Avodah Mailing List

Volume 12 : Number 137

Sunday, April 4 2004

• Re: kosher bittul of kitniyos
• Re: chametz in the kinneret
• Re: Shnayim Mikra v'Echad Targum
• Shtar Mechiras Yud Gimmel
• Re: Ikkarim of Dwarves/ Marc Shapiro's New Book
• Rambam's Principles
• Re: Ikkarim of Dwarves/ Marc Shapiro's New Book
• Bedikat Chametz
• More on Kinneret Kashrus
• Re: R. Elyashiv on pesach
• Annual Chol HaMoed Get Together
• Is Torah Permanent?
• Re: Rambam's Principles
• RE: Ikkarim of Dwarves/ Marc Shapiro's New Book

Rabbi Meir (don't you have a last name? or first?) wrote:
> Is there any truth to the report that kosher agencies do not provide
> Pesach certification to products containing even traces of kitniyos?
> If this is true, how can they disregard and perhaps even be seen to be
> legislating against the Halocha of bittul?

Correct, afaik. I get quetions about such products, on a fairly regular
basis, obviously around Pessa'h. The "culprit" is the Chief Rabbinate
who is ma'hmir on marking all such items for qitniyot eaters.

For Rav Yonah Metzger's phone #, contact me off list. ;-) (I actually
have it, but doubt your phone call will change the system)

> I suppose, if they were to
> indicate that these things are kosher relying on bittul but they wish
> not to provide certification, it might be OK. However, they seem to
> indicate that nothing but that which bears a reliable certification
> should be consumed. Chocolate containing lecithin is a good example,
> lecithin is certainly not a majority ingredient and is not discernible
> and should be OK for Pesach.

The chief Rabbinate forces those wanting to export to Israel to adhere to
certain standards, which is good, however, those standards may sometimes
be too limiting. However, same individual agencies may be more lenient for
products intended for the non Israeli market. An example is one of the
'Hareidi communities of Paris, which cerrtifies sunflower oil without
saying boo (no bittul here, simply disagreeing with contention that
sunflowers are qitniot, or that qitniot oil is prohibited for Ashkenazim,
as it isn't qitniot flour).

Arie Folger
-- 
If an important person, out of humility, does not want to rely on [the Law, as 
applicable to his case], let him behave as an ascetic. However, permission 
was not granted to record this in a book, to rule this way for the future 
generations, and to be stringent of one's own accord, unless he shall bring 
clear proofs from the Talmud [to support his argument].
	paraphrase of Rabbi Asher ben Ye'hiel, as quoted by Rabbi Yoel
	Sirkis, Ba'h, Yoreh De'ah 187:9, s.v. Umah shekatav.

R Arie Folger wrote:
> And I am saying that me'iqar hadin, one could ask the kfeilah wether the
> resulting dish was positively influenced by any such taste. In fact, in this
> area, Ashkenazi rabbanim rely on te'imat kfeilah for some
> industrial settings.

> IOW, the ta'am is meant to be actual in all cases. We just use the full
> volume of the pot because we don't trust a kfeilah ordinarily....

I'm SO confused. I thought the point of kashering dishes is to remove
ta'am. The gemara (AZ 75a-b) doesn't mention te'imah as a way of avoiding
kashering. Nor would there ever be reason for libun chamur -- libun kal
will burn away literal ta'am of any biochemical.

:-)BBii
-mi

From: "Kenneth G Miller" <kennethgmiller@juno.com>
> Not according to Aruch HaShulchan 285:2 -- "... B'Vadai, when Moshe
> Rabenu was m'saken to lain, he also established this takana, that each
> individual should read Shnayim Mikra v'Echad Targum ..."

Why would a member of dor hamidbar need targum?

David Riceman

Date: Fri, 02 Apr 2004 10:20:42 +0200
From: Moshe Feldman <moshe@internationaltax.us>
> AIUI some shtarei mechiras chametz have a Mechiras Yud Gimmel for places
> where you do not plan to go during the Chag and do not want to have
> to check--i.e., you rent those places to the goy prior to the time of
> b'dikas chometz...

In SHU"T Tzemach Tzedek OH # 47 he discusses this issue - and is meikil
and writes that areas that will be sold do not have to be checked. This
is (apparantly) a Tshuva to the Divrei Nechemya who held otherwise -
see SHU"T Divrei Nechemya OH # 35-37.

Chaim G Steinmetz
cgsteinmetz@juno.com

One last time before Pesach (when I go offline)

1)The problem with RDE's understanding of the Ginat Veradim - that the
eighth ikkar means that we believe that the text determined by majority
opinion is the text of moshe - is that this understanding contradicts
everything that we know about the Rambam's understanding both of the
nature of ikkarim, the role that they play, as well as how we know
things and the role of majority opinion. Majority rule, for the rambam,
plays a purely pragmatic, rather than epistemologic, role - a decision
needs to be reached, and one therefore follows the majority. It has no
intrinsic role in determining the truth

2) The role of ikkarim is to provide the minimum of knowledge necessary to
achieve olam haba - which is dependent on one's intellectual achievements
- and there to raise the validity of something which is purely based on
majority rule to an ikkar emuna is a davar tamuha - something that would
be inconceivable to the rambam. It can only occur if someone applies a
methodology alien to the rambam, as well as thought categories alien to
the rambam, to his text.

3) The question that you (and others) raise about the intrinsic
contradiction between the formulation of the 8th ikkar and the rambam's
clear knowledge of textual variants is one raised by many - and there are
no good, simple answers. The radical formulation of the eighth ikkar is
viewed by many as a response to the islamic challenge that the torah was
correct but falsified by the rabbis, clearly a feasible explanation of
the radical explanation. There may be others. However, any explanation
has to be consistent with the rambam's own general understanding of
the nature of truth, nevua, and the importance of the torah - and your
understanding of the ginat veradim's position isn't.

4) What you cite from Rav Weinberg is actually a proof of something quite
different - that he agrees the eighth ikkar can not be taken literally,
and tries to salvage it that the essential text is correct with minor
modifications. This isn't a statement that the text is now the same.
This, of course, is hard to formulate as dogma.

5) In a major way, you actually agree with R Schapiro, but are unwilling
to accept it. The rambam clearly intended the 13 ikkarim to be at
least the exoteric dogma - which defines those who deny it as heretics.
RGS and RMB have also argued that the 13 ikkarim define heresy. That was
essentially the statement of Rav Parness that RM Schapiro was responding
to - and there are many others who write that Judaism has a dogma -
the 13 ikkarim, and any one who denies them is a heretic.

The problem is, as you point out - to the extent that the 13 ikkarim
are accepted, they are not accepted as dogma - and are accepted in many
different flavors and exceptions. The fact that they define in some sense
important issues about which there is some consensus is a very different
statement than stating that they are dogma - and no one denies that they
summarize important areas of thought. What RM Schapiro debunks accurately,
and you agree with, is the statement that they were universally accepted
as dogma. The question then arises about the issue of what their status
is - and here you are trying to develop new categories of virtual dogma
and doctrine. As you note, there is no post sanhedrin body with the
authority to make that determination, and the question therefore is how
that determination is made.

6) Many bodies will try to set norms of behavior and of thought for their
communities, and enforce them as essentially heresy. I suspect that there
are quite a few bate din who will refuse to be megayer (to use RMB's
example as defining heresy) anyone who accepts tora shebichtav vealpe,
and the 13 ikkarim, but who holds, eg, that the zohar was written in
the 13th century, that we can understand the flood allegorically, that
shedim don't really exist, and that the ari (or besht) did not have
ruach hakodesh. Other (probably most) bate din will be megayer someone
who will say piyutim to angels. Does that rise to heresy? Is that dogma,
or doctrine? That is where the problem arises.

Meir Shinnar

R. Daniel Eidensohn has quoted the following from R. Marc Shapiro's book:

For example Page 97 "Faced with all the textual differences, even
Maimonides' son R. Abraham invalidate scrolls that differed from
Maimonides' prescriptions.39 Maimonides' establishment of the authority
of the Ben Asher Masoretic text as dogma means that the sages of the
Talmud and Midrash, the Babylonian Masoretes,40 and countless medieval
scholars stand in opposition to Maimonides' Principle, thus making them
heretics! Even today the Yemenites have a slightly different text from
that used by the rest of Jewry.41 It is thus impossible to I speak about
the Torah 'found in our hands today' without clarifying that there is no
such single text. Considering all that has been mentioned with regard
to the non-uniformity of the Torah text, it should not be surprising
that R. Jacob Kamenetzky (I89I-I984) argued that perhaps Maimonides'
text of the Pentateuch differed from the one in use today.42 In fact,
with the publication of Jordan Penkower's monograph on the Aleppo Codex,
we see that the letters in Maimonides' pentateuchal text (the Ben Asher
text) were identical to those of the current Yemenite text.43 This means
that if contemporary Ashkenazim and Sephardim accept Maimonides' Eighth
Principle with regard to their versions of the Pentateuch, they stand
condemned as heretics by Maimonides himself for refusing to accept his
version as the proper one.44"

I may be missing the point, but it seems that every observant Jew
believes that the text of the Torah in his possession is the authentic
word of Hashem, while at the same time recognizing that others may have
a different variant on the text which they believe is equally authentic.
As long as there are no material differences in the texts, why should
this matter? We know, for example, that we are not practicing Judaism
as declared to Moshe, because of the halachot which were forgotten
during the Yimai Availo shel Moshe (period of mourning for Moshe), as
well as the fact that as a consequence, there emerged macklokot which
is inconsistent with an unbroken tradition. So? Inasmuch as no one can
point to any particular practice or halacha as being the incorrect one,
we can only do as best we can. The gap is an issue of practicality,
not of theology or faith, which is what the ikkarim seek to address.

Shalom L. Kohn

Shinnar, Meir wrote:
>1)The problem with RDE's understanding of the Ginat Veradim - that the
>eighth ikkar means that we believe that the text determined by majority
>opinion is the text of moshe - is that this understanding contradicts
>everything that we know about the Rambam's understanding both of the
>nature of ikkarim, the role that they play, as well as how we know
>things and the role of majority opinion. Majority rule, for the rambam,
>plays a purely pragmatic, rather than epistemologic, role - a decision
>needs to be reached, and one therefore follows the majority. It has no
>intrinsic role in determining the truth

You are asserting that once the Rambam labels something as an ikkar it
must be taken literally - even if it contradicts what he says in Mishneh
Torah. Could you quote a source for this assertion?

>2) The role of ikkarim is to provide the minimum of knowledge necessary to
>achieve olam haba - which is dependent on one's intellectual achievements
>- and there to raise the validity of something which is purely based on
>majority rule to an ikkar emuna is a davar tamuha - something that would
>be inconceivable to the rambam. It can only occur if someone applies a
>methodology alien to the rambam, as well as thought categories alien to
>the rambam, to his text.

Part of our disagreement involves the question of how the Rambam viewed
the Ikkarim. Was it a defense against the Moslems - but the Rambam didn't
believe it himself or was it the best approximation to the Rambam's
personal beliefs that the ignorant masses could comprehend? At the
present it is really uncertain what the Rambam's attitude was.

Let me quote Prof Kellner:

"I have examined here the following theories concerning why Maimonides
posited his principles: (a) that they are simply pedagogical devices
(AbravaneI); (b) that Maimonides was copying contemporary sciences
(Abravanel) or religions (Schechter and Neumark); (c) that Maimonides
was trying to guarantee to even the simplest Jew a portion in the
world to come (Hyman); and (d) that Maimonides was seeking to guarantee
political stability among the Jews (Berman). I have also put forward
my own explanation which I may be summarized as follows: seeking
to make possible more perfect halakhic observance among the Jews -
which depended upon the holding of correct beliefs at least about G-d.
Maimonides sought to replace incorrect habits of thought. In order to
achieve his aims while arousing the least possible amount of hostility,
Maimonides, patterning his discussion after a common Muslim practice, laid
down his thirteen principles as dogmas! Without committing himself on the
question of whether he himself actually thought they were dogmas in the
sense of being both necessary and sufficient conditions for enjoying a
portion in the world to come. My explanation, while suffering from none
of the faults shown to afflict the other explanations, has the advantages
of (a) taking seriously Maimonides' commitment to Torah and the Jewish
people; (b) being consistent with interpretations of Maimonidcs which
affirm that intellectual perfection is the sine qua non for salvation and
interpretations which deny that; and (c) being based firmly on Maimonides'
texts (as demonstrated above)."

>5) In a major way, you actually agree with R Schapiro, but are unwilling
>to accept it. The rambam clearly intended the 13 ikkarim to be at
>least the exoteric dogma - which defines those who deny it as heretics.

I have no problem with agreeing with Prof Shapiro - but I often have a
problem figuring out what his position is. The problem with the above
assertion is why there is inconsistency between the Rambam's expression
of the Ikkarim in the Commentary to Sanhedrin and the Mishna Torah? The
version in Mishna Torah is concerned with not asserting deliberate
human creation while the expression in the Commentary is that the text
we have today is identical. I have been asserting that the version in
Mishna Torah is what he meant and you have asserted that Mishna Torah
is halacha while the Commentary is dogma.

>The problem is, as you point out - to the extent that the 13 ikkarim
>are accepted, they are not accepted as dogma - and are accepted in many
>different flavors and exceptions. The fact that they define in some sense
>important issues about which there is some consensus is a very different
>statement than stating that they are dogma - and no one denies that they
>summarize important areas of thought.

It is good to see we have a point of agreement.

> What RM Schapiro debunks accurately,
>and you agree with, is the statement that they were universally accepted
>as dogma. The question then arises about the issue of what their status
>is - and here you are trying to develop new categories of virtual dogma
>and doctrine. As you note, there is no post sanhedrin body with the
>authority to make that determination, and the question therefore is how
>that determination is made.

A large part of our disagreement revolves around the nature of dogma -
in particular the Rambam's understanding. It is important to be aware
that even in the academic world as well as that of other religions the
term dogma is often used interchangeably with doctrine.

 Encyclopedia Britannica:

"This distinction appears in Christianity in the New Testament, in
which didaskalia means "basic teachings" (as in I and II Tim.) whereas
dogma is used only in the sense of an official judgment or decree (as
in Acts 16:4). Later, however, many theologians of the early church
(including, for example, Origen, St. Cyril of Jerusalem, and St. Jerome)
use the term dogma in the sense of doctrine. In Eastern Christianity,
the theologian St. John of Damascus popularized the term "orthodoxy"
(literally "correct views") to connote the sum of Christian truth. In
Western Christianity, the great medieval theologian St. Thomas Aquinas
chose the phrase "articles of faith" to denote those doctrines that
are solemnly defined by the church and are considered to be obligatory
for faith. As late as the Roman Catholic reformatory Council of Trent
(1545-63), "doctrine" and "dogma" were still roughly synonymous."

I think one of the major failings of Prof. Shapiro's latest work is
lack of clarity in these issues. (In contrast Prof Kellner spends a
lot of time trying to clarify basic terms). I don't think we would
be disagreeing if these issues were cogently discussed in the book -
especially as to alternatives and what if any evidence supports them.
For example it seems assumed by Prof Shapiro that the Ikkarim were for
the masses against the pressure of Muslim and or Christian propaganda.
Prof Kellner asserts that the Ikkarim were not written for the masses but
rather specifically for the talmid chachom who had not studied hashgofa
or philosophy;

" Who are the masses according to Maimonides? Maimonides distinguishes,
it seems to me, among three groups of people. The lowest category consists
of 'children, women [sic], stupid ones, and those of a defective natural
disposition' (Guide, i. 35, p. 81). These, apparently, are those who
are cautioned not to read the commentary on Helek (Kafich, p. 203),
athough they ought to be taught the truth concerning them: p. 81). It is
evident that the commentary on helek is not addressed to these people,
both because Maimonides cautions them not to read it and because it
contains a discussion of the service of G-d from love as opposed to
fear, and Maimonides explicitly warns against "teaching this doctrine
to 'children, women, and the generality of the ignorant . [kelal amei
ha-aretz]', in 'Laws of Repentance', x. 5. The second category consists
of the rabbinical1y erudite but philosophically ignorant. This group
is described in the 'Parable of the Palace' (GuIde, iii. 51) and is the
primary audience for Maimonides' rabbinic works (including the commentary
on Helek), as is made evident in the passage from 'Resurrection' cited
here. The members of the third group are individuals like Maimonides'
both rabbinic erudition and philosophical sophistication. Both rabbinic
erudition and philosophical sophistication. The principles, it seems, are
addressed to the second group in the expectation that these individuals
will not only accept and study them but will, in turn, convey them in
some appropriate fashion, to the ignorant masses who comprise the first
group. "

 I have not been able to decide what Prof Shapiro views as the purpose
of his work. Is it : 1) Rambam was not accepted as dogma. 2) Judaism
does not have a core of universally accepted beliefs. 3) Rambam couldn't
possible believe a dogma which excluded so many authorities. 4) Judaism
is much more flexible in beliefs than orthodox Jews realize. 5) Some
major authorities held views that other authorities viewed as heresy. 6)
Rambam's beliefs are not binding because there have been some disagreement
with some of the details of some of the beliefs.

Prof Shapiro does claim on page 4: "My goal is not to continue Kellner's
treatment into more modern times, nor to expand Jacobs' discussion.
Rather, I will concentrate on those aspects of the Principles which
did not receive unqualified acceptance, and, in doing so, will probe
the outer limits of Orthodox theology. Although Jacobs dealt with this
topic to some extent, and I freely acknowledge my debt to him it still
demands a systematic and comprehensive treatment', which I attempt to
offer in this book. To be sure, there are times when I depart from these
narrow confines and elucidate aspects of the Principles themselves. I
do so when the context requires it and when I believe that I can offer
an original contribution. However, throughout the book I assume that
the reader already has an understanding of the Principles. Those who
do not are well advised to study the books of Kellner and Jacobs before
tackling this one."

Thus it was meant to be a mere catalogue of aspects of the Principles
that someone disagreed with - except when Prof Shapiro can reveal the
outer limits of Orthodox theology. The oscillation between the work
as catalogue of disagreement and as revealer of the outer limits of
Orthodoxy - is very problematic. Prof. Shapiro is inconsistent in his
language. Sometimes being extremely respectful and cautious about his
assertions and at other times he is very flippant and polemical. The
book could have benefited greatly from an editor who insisted on greater
conceptual consistency and style. I don't think there would be much
controversy about his topic if he didn't seem to present himself as
the great revealer of truth - instead of a professor of Jewish studies
who would like to share the results of his research. It is a work which
presupposes a knowledge base from former Orthodox rabbi L. Jacobs and
modern Orthodox Prof Kellner. The former having left Orthodoxy and the
latter has sought to blur the border between Orthodox and Conservative.
Unfortunately he does not systematically explain when he agrees
or disagrees with their assessments. His introduction is an erratic
survey of issues and problems - which jumps from issue to issue without
meaningful conclusions. It seems more appropriate for an introductory
lecture on a semester course on the subject - then for a book entitled
"The Limits of Orthodox Theology"

In sum. The fundamental question of the nature of the Rambam's principles
and especially its role in defining normative believe - as opposed
to dogma - needs much more work. Unfortunately Prof. Shapiro's work -
in its present form - is greatly flawed and does not provide adequate
ground for answering this question.

Daniel Eidensohn

> AIUI some shtarei mechiras chametz have a Mechiras Yud Gimmel for places
> where you do not plan to go during the Chag and do not want to have
> to check--i.e., you rent those places to the goy prior to the time of
> b'dikas chometz. 

Why do this? Does anyone imagine that there is a chiyuv bedikah in
the pantry, where all the chametz which is going to be sold to the goy
is stored? What exactly would this bedikah look like? 'Yeah, there's
some chametz, and there, and there, and there, and there too. Oh, and
look, there's some more chametz over there. Next.' This is ridiculous.
We *know* there's chametz in the pantry, we *intend* it to be there, but
we also know that when zman biur comes none of that chametz will belong
to us, and the pantry will be sealed up so nobody will accidentally end
up eating any of it. Therefore there is no chiyuv bedikah.

The exact same reasoning must surely apply to a room, or a whole house
or apartment, that one intends to lock up and abandon before zman biur,
and to sell all the chametz it contains.  No need to sell it on the 13th.

-- 
Zev Sero
zev@sero.name

It happens that our rav mentioned the issue in his Shabbos HaGadol
drasha this afternoon. He gave the halachas we have all discussed and
then various views on whether the chumra was shtuyot or a good chumra
according to Ravs SZA and RSE.

To make a very long story short, the deciding factors are these:

The fact that there is no shiur for a mashehu is only valid when the
body of water is small enough to make it possible for something to impart
ta'am. In other words, it is definitely possible to put enough bread or
whiskey or beer or whatever for there to be a ta'am imparted into the
water of a well. However, it is just not possible or feasible for there
to be enough bread or whiskey or beer dumped into the Kinneret to give
it a ta'am.

It was also brought up that the water is filtered and cleaned and such
before we get it as drinking water, which even though by itself is not
sufficient to clear up any chashash [as the relevant fact is whether
something was in there in the first place, not whether we cleaned it out],
but that due to this cleaning and filtering process the water you drink
in your tap right this minute took two weeks to get there, meaning that
any water you drink from your faucet during Pesach really is from two
weeks before Pesach and any water that would be pumped during Pesach
wouldn't reach your faucet until two weeks later.

 --Rena 

R' Eli Turkel brought some points from <<< a booklet recent appeared
with piskei halachot of R. Elyashiv about Pesach. >>>

Included in that was <<< Everyone stands for "shefoch hamatcha" and RYSE
announces - boruch haba >>>

I questioned this. <<< Baruch Haba? To who, Eliyahu HaNavi? I've been
trying for years to tell people that he comes to ... a bris, but coming
to sedarim is only an urban legend. Could I have been wrong? >>>

Yes, it seems that I *was* wrong.

I am indebted to an article I saw in the magazine section of this week's
(American) HaModia, written by R. Shlomo Ashkenazi, which referred to
the Aruch HaShulchan 480:1, who writes:

"After they drink the third cup, the minhag is to say Sh'foch Chamas'cha
and to open the door to remember that it is Layl Shimurim, and in the
zechus of this emunah, Mashiach will come and pour out his wrath upon
the Babylonians who destroyed the Beis Hamikdash. And since Eliyahu will
come before Mashiach does... therefore the minhag is to place another
kos in the middle of the table, and we call it Koso Shel Eliyahu. Some
had the minhag to stand up from their heseba and say, "Baruch HaBa!",
and it is all for chizuk emunah..."

I had always thought that the reason for the Kos Eliyahu was simply that
he will be machria the machlokes between 4 or 5 kosos, so we pour a fifth
cup but we don't drink it. This reason is brought by the Hagada Yayna
Shel Torah (#159) in the name of the Haflaah, and also by the YU Hagada.
But it is totally omitted by that Aruch Hashulchan, and by the Mishna
Brurah (480:10) and many others, who bring ideas very similar to those
mentioned by the Aruch Hashulchan, except for the "Baruch Haba".

Bottom line, I was very wrong. I used to make fun of those who pretend
that Eliyahu actually comes to our sedarim, like those fathers who
nudge the table to make the kos shake, and who then tell the kids,
"Look! Eliyahu is taking a sip!" That's really not too far removed from
standing up to greet the navi with "Baruch Haba", and if I have ever
made such disparaging comments to anyone here, I publicly apologize.

Akiva Miller

Adina and I are pleased to once again invite those of you who will be
in Israel to the 5th (if I'm counting correctly) annual Avodah- Areivim
Chol HaMoed get together to be held in our house in Ramat Shlomo.

The get together will take place on Sunday, the 5th day of Chol HaMoed,
between 11:00 AM and 2:00 PM (Yom Tov starts at 6:30 PM in Jerusalem
and later elsewhere, so that should not be an issue).

IMPORTANT - Adina asks that those who plan to come PLEASE RSVP AS SOON
AS POSSIBLE AND LET US KNOW THAT YOU PLAN TO COME. In the past, no one
has RSVP'ed and people have just shown up (in typical Israeli fashion
:-). Adina would like to know in advance who and how many people are
coming.

We look forward to seeing you. 

Chag Kasher v'Sameyach. 
 - Carl and Adina

Please daven and learn for a Refuah Shleima for our son, 
Baruch Yosef ben Adina Batya among the sick of Israel.  
Thank you very much. 

In a message dated 3/31/2004 5:03:13 PM EST, skohn@Sidley.com writes:
> How do we square "the law of the Torah can never change" with the
> teachings that in the future, for example, the only chag that will
> survive is Purim, or (per the Rambam in Moreh, albeit not in Yad), that
> the korbanot will be unnecessary, or (to a lesser degree) that halacha
> will be like Beis Shammai, or the argument (recited in the seder) about
> whether yetziat mitzraim will be recited as part of the shma after the
> arrival of Moshiach? It is one thing to accept those teachings in the
> abstract, but once Torah is compared to the essence of HKB"H, it becomes
> far more problematic.

Here is a real simple answer.

The avos kept all of the mitzvos. Yet it is clear that the Torah was
mechadesh certain mitzvos only after an event - e.g. psach sheini and
bnos zlaphcahd.

Al pi nistar this is simple. There is an underlying Torah or set of
mitzvos that must be fulfilled. Some physical manifestation of that
Torah are temporary or transient but that core is permanent.

Lemashal,. korbanos are not offered on the alter days but we have the
conept of unshalma parim sefosaynu.

Another tengential mashal. The construction of the Mishkan as described
in Trumah thru Pekudei is largely academic EXCEPT to teach us about
mlachos of Shabbos. Nevertheless, the underlying manifestations in the
Torah point to the underlying core EVEN nowadays. IOW even though we
don't have a mishkan a picture of that mishkan still teaches us something
that CAN be implemented today. IOW the symbolism still works.

Hirschian Symbolism reflects this concept to an extent and is AFAIK
built upon Zoharic principles.

The secondary problem with antinomian groups is not only do they reject
PRACTICE of Halachah they also throw out the underlying principles
behind them.

Halachic Rabbinic Judaism, as preserved by Rabban Yochana ben Zakkai seeks
to preserve Halachic practice AND the theory behind the destroyed Temple.
Hence the Mishnah is written pretty mcuh AS IF the Beis Hamikdash were
still there.
 So, too, Rambam's Yad.

Hameivin Yavin

Best Wishes for a "Sweet" Passover
Richard Wolpoe
RabbiRichWolpoe@aol.com

In a message dated 4/3/2004 10:40:40 PM EST, skohn@Sidley.com writes:
> We know, for example, that we are not practicing Judaism as declared
> to Moshe, because of the halachot which were forgotten during the Yimai
> Availo shel Moshe (period of mourning for Moshe), as well as the fact that
> as a consequence, there emerged macklokot which is inconsistent with an
> unbroken tradition. So? Inasmuch as no one can point to any particular
> practice or halacha as being the incorrect one, we can only do as best
> we can. The gap is an issue of practicality, not of theology or faith,
> which is what the ikkarim seek to address.

Agreed. Which is why a defense for lower criticism is arguable based
upon the premise that noe one can assuer a perfect transmission. If the
death of Moshe Rabbeinu wiped out Halachos how about all the persectuiont
and catastrophes. How about the loss of Massorah with the death of 24k
talmiddim of R. Akiva?

Clearly much Torah is lost with every major catastrophic event!
Hence niskatnu hadoros!

[Email #2. -my]

In a message dated 3/16/2004 5:07:43 PM EST, Joelirich@aol.com writes:
> So did Moshe Rabeinu not have a position on corporeality or did he have
> one but others in his generation disagreed or did later generations
> forget what he believed?

it seems that Moshe Rabbeinu's position on corporablity can be embodied
by the voice of the Torah in Devarim 4:12 usmunah ein'chem ro'im zulassi
kol...

Probably everyone who heard Moshe's voice on this matter understood
precisely what he meant, but our reading of it 3300 years later is
perhaps less clear

Best Wishes for a "Sweet" Passover
Richard Wolpoe
RabbiRichWolpoe@aol.com

Daniel Eidensohn wrote:
> The oscillation between the work
> as catalogue of disagreement and as revealer of the outer limits of
> Orthodoxy - is very problematic. Prof. Shapiro is inconsistent in his
> language. Sometimes being extremely respectful and cautious about his
> assertions and at other times he is very flippant and polemical. The
> book could have benefited greatly from an editor who insisted 
> on greater
> conceptual consistency and style. I don't think there would be much
> controversy about his topic if he didn't seem to present himself as
> the great revealer of truth - instead of a professor of Jewish studies
> who would like to share the results of his research. It is a 
> work which
> presupposes a knowledge base from former Orthodox rabbi L. Jacobs and
> modern Orthodox Prof Kellner. The former having left Orthodoxy and the
> latter has sought to blur the border between Orthodox and 
> Conservative.
> Unfortunately he does not systematically explain when he agrees
> or disagrees with their assessments. His introduction is an erratic
> survey of issues and problems - which jumps from issue to 
> issue without
> meaningful conclusions. It seems more appropriate for an introductory
> lecture on a semester course on the subject - then for a book entitled
> "The Limits of Orthodox Theology"

> In sum. The fundamental question of the nature of the 
> Rambam's principles
> and especially its role in defining normative believe - as opposed
> to dogma - needs much more work. Unfortunately Prof. Shapiro's work -
> in its present form - is greatly flawed and does not provide adequate
> ground for answering this question.

RDE has stated the problems with Dr. Marc Shapiro's monograph "The Limits
of Orthodox Theology" very well, and I could not agree more. There are
major flaws on important issues on virtually every page. In an earlier
post, I provided some illustrative examples (one of the examples would
appear to border on deliberate deception, would it not be that one must
give the author the benefit of the doubt). The omission of important
material is startling.

It is deeply troubling to me that such a monograph is selling briskly at
a bookstore in Flatbush (accrding to the Forward, and probably elsewhere)
where unsuspecting customers might buy it.

After all, we are talking about serious matters. For example, the Mishna
says that somebody who denies Torah Min Hashamayim loses his Olam Haba.

Olam Haba -- nitzchiois!

An undisputed Beraisa says we must believe that every verse was
transmitted to Moshe Rabbenu directly from Hashem. The Rif and the Rosh
quote the Beraisa lehalacha. The Rambam codifies this halacha in three
places, and it is in the Shulchan Aruch in at least two places. All
later authorities who discuss it, quote the Mishna, the Beraisa and
the Shulchan Aruch approvingly, and (as RGS pointed out to me) it is so
quoted in one of the great latter day halachic works Aruch Hashulchan
(OC, 1). The Aruch Hashulchan mentions approvingly that the 13 Ikkarim,
including of course Torah min Hashamayim, are in the Siddur.

Mishna. Gemora. Shulchan Aruch. Siddur!

If this is not normative Torah, then what is? 

Of course, there are many interesting questions to be clarified. The
status of the last eight verses of the Torah is one example. But there
are also some interesting answers (omitted in the monograph; see R. I
Kasdan's post on the Seder Mishna).

The Radak brings together many of the strands in this sugya in his
hakdama to Sefer Beraishis:

<Moshe Rabbeinu wrote the whole Torah from the mouth of the Al-mighty
from "in the beginning" until "in the eyes of all Israel" (The eight
verses at the end are disputed in Chazal because some say that Yehoshua
wrote them.) One must believe that all was said with Ruach Hakodesh
and through prophecy to Moshe Rabbeinu a"h because otherwise how would
Moshe Rabbeinu know all the stories written in Sefer Bereishis. Who would
he have received them from, being in the desert. But in truth, it was
all said to him from the mouth of the Al-mighty. In the words of Chazal
"One who says that the Torah is not from Hashem does not have a portion
in the World to Come" because he has despised the word of Hashem. One
who says that the Torah is not from Hashem, and even one who says that
the whole Torah is from Hashem except for a certain verse -- that Hashem
did not say, but rather Moshe said it on his own -- he has despised the
word of Hashem. Even one who says that the whole Torah is from Hashem,
except for a certain detail, kal v'chomer, or gezaira shoveh, he has
despised the word of Hashem.>

Why does the monograph omit quoting the above, while quoting the Radak
in full on textual variants on page 101?

Avodah, and it's esteemed moderator [RMB], are to be commended on the
membership agreement which states: The parameters of "darchei noam"
and the Rambam's Thirteen Principles of Belief (and/or The Ani Ma'amins
and/or the Yigdal) are baseline standards for our discussion group.

Jonathan Ostoff

**********************


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