Avodah Mailing List

Volume 14 : Number 043

Friday, December 17 2004

• Re: Torah and Science
• Fwd: Yom Tov - Chanukah - A Glaring Omission
• Re: Torah and Science [for Children]
• Re: Three angels real or a vision?
• RE: Torah and Science
• Re: Three angels real or a vision?
• Re: Kabbalah and Ikkarim
• Re: Kabbalah and Ikkarim was Re: Orthodox Conservative Rabbi
• Re: Yisrael
• Re: Kabbalah and Ikkarim
• Re: Kabbalah and Ikkarim
• Re: Kabbalah and Ikkarim was Re: Orthodox Conservative Rabbi
• Re: An Orthodox Conservative Rabbi?
• Authenticity of Zohar

> OTOH, learning basic assumptions at an early age can be problematic.
> If one is indoctrinated to believe only certain versions of the truth,
> it can result in serious questions of faith later on. It is best to keep
> a child's mind open to what ever extent possible as long as you don't
> undermine the basic Emunah. To that extent I believe that as a child
> becomes old enough to understand, it might be wise to expose them to
> different Mahalchim in understanding Maaseh Bereishis.

My experience is very diffferent. I see that emunah is a matter of
the heart and that it is a delicate flower that is easily smothered by
the crassness of our society on one end and absence of strong, widely
accepted postulates on the other. Chidren tend to make everything into an
incontrovertible fact anyway and teaching them that there are different
opinions plants only a certainly that nothing is real or true.

There is plenty of tiem to dealwith complexity at a later age when the
emotional and spiritual apparatus is mature and better able to deal with
shocks and contradictions.

M. Levin

Another answer for Chanukah's omission from the mishnah. More derashah
than anything I'd personally find historically convincing, but a nice
thought.

-mi

 -------------------- Original Message -------------------
Subject: Yom Tov - Chanukah - A Glaring Omission
From:    "Rabbi Yehudah Prero" <prero@torah.org>
Date:    Wed, December 15, 2004 11:49 am
To:      yomtov@torah.org
...

Have you ever tried to find a detailed discussion of Chanukah in
Talmud? You shouldn't try too hard: it's not there. Yes, a few highlights
of the history and some brief discussion of the Menorah-lighting are
mentioned on a few pages. However, there is no "in-depth" discussion,
let alone a tractate, devoted to Chanukah and the laws applicable on
the holiday.

The Talmud (Yoma 29a) discusses another "omission" concerning
Chanukah. "It is written (Tehilim 22), 'For the Conductor, on the Ayeles
HaShachar (brightening of dawn, according to one interpretation).' Rav
Assi said: Why was Esther compared to the dawn? To tell you that just as
the dawn is the end of the whole night, so too is the story of Esther
the end of all the miracles. What about Chanukah? -- we refer only to
those included in Scripture."

The story of the miracle of Chanukah, as this passage in the Talmud
notes, is not included in Scriptures, while the story of Purim is,
in Megillas Esther. Chanukah is omitted from discussion in the Talmud,
while the discussion of Purim in contained in an entire tractate. Clearly,
there must be a reason for this stark difference between Chanukah and
Purim. Rav Yehonasan Eybshitz comments that this difference highlights
an underlying historical difference between these two holidays.

In the Talmud (Shabbos 88a), we learn that "Raba said... they re
-- accepted it (the Torah) in the days of Achashverosh, for it is
written (in Megillas Esther), [the Jews] confirmed, and took upon them
[etc.] -- they confirmed (at the time of Purim) what they had accepted
long before. (by Mt. Sinai). The spiritual problem that existed in the
days of Mordechai and Esther was a fundamental one: the Jewish people
were lacking in their faith. People openly flaunted their disdain for
the precepts contained in the Torah and dabbled in idolatry. Upon
the threat of physical annihilation, Mordechai rallied the nation
to repent. The people saw the errors of their ways, repented, and a
miraculous turn-around of fortune occurred. The nation of Israel was
saved from the murderous hands of Haman and his willing minions. The
nation, as the Talmud states, then reaccepted the Torah upon themselves,
reaffirming the acceptance of the Torah that occurred at Mount Sinai.
However, not all was well and good with the spiritual status of the
nation of Israel after the events of Purim. Granted, no one desired any
longer to worship idols. However, a new form of heresy emerged. Groups
formed that denied fundamental Jewish beliefs. Rav Eybshitz explains
that at the time of Chanukah, there were three distinct segments of the
populace: the Perushim -- those who faithfully upheld the Torah -- both
the Written and Oral Laws; the Tzedukim -- those who, although accepting
the validity of the Written Law, disavowed any notion of a World to Come
or Resuscitation of the Dead; and lastly, the Baytusim -- those who,
although accepting the validity of the Written Law, denied the validity
of the Oral Law. Greek philosophy had infiltrated the belief system of
a segment of the population, and those who adhered faithfully to the
teachings of generations previous were in the minority.

The Chashmonaim were part of this minority group. They had to battle the
Greeks and their non-believing brethren. As we know, in the end, they were
victorious. The Chashmonaim were able to uphold the honor of the Oral Law.
In fact, the very miracle of the Menorah's oil is an illustration of one
of the precepts of Oral Law: nowhere in the Written Law do we find any
prohibition on lighting the menorah with impure oil. That law is learned
in the Oral Law, and because of the strict adherence to this precept,
the nation of Israel merited the miracle of one flask of oil lasting
for eight days, a miracle we celebrate to this day.

The Oral Law is just that -- Oral Law. It was not to be written down. Only
because of dire circumstances did our Sages allow for Mishna and then
Gemora to be transcribed and ordered. Because Chanukah is the holiday
that commemorates the reestablishment of the primacy of the Oral Law, it
was not to be recorded in the Written Law, in Scriptures. Purim, however,
was written in Scriptures as it celebrates the renewed acceptance of the
entire Torah, Written Law primarily. Perhaps, similarly, the amount of
folios dedicated to discussion of these holidays in Talmud is reflective
of this dichotomy. The Oral Law was only meant to be an aid to remembering
the entirety of the Oral Law. All of the Oral Law was not explicitly
stated therein. It was therefore appropriate that the very holiday that
commemorates the Oral Law be kept in that form of transmission to the
greatest degree possible: limited legal and historical discussion is all
that is found in the Talmud. Purim, however, does not carry with it his
same significance, and therefore it is discussed in the Talmud with the
same degree of detail as any other holiday.

Chanukah, as we know, commemorates a victory of the weak over the mighty,
the few over the many, the pure over the impure, the righteous over
the wicked, and the diligent students of the Torah over the wanton.
However, the holiday also celebrates purity -- not just of the requisite
olive oil that was needed, but of tradition. The integrity of the Oral
Law was upheld by the Chashmonaim in the face of those who did all they
could to diminish it. Tradition was upheld in the face of philosophical
arguments advocating modernity and change. Chanukah commemorates the
strength the Chashmonaim had, not only on the physical battlefield,
but on the spiritual battlefield as well. It is now up to us to live up
to the ideals for which the Chashmonaim fought, and to safeguard those
ideals for generations to come.

-------------------------------------------------------------------------
YomTov, Copyright © 2004 by Rabbi Yehudah Prero and Torah.org.
...

Mlevinmd@aol.com wrote:
> I see that emunah is a matter of
> the heart and that it is a delicate flower that is easily smothered
> by the crassness of our society on one end and absence of strong,
> widely accepted postulates on the other. Chidren tend to make
> everything into an incontrovertible fact anyway and  teaching them
> that there are different opinions plants only a certainly that
> nothing is real or true.
> There is plenty of tiem to deal with complexity at a later age when
> the emotional and spiritual apparatus is mature and better able to
> deal with shocks and contradictions.

I agree with everything you said. In my view, the only thing I would add
is to make sure that a child be allowed to ask questions and to answer
those questions in a manner that will not come back to haunt you at a
later stage. This is not easy to accomplish. There is line which should
not be crossed and an attendant slippery slope. And this line changes as
the child matures. Too much "openess" can lead to Apikursus. OTOH too
much closed mindedness can lead to Apikursus as well. It takes a wise
parent to know how to answer a child appropriately and to recognize a
maturity level that allows more complex answers.

Of course, every child is different. There are different levels of
intellectual capacity, maturity, and emotional development that impacts
on how someone will be receptive to the answers we provide, especially
children. And there are different rates of develpment in each of these
areas. There is also the impact of environment on children. Everything
must be factored in.

The bottom line is to the best of one's abilities one should learn and
try to understand as much as possible about their children. You start
by listening to them... and spending as much time as possible with them.

Parenting ain't easy. 

HM

From: "Micha Berger" <micha@aishdas.org>
>: I think that assuming that Lot was able to walk around and do things
>: while using six senses (the 5 usual plus nevu'ah) is would better fit
>: the Abarbanel's portrayal of the Rambam's opinion.

On Thu, Dec 09, 2004 at 03:31:32PM -0500, Zev Sero wrote:
> "And all of them, when they experience prophecy, their limbs shake and
> the strength of their bodies is feeble, and their senses are deranged,
> and the mind remains empty in order to understand what it sees...
> (Rambam Yesodei Hatorah 7:5)

My recollection is that the Abarbanel held that according to the Rambam
the entire maaseh Sdom was part of Avraham's nevuah, which only ended the
following morning when "vayashkem [signifying the end of the vision] ...
vayashkef ... v'hinei laha kitor haaretz [signifying that the portion of
the vision indicating that Sdom would be destroyed had been fulfilled]".
How is Avraham's incapacity during that time a kasha on the Abarbanel?

David Riceman 

RZL
> I agree that RMS's teirutz works. He and I agree that scientists have
> no role in value judgements. However, the proponents of the above ideas
> present their "factuality" as reasons that one must engage in those
> practices to be healthy, and how can you believe in a G-d who makes
> you do unhealthy things or prevents you from doing things to preserve
> your physical, mental and emotional health? Thus "...religion--even the
> religion of those who find ways to conform it to present-day "scientific"
> thought--is primitive." So we discriminate in what we accept from
> scientists.

We accept from scientists what is correct. Many scientists would like
to extrapolate from their knowledge to values - and here we can disagree.

However, the problem is not merely the scientists, but many religious
spokespeople have misused science for their own ends. To the extent
that religion (both torah as well as other religions) is justified by
some spokespeople on the basis of utility, or on the basis that it is
natural - that means that studies of what is actually utile, or what
is actually natural, have a role to play in assessing the validity of
religion - which is why such justifications are dangerous. eg, (for a
discredited one, but one that is still quite popular in lay circles) if
one advocates kashrut as good for health reasons, then whether lean pork
is today healthy has bearing on keeping kashrut. Similarly, if various
other religious prohibitions are justified by means of health benefits,
then scientific studies of those presumed benefits become relevant (eg,
objections to onanism on health grounds - today mostly discredited -
and the only reason to keep it remains because it is (and remains)
halachically assur)

> So, regardless of the validity of the kushya I posed, I wonder whether
> RMS concedes to my point: that the assertion that once you accept one
> field of science you must accept all others is flawed, because (1)
> each field (especially medicine and surgery vs. archeology, etc.)has
> its own methods, and (2) fields dealing with the nature of the distant
> past are totally not verifiable in the sense that medicinal and surgical
> practices are on people of the present.

As a scientist, I accept from scientists what is good science - not
everything that is called science. Different fields have different levels
of validity - many physical scientists and mathematicians, for example,
do not view the social sciences as science (some may recall a major fight
in the late 1970s, when the Institute of Advanced Study in Princeton
wanted to start a new sociology section, and the mathematicians publicly
revolted). In psychology, one has to differentiate between experimental
psychology and Freudian and related fields, etc. Therefore, the notion
that there exists something called science, and anything that goes by
that name is automatically correct is anathema to any real scientist.
However, that is unrelated to our discussion. The age of the universe
being (much, much) greater than 6000 is something that every serious
scientist knows (not believes) to be true - the data is overwhelming.

RMS:
> (parenthetically, in the shmona prakim, the rambam seems to classify
> hilchot arayot as falling more in the category of religious rather
> than rational mitzvot - and therefore having a ta'ava for them is not
> a character defect, unlike having a ta'ava for murder - and therefore,
> there isn't even a torah mandated reason to think that these averot are
> intrinsically unhealthy or unnatural)

ZL:
> As R. M.D. Rabinowitz clarifies in his commentary on Shemoneh Perakim
> (Mosaad HaRav Kook, p. 194, note 7), the Rambam in that passage cannot
> be referring to "gilui arayos," for that is certainly part of what [the
> philosophers and the Rambam in his other works consider among--ZL] the
> "m'fur'sammos," the manifestly immoral practices.

I don't have that commentary, or the shmona prakim in front of me.
However, the rambam is trying to reconcile several issues:
1)In aristotelian ethics, the good man does not desire to do evil,
rather than merely overcome evil
2) Hazal describe several major figures in hazal and tanach who clearly
feel strong temptation, but overcome that temptation.

The rambam reconciles it (I think that his position is the first to
do so this way) by arguing that there is a difference between things
agreed upon universally as evil, such as murder, and those things that
are only prohibited by religious law (eg, eating hazir) - there is no
reason the good man has to have no desire to eat hazir - but, as a good
Jew, he must overcome that desire - and that all the cases in hazal of
overcoming temptation are the second rather than the first.

However, many of the cases in the gmara, including(IIRC) some specifically
cited by the rambam, and the entire idea of kol hagadol mechavero yitzro
gadol mimenu, as understood by the rambam,clearly includes some cases
of giluy arayot - (I don't know if he would include all (eg incest,
mishkav zachar, mishkav behema), but many clearly are) - and therefore,
I don't understand how one can understand the Rambam that he "cannot
be referring to giluy arayot" - as it seems specifically included.
Reconciliation with other works of the rambam is a different issue,
and perhaps can be discussed.

RMS:
> As in previous go ronunds, I am not aware of any rishon who 
> specifically argues that emunah requires us to go against 
> what our reason requires - and several (eg kuzari)explicitly 
> state  that the torah does not require us to go against reason.

RZL 
> You can add my name to the list of those who say that we should not go
> against reason. When the Rambam says that Creation by definition did not
> follow natural proceses and we therefore cannot know how things came into
> existence from the way things are now, he is using reason. And when I
> say that since Creation by definition was the creation of things beyond
> their incipient stages, and we thereofre cannot know, from the age of
> things, how long they've been in existence, I am using reason. Along
> with value judgements, the length of the world's existence is an area
> that scientists do not have the role they have assigned themselves.

Let me rephrase the argument as I understood it.

On a purely rational basis, I have no way of knowing that anything that I
know corresponds to any external reality, nor that perhaps I (and the rest
of the world) was created yesterday with all the memories and mementoes
of the past as if it was a very old world. To the extent that G-d can
do as he wishes, he has the freedom to act, and he could have created
the world yesterday, or 5800 years ago, to look as if it is very old.
(Leo Strauss has argued this as to why science poses no real problem
to religion)

While no scientific proof can disprove this, this position has the
following problem - because it implies something about hashem and the
world. It means that 1) I can't rely on any deduction and observation
that I make about the world 2) hashem created the world in a fashion
that would lead us, if we would use our own minds in the best possible
fashion, but independently on mesora, to wrong conclusions.

It is these two conclusions that are problematic to many of us - and are
completely incompatible with the position of the rambam. I would add that
the logical implication of this position is that the only truth that we
can believe in is the mesora - because everything else is potentially
falsified - and furthermore, all rational arguments for at least the
plausibility of the mesora (the mesora does require emuna, but most of us
use some rational arguments as to its plausibility) are also problematic.

It is this religious position - that would require that hashem is not
merely unknowable, but one who plays parlor tricks with the world -
and that information derived from our senses and reason, not only
might mislead us (we are fallible), but inherently must mislead us -
that the world is structured to look in a way different than it is -
that is problematic from a religious sense, and is incompatible with
the position that emunah does not require us to go against the mandates
of reason. The only way to make both positions compatible is to hold
a radically sceptical position on the limitations of human knowledge -
which the classical exponents (and most modern ones as well) of accepting
the mandates of reason do not accept. I would add that while one can
not disprove the radically sceptical position, I don't know any one who
truly believes it...

Meir Shinnar

In a Avodah V14 #42 dated 12/15/2004  RMB writes:
[RMB previous:]
>:> I think that assuming that Lot was able to walk around and do  things
>:> while using six senses (the 5 usual plus nevu'ah) is would  better fit
>:> the Abarbanel's portrayal of the Rambam's opinion.  [--RMB]

R' Zev Sero, quoting  Rambam [in reply]:
>: "When there is a prophet among you, I appear to him in a  vision, I speak
>: to him in a dream".

>: "And all of them, when they  experience prophecy, their limbs shake and
>: the strength of their bodies  is feeble, and their senses are deranged,
>: and the mind remains empty in  order to understand what it sees..."
> ...

RMB:
> You're right. This is a strong kushya on the Abarbanel.

I am one of those who think the events involving the angels actually
happened and were not just prophetic visions.

However, if you want to say they were just visions, there is a possible
answer to this kushya, and it's in Rashi on Bereishis 16:13. Rashi
compares Hagar's equanimity after seeing no fewer than four angels with
Manoach's discomposure after seeing just one, and concludes that Hagar
was accustomed to seeing angels in Avraham's house. The same must have
been true of everyone in Avraham's household, including the servants and
Lot. They would not be trembling and fainting when receiving a prophetic
vision (IF all angels ARE prophetic visions) because they were used
to it. Later nevi'im would be more discombobulated because nevuah was
more rare.

But to repeat, I don't think it was just a vision. One more bit of
evidence--looking at the Chumash again--is the repeated motif of "running"
in the story, as I heard R'n Esther Jungreis say at a Bush rally in the
Boca Raton Synagogue. The parsha that week was Parshas Vayera. She talked
about being able to know what kind of a person someone is by what makes
him run, by what arouses his enthusiasm and passion, and she noted that
Avraham was constantly RUNNING to do chessed. Here he was, an old man,
and in pain from his recent circumcision, and yet he RAN to the three
men, he HURRIED to Sarah's tent, he RAN to the cattle. All this running
is much less amazing and praiseworthy if it was just a vision! Even
the most sedentary person can run (or fly, for that matter) in a dream,
without breaking a sweat. Running and hurrying strongly suggest a person
who is awake and alert.

We find more running and hurrying in the story of Lot--this time, running
for his life. Even if you want to say it was some kind of sleep-walking,
it's really a stretch to think of the angels as appearing to Lot in a
mere vision.

 -Toby  Katz
=============

RRW in V14#42:
> The German Kehillos post-Shabtai Zvi rejected LURAINIAC Kabbalah but
> accepted or even Embraced the Shlah

Who came first? and who represented the tradition of Chasidai Ashknaz?

> Examples: Brich shmei and ana v'koach were taken out.

Taken out, or never added?! Re any Zoharic passages, seems to me there
was an element of respect for, not of disdain for or rejection of,
Qabbalah in not bringing passages like "brich shmai" into the davening.

> Some Gematiros -such as Hashem elokeichem Emes - were reduced to jsut
> "EMES" etc.

Certain innovations, g'matria-based or not, weren't added. There is
a lot of numerology in the saider hat'filah (that could be a thread
unto itself).

> Shatz only says Nekadesh Tzibbur does not.  {K'negged Ari}

Just one specific example from a general predilection for the tzibbur
to say what actually should be said by the SHaTZ (and, moreover, to say,
sometimes shout, it before the SHaTZ says it).

> OTOH: Yekees - including a fine Heidneheim edition - have tikkun leil
> Shavuos AND Tikkun Leil Hoshana Rabba (both of which AFAIK were creatures
> of the Shlah Hakodesh)

The saider limud, perhaps, but the concept of learning "all" revealed
Torah all night long seems to me no invention of the ancestors of SHLaH,
much less SHLaH himself.

> Also Roedelheim siddurim omit all "leSheim Yichuds" BUT they DO contain
> "Hinneni Muchans" and AIUI Shlah was the composer of some or all of the
> various "Hinneni Muchan's.

"Hin'ni muchan," or "hin'ni m'chavain"? IIRC, Baer lists the latter
phraseology. Your overall point is well-taken -- Qabbalah is very much
present even in nusach Ashknaz -- but the difference between "muchan" and
"m'chavain" goes beyond the switch of consonants (there's a word for that
switch that I can't recall right now -- I want to say 'ana'-something). A
big example is Qabbolas Shabbos, greatly influenced by RaMaK.

> This pattern has legs but I am not sure how far to take this. Just that
> somehow many minhaggim of the Shlah were honored in German {and possibly
> other Misnagidsher communities suc has Litvaks?!} but the Ari's litrugical
> innovations were rejected.  For example It might imply that if your are
> Chassidically oreinted, then the Ari would be your protypical mentor of
> KABBALAH, OTOH if you are Yekke/Misanagged then look to the Shlah for
> guidance.

It does seem like some innovations from Tzfat were universally accepted
while Lurianic concepts were not.  Re the latter, did ARYZaL intend for
those innovations to be coopted into the saider hat'filah of the hamon am?
IMHO, the way in which RYL taught his small group of talmidim and the way
in which his teachings were revealed only after his passing by one talmid
may have had an influence both upon those communities which integrated his
innovations and those which didn't.

All the best from
 - Michael Poppers via RIM pager

R. Rich Wolpoe wrote:
> ...Also Roedelheim siddurim omit all "leSheim Yichuds" BUT they DO contain
> "Hinneni Muchans"

With the notable exception of Sefiras ho'Omer. "L'Shem" is the "keyword"
used for announcing the Sefira counting in all Yekkishe communities that
I've davened in.

- Danny

on 12/6/04 11:07, micha@aishdas.org wrote:
> The most notable thing about Yaaqov's fight with the mal'ach was not the
> fight, but that he was capable an enountering mal'achim at all! Recall
> that Hashem Himself repeats the mal'ach's renaming when He charges
> Yaaqov with the berakhah, land and mission first given to Avraham. (Ber'
> 35:10) Both need to be taken into account when looking at the meaning
> of the name.

There is an alternative interpretation: Yisroel means "God's Lieutenant"
 - ie - although in the past you've been accused of being a "Yaakov" -
deceitful/tricky - now people will recognize that you're righteous.

Technical correction - the malach only predicted the name change - H'
later enacts it (not a "repeat").

Cf. Ch. 6 of my book The Art of Amazement.

Alexander Seinfeld

In a message dated 12/16/2004 12:46:35pm EST, MPoppers@kayescholer.com writes:
RRW in V14#42:
> The German Kehillos post-Shabtai Zvi rejected LURAINIAC Kabbalah but
> accepted or even Embraced the Shlah

Who came first? and who represented the tradition of Chasidai Ashknaz?

> Examples: Brich shmei and ana v'koach were taken out.

Taken out, or never added?! Re any Zoharic passages, seems to me there
was an element of respect for, not of disdain for or rejection of,
Qabbalah in not bringing passages like "brich shmai" into the davening.
I "dunno" for sure.  There are reports that Heidenheim consiously removed 
certain Kabbalistic references following The Shabsai Zvi debacle.  Brich Shmei 
DOES appear in the Sfas Emes siddur but it is not recited b German communities.  
Ana v'loach is out of kabblas Shabbos but still in Karbanos BUT in the 
section that is omitted by {most} German Kehillos. 

Is is also my understanding that Shbasai Zvi was devoted to specifically 
Lurianic principles.   

Kol Tuv,
R. Rich Wolpoe
Richard_Wolpoe@alumnimail.yu.edu

>> Taken out, or never added?! Re any Zoharic passages, seems to me
>> there was an element of respect for, not of disdain for or rejection of,
>> Qabbalah in not bringing passages like "brich shmai" into the davening.

> I "dunno" for sure.?  There are reports? that Heidenheim consiously
> removed certain Kabbalistic references following The Shabsai Zvi
> debacle.

Yes, I wasn't excluding the possibility of reaction to ShTz, but Zoharic
passages like "Brich shmai" were additions to begin with, and at least
a reason they don't exist in manuscripts between the time of the Zohar
and the time of ShTz is the reason I mentioned.

> Brich Shmei DOES appear in the Sfas Emes siddur but it is not recited
> b German communities.

That siddur was meant for all bnai Ashknaz, including Ostjuden -- that's
why it lists T'hilim 30 before "Baruch sheomar" (not said by Yekkes),
why it lists T'hilim 27 after the Shir shel Yom (ditto), why it also
lists the "Polish minhag" text for various things (last Amidah b'rocho
for Shabbos Mincha, "Avinu Malkainu," etc.), etc.

All the best from
 - Michael Poppers via RIM pager

In a message dated 11/22/2004 1:28:06pm EST, yadmoshe@012.net.il writes:
: Chasam Sofer(Yoreh Deah 2:356): While there is a historic debate
: whether there are 13 principles or three I really don't know what
: difference this makes except in semantics. Furthermore according to the
: kabbalists there is no such thing a foundation principle in the Torah
: because every aspect of the Torah is a foundation principle without
: distinction one part from another...

I think this speaks to our discussion of the Yefetic vs Semitic
perspective. (See the subject lines "omek pshuto shel mikra" and "The
Semitic Perspective" in the archive.)

The Rambam's project was relatively Yefetic. He took the
interconnectedness of halakhah that Rebbe takes for granted when the
first mishnah invokes ashmuros to explain zeman qeri'as shema, and
organizes halakhah into catefory, subcategory, chapter and law.

The notion of identifying facts and declaring them primary is a focus
on items over their relationships.

Part of the rebellion against the Rambam was aimed at this particular
shift.

:-)BBii!
-mi

-- 
Micha Berger             "I hear, then I forget; I see, then I remember;
micha@aishdas.org        I do, then I understand." - Confucius
http://www.aishdas.org   "Hearing doesn't compare to seeing." - Mechilta
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[We're drifting away from the halakhos of the issue and getting into
increasingly greater depth on understanding C. This post is here because
I feel it's still on track. But we're teetering to the edge... -mi]

In a message dated 11/19/2004 1:20:56 P.M. Eastern Standard Time, T613K  
writes:

In Avodah V14 #29 dated 11/19/2004 "Jonathan Zuess" <jgzuessmd@cox.net>
writes:
>>>  What do my fellow Avodites think is the Halachic status of a  
>>>  conservative rabbi who considers himself Orthodox?
>>> Would he be  kosher l'edus? [--R' MYG]

>> Not according to Rav Soloveitchik  zetzal, would he? (re geires;
>> rabbis identifying with an ideology  that denies toure min hashomayem
>> notwithstanding their personal  lifestyle) [--R' ELPh Minden]

> We should not assume he denies Torah min hashamayim. A range of
> positions on revelation are espoused by Conservative thinkers; see
> for example "Emet Ve-Emunah: Statement of Principles of Conservative
> Judaism." Generally, right-wing Conservatism holds views that are the
> same as some Orthodox positions.  [--R' Jonathan  Zuess]

I've seen that book and it is fascinating. About every issue it states,
"Some of us believe...." and lays out the Orthodox position, then states,
"And some of us believe..." and then lays out the Conservative position.
Torah was Divinely revealed; no, it was Divinely inspired--as the sunset
might inspire a poet. Halacha is binding; yes, but you are free to define
halacha any way you want. Etc.

Being a Conservative rabbi means you apply Eilu ve'Eilu to both the O
and the C side of every issue. It means that even if you personally
believe in Torah miSinai, and even if you personally keep Shabbos,
kashrus and taharas hamishpacha according to the Shulchan Aruch--you
will nevertheless accept the weddings, the conversions and the divorces
of fellow Conservative rabbis who do not believe in Torah miSinai and
who do not keep Shabbos, kashrus or taharas hamishpacha.

The result is circular: if you abide by the Shulchan Aruch but accept as
a rabbi someone who does not abide by the S'A, then ipso facto you are
NOT abiding by the S'A. Ergo, a Conservative rabbi cannot be a religious
Jew, is not kosher le'eidus, and so on.

BTW if you think that all C rabbis and/or all graduates of JTS keep
kashrus, taharas hamishpacha and so on, think again. The C rabbi whom
we knew in Chattanooga was probably typical: his wife used a swimming
pool instead of a mikva, they ate Domino's pizza but with no pepperoni,
he walked to shul but used the microphone and so on. One of his children
confided to a friend that he liked going to California to visit the
grandparents because "there we can go to MacDonald's but in Chattanooga
we're not allowed to."

Now, we did know a C rabbi in Knoxville whose eidus could perhaps be
trusted: a man who had concluded that Orthodoxy was correct, who was
personally observant, who wanted to go back to yeshiva and become an
O rabbi, but who was in mid-career with a wife and kids and could not
withstand the parnassah difficulties that such a hiatus would engender.

That individual was highly ATYPICAL for a C rabbi and no halachic
inference may be drawn from that case. In general, dan lekaf zechus
does not apply to heterodox rabbis, certainly not when they are acting
in any official capacity.

Toby Katz
===============

I came across an article in the Jewish Encyclopedia (edited during
1901-1906), available online at
http://www.jewishencyclopedia.com/view.jsp?artid=142&letter=Z&search=zohar,
in which the following statement is made regarding the Zohar:

<<After the death of Moses de Leon, it is related, a rich man of
Avila, named Joseph, offered the widow, who had been left without
means, a large sum of money for the original from which her husband
had made the copy; and she then confessed that her husband himselfwas
the author of the work. She had asked him several times, she said, why
he had chosen to credit his own teachings to another, and he had
always answered that doctrines put into the mouth of the
miracle-working Simeon ben Yoב¸¥ai would be a rich source of profit (see
"Sefer ha-Yuב¸¥asin," ed. Filipowski, p. 89).>>

Does anyone know about the credibility of this story?  Can anyone
provide background information with regard to the Sefer ha_Yuב¸¥asin?

Kol tuv,
Moshe

*********************


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