Avodah Mailing List

Volume 14 : Number 067

Monday, January 31 2005

• Reb Yisroel Salanter and Kabbalah (Avodah V14 #62)
• The purpose of creation according to Chovos haLvavos
• Age of the Universe
• Re: R. Mordechai Eliyahu on the reason for the tsunami
• Calculating the End
• Singing in Shower
• 'kabbolas ol malchus shomayim' at public gatherings
• Guide II:25 New Translation
• RE: R. Mordechai Eliyahu on the reason for the tsunami
• Re: Why are you sleeping?
• Free Will and Environment
• Re: Torah and Science - Rav Dessler
• Re: A of the U
• Age of the Universe
• Re: Torah and Science
• The purpose of creation according to Chovos haLvavos
• Re: The purpose of creation according to Chovos haLvavos
• RE: R. Mordechai Eliyahu on the reason for the tsunami
• Reb Yisroel Salanter and Kabbalah
• Re: Electricity on Shabbat
• Electricity on Shabbat
• Re: Electricity on Shabbat

On Tue, Jan 25, 2005  Micha Berger wrote:
> It can't be "did not give any expression ... if in fact he did learn",
> as Rav Itzele Blazer expressed knowledge of his learning qabalah. What
> he did not do was teach qabbalah. R' Hillel Goldberg's assessment is
> more loyal to the source.

> I find it quite odd. The opening chapters of Etkes's book set the
> historical context of Rav Yisra'el and the rise of the mussar movement
> in terms of a sequence from the Gra and R' Chaim Vilozhiner. Given that
> context, could R' Yisra'el Salanter have succeeded in gaining a following
> if his contemporaries had doubts about his knowledge of qabalah?

Rabbi Nathan Kaminetsky, the author of  Making of a Godol, sent the 
following to me:

On pages 845-846 I quote "Hever Ma'amarim II" (Brooklyn, 5729), p. 174 -
this is a sepher of shmuessen of R' Yeruham Levovitz (the name of the book
and its contents are in Hebrew, a language which my email server does not
type) - that "R' [Shlomo] Elyashiv [author of the Leshem Kabala series]
once rode with the Salanter and mustered the courage to ask him why he
did not study Kabala. R' Yisrael replied, 'What difference does it make
to me in which firmament G-d dwells? One thing I know: that [a sinner]
will be struck with fiery rods, and it will be very painful. That the
blows will be fiery, I know clearly - and what else [should interest
me]?'" The translation from the Hebrew is my own. I do not have the
Hever Ma'amarim handy to look up again, so I hope you will be satisfied
with the above. I do recall that this talk of R' Yeruham centers on the
imperative of a person moving gradually, from the level on which he stands
to the next and so onward, and not trying to skip steps in his spiritual
development. This is how R' Levovitz understood R' Yisrael's words.

Yitzchok Levine

I got back to the beginning of Chovos haLvavos, and I'm having a problem
understanding the opening words of the haqdamah.

R' Bachya seems to be saying that Hashem created the world in order to
prove to us His Unity. But isn't that circular? There wouldn't be an
"us" to have to prove it to had He not created the world!

-mi

To contribute a point: According to Sefer Hatemuna, which teh Ramchal
"poskins" like, there are 10 thousand years altogether. When Moschiach
comes in the 7th cycle, we begin upward progression into Yetsirah,
Beriah and Atzilus, so that the at end the world rises into the level of
Atsilus. I don't know how this relates to cycles of 7000 years each. I
will, bl"n try to look it up in the Ramchal.

M. Levin

In  Avodah V14 #66 dated 1/30/2005 "Schoemann, Danny" <schoemann@lucent.com>
writes:
> ...Either way, Hashem decided in advance that a quarter million people
> would perish very suddenly and very tragically. Assuming He did this for
> no reason is absurd - it would be equivalent to saying He did it for the
> "fun of it", chalilo. Assuming He did this for a reason, but we are not
> supposed to guess at that reason, essentially means He did it for no
> reason. Conclusion: He did it for a reason, and we're supposed to make
> an educated guess as to what it is, and try learn something from it....

I'm glad you wrote, I have been feeling very irritated all along at
the line that goes, "We can't possibly know the reason for tragedy and
it's wrong to even try to speculate" which, as you say, has the practical
result of declaring that for all practical purposes, G-d kills millions of
people for no reason. And also has the further result that no one tries
to change, fix, or correct anything, so that it becomes self-fulfilling:
G-d has no positive results in mind and we will make sure that no positive
good results from this catastrophe.

Someone wrote--sorry don't remember who, so can't give credit--that if you
draw the "wrong" conclusion from tragedy and accidentally do teshuva for
something other than the sin you were "supposed" to do teshuva for, well,
there has still been a net benefit. At least you improved in SOMETHING.
But if you say, "I don't know why it happened so I will assume there is
no lesson for me" then there is no net benefit to you or to the world.
Surely "no net benefit" cannot be part of G-d's intention, whatever His
intention is.

 -Toby  Katz
=============

In the thread "Torah and Science - Rav Dessler", R' Micha Berger wrote: <<< The Gra identifies the 6 days with the subsequent 6 millenia, >>>

Lots of other people have said similar things, of course. I'm just using this one as an example. My question is:

We are told (Rambam, Melachim 12:2) not to calculate the end. Don't these sort of statements constitute exactly that? It is a very commonly held belief that the seventh millenium will be some sort of universal Shabbos. The nature of that Shabbos is not crystal clear, but I often shudder to think of how many disillusioned Jews might abandon Torah if the year 6001 (or 7001?) arrives before Moshiach does.

(I am similarly curious about past events. Did the ordinary Jew of Bayis Rishon or Bayis Sheni know of the possibility that they would end up being temporary structures, or were they under the impression that they'd be permanent -- like so many people today say about Bayis Shlishi?)

Akiva Miller

From: Micha Berger <micha@aishdas.org>
> One LOR (who happens to also be a dayan and a rebbe-chaveir) holds that
> me'ikkar hadin it's only outhouses and portapotties. That the flush
> toilet reduced the inyan to lifnim mishuras hadin status.

> BTW, in the winter, most people had a chamber pot, and yet woke up, said
> Modeh Ani, washed neigl vasr and continued the early morning tefilos in
> that room.

I remember a shiur on that, I think it was from Rabbi Frand, He discussed
the chamber pot issue, but he also discussed the beis hkesei parsi.
That was apparently an out house with a diagnol chute that removed the
filth from the area. That did not hae a status of a beis hakise.

The question discussed was our modern bathrooms. Does one have to do
netillat yadayim if one enters the restroom to rinse ones hand or to
get something from the medicine cabinet. He brought down a Tshuvah
(it may have been from R' Moshe) that said that while our toilets are
clean after being flushed, there is a period of time tha the filth is
in there, and thus it it not the same as teh Beis Hakise ha Parsi which
the waste went away immediately.

  Harry J. Weiss
hjweiss@panix.com

I got some responses after my posting on this topic earlier this week -
in private e-mails and orally - which I would like to share.

1) Rabbi Joshua Hoffman (<JoshHoff@aol.com> - he gave me permission to
share his response) sent that 'Rav Meir Don Plotzki did this when he spoke
at a Kenesiah Gedolah, or some other gathering of Agudas Yisroel. At the
end of his speech he asked people to be mekabel ol malchus shmayim by
saying Shema together, which they did. It is recorded in his Keli Chemda,
but I don't remember where, offhand.'

Does anyone know more about this ? I suspect that this is significant,
as some of the gatherings that I referred to as having done it, were
connected to Agudath Israel.

2) Another private e-mailer (I don't know if he wants his name given,
so will omit it) stated "Without addressing your specific questions, I
just wanted to point out that the Sh'ma, Boruch Shem, Hashem hu haElokim
sequence is not limited to Yom Kippur. It is also part of the Yom Kippur
Katan slichos."

3) Someone I spoke to offline claimed that they only say shema and not
the other things I mentioned at the gatherings. Is that correct ? He
also told me that certain Hassidim do something similar (say Shema)
during 'sholosh seudos'.

Mordechai

"Micha Berger" <micha@aishdas.org> posted 27 Jan 2005: 
> jjbaker@panix.com wrote:
>> There is a new translation of the Dalalat al-Ha`irin...
>>> The second criterion..As I read it: It's okay to allegorize G-d's
>>>"Hand", because only fools think that [the literal understanding]'s
>>>what the pasuq means. Intelligent people, including baalei mesorah does
>>>not take that position.

> See also the last two paragraphs in that edition of the pereq. Only
> someone who isn't a "bar da'as" would think they're literal. And if
> Aristotle were shown to be correct conclusively, the Rambam conludes
> "haTorah kulah haysah mevateles, vehayu misqablos dei'os acheiros."* The
> Torah can stand on a historical issue so strongly that disproving the
> claim would disprove the Torah. Of course, such claims would never be
> disproven, the eventuality would never occur -- emes is emes.

*And in case anyone's wondering why the Rambam doesn't say the requisite
"c"v" (chas v'chalila), he supplies it in II:28:

MANY of our coreligionists thought that King Solomon believed in the
Eternity of the Universe. This is very strange. How can we suppose that
any one that adheres to the Law of Moses, our Teacher, should accept that
theory? If we were to assume that Solomon has on this point, *G-D FORBID*
[Kapah: "chas v'chalila], deviated from the Law of Moses [by asserting
the universe is eternal--ZL], the question would be asked, Why did most
of the Prophets and of the Sages accept it of him? ...

P.S. Rabbi Berger signed off with: 
>   You will never "find" time for anything.
>       If you want time, you must make it.
>                    - Charles Buxton

You weren't thinking of /me/, were you?

Zvi Lampel

P.P.S. Can a nivrah truly "make time"? (:-)

"Assuming He did this for a reason, but we are not supposed to guess at
that reason, essentially means He did it for no reason."

There is a glaring flaw in the logic of this statement. Just because
we can't understand something, doesn't make it not so. You are saying
"Assuming He did this for a reason" means that He did it "for no reason"
if "we are not supposed to guess at that reason." All I can say is
"Wow!" That would be like saying: "Assuming G-d created the world, but
we don't believe he created the world, essentially means he didn't create
the world." That makes no sense. One is not contingent upon the other.

This very issue is dealt with in the book of Iyov and the high point
of the book is arguably chapter 28. Wisdom is not within Man's reach;
however, Job finds justification for his life in the acceptance of
the statement, "Awe of G-d contains wisdom, and to depart from evil is
understanding" (28:28). This is one of the great, climactic moments in the
Book. G-d's absolute wisdom, the moral order over which He rules, lies
forever hidden from our finite minds. G-d's words from the whirlwind,
"Where were you when I laid the foundations of the earth...?" (38:4)
do not uncover the justice hidden in creation; rather, they prove man's
lowliness. Man cannot answer the question.

The first few sentences in chapter 30 of Mishlei is a reply to some
questions put forward by Ithiel and Ukhal about Divine Providence. Agur
answers that he is incapable of understanding the mind of the human being,
so how much less dare he presume to try to comprehend the working of
the Infinite Mind! What could be more powerful.

In other words, this is saying just the opposite of those who posit G-d's
reasons for the Tzunami, the shoah, etc. etc. One of the most damaging
and outrageous statements made by a talmid chakham was several years ago
when a busload of children were killed in Israel and the reason given was
that their parents' mezuzot were not kosher. Did this rabbi consider the
pain, anguish and agmas nefesh he needlessly caused the family members
and friends!

I believe we are treading on very dangerous ground once we start to speak
for G-d. Yes, we are supposed to search our ways and to constantly perform
a cheshbon nefesh, but it is foolish to assume that we must guess at the
reasons for G-d's behavior. We have more than enough to worry about our
own behavior.

Richard Wolberg

On Sat, Jan 22, 2005 at 07:43:23PM +0000, Chana Luntz wrote:
: Is not the position you seem to be citing very close to that of Rav Ami
: (Shabbas 55a) "ain misa b'lo chet v'ain yissurim b'lo avon" and this
: is the one position the gemora specifically rejects (v'teufta d' R'
: Ami teufta on 55b).

However, I think it's closer to your own position than R' Ami's.

: This does not, it seems to me obliterate a concept that there may be
: times when we are obligated to try and find meaning in suffering, but
: I am not sure that any one position on this is always the right one.

Isn't that an infinite regress? Didn't both you and I propose
different "we can't know" answers? In which case, how can we include
such non-answers in the choice of possible positions? Im kein, one is
including the plurality within itself.

To me, the notion that Chazal offered many answers to the tragedies in
chumash (e.g. the death of Nadav vaAvihu) or later ones (eg the two
churbanos) is that they saw that no one answer sufficed. Can we turn this
idea into a "one answer" which itself doesn't suffice?

And if not, how does this last sentence apply to either of our statements?

-mi

-- 
Micha Berger             I slept and dreamt that life was joy.
micha@aishdas.org        I awoke and found that life was duty.
http://www.aishdas.org   I worked and, behold -- duty is joy.
Fax: (270) 514-1507                        - Rabindranath Tagore

[The following, slightly modified for difference in medium,
appeared on my blog <http://www.aishdas.org> "Aspaqlaria" at
<http://www.aishdas.org/asp/2005/01/free-will-and-environment.shtml>.

I noticed a result of combinging two previous divrei Torah. Before
reading the following, see Bemachashavah Techilah for parshiyos
Bo <http://www.aishdas.org/mesukim/5764/bo.pdf> and Beshalach
<http://www.aishdas.org/mesukim/5764/beshalach.pdf>. In the first, I
explore the question of Hashem making it impossible for Par'oh to change
his mind. Isn't that a violation of Par'oh's free will? I elaborate
on the Sefornu's answer that in truth, Par'oh's witnessing miracles
was a supernatural intervention that influence his decision. Hashem's
preventing Par'oh from remaking his decisions based on that evidence
actually preserved his free will from such supernatural intervention. This
is why the Torah's shift from saying that Par'oh immobilized his own
heart to saying that Hashem did it was with makas shechin (boils), the
plague that made his magicians "unable to stand before Par'oh". At that
point he no longer had a balance between miracle and magic, and miracle
could unduly influence him.

On parashas Beshalach I presented the Maharal's view, that miracles
in fact could occur all the time -- if we were on the level to observe
them. And so for Yehushua and the Jewish people, the sun stood still; but
for the rest of the world, nature ran its course. Rav Dessler explains
this idea further. Someone who lives a more physical lifestyle sees the
laws of physics as absolute. And the higher law, involving notions of
justice, oppression, right, wrong, etc... seems more relative. However,
to someone who lives his life focusing on the higher plane, the laws of
nature seem relative, and the higher law becomes absolute. That's how
the same liquid could be water and blood simultaneously, physical reality
became a relative thing. To Rav Dessler, this is an extension of the idea
that when a shoemaker walks down the street, he sees a see of shoes; when
a taylor walks down the same steet, he all he sees is clothing. People
see what they're attuned to see -- even nature vs miracle.

However, I noticed since writing those divrei Torah for Mesukim MiDevash
that in fact the plagues were a reversal of this order. The righteous
experienced nature, to them water remained water, but the baser community,
the Egyptians, experienced its miraculous tranformation into blood. This
observation is not made by Rav Dessler, and this is not Rav Dessler's
resolution of the question of Par'ohs free will. But it would seem to me
that perhaps this is why the plagues in particular would be a violation
of free will.

Psychologists debate the roles of nature vs. nurture in forming human
nature. But by focusing on this debate, one is looking at the initial
formation of personality, how a person is shaped before they take the
reins of their own life. People have free will, they have the power to
shape themselves.

Often people have little control over the world around them and what
happens to them. In fact, the primary choice people have is how they
choose to react internally to a situation, the choice of how they perceive
what's happening.

See the famous optical illusion "My Wife and My Mother-in-Law" by WE
Hill at <http://mathworld.wolfram.com/gifs/young3.gif>. Which woman one
sees is a choice of perception.

Usually, the only person who witnesses a miracle is seeing the world
though his own perspective. The miracle only proves the perspective he
himself brings to the world. "In the path that a person wants to go,
thats the way they take him." This wasn't true of the makkos. But this
is not only true of most miracles, this is true of all the events we
witness in our own lives. Our lives may be determined by our environment,
but what elements of our environment come to the forefront and which
remain in the background lies within our choice.

See <http://mathworld.wolfram.com/gimg2235.gif> for a popular illustration
of the power of choosing foreground vs background.

On Thu, 27 Jan 2005 23:33:55 -0500 Micha Berger wrote:
> It is interesting to follow the parallel between REED's mashal and Davies'
> to explore how REED's position compares to R' Yaakov ("Gerald") Shroeder's
> resolution of the time of creation issue. To start: both dismiss the
> notion that 6 days does not rule out it also being something else.

No doubt. However, with Gerald Schroeder, the "something else" is
a slowing down of the flow of real time due to gravitational forces
which existed in different parts of the universe, whereas in REED, the
focus seems to be on the *perception* of time due to the overwhelmingly
spiritual nature of the universe at its inception. With Schroeder,
the primary focus of the book is the resolution of a 15 billion year
universe with the account of creation in the Torah which seems to be
describing a relatively recent event. With REED, the focus of the maamar
is the spirituality of creation which pervades our world, how it was
felt, in which way it was related to, and in what way it was achieved
by man during the six days of creation versus the six millennia of our
world. Thus, the "something else" here is the *perception* of the flow
of time as it relates to man's level of ruchnius during these two eras.

Accordingly, the second quotation of the Ramban (2:3) sometimes discusses
the dynamic of the relationship between these two eras using terminology
such as "remez" or "kineged", versus sometimes describing it as "hu",
it is. The first is a description keeping the physical properties of
these two eras in mind (which is primarily the way human beings think or
relate to things) and thus, 6 days is only a "remez" to 6000 years. The
second is a description of the spirituality that binds these two eras
and from this perspective, they are actually one and the same. The sixth
millennium is actually the sixth day.

In other maamarim, REED expounds upon this concept at length based
on a well-known Ramchal. The Ramchal states that Adam Harishon was
capable of accomplishing, with his one bechira, what is now taking us
6000 years. Each one of the spiritual revelations of the first six days
(referred to by the original quote of the Ramban as sefiros) was supposed
to be used by AH in one powerful conclusive bechira to elevate himself
and the beriah to a matzav of olam habba, the ultimate spirituality. Thus,
our bechiros are just nitzotzos of Adam HaRishon's original bechira. This
also is the idea of tikkun chet Adam Harishon which tzadikim throughout
the generations have strived to achieve.

Simcha Coffer

On Fri, 28 Jan 2005 08:44:28 -0500 Yosef Gavriel & Shoshanah M. Bechhofer
wrote:
> Let me note that my last post merely came to prove that according to
> most opinions the world is older than 5765 years. I am not necessarily
> advocating the position that it is billions of years old. However, those
> who do advocate such a position need not find in Chazal or the Rishonim
> a source that says that the world is billions of years old. Those who
> maintain that position are of the opinion that the Beriah itself, as
> chosamo shel HKB"H emes, makes that point. 

By this RYGB is apparently referring to the theory of evolution. These
theories are not "chosamo shel HKB"H" by any stretch of the imagination.
They are simply theories that are still being debated today, 145 years
after they were first postulated. The theory itself has "evolved" several
times since Darwin originally proposed it making it almost unrecognizable
from its original form.

First of all, the spontaneously generated appearance of life, which,
primitive as it might sound, was the commonly accepted method of
understanding life, was subsequently disproved by Lois Pasteur. Variation
(alternatively referred to as modification), which Darwin assumed was
accomplished via beneficial characteristics acquired during the lifetime
of an organism and inherited by the subsequent generation via a Lamarckian
type mechanism, was subsequently disproved by the experiments of a German
Monk named Mendel.

Even the mechanism (such as natural selection) of evolution is not
universally accepted; several different methods have been proposed to
achieve evolutionary adaptation. There were so many things wrong with
the theory that scientists had to throw the book out and rewrite it
again. Thus, Theodosius Dobzhansky, Ernst Mayr and Julian Huxley (amongst
others) convened a meeting of the Geological Society of America in 1941
and Neo-Darwinism was born. Up until this day, the theory is still in
flux and by no means can be identified with "chosamo shel HKB"H", which
implies stability and assuredness.

> All we need to prove is that it is tenable to say the world is billions
> of years old, as it is not in contradiction to Chazal or the Rishonim,
> and then, BINGO!

Why? Since when do we as Jews postulate grandiose theories (that appear
to be in contradiction to open pesukim) without recourse to Chazal or
Rishonim? This is a very dangerous attitude because it paves the way for
all kinds of prevarications to be foisted upon the unsuspecting public
and subsequently be accepted as Jewish tradition or dogma. Us Jews,
maaminim bnei maaminim, believe in the Torah and in Chazal; they are
the ultimate repository of all of our ideology. If no hint of billions
of years can be found there, it would behove us to categorically reject
the notion. Like Chazal say, "hafoch ba v'hafoch ba, dikulo ba"... "ve'im
hu reik, mee'kem hu reik".

In fact, this was the very consideration which animated Rabbi Aryeh
Kaplan to write his book on the age of the universe. He writes "A number
of approaches have been proposed to resolve this problem...Our concern,
however, is not merely to resolve the question, but to do so in a manner
firmly based on Torah teachings. That is to say, we seek a solution that
is actually found in the classical Torah literature."

Simcha Coffer 

Posted by: Mlevinmd@aol.com
>"poskins" like, there are 10 thousand years altogether. When Moschiach
>comes in the 7th cycle, we begin upward progression into Yetsirah,
>Beriah and Atzilus....

Here is the source and it is slightly different than I expressed but
basically the same - Pischei Chochma VDass 21-23.

M. Levin

On Fri, 28 Jan 2005 00:50:37 -0500 Micha Berger wrote:
> From the opposite direction, what's significantly worse about the
> evolution of man? Need Hashem's making clay from afar min ha'adah rule
> out that the process was the evoution of homo sapiens, and into one homo
> sapien He breathed a ru'ach memalela?

The mashmaus of the pasuk certainly seems to say so. The pasuk seems
to say that the FIRST man that was ever created was already endowed
with a ruach memalela. Besides, Chazal certainly seem to learn this
pasuk this way as they ask "lamah nivra haadam yechidi" which implies
that only one man was created initially and it is the one referred
to in this pasuk. Otherwise, how would Chazal know that he was born
"yechidi"? Besides, according to the theory of evolution, homo sapiens
evolved from Neanderthals (at different rates depending on geographical
locations) such that six thousand years ago, there were millions of
homo-sapiens in Africa and Europe that could easily be described as
ruach memalela (literally, a living creature endowed with the capacity
of speech). And although we know that nishmas chaim means much more than
that, the Targum's peshat must also be reckoned with such that it can
fit into the scheme of evolution and if it doesn't, either evolution
must be rejected or the Targum. To my mind, the pesukim in the Torah
are simply incompatible with the theory of evolution. Ask any Christian
fundamentalist :-)

Simcha Coffer

From: Micha Berger <micha@aishdas.org>
>R' Bachya seems to be saying that Hashem created the world in order to
>prove to us His Unity. But isn't that circular -- there wouldn't be an
>"us" to have to prove it to had He not created the world!

Note: I am not taking the time right now to look at the ChL.

The Ramchal, however, says that it is to prove that geshem and ruach
can constitute a unity.

YGBG 

On Mon, Jan 31, 2005 at 08:50:47AM -0500, RYGB wrote:
: The Ramchal, however, says that it is to prove that geshem and ruach
: can constitute a unity.

"It is the nature of good to have someone to whom to be good."
						- Derekh Hashem 1:2:1
According to the Ramchal, we exist so that Hashem has someone to be good
to.

In Emunos veDei'os, Rav Saadia Gaon makes pretty much the same point.

-mi

-- 
Micha Berger             Spirituality is like a bird: if you tighten
micha@aishdas.org        your grip on it, it chokes; slacken your grip,
http://www.aishdas.org   and it flies away.
Fax: (270) 514-1507                            - Rav Yisrael Salanter

In my opinion, it is absurdly ethnocentric to assume that 250,000+
non-Jews were killed and millions more injured or displaced simply in
order to forewarn the Jews about the disengagement.

I believe we need to recall that HKB"H is concerned with the fate of all
nations (a la Yechezkel's prophecy of the destruction and rebuilding of
Egypt). And, in the long run, we do not know how the tsunami might yet
benefit these populations. But we have examples from our own history,
such as the great tragedy of the Holocaust leading to the receipt of the
EY by a Jewish government and to the burgeoning of Torah in EY and the US.

YGB

> Rabbi Nathan Kaminetsky, the author of Making of a Godol, sent the
> following to me:
> On pages 845-846 I quote "Hever Ma'amarim II" (Brooklyn, 5729), p. 174 -
> this is a sepher of shmuessen of R' Yeruham Levovitz...
> type) - that "R' [Shlomo] Elyashiv [author of the Leshem Kabala series]
> once rode with the Salanter and mustered the courage to ask him why he
> did not study Kabala. R' Yisrael replied, 'What difference does it make to
> me in which firmament G-d dwells? One thing I know: that [a sinner] will
> be struck with fiery rods, and it will be very painful. That the blows
> will be fiery, I know clearly - and what else [should interest me]?'"...

An important source but already adressed by H. Goldberg who dismisses
it as being third hand.

M. Levin

On Sat, 29 Jan 2005 23:05:31 -0500 Russell Levy wrote:
> In normal situations, use of this elevator would be prohibited
> (ignoring all other possible problems with using a shabbos elevator).

> I don't think it really matters for this if electricity is assur
> d'oraita or d'rabbanan. Is there a mistake in my reasoning?

Absolutely not. Your reasoning is sound. I just wish to add (and perhaps
you meant this) that according to most shittos, electricity is assur
because of boneh. Thus, when entering an elevator which has an infrared
beam, tripping the beam actually sends a signal to the processing unit via
a circuit thereby creating a milacha. The fact that the processing unit
is programmed to ignore the signal for five seconds does not make the
signal any less of a milachah. (In my building, the beam is deactivated
before Shabbos)

Simcha Coffer

There are two issues. One is there actually a circuit being closed or
opened? In a simple electric bulb case, if a circuit does not close
there is no problem is throwing a swich, except that it is muktseh and
needs to be done with a shinui. Your case is more complex and needs to
be investigated as to what actually happens.

The general approach to these cases now is to permit it based on the
psik reisha dlo nicha lei. The same applies to lights that go on when
you walk by or chimes in certain alarms when you passs by. Electricity
potentially being midrabanan or a minhag cetainly helps to rely on this.

M. Levin

Mlevinmd@aol.com wrote:
>There are two issues. One is there actually a circuit being closed
>or opened? In a simple electric bulb case, if a circuit does not close
>there is no problem is throwing a swich, except that it is muktseh and
>needs to be done with a shinui. Your case is more complex and needs to
>be investigated as to what actually happens.

In the case of the computer, there is a closing of a switch -- it's
not solid state electronics, and a timer is being started, so a circuit
had to close. In the case of the elevator, just by logic, if a flow of
electrons through a circuit is started by something getting in the way
of the infrared beam that could ends up causing some beeping, the same
flow of electrons must start. From what I remember from my one year in
Engineering (before I got lazy and dropped out), most IR sensors "trip
a switch" when they are set off.

>The general approach to these cases now is to permit it based on the
>psik reisha dlo nicha lei. The same applies to lights that go on when
>you walk by or chimes in certain alarms when you passs by. Electricity
>potentially being midrabanan or a minhag cetainly helps to rely on this.

But is this a case of psik reisha d'lo nicha lei? A shiur I heard online
by Rabbi Willig defined d'lo nicha lei to be something you wouldn't want
to happen if it was a weekday. Wouldn't someone want the sensor working
on a weekday?

 -Russell

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