Avodah Mailing List

Volume 12 : Number 020

Tuesday, October 21 2003

• Hashgocha Protis - ramifications of theory
• Re: Hashgocha Protis - ramifications of theory
• Re: Hilonim and wine
• RE: Hilonim and wine
• Re: Aveilus and Sukkah
• Re: Hashgocha Pratis
• Buying in Bulk and Ribis
• Re: sonei matanos / shalahmones
• Buying in Bulk and Ribis
• Re: Hashgocha Pratis
• Re: Rabbi Yosef Bechhofer & Eruvin
• Re: Aveilus and Sukkah
• Re: Basics for Philisophical discussions
• Re: Basics for Philisophical discussions
• Re: Hashgocha Pratis - finale

R' Micha Berger wrote:
>The difference in scope of the sefarim in question doesn't say anything
>about importance or unimportance.

>When one is writing a mussar text, one is looking at the question
>prescriptively. Therefore, if there is no lema'aseh, why would the
>author discuss it. However, when one is writing about machshavah,
> the philosophical differences are of import.

The nature of hashgocha protis -- machshavah -- does impact l'maaseh. To
illustrate

Chinuch(241): A person is not to seek revenge. Typically when someone
harms another person the response is to search after the oppressor until
he has afflicted him in a similar way to what was done to him. However
G-d commanded us not to see revenge. The basis of the mitzva is that
a person must fully understand that everything that happens to him --
both the good and the bad -- was caused by G-d. Therefore when a person
is distressed or harmed he needs to realize that it was his sins that
caused G-d to decree this bad to happen to him. Consequently there is no
reason to seek revenge since it was not the tormentor but G-d which caused
this to happen because of his sins. Furthermore this mitzva provides
great benefit in that it terminates disputes and removes hatred from the
heart. When there is peace between people, G-d provides peace for them.

Tanya(Igros Kodesh #25): Whoever gets angry is if he worships idols...
The reason is obvious to those with proper understanding, because at the
time a person is angry his faith leaves him. If he truly believed that
everything is from G-d he would not get angry at all. This is even when
a person -- who has free will -- curses, hits or causes him financial
loss and incurs punishment by the laws man and G-d. The fact is that
his loss was decreed from Heaven and if he hadn't suffered from this
person there are many alternative paths to receive the decreed loss.
Furthermore even at the actual moment that he is being hit or cursed
the assailant is receiving his strength from G-d to be able to cause
the harm....Even the thought to cause the harm came from G-d... Thus
the suffering is from G-d because without G-d's active involvement it
would impossible for the assailant to do anything.

Chofetz Chaim(Shem Olam 1:3):

The basis of not seeking revenge is the realization that hashgocha protis
applies to the action of other men -- even though they have free will

In contrast:

Rambam(Hilchos De'os 7:7-8): He who takes revenge, violates a
prohibition...And although he is not punished with stripes, still such
conduct indicates an exceedingly bad disposition. One should rather
practice forbearance in all secular matters. For the intelligent realize
that these are vain things and not worth taking vengeance for

Thus according to the previous positions seeking vengeance against those
that harm you is not only a prohibited act but also involves the issue of
heresy. In contrast the Rambam's position is simply that any intelligent
person would not seek revenge. The issue of course is more complicated
than this see Minchas Chinuch (241).

                   Daniel Eidensohn

On Tue, Oct 21, 2003 at 07:50:26PM +0200, Daniel Eidensohn wrote:
:>When one is writing a mussar text, one is looking at the question
:>prescriptively. Therefore, if there is no lema'aseh, why would the
:>author discuss it. However, when one is writing about machshavah,
:> the philosophical differences are of import.

: The nature of hashgocha protis -- machshavah -- does impact l'maaseh. To
: illustrate

I think you're responding point-by-point to the text of my emails
without taking the time to relate those points to the thesis. You are
actually making my point; your response only makes sense to this text
out of context.

I wrote "if there is no lema'aseh", meaning that some of the discussion
of HP, or some of machshavah in general, has a lema'aseh, some does
not. The nature of HP as it impacts people is an item of machshavah
that has lema'aseh consequences. However, when dealing a with domeim,
tzomei'ach or chai where there is no impact on medaberim, definitionally
it can have no lema'aseh impact.

Therefore, a work dealing with bitachon and how to face what happens to
you will simply not discuss these things. When it says something to the
effect of "everything that happens to a person", one can't assume it means
"and only a person".

-mi

-- 
Micha Berger             The mind is a wonderful organ
micha@aishdas.org        for justifying decisions
http://www.aishdas.org   the heart already reached.
Fax: (413) 403-9905      

Harry Maryles wrote:
>If they are not Mechallel Shabbos L'Hachis,
>the Binyan Tzion argues that their wine
>should not be considered Assur since they
>are not L'Hachis. But it is better to be
>Machmir if possible. The Achiezer, R. Chaim
>Ozer, (3:25)agrees with the Binyan Tzion's
>Sevarah.

Just to clarify, the Binyan Tzion's teshuvah on the subject is published
in a section titled "She-lo le-ma'aseh" and the Achiezer used the view in
conjunction with other reasons to be lenient and explicitly wrote that his
use of the view should not be seen as precedent to utilize it in other
areas.

I saw that R' Chaim Hirschenson in his Malki BaKodesh vol. 2 p. 160 ff.
argues that a Mechallel Shabbos, even if not a tinok she-nishbah, does not
assur wine.  In Malki BaKodesh vol. 4 p. 38 ff. there is a letter from
RCH's mechutan, R' Tzvi Pesach Frank, politely but vehemently disagreeing.

Gil Student

> This brings us to the issue at hand... Chilonim. The question is
> whether they are considered Tinokos SheNishbu and whether that makes
> any difference WRT the Knas. If they are not Mechallel Shabbos
> L'Hachis, the Binyan Tzion argues that their wine should not be
> considered Assur since they are not L'Hachis. But it is better to be
> Machmir if possible. The Achiezer, R. Chaim Ozer, (3:25)agrees with
> the Binyan Tzion's Sevarah.

In previous go rounds, discussing the issue of tinok shenishba, it was
argued by some members of the list that almost nobody today accepts the
binyan tziyon with regard to wine, even though it is partially accepted
with regard to that we don't hold moridin velo maalin - and here the
RSZA equates the issue of wine with moridin velo maalin

MEir Shinnar

In a message dated 10/21/2003 1:24:34 PM EDT, hmaryles@yahoo.com writes:
> Off the cuff I would say that the Gemmarh is speaking of the Metzius
> and not the Halachic definition of an Avel. The fact is that someone who
> just lost a parent, child or any loved one which would normally put one
> into aveilus is filled with tremendous grief. The Halacha that dispenses
> the requirement of Shiva does not remove the grief i.e. Tzar. This is
> what the Gemmarrah is probably reffering to. Tzar is not a function
> of Halacha. Tzar is a physical or emotional reality impacting on an
> idividual in the same way rain is considered Tzar because it impacts on
> an individual.

So would you say that an avel is ones on yom tov (ie he's over on not
being besimcha but he can't help it?) or does the Torah demand he control
his emotions (a la R' YBS)

KT
Joel

Micha Berger wrote:
>Tenu'as haMussar, capital M, just like any derekh, requires
>underpinning in machshavah. You need it for both intellectual and
>emotional commitment.

>However, mussar itself, as in advising people on how to improve, does
>not include machshavah....

>Emunah includes inyanei machshvah. Bitachon is the awakening of that
>into the realm of mussar (again, lower case "m").
...
>The acceptance of limudei machshavah, OTOH, is what we call emunah.

If I understand you correctly - you are asserting that a mussar work
does not have to explain machshava but gets you energized to act on
your knowledge while Mussar works dealing with machshova-emuna do have
to deal with machshova.

The original point however is that none of the mussar or Mussar works
express the view of the Besht. Since you grant that at least the the
Michtav M'Eliyahu is both a Mussar and a mussar work it is reasonable to
conclude that the absence of the Besht's view means that Rav Dessler does
not accept it. Sifsei Chaim also deals with machshova and yet doesn't
cite the Besht. So even if you can excuse mussar books from mentioning
the Besht - the only excuse for Mussar-machshova works not mentioning
it is because they don't accept it.

However I disagree with you that whether HP affects non-man is not
relevant for mussar. As an extention of the Chinuch(241) or the Tanya -
how a person views and reacts to a tree falling on his house would depend
upon his understanding of HP as would the significance of his wrestling
with a lion.

Chovas HaLevavos(4:4): It is wrong for a person to put himself into
danger and rely on his trust in G-d to save him. He shouldn't drink
poison or needlessly fight a lion, throw himself into the sea or a fire or
anything other dangerous activities. The Torah (Devarim 6:16) has warned
us against such activities by saying "Do not test G-d... There are only
two possiblities for someone who endangers himself this way. 1) He will
die and it will be considered as if he deliberately killed himself... 2)
He might be saved with G-d's intervention but he will use up all his
merit and thus lose the reward for it. All this is expressed by our Sages
(Shabbos 32a): A person should never place himself in a place of danger
and expect a miracle to happen because perhaps the miracle won't happen
and if it does his merit will be diminished...

[Email #2. -mi]

Micha Berger wrote:
>I think you're responding point-by-point to the text of my emails
>without taking the time to relate those points to the thesis. You are
>actually making my point; your response only makes sense to this text
>out of context.

>I wrote "if there is no lema'aseh", meaning that some of the discussion
>of HP, or some of machshavah in general, has a lema'aseh, some does
>not. The nature of HP as it impacts people is an item of machshavah
>that has lema'aseh consequences. However, when dealing a with domeim,
>tzomei'ach or chai where there is no impact on medaberim, definitionally
>it can have no lema'aseh impact.

I agree with you that the forest has been lost in the trees. If you
want to posit the existence of something which has by definition has no
impact l'maaseh then it is understandable that a sefer which is only
dealing with l'maaseh would not mention it. But I am not dealing with
such artificial and probably non existent phenomena. The issue that I
thought we were dealing with is whether the universal absence of the
mention of the Besht's view of HP in non chassidic works of mussar,
Mussar and machshova implies that it is not accepted in the non chassidic
world. To say that the issue is such that by definition it would not
be considered since it by definition is not l'maaseh - is rather far
fetched. Especially since R' Schochet has pronounced that this is the
biggest revolutionary change that the Besht brought about.

It is simply astounding to conclude that this revolution is universally
accepted but is also universally not mentioned because it is not l'maaseh.
It is equivalent to asserting that there are pink elephants everywhere
but that they disappear when you look at them and therefore failure to
observe them is not proof that they don't exist. In fact it proves they
exist because your failure to find them is the result of looking for them

Daniel Eidensohn

                   Daniel Eidensohn

In  Avodah V12 #18 dated 10/21/03  gil@aishdas.org writes:
> Let's say that my family uses a dozen eggs each week. I can buy it from a
> frum grocer for $2 each week or I can buy a big four-dozen box for $7.50,
> with a $.50 discount for buying in bulk, and keep the eggs in my fridge
> until I need them.

> Is the grocer charging me (avak) ribis for buying the eggs weekly?


Absolutely not. I can tell you as a shopkeeper's wife, it costs the
shopkeeper money to store those eggs in HIS fridge till you decide to go
get them, and to have them in separate small cartons, too. Every time
he rings up a little sale in his cash register it's more paper on the
register tape, and more of his valuable time too. My husband definitely
makes more money when he sells wine by the case rather than the bottle,
and he passes savings on to the customer. Another way of saying he
makes more by the case is that it costs him more to sell by the bottle.
(I know some of you will be surprised we sell wine in Judaica stores here,
but that's Florida.) When he sells sets of chumashim to an entire class
rather than one set to an individual, that also works out as a better
deal for him, and his customers get a break too.

 -Toby Katz

In  Avodah V12 #18 dated 10/21/03  "Marmer, Jacob" <JMarmer@randomhouse.com> 
writes:
> Does anybody know of a source for a solid discussion on "soneh matanos
> yechie?" How does one reconcile this posuk with mishloah manot on
> Purim? Let alone wedding gifts, etc.?

I don't have sources and therefore maybe have no right to post this on
Avodah, but I think that the pasuk about "soneh matanos yichyeh" has
to do with receiving and accepting unearned and unreciprocated gifts.
Mishloach manos and wedding gifts have a built-in reciprocity to them and
involve greasing the wheels of the social fabric, to coin an exceptionally
dysfunctional metaphor.

 -Toby Katz

From: gil@aishdas.org
>Let's say that my family uses a dozen eggs each week. I can buy it from a
>frum grocer for $2 each week or I can buy a big four-dozen box for $7.50,
>with a $.50 discount for buying in bulk, and keep the eggs in my fridge
>until I need them.

>Is the grocer charging me (avak) ribis for buying the eggs weekly?


Wouldn't Avak Ribbis only be if the savings was mostly as a result of
paying up front.

In a case such as yours there are numerous other reasons to give
a discount.

It may cost less for packaging, you not the store has the risk of the
eggs breaking, or expiring. You are providing the storage.

Another advantage is that you are buying the full quantity from this
vendor. If you bought now some and the rest later, the later purchase
may end up being from a different vendor.

I would think all of these would be much more likely than an avak ribis.

A better question would be a case discount of a non perishable item from
the only kosher store in town.

Harry J. Weiss
hjweiss@panix.com

On Tue, Oct 21, 2003 at 09:31:54PM +0200, Daniel Eidensohn wrote:
: If I understand you correctly - you are asserting that a mussar work
: does not have to explain machshava but gets you energized to act on
: your knowledge while Mussar works dealing with machshova-emuna do have
: to deal with machshova.

What I'm saying is definition. Mussar, by defnition, means a change
in mindset and attitude. It therefore is about the energizing.

Machshavah is about knowledge.

It's not that one "requires" this while the other "requires" that. It's
that mussar is that which causes his'orerus.

: The original point however is that none of the mussar or Mussar works
: express the view of the Besht....

Actually, this came from a different original point.

I asserted that a seifer dealing with bitachon could say "all people
experience HP" without implying anything about whether non-people do.

: However I disagree with you that whether HP affects non-man is not
: relevant for mussar. As an extention of the Chinuch(241) or the Tanya -
: how a person views and reacts to a tree falling on his house would depend
: upon his understanding of HP as would the significance of his wrestling
: with a lion.

That is the effect of his HP, not the tree's or the lion's. Similarly,
the hunted bird in Mishlei -- either it's chosen because of its own HP
(and Mishlei is talking about why this bird rather than another in the
same place at the same time) or because of the hunter's.

Which explains the following:
: >I wrote "if there is no lema'aseh", meaning that some of the discussion
: >of HP, or some of machshavah in general, has a lema'aseh, some does
: >not. The nature of HP as it impacts people is an item of machshavah
: >that has lema'aseh consequences. However, when dealing a with domeim,
: >tzomei'ach or chai where there is no impact on medaberim, definitionally
: >it can have no lema'aseh impact.
: 
: I agree with you that the forest has been lost in the trees. If you
: want to posit the existence of something which has by definition has no
: impact l'maaseh...

Because if it did, then it would invole the impacted person's HP, and be
no proof that the animal itself gets any.

:                                           . But I am not dealing with
: such artificial and probably non existent phenomena...

A problem I had understanding the Besh"t's view is that I agree the
situation described probably non-existant.

: It is simply astounding to conclude that this revolution is universally
: accepted but is also universally not mentioned because it is not l'maaseh.

I'm making a much weaker claim. Among those who hold that HP is universal
for humans, we have no way of knowing whether they accepted the Besht's
chiddush that it's universal for everything, rejected it, or believe
that there's no difference (no other situations exist).

-mi

-- 
Micha Berger             The mind is a wonderful organ
micha@aishdas.org        for justifying decisions
http://www.aishdas.org   the heart already reached.
Fax: (413) 403-9905      

R' Harry Maryles wrote <<< Baalei Nefesh ... There are some very popular
Hechsherim that they do not utilize BECAUSE of the Kulos used. I know
some people that do not trust the OU. I know some people who do not
trust Empire etc.>>>

Lemme see if I have this straight: There are some people who are aware of
certain shitos which the OU and Empire follow, and which they'd rather
not rely on, so they avoid eating those foods. That sounds (to me)
like a very intelligent and reasonable approach.

But how do those people get hold of that information? Can anyone give
me any examples of (a) a debated halacha where Empire might follow a
different shita than others; (b) names of the lenient poskim who Empire
relies on; (c) names of the poskim who reject the lenient opinions;
(d) other brands which satisfy the stricter opinions.

I'm not referring to claims such as "My rav feels that Empire shechts
too many chickens in too short a time." That's a shikul hadaas, an
honest difference of opinion. But that's not what we're talking about
here. The topic here is hechsherim which choose a lenient minority in
a machlokes haposkim.

There are many varying degrees of how "in the know" a person might be.
For example, I am zocheh to be aware of machlokesim regarding various
issues, and I know that other people are *not* aware of them. These
include Chadash, Chalav haCompanies, Glatt Beef, Yayin Mevushal, and
Heter Mechira. It is reasonable to conclude that there are other issues
which are well-known to people who are more "in the know" than I am.

I am also aware that none of those issues apply to a raw cut-up chicken,
so I have to be curious about the other issues that other people *are*
concerned about. As I intimated in my previous post, I am personally
frustrated when a magazine article -- or Avodah poster -- mentions that
problems exist but then they refuse to specify what the problems are or
which products they apply to.

RHM then switched gears from kashrus to eruvin:

<<< But some of these very same people might trust an Eruv that has a
Chushuva Rav as the Rav HaMachshir. They don't think of the possible
Kulos utilized. They simply assume that Rabbi "X" who was a Lakewood
Musmach in good standing wouldn't lead them astray.>>>

The same people who are into all the good dirt on the many problems
of hechsherim haven't heard of the problems which can befall an eruv?
Doesn't make sense to me, so RHM tries to explain why it is hard to dig
up this sort of dirt about the eruvin:

<<< But the concepts of Reshus HaRabim D'Oraisa, the construction
of Mechitzos and Tzuros HaPesach and the utilization of pre-existing
Mechitzos are often very Kula-ized. This is because of the enormous
expense of building new Mechitzos and sometimes there are great
diificulties which can only be overcome by utilizing these Kulos. The
Rav HaMachshir OTOH does not want to cast any doubts on the Hechshir as
that would undermine the entire Kashrus of the Eruv. He is not going to
come out and say "You can only use this Eruv B'Dieved." So he does not go
into detail. He simply will consult with experts in the field and rely on
any Kula that is needed to accomplish an Halachicly accpetable Eruv.>>>

I still see little or no difference between kashrus and eruvin. Wouldn't
your attacks on the rav of an eruv apply just as well to the rav of a
hechsher? Let me change your words ever so slightly:

"Nosayn taam lifgam, bittul b'shishim, yotzay v'nichnas, definition of
sircha, and basar shenisalem min ha'ayin are often very Kula-ized. This is
because of the enormous expense of kashering treif keilim and discarding
treif behemos, and sometimes there are great difficulties which can
only be overcome by utilizing these Kulos. The Rav HaMachshir OTOH does
not want to cast any doubts on the Hechshir as that would undermine the
entire Kashrus of the establishment. He is not going to come out and say
"You can only eat this food B'Dieved." So he does not go into detail. He
simply will consult with experts in the field and rely on any Kula that
is needed to accomplish an Halachicly acceptable kitchen."

What's the difference? I don't see any.

Akiva Miller

Joelirich@aol.com wrote:
>> Off the cuff I would say that the Gemmarh is speaking of the Metzius
>> and not the Halachic definition of an Avel. The fact is that someone who
>> just lost a parent, child or any loved one which would normally put one
>> into aveilus is filled with tremendous grief. The Halacha that dispenses
>> the requirement of Shiva does not remove the grief i.e. Tzar. This is
>> what the Gemmarrah is probably reffering to. Tzar is not a function
>> of Halacha. Tzar is a physical or emotional reality impacting on an
>> idividual in the same way rain is considered Tzar because it impacts on
>> an individual.

> So would you say that an avel is ones on yom tov (ie he's over on not
> being besimcha but he can't help it?) or does the Torah demand he control
> his emotions (a la R' YBS)

Both. Even though in Halachic terms YT cancels the rest of Shiva one
cannot help but feel grief at such times. Therefore, an Avel is an
Ones on YT. But Chazal mandated that Simchas YT be maintained and
that personal grief should be minimized as much as is humanly
possible.

HM

Micha Berger <micha@aishdas.org> wrote:
> I believe the divergence between C and O starts with a difference in
> epistomology. The liberal Jew bought into the technological man's
> focus on pragmaticism, empiricism, functionalism and the experimental
> method. Things that can be subject to experimental proof (*) are
> treated as more real than those whose proof is internal and can't be
> shared.

This is an area that I think is somewhat grey. Even though IMOI2 "buy"
into technological man's pragmaticism, empiricism, functionalism and
the experimental method. The differernce between O and C is not whether
science is to be a trusted resource, but to what extent it is to be
trusted in matters of belief. C puts far too much credence into man's
perceived infallibilty when in fact it is man's very fallability that C
should question. Science doesn't see itself as inffalible either. The
only thing that science knows for sure is that it DOESN'T know for
sure. Science... as the great Dr. Jones has said, deals in facts not
truths. Science is only as true as the latest facts indicate and can
admittedly be disproven in a moment. But eternal truths OTOH are based
on beliefs that only partially rely on facts.

> They therefore bought into an epistomology that rules out the
> possibility of miracle, prophecy or a revelation at Sinai before the
> discussion even begins. The lack of belief in Torah miSinai (TmS) is
> not the cause of the divergence. On that point I agree with RML. The
> basic divergence is a difference in thought process that, followed
> through to its logical conclusion, leads them to a difference in ikkarim.

> However, I also agree with RHM that the actual dividing line between
> us is TmS. 

Night is dark and day is light. That is the dividing line. What the
causes are can be discussed later. Same thing C and O. C denies Maamid
Har Sinai; O believes in Maamid Har Sinai. What the causes are can also
be discussed later and are irrelavent to the definition.

HM

On Tue, Oct 21, 2003 at 04:34:52PM -0700, Harry Maryles wrote:
:> I believe the divergence between C and O starts with a difference in
:> epistomology. The liberal Jew bought into the technological man's
:> focus on pragmaticism, empiricism, functionalism and the experimental
:> method. Things that can be subject to experimental proof (*) are
:> treated as more real than those whose proof is internal and can't be
:> shared.

: This is an area that I think is somewhat grey. Even though IMOI2 "buy"
: into technological man's pragmaticism, empiricism, functionalism and
: the experimental method...

Not really. Look again at my last sentence. No O Jew treats the emprical
world as the only objective reality. We don't confuse the problem of
proving religious truths to others with the idea that everyone's belief
system is equally true.

-mi

Micha Berger wrote:
>: It is simply astounding to conclude that this revolution is universally
>: accepted but is also universally not mentioned because it is not l'maaseh.

>I'm making a much weaker claim. Among those who hold that HP is universal
>for humans, we have no way of knowing whether they accepted the Besht's
>chiddush that it's universal for everything, rejected it, or believe
>that there's no difference (no other situations exist).

I am working on a similar track concerning the chassidic position. Just
as we have failed to find an acknowledgment of the Besht's position
amongst the non chassidim - it appears that there is no clear evidence
of the acceptance of the Besht's position amongst the chassidim. In fact
it is not really clear what the Besht's position is.

We all agree that there is much discussion of HP amongst the Rishonim
and that there is a general agreement that they hold that it applies to
humans. There has been an assertion made by R' Shochet that the Besht's
greatest change was to convince the world that HP applies to everything.
The following is the result of much library work and long talks with
a friend R' Eliyahu Touger (a well known Lubavitcher translator and
publicist .)

-------------------------------------

As is well known the most accepted source for the views of Besht is
Keser Shem Tov. The Chabad edition (current) is divided into three
sections. The original Keser Shem Tov, A second section with additions
from early sources and a third section with later sources concerning
traditions of what he said. There is no mention of HP in the first
section. At the end of the 2nd section the following statement is found.

Keser Shem Tov (#427): Everything is with hashgocha protis from G-d.
Whoever doesn't believe in this is subject to the din of Heaven and is
subjugated by the klipos which cover and conceal the aspects of G-d's
hashgocha. And in the future in the time of Moshiach the impure spirit
with be removed and G-d's hashgocha will be revealed in full detail.
This is what is meant by "there is no difference between Olam Hazeh and
the messianic period except subjugation to the kings."

The third section has much discussion of HP but apparently it is entirely
from Chabad sources (thought I didn't read through all of it).

Having searched through DBS I have found a number of citations from
accepted chassidic works which sound like that of the Rishonim.

R' Menachem Mendel of Vitebst - Peri HaEretz (Miketz): One must believe in
individual providence over everything in the world big and small and that
nothing occurs without G-d's providence. Through this trust in G-d namely
faith in His providence and that His acts are true and faithful (for the
divine act is always good), man elevates this cause (Providence) and binds
it with supernal wisdom. To the extent that man has faith and reflects
upon providence he draws G-d's providence upon himself. If one believes
in G-d's individual providence, then one is cared for individually even
to bruising a finger. If man loses his faith in divine providence he is
placed upon the blind] laws of nature and is called an apostate.

R' Nachman Breslover (Likutei Mahran #17): When a person does good
he is dealt with hashgocha. However when he isn't good then if he was
dealt with hashgocha then it would be impossible for him to obtain any
goodness. Therefore G-d leaves him to nature where he can possibly obtain
good in a natural way. In fact it is possible that providence for him is
totally absent. That is because when G-d see that person does not act
properly He is angry and He removes His providence entirely. However
now that he is left to nature - when he repents providence returns. In
truth however we are not able to understand what is meant by nature and
providence. The problem is that nature is also a manifestation of G-d's
providence. It is impossible for a person to understand how two things
are actually one i.e., that nature is in truth G-d's providence."

---------
R' Eliyahu Touger - lent me his work "Led by G-d's Hand" which is
compilation of Chabad sources on the matter. The Lubavitcher Rebbe clearly
indicates that it is possible that there is no major difference between
the Rambam and that of the Besht.

"The Mitteler Rebbe explains there are two levels of Divine providence.
On one level, man's fate is controlled by G-d overtly...The second level
relates to G-d's control of the world within the context of the natural
order. Although G-d controls the particular fate of every element of
existence the manner in which He determines their fate is enclothed
within the workings of the natural order; it is not overtly visible.
This interpretation is reflected in the concept of hester panim.... This
enables us to resolve the apparent contradiction between the Ramban's
perspective and that of the Baal Shem Tov. The Rambam is speaking about
direct and overt providence. This is indeed dependent on the extent of
man's relationship with G-d. The Baal Shem Tov, however, is speaking in
a larger context, describing the all encompassing connection G-d shares
with existence as a whole...THUS ALL TORAH AUTHORITIES AGREE THAT DIVINE
PROVIDENCE CONTROLS EVERYTHING THAT HAPPENS TO ANY AND EVERY CREATED BEING
IN THE WORLD. The difference between the interpretations concerns only the
extent to which that providence is manifest... More particularly, however,
there is a difference ... According to the Rambam G-d's involvement in
the particulars of the future of any being other than the righteous is
"passive". He has created the natural order and He has deemed that the
natural order control the fate of these entities. In contrast, according
to the Baal Shem Tov every element of existence and every slight change
that occurs regarding it depends directly on G-d's will and desire."

---------------
R' Touger stated that in fact in Chabad sources it is possible to find
both statements consistent with the Rambam as well as what is described
as the view of the Besht. There is no indication in these sources that
they were incompatible. He notes that in fact up till 110 years ago,
expositions on the nature of HP did not exist - either in the Chabad
literature or in that of other chassidic literature. He readily
acknowledged that most of the discussion and development of what is
called the Besht's view of HP is from Chabad sources. Another chassidic
friend - initially scoffed at my understanding of the chassidic view of
HP. However after he spent a day going through the classic chassidic
seforim he discovered that there is in fact very little discussion of
what HP is and some seforim did not even mention the subject. He also
observed that the view of the Rishonim is found in chassidic work as
well as the universal view of HP. In general there is no mention in
chassidic works that universal HP is an innovation of the Besht.
----------------

Thus it is possible to conclude. 1) There is a fairly consistent position
found in the Rishonim concerning HP a) that it applies only to man b)
that it is a function of spiritual level.. 2) The Besht made a statement
that HP applied to everything - but did not elaborate on what he meant. 3)
During the 1800's the issue of HP was not a major concern and thus there
was no focus or major debate as to what it really meant. Starting about
110 years ago Chabad started elaborating and expanding the meaning of
HP and attributed these views to the Besht. 4) The concern with HP was
probably a reaction against the acceptance in the general culture of
the mechanical Newtonian scientific view.[See Chofetz Chaim Shem Olam
1:3/1:24] 5) At no point does there seem to be a revolution in thought
but rather a greater emphasis in religious circles that nothing is by
accident or by mechanical laws of nature. However only Chabad concerned
itself with developing a systematic conceptualization of HP.

-------------------------
Rabbi Lamm in his source book of chassidis states:

P 52 It should added that the Lurianic-Beshtian theory departs from the
dominant approach in the history of Jewish thought. The prevailing opinion
was that divine providence for individuals (hashgocha protis) is limited
only to humans; for all else, providence applies only to the species in
general(Hashgacha kelalit). Thus the opinion of the Sages of the Talmud is
summarized by Maimonides (Guide 3:17, 51). And see Ramban (Genesis 18:19)
and Chinuch (169). The kabbalists were general of the same opinion;
see Ergas' Shomer emnim 2 #81. (That G-d does not exercise providence
over the individuals of other species does not, however, mean that He
does not know them and what occurs to them. Ikkarim 4:7). By asserting
that every created item, even in the animal world, possessed a "soul"
as Luria did, and certainly with the Besht's elaboration, attributing
its continued existed to its recreation by virtue of divine immanence,
individual providence over the differentia of all non human species
is presupposed. Whether the converse is true i.e., whether the many
thinkers who deny individual providence for other species necessarily
disagree with the Beshtian thesis of constant re-creation is an open
question. R Menachem Mendel Schneerson inclines to the opinion that
they would not disagree with the Beshtian idea; Likkutei Sichos vol 8
bamidbar p 283 1974.

--------------

In sum. I agree with R' Micha that the absence of discussion of HP
in mussar, Mussar and Machshova works does not allow one to state
with certainty whether their views were in agreement with that of the
Rishonim. However by the same token the lack of discussion concerning the
nature of Hp and the lack of consistency that exists in chassidic works
[other than Chabad] make it impossible to conclude that they disagreed
with the view of the rishonim or that there was a revolution in thought
initiated by the Besht. Therefore unless one accepts the view of Chabad
on the subject of HP, there is no justification for R' Bechhofer's
criticism of Prof Levi for not citing the view of HP attributed to the
Besht. Finally - as the Lubavitcher Rebbe himself states - it is possible
to view that in fact there is no major dispute concerning HP but rather
differences in emphasis and definition of terms - a point that R' Micha
made a number of posts ago. Therefore this discussion has very little
to do with being open minded and more to do with how you wish to express
the concept of HP.

                   Daniel Eidensohn

*********************


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