Avodah Mailing List

Volume 13 : Number 089

Friday, September 3 2004

• Bar Mitzvas
• Calendar
• RE: Age of the Universe (Rabbi Dessler zt"l)
• RE: Age of the Universe
• RE: Age of the Universe (Rabbi Dessler zt"l)
• Age of the Universe
• RE: Age of the Universe
• halcha vs agada
• Shiv'im Panim
• Re: tfillin not worn
• Re: Hiyuv to daven in a minyan
• Re: halcha vs agada
• Re: Ikkarim (again??)
• Re: Pi
• Re: Reliability of Science
• RE: Age of the Universe (Rabbi Dessler zt"l)

[Related to the discussion on Areivim in which we were calling the
boy the ba'al simchah of a bar mitzvah celebration. -mi]

At his eldest son's Bar Mitzva (Tazria-Metzora 1987?), Rav Hershel
Schachter mentioned two complementary reasons for celebrating a Bar
Mitzva:

(1) The completion of the father's mitzva of chinukh. [15 Av was
considered a particularly joyous day because, according to one opinion,
it was the day on which they completed cutting the Atzei HaMaarakha. See
Bava Basra 121b and Rashbam, s.v. miNissan. Cf. Rabbenu Gershom for a
very different explanation.]

(2) The boy's becoming a Bar Chiyyuva. [We hold "Gadol metzuveh ve-oseh
mimi she-eno metzuveh ve-oseh. See Kiddushin 31a that becoming a member
of the former category is cause for celebration.]

Micha Berger <micha@aishdas.org> wrote:
> As for RZS's question, it will wait until I pull out some books on the
> calendar. IIRC, molad tohu implies that the subsequent Elul was malei
> if our calendar would have been in use.

Well, with *our* calendar, Elul *couldn't* be malei, but nor could Rosh
Hashana be on Friday, so Elul would have been dragged forward, and Sunday
would have been 24 Elul, not 25. But if we leave aside artificial rules
like 'lo adu rosh' and the fixed lengths of most months, and apply the
simple rule that Rosh Chodesh is on the day of the molad unless it is
zaken, then since that molad was at VYD, i.e. 8am, RH would have been
on Friday. And since the previous molad, had there been a world in which
to have one, would have been on a Wednesday at 7:16pm, Rosh Chodesh Elul
would have been on a Thursday, making Elul chaser.

-- 
Zev Sero
zev@sero.name

Rabbi Nossen Slifkin wrote 
> R' Ostroff has misunderstood my book and/or my Avodah post. I 
> do not appeal to Rav Dessler for anything other than the 
> explanation of the six days per se and showing that they do 
> not represent periods of time (and certainly not
> 24 hours), not with regard to Adam HaRishon, who is not 
> directly discussed by Rav Dessler in this context.

Not so. Adam HaRishon is explicitly quoted in the context and in
the section (the one from which RNS took his quote) of Rav Dessler's
discussion of zman/time. Here is a much too brief outline of his shiur
given at Ponevez:

(a) Rav Dessler tells us that Adam HaRishon's perception of zman/bechira
changed radically from what it was before his chet in Gan Eden, to what
it was after the chet (p150). See the previous section pages 137-149
for his discussion of the chet.
(b) He then explains his notion of zman/time from which the RNS quote
is taken (p151).
(c) He then uses his new notion of zman/time to explain how in acharis
hayamim our post-chet peception of bechira/zman will change back to that
of Adam HaRishon before the chet in Gan Eden (p153).

It's all inyan echad! Rav Dessler explicitly ties together his profound
notion of time with his discussion of Adam HaRishon before and after the
chet (p153): "The nature of our perception of zman/time changed after
the chet of Adam HaRishon ... the nature of acharis hayamim is that all
will return to the deeper insights of Gan Eden ... in which zman/time
will no longer change ...".

RNS wrote that "If your point is that Rav Dessler must have held Adam to
be an actual person, then this is true". Thus he agrees that Adam HaRishon
(and not the ape-like hominid) was the real first man (see below). But,
as Rav Dessler himself explains, Adam HaRishon, Chava, the tree, and
the nachash are all part of the 6th day of Maaseh Beraishis, discussed
in the very section from which RSN takes his quote. This is the biggest
proof that RNS's peshat in Rav Dessler cannot be correct. Therefore,
RNS cannot be correct in assuming that the six days of creation are a
non-historical mashal.

(As an aside, and to avoid misunderstandings, I stated in the earlier post
that non-literal does not necessarily mean non-historical. Of course,
Maaseh Beraishis cannot be understood in a simple-mindedly literal
way. We are dealing with recondite matters and a very subtle concept of
time deeply related to the concept of bechira and gilui yechido. Einstein
already showed how time is more profound than what was once thought. Rav
Dessler's notion of time, quite different from that of Einstein, is
deserving of further study. I would be happy to discuss RNS's question
about where Gan Eden is in the thinking of Rav Dessler, but this is not
the place yet. The point remains that Adam HaRishon is historical.).

RNS writes in another post
> The reason is that even if the overall time span is 
> solved, the events of the six days of Bereishis still cannot 
> be correlated with the history of the universe that we know ...
> For this reason, it seems to me that the only viable approach 
> is that of Rav Dessler, who explains that the six days are 
> six sefiros, representing modes of "Divine power" used in 
> creation, and do not refer to periods of time at all or even 
> necessarily to a chronological sequence. Bereishis would 
> therefore represent a spiritual hierarchy of creation, rather 
> than a description of a physical process. This is an approach 
> from a universally accepted talmid chacham (the mashgiach of 
> Ponovezh!) which is the only one to solve all the scientific 
> difficulties without distorting the pesukim in any way.

But RNS will distort the pesukim regarding the 6th day by taking them
as a non-historical mashal contra Rav Dessler. According to Rav Dessler,
Adam HaRishon was a real historical personality (the first man) created
directly from earth in Gan Eden on the 6th day of Maaseh Beraishis.

RNS identifies the first man as an evolved ape-like hominid plus neshama
(The Science of Torah, p179); "But the theory that man was created
by inserting a soul into a hominid creature [i.e. the precursors of a
gorilla] which itself evolved from the earlier creatures [e.g an amoeba]
is no more problematic than the embryo evolving from a sperm and egg"

Regarding the above quote, RNS wrote:
> Actually, I think I did not make any statement as to what 
> happened, just regarding whether this [hominid + neshama] is an acceptable

> belief, which I think it is. But, yes, I do now believe that 
> to be the case.

If the first man was an evolved ape-like hominid (plus neshama) as stated
by RNS, then that contradicts Rav Dessler's explanation of the first
man as the historical Adam HaRishon created directly from the earth on
the 6th day of Maaseh Beraishis.

You cannot use Rav Dessler to construct a peshat (i.e. Adam HaRishon
is part of the non-historical mashal of Maaseh Beraishis, and the real
first man was an evolved ape-like hominid) that flatly contradicts Rav
Dessler himself (i.e. Adam HaRishon is the historical first man)!

One either considers that *some* of the scientific results are less
than compelling (see my earlier posts on the reliability of science)
or one distorts the pesukim.

Kol Tuv ... Jonathan

At 11:12 AM 9/2/2004, [RSA] wrote:
>>>We have biological records going back over 10,000 years.

>>Surely you jest? In the evolutionary time-frame these are mere moments...

>But more than sufficient to refute a less-than-6000 year old universe...

That was not the issue under discussion.

[Email #2. -mi]

At 11:22 AM 9/2/2004, [RAA] wrote:
>I just pointed out that we have both physical and biological records --
>complete -- that go back MUCH further than 6000 years. Once we go back more
>than 6000 years, it doesn't matter if we're talking 10,000 or 100,000 or 65
>million years.

That was not the issue under discussion, it was the order of evolution as 
depicted in Chumash vs. Darwin that was under discussion.

YGB  

Unfortunately it seems that R' Jonathan Ostroff has still misunderstood me: 
>as Rav Dessler himself explains, Adam HaRishon, Chava, the tree, and
>the nachash are all part of the 6th day of Maaseh Beraishis, discussed
>in the very section from which RNS takes his quote. This is the biggest
>proof that RNS's peshat in Rav Dessler cannot be correct. Therefore,
>RNS cannot be correct in assuming that the six days of creation are a
>non-historical mashal.

In the paragraph I cited, Rav Dessler is not addressing the content of
the six days, but rather the nature of the days themselves, and it is
with regard to this (and only with regard to this) that I am quoting
him. Of course he explains the events that transpired on those days,
at least regarding Gan Eden, as having actually happened. But I am only
quoting him regarding the nature of the word "day" itself, with which Rav
Dessler is quite clear that they are only described as "periods of time"
to enable a simple understanding, but that this is not their true nature.

>If the first man was an evolved ape-like hominid (plus neshama) as stated
>by RNS, then that contradicts Rav Dessler's explanation of the first man as
>the historical Adam HaRishon created directly from the earth on the 6th day
>of Maaseh Beraishis.

First of all, the first man was not ape-like, no more so than you or I.
There haven't been any ape-men for hundreds of thousands of years
(barring Lord Greystoke). Perhaps this explanation of Adam's origins
contradicts Rav Dessler, I'm not sure; I didn't see anywhere where Rav
Dessler described Adam's origins any differently from the chumash. But
(for the nth time) I didn't say it in the name of Rav Dessler!!!!

>You cannot use Rav Dessler to construct a peshat (i.e. Adam HaRishon
>is part of the non-historical mashal of Maaseh Beraishis, and the real
>first man was an evolved ape-like hominid) that flatly contradicts Rav
>Dessler himself (i.e. Adam HaRishon is the historical first man)!

Agreed, but I can certainly use Rav Dessler's explanation of the meaning
of the word "yom" even if I am not using his explanation regarding the
nature of Adam - since the two are not neccessarily linked in any way!

[Email #2. -mi]

RMS wrote:
>...I think RYGB is unique in claiming that there are no substantive sources
>that understand ma'ase breshit as nonliteral, and that even understands the
>rambam on ma'ase breshit as being "debatable, to say the least". The
>dominant interpretation of the rambam has been to allow quite extensive
>allegory - which is one reason he was criticized. There are no substantive
>sources that would support RYGB's interpretation. Perhaps RYGB can cite one
>major mefaresh of the rambam who understands him as he does - requiring the
>literal understanding of ma'ase breshit? Does RYGB consider all the standard
>meforshim of the rambam as not being substantive sources?

RYGB wrote in response:
>Did I say all of MB must be taken "literally?" If I did, I meant that all
>(or part) of Bereishis 1 cannot be dismissed as the Torah equivalent of
>Aesop's fables. There are many layers of understanding between
>fundamentalist pshat and peshuto shel mikro.

RYGB, I would appreciate it if you could clarify your position. Your
original statement was in response to my statement that (according to the
way I understand Rav Dessler) the concept of six days does not refer to
six time periods, but rather to six spiritual modes used in creation. In
response to this, you stated that allegorization is unacceptable. You
then stated that this is in accordance with your earlier posts on Avodah,
in which you rejected the way that Abarbanel, Efodi and Rav Kappach
explain Rambam. Now you say to RMS that you just meant that no part of
Torah can be dismissed as the equivalent of Aesop's fables, but I can't
figure out what that means (is there a difference between a fable and
an allegory, except in the pejorative connotation?), and which of your
statements you are clarifying.

I have three questions for you:

1. When Abarbanel, Efodi and Rav Kappach explain Rambam's view to be
that the events of Gan Eden are allegorical (which you felt to be the
wrong interpretation of Rambam), was Rambam accordingly "dismissing it
as the equivalent of Aesop's fables"?

2. When Rambam states that "The account of creation given in Scripture is
not, as is generally believed, intended to be literal in all its parts,"
was he "dismissing it as the equivalent of Aesop's fables"?

3. When I explained Rav Dessler's position that the word Yom in Bereishis
does not mean that there was a period of time in the literal historical
sense, but rather refers to a spiritual force used in creation, would
this mean that Rav Dessler is "dismissing it as the equivalent of
Aesop's fables"?

I would greatly appreciate it if you could provide clear answers for
these three questions.

I would also like to point out that a contrast should be made here. There
is strict allegory or "fable", i.e. something that did not take place
in any sense of the word, which is how Abarbanel, Efodi and Rav Kappach
apparently explain Rambam's view of Gan Eden, and how some recently
suggest the mabul to be explained. But Rav Dessler is not explaining
the six days in this way. Instead, he is explaining them to refer to
metaphysical events - something that actually exists, just not in the
physical world. So that should be more acceptable to you than Rambam's
position. On the other hand, either way, the literal meaning of the text
is not true (in the conventional physical sense).

Kol tuv
Nosson Slifkin

RYGB:
> Your answer certainly does not give a ma'amin any great comfort. If it
> works for you, so be it. If I was not frum and got your answer, I would
> probably remain not-frum.

Every non-frum person is different. Many people are very much attracted
and comforted by approaches that tie everything together, refute secular
approaches, and show that the Torah is true. Others are suspicious of
these arguments and will not desist from poking holes in them. The more
valid approaches one has available, the better equipped one is to deal
with different types of people.

Many people want to hear a beautifully crafted proof of Torah min
HaShamayim, Creation, etc., and will appreciate perfect answers to
difficult questions. Once they hear a good answer, they won't poke too
hard to find its weak points. But the suspicious minority can smell
the tiniest bit of fudging or apologetics a mile away. They prefer to
hear, "That's really a very difficult question. I don't have a perfect
answer. But here are some approaches." (Better yet, skip the hashkafa
and teach them gemara - they'll have so much fun asking kashyas they'll
forget they aren't frum.)

I won't venture to express a personal opinion on Creation from among
the various options offered by listmembers infinitely more learned than
myself. I wasn't around back then and didn't see what happened. But if
I were presenting a stretching-out-the-days type theory, and someone
challenged me about birds preceding animals, I would be happy that RNS's
approach is also available.

 - Ilana

[Drifting off into Areivim-land... -mi]

>>You can't say that -- since you have no understanding of the mind-set
>>and worldview of a non-frum person.

> Uh-uh. I teach in Ohr Somayach and am very close to several of
> the talmidim.

Doesn't count -- they have already made the committment , to one degree
or another, to accepting the Torah worldview/mindset..

Now, if you tell me you run a hillel house on a campus with no Orthodox
Jews -- and are successful in m'karvim them -- then I'd agree that you
understand their mindset.

Akiva
--
"If you want to build a ship, then don't drum up men to gather wood, give
orders, and divide the work. Rather, teach them to yearn for the far and
endless sea." - Antoine de Saint-Exupery

RGS>The Ritva (Rosh Hashanah 16a sv ha-meivin) discusses the question of
>exactly when and on what a person is judged throughout the year. He was
>not the first to do so (see the Ramban's derashah for Rosh Hashanah) but,
>uniquely,[1] he uses the language of halachah in his discussion. Thus,
>he begins with the rule that stam Mishnah and machloked in a Baraisa,
>the halachah is according to the Mishnah. After reviewing all of the
>relevant sources and reaching a conclusion, the Ritva ends with a
>[2]"ve-chen halachah." This is all about a matter of hashkafah!

It seems to me from the above that the Ritva disagreed with the Rambam
and held that even on matters of belief for which there are no practical
ramifications one can still "pasken" between views. From the Meiri that
RD Eidensohn quoted, it seems that he also agrees with the Ritva.>>

I would like to disagree with this analysis of the Meiri. The Meiri
quoted concerning yesh/ain mazal byisrael did not do either of the two
unique aspects of the Ritva quoted. The Meiri neither used the halachic
methods of settling a dispute (Stam vs machlokes; Mishna vs braisa),
nor did he indicate that his viewpoint was halachic. The Meiri merely
posited a strong point-of-view concerning an agaddic issue. This is
certainly his right as a parshan.
I think the Meiri can agree with the Rambam's caveat of not treating
agada as halacha.

The example of the Ritva also bears further investigation. The Ritva is
[also] analyzing the words of the Rif. As is well known, Halachos of the
Rif codify only halacha and not agada. It could be that judgment days is
seen as an halachic issue, perhaps with ramifications in nusach hatefilla.
If so, then no one is necessarily arguing on the Rambam's caveat.

Shlomo Goldstein

RabbiRichWolpoe@aol.com wrote:
>     Each member of the BD hagdaol had the power to interpret...
> and therfore each interpretation COULD be valid even if all 70 were
> unique and distinct
>[...] 
> 70 is AISI davka. It means that the 70 have the power over the meaning
> {within certain parameters} and their authority counts as if it derived
> from Sinai and that the Tzadukkim are WRONG to think that HKBH had ONE
> intent. Aderabba, HKBH gave Torah shebichsav with middos/rules in order
> to give the BD hagadol the latitude to make interpretations and that at
> any time HKBH contemplated 70 meanings as a maximum outcome of His system.

One slight problem: the Beit Din Hagadol has *71* members.

-- 
Zev Sero
zev@sero.name

On Thu, 2 Sep 2004 RabbiRichWolpoe@aol.com wrote:
> On another note, we see that "chalita" is a lost art both regarding
> pesach and re: melichas kaveid... This is as per the gaonim. Techeiles
> is simlar, we forgot the lost art of tcheiles

> The coutner argument is simple, what harm is there in sing t'cheiles?
> It is not like chlita which if done improperly creates a kashrus problem.

where do you see chalita forgotten.
The Rambam requires it and many frum taimanim in Israel are careful to do
it to all meat.

On Wed, 1 Sep 2004, Shinnar, Meir wrote:
> RYE Henkin seems to hold that there is a hiyuv for the community to have
> a minyan, and there is a hiyuv for a person to be part of that community.
> However, if the person has good reasons why he can't make the minyan
> (work schedule, etc), he is against forming other minyanim so that the
> person can go to minyan...

where can I find this position of YYE Henkin?

S Goldstein wrote:
>I would like to disagree with this analysis of the Meiri. The Meiri
>quoted concerning yesh/ain mazal byisrael did not do either of the two
>unique aspects of the Ritva quoted. The Meiri neither used the halachic
>methods of settling a dispute (Stam vs machlokes; Mishna vs braisa),
>nor did he indicate that his viewpoint was halachic. The Meiri merely
>posited a strong point-of-view concerning an agaddic issue. This is
>certainly his right as a parshan.
>I think the Meiri can agree with the Rambam's caveat of not treating
>agada as halacha.

I would appreciate your definition of psak and halacha.

There are two basic processes 1) commentary and attempt to understand
a particular view or sugya 2) specification that there is one correct
way of understanding and that the others are wrong.

The latter process is my understanding of halacha. It is not critical
whether the decisor describes how he arrived at his conclusion or
whether he just states his conclusion. There is a further division
of halacha and halacha l'maaseh. In both cases we have conclusions of
right and wrong. An an assertion of halacha v'lo lmaaseh indicates the
awareness that additional factors might influence utilization of the
psak as we find also in halacha v'ein morin kein. Accordingly psak and
halacha can apply to ideas and thoughts. The Rambam, according to my
understanding, is clearly paskening in areas of hashkofa - even though
there is not necessary an activity involved. A person is an apikorus if
he has heretical thoughts - even though he doesn't tell anyone. However
just as there are issues such as the debate between Beis Hillel and
Beis Shammair that were not official paskened for an extended period
of time - there are issues of hashkofa which are not clearly poskened.
In contrast agada is typically given to a wide number of interpretations
which can be viewed as equally valid. Where the multiplicity needs to
be maintained we don't talk about psak.

R' Meir Shinnar wrote:
>therefore, even in the rambam, who very clearly paskens some aspects of
>hilchot machshavot, there is a clear differentiation between the position
>that a hashkafa is wrong - and there are many disagreements in rishonim
>who believe that positions of other rishonim is wrong - and translating
>that to a psak. Only if the hashkafa has practical consequences does
>the statement that the position is wrong elevated to a notion of a psak.

I agree with the above. However the issue of whether Jews are determined
by mazal has a major impact on understanding hashgacha protis and reward
and punishment as well as things such as bitachon etc. Thus it in fact
does a practical consequence and consequently the Meiri is making a psak.

In sum: psak is any strong statement that position "A" is correct and
the alternatives are wrong. However there is an additional condition to
be considered psak - there has to be some consequence of choosing one
or the other alternative.

Daniel Eidensohn

On Wed, Sep 01, 2004 at 04:00:16PM -0400, David Riceman wrote:
:> Can we, or the Rambam, entertain the possibility that the Dayan haEmes
:> can mete out punishment for something that isn't both an issur and
:> identified by Him as such?

: What do you think the issur is?

Hilkhos Yesodei haTorah has the following mitzvos listed applicable to
the ikkarim:
1- "Leida`" there's a G-d
2- Not to let the thought cross your mind that there's a god other than H'
3- To [declare] His Unity
9- To listen to the navi who speaks in His name

According to the Rambam, the believer in a corporial god would violate
the third mitzvah of the Taryag.

I'm sure that with some work I'll find similar chovos halvavos to believe
in Divine Justice and our eschtology.

: For not going to heaven see H. Teshuva 8:3, H. Yesodei HaTorah 4:8-9
: which make clear that you go to heaven only if you have correct knowledge
: of God. For moridin see H. Mamrim 3:1-3. Notice the loophole in 3 for
: people who were brought up wrong, which may be motivated by your concern.

The Rambam made sechar va'onesh an ikkar emnah, so clearly he considers
yedi'ah (which I'll refrain from translating) a mechanism for din,
not an alternate route.

IOW, the Rambam holds that olam haba is a consequence of yedi'ah, which
in turn can only be a consequence of mitzvos.

Which is why I refrain from translating the Rambam's use of the concept of
da'as. Because he is talking about something in the mind that one can't
acheive a priori, but that it requires and is a noecessary consequence
of proper shemiras hamitzvos. Add to that his use of the shoresh to name
Hil' Dei'os, and you see he's not speaking of abstract knowledge.

:-)BBii!
-mi

-- 
Micha Berger             When you come to a place of darkness,
micha@aishdas.org        you don't chase out the darkness with a broom.
http://www.aishdas.org   You light a candle.
Fax: (270) 514-1507        - R' Yekusiel Halberstam of Klausenberg zt"l

On Thu, Sep 02, 2004 at 12:54:14AM -0400, RabbiRichWolpoe@aol.com wrote:
: Lemashal if Chazal were alive NOW and found out that the Julian calendar
: has drifedt from the Gregorian adustment to the point of 12-13 day gap -
: would now be OK with making the same adjustment Halachically themselves?
: My guess is that they would have shifted according to the more recently
: refined Gregorian correctionf...

Why do you assume that? This is exactly the point made at the start
of this thread about pi and sqrt(2).

These numbers are irrational. As is the length of the lunar month in
days, the length of the solar year in lunar months, and the length of
the solar year in days. All these numbers must be approximate.

The question is just how precise does halakhah require us to be. Perfect
precision is not a choice.

In the case of pi, there is a pasuq that presumes a particular estimate,
3, which Chazal then follow. For sqrt(2), we're given 1.4 as the
estimate. For the year, we use tekufas Shemu'el (an estimate of 365.25)
for many dinim, but a more accurate estimate for setting the calendar.

This isn't the same as the lice thread that (asexually <g>) spawned
this one. Chazal knew they were using an estimate, and not asserting
the numbers as exactly accurate. Whether or not one argues that's true
by pi and sqrt(2), it was certainly true WRT the calendar.

As for why we don't change estimates, there are two issues:

1- We could very well lack the authority leqadeish hachodesh, and are
relying on the earlier qiddush performed by those who accepted the
formula now in use. This is the whole issue of Hillel II's beis din
vs chachmei EY, discussed repeatedly.

2- Who says we're required to use as precise of an estimate as available?
Perhaps precision to the nearest cheileq is right?

:-)BBii!
-mi

-- 
Micha Berger             None of us will leave this place alive.
micha@aishdas.org        All that is left to us is
http://www.aishdas.org   to be as human as possible while we are here.
Fax: (270) 514-1507            - anyonyous Dr, while a Nazi prisoner

On Mon, Aug 30, 2004 at 11:15:27PM -0400, R Jonathan Ostroff forwarded
from Rabbi Dovid Gottlieb:
:> (a) refers to a set of events that we consider identical. This means 
:> we have a theory about what features of the cause and the effect are 
:> relevent, and thereby assume it's the same phenomenon, repeated.

: This is a little too strong. We often associate events without any theory
: whatsoever - just with a pre-theoretic intuition that whatever theory will
: explain these events, this group will be explained in the same way...

The difference is merely one of terminology. No matter what you call it,
your "pre-theoretic intuition" and "theory" both require repeated failure
at falsification to be accepted. For my purposes, they are identical

:> (d), however, is the explanation by which we group the events of (a) 
:> as identical, those of (b) as laying on a spectrum with the new event 
:> between them, as well as defining the spectrum of (d).

:> Theory is that which justifies a-d, it's not an alternative to them.

: From the above comment you see I do not agree here. I meant (d) as further
: from the original observational evidence than (c) on the grounds that it is
: categorically removed - beyond all observational tests altogether....

But that's not what theory is. It's an idea that summarizes the results
of a wide range of observations that then consistantly succeeds in
providing the means for making interpolations and extrapolations that
are successful.

RDG says he disagrees, but doesn't say how it's divorced from
observational test, or why my characterization is flawed.

He also dismisses Poppers' position as one everyone in the field knows
is false. I took a philosophy of science course in Columbia in 87,
and was left with a very different conclusion.

: [I guess in this way of looking at it, we never actually observe an electon.
: What we actually see are phosphors triggered on the oscilloscope, which we
: interpret to be an electronic current according to our theory. Don't tell
: this to electrical engineers because we actually do see the electrons :-)
: JSO]

We don't actually see balls, we see photons entering our eyes after they
-- according to theory -- reflected off the ball.

:-)BBii!
-mi

-- 
Micha Berger             When you come to a place of darkness,
micha@aishdas.org        you don't chase out the darkness with a broom.
http://www.aishdas.org   You light a candle.
Fax: (270) 514-1507        - R' Yekusiel Halberstam of Klausenberg zt"l

>RYGB wrote in response:
> >Did I say all of MB must be taken "literally?" If I did, I meant that all
> >(or part) of Bereishis 1 cannot be dismissed as the Torah equivalent of
> >Aesop's fables. There are many layers of understanding between
> >fundamentalist pshat and peshuto shel mikro.

>RYGB, I would appreciate it if you could clarify your position. Your
>original statement was in response to my statement that (according to the
>way I understand Rav Dessler) the concept of six days does not refer to
>six time periods, but rather to six spiritual modes used in creation. In

Actually, I did not participate in that conversation. Personally, I accept
that the universe is probably billions of years old. My sole objection
was to your dismissal of the Torah's account of the *order* Sheishes
Yemei Bereishis as allegory (l'afukei metzius) on the basis of the fossil
record. To that I responded that fuhn a kashya shtarbt men nisht etc.

>response to this, you stated that allegorization is unacceptable. You
>then stated that this is in accordance with your earlier posts on Avodah,
>in which you rejected the way that Abarbanel, Efodi and Rav Kappach
>explain Rambam. Now you say to RMS that you just meant that no part of
>Torah can be dismissed as the equivalent of Aesop's fables, but I can't
>figure out what that means (is there a difference between a fable and
>an allegory, except in the pejorative connotation?), and which of your
>statements you are clarifying.

Yes, the terms have been used in a confusing and ambiguous manner here,
and this may be partially, or even wholly, my fault. So let us discard
the terms and talk to the substance.

There are several approaches that may be taken to a Biblical text for
which we find precedents in Chazal or the Rishonim:

1. To take the pasuk k'peshuto.
2. To take the pasuk as describing the aliba d'shemaya aspect of a deed
(a la the sin of Chofni and Pinchas the sons of Eli).
3. To take the pasuk as describing the metzius, but on a spiritual, not a
physical plane (a la the Rambam's understanding of the interaction
between humans and malachim.
4. To take the pasuk on one of these three levels, but also to infer
a remez to something more profound or hidden (a la the Kabbalists'
understanding of the eight kings of Edom).

To the best of my knowledge, you will find no authoritative source (note:
kevodo b'mekomo munach, but the Efodi is not amongst the authoritative
sources) who goes beyond these four approaches and says that a metzius or
ma'aseh described in a pasuk did not take place or does not occur on *any*
of these three levels, but is merely some elaborate metaphor. Years ago,
when we first discussed this in regard to and essay by Rabbi Shubert
Spero, it was because Rabbi Spero had asserted that the entire Mabul
account is of this kind - it never took place in *any* way, shape or
form and is merely an elaborate metaphor concerning the struggles of
good and evil and what not. (IIRC, Rollo May has a very nice similar
approach to Gan Eden and the story of Adam, Chava and the snake.)

>I have three questions for you:

>1. When Abarbanel, Efodi and Rav Kappach explain Rambam's view to be
>that the events of Gan Eden are allegorical (which you felt to be the
>wrong interpretation of Rambam), was Rambam accordingly "dismissing it
>as the equivalent of Aesop's fables"?

Let's start with RSG, whom you cited in an earlier post. It is obvious
in EvD #3 d.h. v'acharei eileh and #9 d.h. v'achel be'techilah that he
took the story of GE pretty literally.

Moreover, at the very end of #7 that you cite, RSG explicitly places the
Spero school, to which it seems that you subscribe, me'chutz la'machaneh
(my translation):

"And know that one who requires or allows to explain the stories of the
resurrection as meshalim [you translate that yourself, I am trying to
avoid nomenclature], because it is possible to understand them in [this]
other way, he is required to require and accept speaking of the story
of the Creation and all the signs and wonders and all the disciplinary
mitzvos to the point that he categorizes all of them as meshalim,
for it is possible to explain them in [such] explanations. And if he
accepts this upon himself, he has deviated from the category of Toras
Yisroel. And if he refuses to do so, then all that he asked upon us
concerning the resurrection is null."

>2. When Rambam states that "The account of creation given in Scripture is
>not, as is generally believed, intended to be literal in all its parts,"
>was he "dismissing it as the equivalent of Aesop's fables"?

As to the Moreh, in 1:2 he explains Gan Eden quite literally (with some
profound explanation of concepts and meanings, of course). And in 2:30 he
explains Ma'aseh Bereishis in line with the pesukim, not as some mashal -
but interpreting the terms used as descriptions of the creative process
in a kind of shorthand that alludes to the more abstract and obscure
nuances that cannot be reduced to writing. Thus, the words in the Chumash
are like tips of icebergs, where a bit juts out but there is far more
beneath the surface. This is derech #2 above, in conjunction with derech
#3. It is not the Spero school. (It is in this spirit that the Malbim
explaind Ma'aseh Bereishis on the basis of evolutuin.) And thus, while
the Rambam in 2:29 tells us that the *prohpets* spoke with meshalim,
in the case of Ma'aseh Bereishis he is very precise (my translation):

"...That all that is mentioned in Ma'aseh Bereishis in the Torah is not
*completely* [my emphasis] in its simple sense as the masses assume..."

I do not know where my Rambam with the aforementioned commentaries is
right now, but this is pashut pshat ;-) in the Rambam.

>3. When I explained Rav Dessler's position that the word Yom in Bereishis
>does not mean that there was a period of time in the literal historical
>sense, but rather refers to a spiritual force used in creation, would
>this mean that Rav Dessler is "dismissing it as the equivalent of
>Aesop's fables"?

No. He is explaining it (perhaps - but I assert you misunderstand him
in any case) in the vein of derech #3 above.

KT,
YGB

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