Avodah Mailing List

Volume 12 : Number 116

Friday, March 12 2004

• Re: Kedushah
• HaKel HaGadol HaGibor VeHaNorah
• Re: omek pshuto shel mikra
• Riddle
• Re: Havdala before/after Maariv
• Re: G-d's existence
• Rambam, Torah and philosophy
• Re: Rambam, Torah and philosophy
• Re:bigdei k'huna (was Euphemisms and Idioms)
• big letters in the megilla
• Re: Women Reading Megillah - R' Yehuda Henkin's Response to R' Shlomo Aviner's Position
• omek pshuto shel mikra
• Sefer Yonah
• The ikkarim of midgets
• Yom Haatzmaut 5764
• big letters in the Megil
• big letters in the Megil

RGS wrote in this week's MmD <http://www.aishdas.org/mesukim/5764/kiSisa.pdf>:
: Similarly, Ramban continues, Hebrew is called lashon hakodesh - the holy
: language - because it was and continues to be used for holy purposes...

This fits the understanding of qedushah as being set aside for avodas
Hashem.

But as we continue, I don't see how the Ramban fits.

:                                                      ...     According to
: Rashi we fulfill this obligation by adhering to the strict prohibitions
: of the Torah while according to the Ramban we must go beyond the laws and
: create our own stringencies.[8] In other words, Rashi understands that we
: are inherently holy and we can fulfill the mandate of kedoshim tihyu by
: refraining from defiling our sanctity through sin. As long as we do not
: violate a prohibition we are, according to Rashi, holy...

I don't understand this paragraph. One is saying that being qadosh is by
avoiding the gashmi to the extent of the law, the other to the extent
beyond the law. Neither actually speaks of an active application for
avodas Hashem, like the example of machatzis hasheqel. Both make qedushah
more to be a super-taharah. Both speak in terms of sur meirah. How do
we cast this into a notion of the Ramban connecting it to asei tov?

Which is certainly true of the Rambam:
:                         Similarly, presumably, the Rambam would explain
: that the shekel hakodesh is called holy because, as the Ramban himself
: suggests at the beginning of his comments, the shekel coins used in the
: Torah were entirely pure, lacking all dilution...

Which would be exactly like the "zahav tahor" from which the menorah was
made. Again, qedushah as a super-tahrah. But we knew that was the Rambam's
shitah.

What I don't get according to this shitah is how it can explain that
something tamei can still be qadosh. Whether we're speaking of me'aras
hamachpeilah, or the continued qedushah of terumah shenitme'ah.

-mi

-- 
Micha Berger             When we long for life without difficulties,
micha@aishdas.org        remind us that oaks grow strong in contrary
http://www.aishdas.org   winds, and diamonds are made under pressure.
Fax: (413) 403-9905                        - Peter Marshall

In this week's MmD <http://www.aishdas.org/mesukim/5764/tetzaveh.pdf>,
RJJB discusses the history of the four terms (four nouns? one noun and
three adjectives?) in the title.

First, on the subject of peshat, relevent to existing threads, RJJB
quotes the Chavos Ya'ir:
> "If the simple translation makes no sense and we have to explain it in
> a way that makes sense -- that explanation is called Pshat and not the
> simple translation."[2]

> [2] Mar Kashisha p. 29, quoted by R. Daniel Eidensohn in Avodah vol. 2
> no. 55 <http://www.aishdas.org/avodah/vol02/v02n055.shtml#14>

Note the line "pshat and not the simple translation".

He later writes:
> The Maharsha puts it most poignantly. The prophets could not lie to
> their generations. However, the Anshei Knesses HaGedolah, with the
> perspective of the end of exile, including among their number Mordechai,
> instrumental in the Jews' survival through hidden miracles, could
> see that G-d's greatness consisted of withholding His anger, that His
> Awesomeness consisted of inspiring fear to maintain the connection
> between the Jews and Himself. The Anshei Knesses HaGedolah were thus
> called "HaGedolah" because they, through reinterpretation of pshat,
> magnified the perception of G-d's strengths and attributes, restoring
> meaning to all of the attributes given by Moshe.

(RGS points you also to his essay at at
<http://www.aishdas.org/toratemet/en_devarim.html>.)

I would suggest that the difference is in the level of the generation,
as per my approach to the same phrase in last week's issue
<http://www.aishdas.org/mesukim/5764/tetzaveh.pdf>. I suggested that the
berakhah is a means of aspiring to the level of the avos, and therefore
the shevach of the berakhah is from that loftier level. However, when
dealing to a tzibbur suffering oneshim, one has to grapple with that
reality, not laud the platitudes of a loftier and happier one.

-mi

-- 
Micha Berger             When we long for life without difficulties,
micha@aishdas.org        remind us that oaks grow strong in contrary
http://www.aishdas.org   winds, and diamonds are made under pressure.
Fax: (413) 403-9905                        - Peter Marshall

On Mon, Mar 08, 2004 at 07:23:52PM +0100, Arie Folger wrote:
: How do you explain that if there is *no* Jewish notion of an objective
: reading of a text (although we may disagree what that objective notion
: is)?

I think RML was not so much denying the notion of an objective truth
as much as denying the notion that objectivity necessitates uniqueness.

Me, on Areivim::
>> It's not about "intellectual freedom". It's about truth. Casting the whole
>> issue into one of granting rights vs dealing with halachic ontologies is
>> already leaving  O perspective.

RJJB, also Areivim:
>                                    [N]ote that a lot of people on the left
> of O - Edah, JOFA, etc. - talk about rights.  Asita hayashar vehatov leaves
> some room for rights.  Mutar, too, is partially about rights.  It does seem
> an odd way of dealing with the idea of halacha qua positive and negative
> commands, but it does seem appropriate for dealing with the fringes and gray
> areas of chumra/kula, hidur, etc.

Mussar is about yenem's rights, and my chiyuvim. There is a conscious
effort to cultivate a different attitude WRT other people than
oneself. But back to the subject...

I wasn't on the subject of rights in general, but about viewing the
problem as one of granting rights. I'm tying in to the idea of social
construct that I mention later in that post.

It's like on scj(m), when a non-O poster views a mamzeir as someone the
rabbinate is unfairly stigmatizing and taking out of the marriage pool,
while the O poster will compare it to physical birth defects. Mamzeirus
isn't about granting or denying marriage rights, it's about something
that has a real existance.

RML spoke of the Semitic worldview, one in which something being
objectively real doesn't mean that only one accurate interpretation
exists. Because the typical non-O Jew buys into the Yefetic-Greek-Western
worldview, they think that such plurality implies subjectivity.

-mi

-- 
Micha Berger             When we long for life without difficulties,
micha@aishdas.org        remind us that oaks grow strong in contrary
http://www.aishdas.org   winds, and diamonds are made under pressure.
Fax: (413) 403-9905                        - Peter Marshall

We're all familiar with the pasuk "Layhudim haysa orah vesason vykar"
to which we, during havdala, add "ken tihyeh lanu"

I'm looking for other instances where we add our beracha to the pasuk.
I have one other example in mind but am looking for others I have not
thought of.

Any contributions?

Gershon
gershon.dubin@juno.com

On Mon, Mar 08, 2004 at 10:57:49AM -0500, Kenneth G Miller wrote:
: (2) In 60:25, he writes that if ones Seudah Shlishis stretches past
: Tzeis, he can say Havdalah Al Hakos during the meal. He adds two points
: that sound a bit contradictory - one, that this can be done "even
: l'chatchilah", and two, that this should be done only "l'ays hatzorech"
: because it will force him to omit "Retzeh" from Birkas HaMazon.

Perhaps relevent are the two meanings I saw for bedi'eved: 1- if done,
you were yotzei, or 2- if done, it had a chalos. It's possible that an
act has a challos even though you weren't yotzei the chiyuv.

Perhaps the SSK means you're yotzei havdalah, and not just have succeeded
in ending Shabbos.

-mi

-- 
Micha Berger             When we long for life without difficulties,
micha@aishdas.org        remind us that oaks grow strong in contrary
http://www.aishdas.org   winds, and diamonds are made under pressure.
Fax: (413) 403-9905                        - Peter Marshall

On Tue, Mar 09, 2004 at 03:06:30PM -0800, Harry Maryles wrote:
: I know that I am going to sound like an agnostic but... here goes:

I know I'm going to sound like an idiot, because I'm going to reply
to a post I can't understand but... here goes:

:> Occam's Razor would have you select the theory that requires the fewest
:> assumptions. 

: That is no proof of the validity of the theory...

Agreed. Another flaw in scientific thought. But then, Karl Poppers pointed
out that science doesn't actually prove theories. Failed experiments
prove a theory false, but successful experiments don't flawlessly prove
one explanation for the event over another.

That's why they need rules for choosing between disproved theories.

:> A major flaw in scientific thiking is that the absence of teleological
:> explanations is a given. 

: I don't think scientists look at it as a given...

Of course it is. Scientific process is only about empirical evidence
and empirical explanations.

:             Why believe in something that has no basis in fact? Why not
: wait and see? Why not experiment and test the teleologocal hypothesis? ...

Because they would never select "the rock fell because G-d wanted it to"
as a hypothesis to test. Or even an atheistic "aliens made it happen".
Nor "evolution is a possible explanation for the origin of the species
because mutations could be directed by Divine Intent rather than truly
random."

-mi

-- 
Micha Berger             When we long for life without difficulties,
micha@aishdas.org        remind us that oaks grow strong in contrary
http://www.aishdas.org   winds, and diamonds are made under pressure.
Fax: (413) 403-9905                        - Peter Marshall

On a thread on areivim (bounced here) RMB wrote
>If he were entertaining the possibility that philosophy could even possibly
>contradict Torah (not just TSBK alone), would the Rambam write in that very
>chapter (Friedlander's tr.), "Secondly, our belief in the Incorporeality of
>God is not contrary to any of the fundamental principles of our religion: it
>is not contrary to the words of any prophet." Why would he care, if philosophy
>could trump Torah? I recommend reading the 2nd paragraph (as Friedlander
>divides it) in full -- the Rambam clearly discusses limits to something you
>present as absolute license. (IMHO, but not RMShinnar's.)

As RMB cites me, let me clarify my position (which I think is simple
pshat - and I don't know of any major scholar who holds as RMB) - which
I think also answers most of RMB's reasons for holding as he does.

1) there is a presumption by the rambam that there is an identity between
philosophical truth and torah truth

2) What the torah means by truth, including hazal, is not clear, as it
speaks in parables. (Most of the talmudical scholars of his generation
were held not to understand the true meaning of torah and hazal (his
parable of people who don't enter the castle))

3) If there is a conflict between philosophically proven truth and what
the torah seems to say, we have to reconcile the two, as there should
be an identity between them

4) THis can be done by reinterpreting the naive meaning of torah - done
for ma'ase breshit, angels, etc. THis is not that "philosophy trumps
torah" - as RMB states, but that the philosophical proof tells us what
the torah must have meant.

5) RMB asks why the rambam cares that there is no contradiction between
torah and philosophy if torah can be reinterpreted - this shows a
fundamental misunderstanding (IMHO) of the thrust of the Moreh .One of
the primary purposes of the MOreh is precisely to show that there is no
contradiction between the two realms, something that was widely doubted
on both sides - but the reconciliation is achieved precisely by achieving
a proper understanding of what the torah means, not by reinterpreting
Aristotle. The issue is how to reinterprete the torah. The issue is
upholding the honor of the torah - which in a naive reading contradicts
the real truth of philosophy (which needs no defending) - and the refusal
to reinterprete actually denigrates, rather than protects the torah.

6) Not everything held by philosophers is proven - the rambam does seem to
believe in our ability to determine which category a statement falls into.
There is no need for a major (see below) reinterpretation of the torah
for statements that haven't been proven - which RMB takes to mean that
in case of conflict, we don't reinterprete.

7) In Ma'amar tchiyat hametim, in explaining the issue of tchiyat hametim,
he adds that in cases where the position is very explicit in hazal,
or the reinterpretation would essentially make a mockery, there is a
limit to reinterpretation. This is applied in practice to things which
don't directly contradict philosophical truth, but which a philosophical
understanding may be difficult. eg, tchiyat hametim doesn't directly
contradict any philosphical truth, but philosophically, there is no
reason for it. There is never any case of a direct contradiction where
one rejects philosophy.

The precise limits of this position, as well as the extent to which it
is apologetical, may be part of the basis of the dispute between us.

Meir Shinnar

On Thu, Mar 11, 2004 at 04:09:13PM -0500, Shinnar, Meir wrote:
: 2) What the torah means by truth, including hazal, is not clear, as it
: speaks in parables....

Agreed, but I think you're being counterproductive in focusing on what
we can't understand rather than looking at what he does spell out.

: 3) If there is a conflict between philosophically proven truth and what
: the torah seems to say, we have to reconcile the two, as there should
: be an identity between them

I would have said: If there seems to be a conflict.... we have to find
the flaw in our understanding which, once cleared up, shows the two
are identical. The flaw could be in our understanding of the relevent
Torah or in our understanding of philosophy.

After all, he says no real contradiction is possible.

Which means that his declaration that Aristotle doesn't prove his point
is an example of his realizing that it's the philosophy that's wrong,
rather than his asuming the TSBP is.

You seem to make this statement into being about limiting TSBP to
only that which philosophy can't disprove, of secondary certainty,
rather than being equally considered.

: 4) THis can be done by reinterpreting the naive meaning of torah - done
: for ma'ase breshit, angels, etc. THis is not that "philosophy trumps
: torah" - as RMB states, but that the philosophical proof tells us what
: the torah must have meant.

You're using the word "Torah" without being as specific as I would like
to be. Reinterpreting ma'aseh bereishis does not require reinterpreting
the TSBP on the subject as well.

: 7) In Ma'amar tchiyat hametim, in explaining the issue of tchiyat hametim,
: he adds that in cases where the position is very explicit in hazal,
: or the reinterpretation would essentially make a mockery, there is a
: limit to reinterpretation...

Why go to another text, when we can look at the very pereq of the Moreh
(2:25) in question?

You seem to focus on the Rambam's first reason for being willing to
reinterpret Bereishis 1:
> First, the Incorporeality of God has been demonstrated by proof: those
> passages in the Bible, which in their literal sense contain statements
> that can be refuted by proof, must and can be interpreted otherwise. But
> the Eternity of the Universe has not been proved; a mere argument in
> favour of a certain theory is not sufficient reason for rejecting the
> literal meaning of a Biblical text, and explaining it figuratively,
> when the opposite theory can be supported by an equally good argument.

However, I do not recall you yet addressing the second:
> Secondly, our belief in the Incorporeality of God is not contrary to
> any of the fundamental principles of our religion: it is not contrary
> to the words of any prophet.

Reinterpretation works for TSBK, but not to actual tenets of religion.

-mi

-- 
Micha Berger             When we long for life without difficulties,
micha@aishdas.org        remind us that oaks grow strong in contrary
http://www.aishdas.org   winds, and diamonds are made under pressure.
Fax: (413) 403-9905                        - Peter Marshall

> The impression I got from the mention of the kesones getting dirty on
> erev Pesach when the kohanim were knee-deep in blood was that the kesones
> was around knee length.

In that g'mara (P'sachim 65b), Rashi says "shaveh la'aretz." The source
is Z'vachim 18a, where the g'mara says that if they dragged on the ground
(Rashi: because they were too long) or were raised from the ground (Rashi:
because they were short), the avodah is kasher (Rashi: even though it
is supposed to be to his measure, it is l'mitzvah and not l'akev). Thus,
they were supposed to be of ground length.

EMT

In the Book of Esther (Esther 9:7,9), certain letters in the names of
Haman's sons are written smaller, and one is written larger. There are
also two other instances in the Megillah where words contain a letter
that is written large.

To quote Ask the Rabbi, http://www.ohr.org.il/ask/ask228.htm : "the small
letters in the names of Haman's ten sons are: "tav" "shin" "zain." The
large letter is "vav." These letters represent the year 707 ("tav shin
zain" equal 707) of the sixth millennium (represented by the large
"vav" which equals 6). Thus you have the Jewish date 5707, or 1946 by
the civil calendar. On the first of October, 1946 - 6 Tishrei 5707 on
the Jewish calendar - the Nuremberg Military Tribunal tried ten Nazis
and sentenced them to death by hanging for their modern "Hamanism." One
of them, the notorious Julius Streicher, even cried "Purim-Fest 1946"
as his cryptic last words."

The two other large letters in Megillas Esther are a "chet" in 1:6 and
a "tav" in 9:29. Many years ago I asked a Rabbi in Montreal the reason
for the large "chet". He referred me to the sefer M'nos Halevi by the
Alkabetz. Then he added that this letter and the other large letter "tav"
at the end of the Megillah add up to 408, the year 5408, the year which
witnessed the start of the Chmielnicki massacres in Poland. In those
massacres, between 100,000 and 200,000 Jews were slaughtered.

Recently I checked the web to find the date on which those massacres
began - March 6th, 1648. Another website converted the date to the
Jewish calendar - 12 Adar, 5408. Purim 1648..

Yitschak Maser
Montpellier, France

"Shoshana L. Boublil" <toramada@bezeqint.net> stated the following:
>The issue of women reading megillah is not at all simple. The halachic
>issue has already been discussed. But there is a social/halachic issue
>that apparently is being ignored.

There certainly is. In the cases with which I am familiar, the issue
is a feminist issue. Women with no small children choose to hear the
Megilla read by a woman to state and act out their political position.

~=~=~=~=~=~=~=~=
IRA L. JACOBSON
=~=~=~=~=~=~=~=~
mailto:laser@ieee.org

> I can't say that eyin tachas eyin literally means an eye for an eye because it
> fis the literal traslation of the Torah and expect that to be part of torah.

> So far, I have enjoyed the back and forth on what the limitations of parshanut
> are.  But here I see an error in p'shat.  The LITERAL meaning of the words
> ayin tachas ayin is exactly AN EYE IN PLACE OF AN EYE.  This is not the
> HALACHIC understanding of the pasuk, but the halachic understanding is D'RASH,
> not p'shat.

> If asked the LITERAL meaning of the words, I MUST say 'an eye for an eye'.  If
> asked how we understand those words, I MUST say 'monetary compensation for
> damages'.  But to insist that the words 'ayin tachas ayin' literally means
> monetary compensation for damages is to totally misunderstand the words of the
> Torah.

This approach is found in a number of meforshim on that verse. However,
since the late 18th century, a different approach ahs been championed
by such commentators as Netsiv, Meshach Chokhmah, Haksva V Hakabbola,
Malbim, RSRH and others, such as Cassuto, Shadal, Benno. Jacobs. Some
of you may have noticed that I believe, in that vein, that much of what
we call drash is in fact what we often call peshat, if we only apply
ourselves to understanding the fine details of language, idiom, cultural
background and wider (not only local) context. Otherwise, much of halachic
midrash makes no sense as it offers different possibilities, some of which
it accepts and others it rejects while none of them is simple peshat.

In regard to eye for an eye, I attempted to show in Midrash
and Method on Mishpatim that careful comprison reading in which
the Mekhilta engaged, established that meaning of tachas is "in
place of" and vnatata means "assess, allow, determine" (as is
the meaning of dar in Spanish or davai in Russian and similarly
in many other languages). I refer those interested to that page.
http://www.aishdas.org/midrash/5764/mishpatim.htm

M. Levin

I have began writing a weekly shiur on Sefer Yonah at torah.org. I hope
to be able to bring together musar, theology, psychology, parshanut
and inspiration in one package. I hope, with Hashem's help, to offer
something unique. I hope that you find it useful.

I include the introductory shiur as a sample. More information - on
http://torah.org/learning/yonah/

Introduction

> Most of us have a definite impression about Sefer Yonah. If, like most
> people, you know it from leafing through the Yom Kippur prayer-book,
> your recollection may be of a whale that swallowed the prophet who
> refused to do his job. You might remember Yohah's flight to Tarshish
> "from before the Lord", perhaps the storm at the sea, the jaws of the
> awaiting whale and the reluctant discharge of the mission imposed on
> him. Then there is that surprising complaint about the G-d who is too
> kind and too merciful for Yonah's liking.

> Would it surprise you to learn that the book of Yonah is widely thought of
> as arguably being one of the most profound and meaningful prophetic books?

> Many beautiful approaches to exposition of Yonah have been offered
> throughout the ages and we will review some of them in the upcoming
> lectures. We will proceed from the assumption that this book speaks to
> the central issues that every spiritually attuned man and woman faces
> in the very framework of life. What is life but a dynamic of encounter
> between G-d and man, the Divine intrusion into our routine and His
> demands upon our very soul, especially when He refuses to take our
> advice about how to run the world. Perforce we are born and perforce do
> we live our lives. There are those sensitive souls who struggle with
> this truth every day of their lives. For others, it comes to fore at
> time of crisis. All men are tested, if they only live long enough. For
> some it may be unexpected prosperity, for others a difficult divorce,
> a loss of a loved one, an unexpected illness. Jarring experiences take
> us out of the daily routine; events impact on us unexpectedly, seemingly
> randomly, seemingly without purpose or meaning. There is meaning but we
> rather not see it, not act according to its imperative. So much do we
> wish to keep Him out…but He refuses to go away. He keeps on demanding,
> he again and again shutters our smug self-sufficiency, our comfortable
> illusions, our pretenses of who we think we are, of what we think He
> should be. Psychological denial, spiritual pre-conceptions, intellectual
> complacency-how do we insist on retaining them, how hard we fight to hold
> on to them. Like Yonah we attempt to escape Hashem's Presence; like him,
> we hold in our hands the choice of resisting, escaping, running away,
> or… being, in the process, redeemed and reborn.

> Like Job, Yonah could not agree with the manner in which G-d conducts His
> world. While the book of Job (with which Yonah shares many structural
> and philosophical parallels) presents Job's problem with the Attribute
> of Justice, Yonah could not abide the Attribute of Mercy. This prophet
> would have much preferred a world just a bit more organized, more certain
> and predictable, a world where the wicked suffer certain retribution and
> the righthouse receive immediate reward; in other words, a world that
> functions more according to the rules and without the redundancies and
> paradoxes that are found all around us. At the end, the prophet had to
> experience pity and in his own feelings and emotions he discovered the
> echo of Divine Mercy.

> But… learning this is not a one time event, it is a process, it is
> a dynamic. Yonah emerged with gratitude and praise from the belly of
> the fish, thinking that he had been reborn and redeemed, and yet, he
> was still resisting. There was still unfinished business, there were
> yet other layers of denial to pierce and more shells of self-delusion
> to be shattered in the crucible of future trials. The lessons were not
> yet finished, there was more schooling still to come.

> Out tool in this process of exploration will be, among others, the
> principle of intertextuality, which can be defined as the assumption
> that Biblical authors and their intended audience were conversant with
> and fully familiar with the entire corpus of Biblical writing and the
> ideas and typology of other books of Tanach. It follows, therefore,
> that they skillfully utilized references to context, thought and idiom,
> construction and literary patterns found in other Biblical works. Always,
> the words of our Sages will serve as our signposts in this quest. This
> methodology, a mainstay of midrashic analysis, will guide us beyond the
> apparent disjointed meaning of individual phrases to the deeper intended
> significance of the Holy text. More importantly, it will uncover for us
> significance that we can apply to our own lives in the here and now.
> No longer will we be reading a peculiar little story of a prophet and
> a whale in a far away time and place; now it will become an intensely
> personal document for application and relevance to our own lives.

> Let us then journey together along with Yonah. Let us descend into the
> heart of Jewish religious experience along with the man who sought to
> escape from G-d only to find Him and to reconcile with Him in the heart
> of the seas ­" a compassionate and gracious G-d, abounding in kindness
> and repenting of evil". "Then he fell on his face and said: Conduct Your
> world according to the attribute of Mercy, as it is written: To the L-rd
> our G-d belongs mercy and forgiveness (Dan. 9:9)" ( Midrash Yonah)

> Let us embark on the study of the Sefer Yonah.

I wrote to Areivim, in a discussion about the evolution of ikkarim over
time (other parts of the discussion have already started migrating here):
>> But the midgets on the giants' shoulders DO see further.

Shaya Potter replied there:
>> We know more. However, that's not everything that defines being "better
>> and frummer and closer to the correct path". Yir'as Shamayim and a
>> willingness to be moseir nefesh living Jewishly are far more central.

> You didn't understand my point.  I'm not talking about halacha, but the fact
> that since Jewish Dogma (say the Rambam's Ikkarim) was set down at Sinai,
> those closer to Sinai should understand it better, as we have a much less
> clear understanding of it.  But it appears that our
> understanding is actually clearer, at least according to the
> understanding that "it was ok for those people to believe that
> apirkorsus, but not for us, as we know it's wrong."

First, you ARE talking about halakhah. Truth vs falsehood would not be a
question of halakhah. However, whether a falsehood qualifies as minus,
apiqursus or kefirah is. This is a recurring thesis of RGS's on Avodah.

Second, understanding is an intellectual activity. And knowledge grows --
be it halakhah or aggadita. Commitment, or knowing it in the heart rather
than just in the brain, is a different thing altogether. We know more,
but their lesser knowledge was more ingrained and who they were.

Again, see the discussion between Abayei and R' Papa. Niskatnu hadoros
is about mesiras nefesh, not intellectual knowledge. The fact that it has
impact on pesaq says much about pasqening being an art, not an algorythm.

:-)BBii
-mi

-- 
Micha Berger             It isn't what you have, or who you are, or where
micha@aishdas.org        you are,  or what you are doing,  that makes you
http://www.aishdas.org   happy or unhappy. It's what you think about.
Fax: (413) 403-9905                        - Dale Carnegie

I share this follow up with members of avodah.

Rabbi Michael Broyde
Dayan, Beth Din of America

*********************************************
To the Chaverim of the RCA:

I recently issued a psak regarding the observance date of Yom Haatzmaut
this year, in light of the position taken by the Israeli Chief Rabbinate
to delay observances of Yom Hazikaron and Yom Haatzmaut by one day. The
position I took was to maintain 5 Iyyar (i.e., Sunday evening April
25th/Monday April 26th ) as the day of observance, given the fact that
the key consideration invoked by the Rabbanut of chillul Shabbas on
Motzaei Shabbas did not apply in America.

I have subsequently been approached by one of the Rabbanim Harashiim.
While they understand the rationale of the position I have taken,
they have requested that I reconsider in the interest of uniformity of
practice. I have given the matter due thought, and as a result wish to
recommend that our chaverim should indeed make every effort to schedule
their local commemoration of Yom Hazikaron and celebration of Yom
Haatzmaut to Sunday evening/Monday, and Monday evening/Tuesday April
26/27, respectively. Of course if programs have already been scheduled
for the earlier dates, and cannot be changed, they can continue to be
held on the original date.

As always, if individual rabbanim wish to discuss this matter with me
directly, they should feel free to do so.

Rabbi Gedaliah Dov Schwartz.
Av Beis Din
The Beth Din of America

From: Gershon Dubin gershon.dubin@juno.com
> Check the aseres benei Haman

From: "SBA" <sba@iprimus.com.au>
<<Not if one has an '11-liner' megilah.>>

Does the number of lines alter the mesorah of how large or small to write
the letters?

Gershon gershon.dubin@juno.com

From: Gershon Dubin gershon.dubin@juno.com
> Check the aseres benei Haman

From: "SBA" <sba@iprimus.com.au>
<<Not if one has an '11-liner' megilah.>>

Does the number of lines alter the mesorah of how large or small to write
the letters?

Gershon gershon.dubin@juno.com

**********************


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