won't be korbanot -
and this relates to the entire theory of levels of understanding ta'ame
hamitzvot and their relationship to practice - a different issue.

Meir Shinnar 

In Avodah V16 #119 dated 2/6/2006 R'n Chana Luntz writes:
> On the other hand, the other approach is to try and minimise the
> number of miracles involved (based on an understanding that part of the
> glory of Hashem's creation is that everything was pretty much set from
> breishis.... and therefore it is appropriate to understand the mabul as
> something that was part and parcel of laws of nature as we know them....

> But following that approach means you end up with concepts like a local
> flood.... That is, when the Torah refers to the earth, what it means
> is what was sometimes referred to historically as "the known world" ie
> the world known to mankind at the given time. (there are some wonderful
> maps from the thirteenth or fourteenth century that show the world,
> but show sea where the continent of Australia is, because they had no
> idea it existed....

> ...This locating the text in the context of human knowledge at the time
> also fits with the concept that comes through very clearly from the Torah
> (as further detailed in the meforshim) that the mabul was a punishment
> for the actions of mankind....

This approach is the one that seems most reasonable to me, but it still
leaves some questions. When you talk about the "known world," for example
-- known to whom? To all the people alive at the time of the mabul?
That would not just be people around the Mediterranean then. Even though
the "known world" as late as the 14th century (known to Europeans that
is) did not include Australia -- there WERE people in Australia --
or were there? How did they get there? How long have humans been in
Australia? Were they part of the sin, were they part of the flood?
And what about Indians in the Americas, were they around before the flood?

The "known world" say at the time the Torah was given didn't include
parts that were already populated by 5000 years ago (at least, I /think/
they were). So was the Flood in the part of the world that was "known"
to the Jews at the time of Mattan Torah or was it in all parts of the
world that were already populated? Oh wait, there should have been no
humans in all those places until after the Dor Haflagah (=Dor HaPalagah
to you purists). Well uh oh we just stumbled into the next big mystery.
How did people get all over the world so fast and why does there seem to
be evidence dating human habitation in America and Australia so far back?

 -Toby Katz
=============

MSDratch@aol.com asked:


>Apropos our discussion about rape... For a project I am working on,
>I am looking for sources that actually say that rape is forbidden.


See my post on Avodah from 2 weeks ago. I am quoting just the
second paragraph of that post:

"As to how batei din in the past centuries treated sex offenders,
see: Rambam Hilchot Sanhedrin 1:1; Yam shel Shlomo on Bava Kamma
VIII 48; Mabit I 22; Zichron Yehuda 91; and many of the Takkanot
haKahal."

KT

Josh

In  Avodah V16 #120 dated 2/6/2006 R' Mark Dratch writes: 
> Apropos our discussion about rape... For a project I am working  on,
> I am looking for sources that actually say that rape is  forbidden.

> Rambam, Hilkhot Na'arah Betulah and Shulhan Arukh, Even  ha-Ezer 177 only
> discuss the issue of fines and forced marriage/no divorce.  Nowhere does
> it say that the act itself is forbidden. And nowhere does it  speak of
> consequences for the rape of a married woman (except whether or not  she
> is subsequently forbidden to her husband).

Um, when you say "nowhere" -- are you excluding the Chumash as a source?
Why wouldn't that count? And I must say that it is rather lawyerly to
say, "A penalty is stated but it is not clear that it is forbidden."
If I see a road sign that says "$100 fine for littering" I don't say
to myself, "Hm, I wonder if you're allowed to dump trash here -- as
long as I pay the littering fee, of course."

Also, the penalty for having relations with a married woman is death.
Again, I am at a loss to understand how this leaves any question as to
whether raping her might perhaps be allowed.

 -Toby Katz
=============

Toby Katz writes:
> Um, when you say "nowhere" -- are you excluding the Chumash as
> a source? Why wouldn't that count? And I must say that it is rather
> lawyerly to say, "A penalty is stated but it is not clear that it is
> forbidden." If I see a road sign that says "$100 fine for littering"
> I don't say to myself, "Hm, I wonder if you're allowed to dump trash
> here -- as long as I pay the littering fee, of course."

Also, the penalty for having relations with a married woman is death.
Again, I am at a loss to understand how this leaves any question as to
whether raping her might perhaps be allowed.

1. I am not including the chumash as a source because:
a) there is no disctinction in the Torah's death penalty for the married
woman scenario between consensual and nonconsensual sex... so is it
because it's rape or because its adultery.
b) the punshment does not apply to the rape of a single woman.
c) no where does it say that it's forbidden-- is it a sex crime? assault?
theft? it's not there and it's not not clear.

2. As for the fine-- that may also come to compensate for financial
damage and not as a punishment for a crime. So maybe there is financial
damage to the father in erms of the dowry that he can collect. And if
it is a crime, why allow the rapist to marry his victim?

Just trying to understand.

Mark Dratch

R' Mark Dratch:
> I am looking for sources that actually say that rape is forbidden.

It would certainly fall under Lo Tonu, V'ahavta l'reiacha, kedoshim
tih'yu, v'halachta b'drachav, Yichud, etc.

R' MD:
> Rambam, Hilkhot Na'arah Betulah and Shulhan Arukh, Even ha-Ezer 177 only
> discuss the issue of fines and forced marriage/no divorce. Nowhere does
> it say that the act itself is forbidden.

I don't believe it says anywhere in Shulchan Aruch that murder is
forbidden. Some things don't need to be said.

R' MD:
> And nowhere does it speak of consequences for the rape of a married woman
> (except whether or not she is subsequently forbidden to her husband).

Well, the guy is killed. 

KT,
MYG

From Nachum Rabinowitz, "Halakhah and Otehr Sysems of Ethics: Attitudes
and Interactions" in Modern Jewish Ethics, Marvin Fox, ed.

It should be noted as well that in a historicist view, which is certainly
not foreign to Torah, man and society are not static - and unchangeable;
rather some truths about human nature, for example, must be seen as
time-bound and consequently ethical theories involving such postulates
as well as some aspects of the moral code depeindent upon them must be
seen as evolving constantly. Such an approach is certainly applicable
to gaps in the halakhic code or areas for which only the most general
guidance is offered.

This position is perhaps best summed up in the following passage:
    Our perfect Torah sets forth general principles for the cultivation
    of human virtue and for [ethical] behavior in the world, in the
    statement: "Holy shall you be..." This means, as the Rabbis said,
    "Sanctify yourself in what is permitted"-that one should not be drawn
    after lusts. Similarly the Torah says: "You shall do that which is
    right and good" meaning that one should deal well and uprightly
    with men. It was not appropriate in all this to command details,
    for the commandments of the Torah are obligatory for every period
    and all time and in every circumstance, but the virtues of man and
    his conduct vary according to the time and the people. The sages
    of blessed memory specified some useful particulars included under
    these principles~ some of which they made binding law and others only
    rules recommended before the fact, but not binding or actionable
    after the fact, still other rules for those who seek the way of
    special piety. (Magid Mishneh to Hil. Shekhenim 14:3.)

my own question: is polygamy more virtuous than monagomy? I know that
the Torah doesn't require polygamy, but it does allow for it.

Mark Dratch

RYGB writes:
>This whole conversation mystifies me. Does no one remember that there is
>a Meseches Demai (currently being studied as the Daf Yomi Yerushalmi)?
>Ne'emanus is not automatic by any stretch of the imagination. It is a
>privilege that is earned (Chaveirus) not an automatic right.

I think we are confusing a whole range of issues here that probably need to 
get disentangled.

The first is how we deal with people who are already established as being 
suspect in terms of kashrus.  And indeed the Yerushalmi on Demai is the place 
to start (as I brought in my previous posting on the subject in Avodah Volume 
16 : Number 095).  The situation with demai was that it came to the attention 
of chazal that many people were lax when it came to the d'orisa obligation 
(chayav misa) of taking trumos and ma'asros, and therefore Yochanan Cohen 
Gadol enacted the prohibition of demai.  I am not aware of any suggestion that 
the reason that the amei ha'aretz did not take terumos and 
ma'asros was because the subject was too complicated for them (ie that they 
were doing their best) - rather it was acknowledged was that they were in fact 
taking teruma gedola (which is not expensive to do) but not taking the rest 
(which costs considerably more) so at least by implication the reason would 
seem to be monetary, rather than ignorance.

Even in that case of demai, or where you have somebody who fits into the 
category of suspect of issurim or is known to be in violation of a particular 
matter, there are various halachic developments and discussions about how to 
deal with them - which is what I discussed in my previous post referred to 
above, ie it may be appropriate in certain circumstances to take certain 
leniencies vis a vis kashrus that one would not normally take (such as eating 
demai, or pas akum) because of the importance of good relations.  

Hezkas kashrus is somewhat different.  It is part of a general concept that 
one does not assume that a stam Jew does averos. In relation to food, it is 
perhaps most clearly set out in the Rambam Hilchos Assuros perek 11, halacha 
26 "one who is a guest by a baal habayis in any place and in any time (b'kol 
makom u'b'kol zman) and he brings him wine or meat or cheese, or a piece of 
fish behold this is permitted and he does not need (aino tzorech)  to ask upon 
it even though he does not know him except that he knows that he is a Jew.  
But if it is known *huchzak sheano kasher" v'eano medakdek b'divarim elu 
assur l'oreiach etzlo."

However the consensus of opinion regarding a chezkas kashrus is very much in 
relation to the scenario set out by the Rambam above of a baal habayis.  once 
we get into somebody who is selling something for a profit, there are several 
machlokusim amongst the rishonim (some hold the chezkas kashrus applies but 
only within Eretz Yisroel for example) and the Rema poskens in Yoreh Deah 
siman 119 si'if 1 that there is no automatic chezkas kashrus
when dealing with somebody selling wine or meat or other things in which there 
is a chashash of issur and you cannot buy from him without knowing something 
about him (but that you can still eat by him as a guest based on the principle 
of chezkas kashrus!).

Thus chezkas kashrus is about not even needing to ask the person or know 
anything about them, but it would seem to relate to another halachic concept 
which is also applicable to food, that of eid echad ne'eman b'issurin.  The 
Shulchan Aruch discusses this in Yoreh Deah siman 127 si'if 3.  There are 
various different aspects of this principle, which relate to whether (in the 
case of food) the food is naturally established as forbidden, and needs some 
action to make it mutar (eg an animal cannot be eaten and needs to be shechted 
to make it mutar) or whether it is something that is not in and of itself 
established as being assur.  Very simplistically (and based on the Rema there) 
if it is something that is established as being assur, then you can only rely 
on the person saying it is kosher if they have the power to metaken it (eg 
tevel) but if it is not established as an issur (shelo hukzak) then you can 
rely more generally.

Now in order to answer the question as to whether or not we can continue to 
rely on the principles of eid echad ne'eman b'ssurin in today's world I think 
it important to go back to the source.  The principle is learnt from the 
fact that we trust a woman to count and complete her nidda cycle correctly 
("safra la").

Now it may come as a shock to some of you who only inhabit the rarified 
atmosphere of Avodah, but your average woman is not and has never been, 
throughout history, exactly baki b'shas poskim.  And the laws of niddah and 
counting and mikvah are extremely complicated (in fact on this list we have 
recently had a discussion about veset kavuah, where there has been some level 
of confusion about what is or isn't a vest kavuah, remembering that if one 
thinks one has a vest kavuah and one does not, there is at least likely to be 
a violation of at least a d'rabbanan).  And yet the halacha of eid echad 
b'issurin is learnt out from what is and has been, historically, the most 
ignorant group within klal yisroel, and it is learnt out in relation to a 
matter that if messed up is potentially an issur kares.  Not to impune the 
yiras shamayim of bnos yisroel over the years.  But it is of course eminently 
possible that somebody may have the highest level of yiras shamayim, and yet 
not be able to deal with complex halachas such as counting and mikvah. And yet 
the risks in relation to hilchos nida, compared to the risks of kashrus, even 
in this day and age of increased kashrus complexity, are extremely serious. 

This is not to suggest that you are to stop trusting your wives (or that you 
should be insisting that before you marry them, you put them through three 
years of a toenet course).  That would, inter alia, tear apart the delicate 
fabric that makes for the interpersonal relations in a marriage.

But I think that this analysis gives some insight into the risks associated 
with a wholesale destruction of the concept of eid echad ne'eman b'issurin and 
chezkas kashrus in situations where the allegations are not as to corruption 
or risk thereof, but as to limits on knowledge.

But that and the previous discussion links us into the other matter that seems 
to keep getting blurred in this discussion.  The difference between what might 
be called l'chatchila and bideved.

What I mean by l'chatchila is what you as an individual choose to purchase in 
the shops and bring into your house or where you choose to eat when you are 
travelling in Israel and can freely choose to select restuarant X over 
restuarant Y (whether on grounds of the hashgacha or the decor or whatever you 
choose) or you are the baal hasimcha choosing the caterer.  That can be called 
l'chatchila - you can freely choose to eat or not eat without there being any 
issues of interpersonal relations.

However, there are a second set of issues that arise where you  do not have 
the same level of control.  When you are invited to somebody else's house, 
when somebody else sends you food (eg for a shiva), when somebody else invites 
you to a simcha.  This is b'dieved in kashrus terms, because if you try and 
exert the same level of control over kashrus as you would if you were doing 
your own buying you run into other halachic issues, inter alia, the halachas 
governing interpersonal relations.

There appears at least in some posts to be an assumption that the standards 
that should be applied when the situation is this kind of l'chatchila are the 
same standards that should be applied when this kind of bideved, despite the 
fact that in some of the bideved situations you might thereby be over on 
various d'orisas or vadai d'rabbanans in the way you relate to other people.  
And this blanket rule would seem to be being applied even in circumstances 
where the kashrus violations are at most a safek d'rabbanan (eg you don't know 
if there is a problem, you only know that their might be because X might not 
know enough about a question, on which there are rabbinic opinions both way in 
any event).

And I would go further - even the suggestion of not trusting people and 
constantly looking over other people's shoulder (or making it known that you 
don't trust people so that people don't even think of inviting you) in non 
commercial contexts runs the risk of damaging the fabric of the relationship 
of klal yisroel zeh l'zeh, in the same way that if you spend you life trying 
to check on your wife, you are liable not to have much of a marriage left.  
Marriages are built on trust, so is a kahal.  A marriage is not a business, 
neither is the relationship of an individual to another within a kahal.  If we 
start applying the same standards to interpersonal relationships that are 
correctly applied to businesses, then we can destroy those relationships.  My 
concern about the levels of suspicion that has become the norm in today's 
society is that it is ultimately tearing at the roots of what it means, or 
should mean, to be a community. And that unfortunately that aspect of things  
often fails to be considered when the question is looked at despite the wealth 
of material throughout the sources on the value to be placed on trust.

Regards

Chana
Chana Luntz

----------------------------------------------
This mail sent through http://www.ukonline.net

> Now, you ask whether a store owner has a chezkas kashrus, given the
> fact that he is frum. That is a different issue, given the fact that
> the store owner may have a pecuniary interest in cutting corners.
> The answer to this question was provided by none other than yourself,
> on January 19 on Areivim:
[...]
> The shaila was brought to the Chasam Sofer who paskened that he did
> need supervision on his butcher shop. The reasoning was that when it
> came to shechitah, it did matter if the animal was kosher or not. The
> shochet got paid for shechting, regardless of whether the animal was
> kosher or treif. However, when it comes to the butcher shop, there is
> money involved. In short, the owner is nogeah b'davar. Thus the Chasam
> Sofer paskened that the shochet needs hashgocho on his butcher shop.
> It would seem that given this, and I do not know the exact source, that
> every person who has a business that sells food requires supervision,
> no matter how observant the owner may be.

Neither the Mechaber nor the Rema, however, makes any such distinction.
The Mechaber holds that any Jew who is not known to be suspect may be
trusted on kashrut, while the Rema holds that one must positively know
the person to be an observant Jew. Both agree that a person who appears
to be frum and trustworthy may be trusted on kashrut, whether at home
or at his place of business.

Nor does this principle seem to be followed in frum communities that I've
seen. In Melbourne when I was growing up and the community was smaller,
nobody bothered with hechsherim for businesses, if they would eat in
the proprietor's home. And in Borough Park Ir Hakodesh there is Mrs
Rubashkin's restaurant, which has no hechsher at all, yet I doubt that
there are many people who have the slightest qualm about eating there.
They rely on the proprietress's own hechsher just as they would in
her home.

(Of course, this chezkat kashrut only applies to what the person is
capable of knowing. If he is ignorant either of halacha or of food
manufacturing, then all his ne'emanut and tzidkut will not help, since
he doesn't himself know whether what he is offering is kosher, and it
may be that he doesn't know that he doesn't know.)

Couple of corrections on the post below - I see that the reference
to the Rambam has missed as word, it is halachos "macholos" assuros.
And I think I said toenet where I meant yo'etzet.

Writing too quickly too late at night.

Chana

RYGB writes:
>This whole conversation mystifies me. Does no one remember that there is
>a Meseches Demai (currently being studied as the Daf Yomi Yerushalmi)?
>Ne'emanus is not automatic by any stretch of the imagination. It is a
>privilege that is earned (Chaveirus) not an automatic right.

I think we are confusing a whole range of issues here that probably need
to get disentangled.

The first is how we deal with people who are already established as being
suspect in terms of kashrus. And indeed the Yerushalmi on Demai is the
place to start (as I brought in my previous posting on the subject in
Avodah Volume 16 : Number 095). The situation with demai was that it
came to the attention of chazal that many people were lax when it came
to the d'orisa obligation (chayav misa) of taking trumos and ma'asros,
and therefore Yochanan Cohen Gadol enacted the prohibition of demai. I am
not aware of any suggestion that the reason that the amei ha'aretz did not
take terumos and ma'asros was because the subject was too complicated for
them (ie that they were doing their best) - rather it was acknowledged was
that they were in fact taking teruma gedola (which is not expensive to do)
but not taking the rest (which costs considerably more) so at least by
implication the reason would seem to be monetary, rather than ignorance.

Even in that case of demai, or where you have somebody who fits into
the category of suspect of issurim or is known to be in violation of a
particular matter, there are various halachic developments and discussions
about how to deal with them - which is what I discussed in my previous
post referred to above, ie it may be appropriate in certain circumstances
to take certain leniencies vis a vis kashrus that one would not normally
take (such as eating demai, or pas akum) because of the importance of
good relations.

Hezkas kashrus is somewhat different. It is part of a general concept that
one does not assume that a stam Jew does averos. In relation to food, it
is perhaps most clearly set out in the Rambam Hilchos Assuros perek 11,
halacha 26 "one who is a guest by a baal habayis in any place and in any
time (b'kol makom u'b'kol zman) and he brings him wine or meat or cheese,
or a piece of fish behold this is permitted and he does not need (aino
tzorech) to ask upon it even though he does not know him except that
he knows that he is a Jew. But if it is known *huchzak sheano kasher"
v'eano medakdek b'divarim elu assur l'oreiach etzlo."

However the consensus of opinion regarding a chezkas kashrus is very much
in relation to the scenario set out by the Rambam above of a baal habayis.
once we get into somebody who is selling something for a profit, there are
several machlokusim amongst the rishonim (some hold the chezkas kashrus
applies but only within Eretz Yisroel for example) and the Rema poskens in
Yoreh Deah siman 119 si'if 1 that there is no automatic chezkas kashrus
when dealing with somebody selling wine or meat or other things in which
there is a chashash of issur and you cannot buy from him without knowing
something about him (but that you can still eat by him as a guest based
on the principle of chezkas kashrus!).

Thus chezkas kashrus is about not even needing to ask the person or know
anything about them, but it would seem to relate to another halachic
concept which is also applicable to food, that of eid echad ne'eman
b'issurin. The Shulchan Aruch discusses this in Yoreh Deah siman 127 si'if
3. There are various different aspects of this principle, which relate
to whether (in the case of food) the food is naturally established as
forbidden, and needs some action to make it mutar (eg an animal cannot
be eaten and needs to be shechted to make it mutar) or whether it is
something that is not in and of itself established as being assur. Very
simplistically (and based on the Rema there) if it is something that is
established as being assur, then you can only rely on the person saying it
is kosher if they have the power to metaken it (eg tevel) but if it is not
established as an issur (shelo hukzak) then you can rely more generally.

Now in order to answer the question as to whether or not we can continue
to rely on the principles of eid echad ne'eman b'ssurin in today's world
I think it important to go back to the source. The principle is learnt
from the fact that we trust a woman to count and complete her nidda
cycle correctly ("safra la").

Now it may come as a shock to some of you who only inhabit the rarified
atmosphere of Avodah, but your average woman is not and has never been,
throughout history, exactly baki b'shas poskim. And the laws of niddah
and counting and mikvah are extremely complicated (in fact on this
list we have recently had a discussion about veset kavuah, where there
has been some level of confusion about what is or isn't a vest kavuah,
remembering that if one thinks one has a vest kavuah and one does not,
there is at least likely to be a violation of at least a d'rabbanan).
And yet the halacha of eid echad b'issurin is learnt out from what is and
has been, historically, the most ignorant group within klal yisroel, and
it is learnt out in relation to a matter that if messed up is potentially
an issur kares. Not to impune the yiras shamayim of bnos yisroel over
the years. But it is of course eminently possible that somebody may
have the highest level of yiras shamayim, and yet not be able to deal
with complex halachas such as counting and mikvah. And yet the risks in
relation to hilchos nida, compared to the risks of kashrus, even in this
day and age of increased kashrus complexity, are extremely serious.

This is not to suggest that you are to stop trusting your wives (or that
you should be insisting that before you marry them, you put them through
three years of a toenet course). That would, inter alia, tear apart the
delicate fabric that makes for the interpersonal relations in a marriage.

But I think that this analysis gives some insight into the risks
associated with a wholesale destruction of the concept of eid echad
ne'eman b'issurin and chezkas kashrus in situations where the allegations
are not as to corruption or risk thereof, but as to limits on knowledge.

But that and the previous discussion links us into the other matter that
seems to keep getting blurred in this discussion. The difference between
what might be called l'chatchila and bideved.

What I mean by l'chatchila is what you as an individual choose to purchase
in the shops and bring into your house or where you choose to eat when
you are travelling in Israel and can freely choose to select restuarant
X over restuarant Y (whether on grounds of the hashgacha or the decor or
whatever you choose) or you are the baal hasimcha choosing the caterer.
That can be called l'chatchila - you can freely choose to eat or not
eat without there being any issues of interpersonal relations.

However, there are a second set of issues that arise where you do not have
the same level of control. When you are invited to somebody else's house,
when somebody else sends you food (eg for a shiva), when somebody else
invites you to a simcha. This is b'dieved in kashrus terms, because if
you try and exert the same level of control over kashrus as you would
if you were doing your own buying you run into other halachic issues,
inter alia, the halachas governing interpersonal relations.

There appears at least in some posts to be an assumption that the
standards that should be applied when the situation is this kind of
l'chatchila are the same standards that should be applied when this kind
of bideved, despite the fact that in some of the bideved situations you
might thereby be over on various d'orisas or vadai d'rabbanans in the
way you relate to other people.

And this blanket rule would seem to be being applied even in circumstances
where the kashrus violations are at most a safek d'rabbanan (eg you don't
know if there is a problem, you only know that their might be because
X might not know enough about a question, on which there are rabbinic
opinions both way in any event).

And I would go further - even the suggestion of not trusting people and
constantly looking over other people's shoulder (or making it known that
you don't trust people so that people don't even think of inviting you)
in non commercial contexts runs the risk of damaging the fabric of the
relationship of klal yisroel zeh l'zeh, in the same way that if you
spend you life trying to check on your wife, you are liable not to have
much of a marriage left. Marriages are built on trust, so is a kahal.
A marriage is not a business, neither is the relationship of an individual
to another within a kahal. If we start applying the same standards to
interpersonal relationships that are correctly applied to businesses,
then we can destroy those relationships. My concern about the levels
of suspicion that has become the norm in today's society is that it is
ultimately tearing at the roots of what it means, or should mean, to be
a community. And that unfortunately that aspect of things often fails
to be considered when the question is looked at despite the wealth of
material throughout the sources on the value to be placed on trust.

Chana Luntz

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