Avodah Mailing List

Volume 10 : Number 041

Sunday, October 27 2002

• Rabbenu Gershom
• Re: Avodah V10 #38
• RE: Rabbenu Gershom
• Fw: A question from my father r.e. this week's Haftarah
• Re: oseh shalom
• Yehei shlama rabba
• Re: artificial insemination and selection of gender
• Re: artificial insemination and selection of gender
• RE: IVF and spousal abuse
• IVF
• AI-D - Psak of the Satmar Rebbe z'l
• consulting gedolim
• Re: Gedolim...connections to the Heavens
• Adv #2: Va'ad Leadership Seminar
• Re: Rabbenu Gershom
• atzas gdolim
• Re: Rabbenu Gershom

<Rabbeinu Gershom got the same effect as a latter-day gezeirah by
instituting charamim. I thought it was because even the Me'or haGolah
didn't have the authority to make new gezeiros.>

In fact takkanot rabbenu Gershom are takkanat hakahal which certainly
exist even today. Historically we have no records of any takkanot
of RG. It is first mentioned many years later. The early records all
speak of various meetings of the ashkenaz communities in which dozens
of takkanot were adopted. The cherem was only the means of punishment
not the basis of the takkanah.

--
 Eli Turkel, turkel@math.tau.ac.il on 23/10/2002

On Tue, 22 Oct 2002 14:20:13 -0400 "Gil Student" <gil@aishdas.org> writes:
>Chana Luntz summarized from R' Aryeh Frimer's article:
>>b) Part 5: Ruling that Something is Biblically Forbidden, 
>>When it isNot, may violate Bal Tosif (Adding to the 
>>Torah)...c) Part 6: Misrepresenting Halakha May Violate the 
>>Prohibition of Lying[which discusses mi dvar sheker tirchok 
>>in the context of rulings inhalacha]

>There were obvious implications in including these sections 
>in this article. What I thought was missing from the 
>article, however, was the aspect of "exaggerating" an issur 
>due to public policy issues. By exaggerating, I mean being 
>extremely machmir. We all know that there is a good deal of 
>leeway in paskening she'eilos. What I have found is
>that poskim will sometimes latch onto a da'as yachid or a 
>not-so-strong shitah in order to justify their public policy 
>decision.

Is not the core question here - what is emes (or, in other words - if the
prohibition is mi dvar sheker tirchok - how far is sufficiently far? Is
exaggeration a form of sheker (it tends to drive my father nuts when my
mother says things like "there were millions of people at the rally" - and
he is liable to butt in and say "well the police say it was only 100,000"
or whatever. My mother would say that millions was not a sheker, there
were lots and lots of people, more than anyone expected, and nobody who
listened to her would have assumed that there was literally 1,000,000
people, whereas my father would see saying millions when it was only
100,000 as being a form of sheker).

The test suggested in some of the sources brought in the Addendum
appears to set out an interesting position - ie it is OK so long as
it does not make the person liable for a greater punishment than they
would otherwise get. In the examples that you give, above - I guess
that would translate to if we had beitei din with the power to punish,
would they be obligated to flog (or give the death penalty, or whatever)
(assuming necessary warnings etc had been given) based on the daas yachid
or the not so strong shita?

Do people tend to think of piskei halacha this way?

>Are they being mezayef haTorah by paskening like a da'as 
>yachid? No, that is in their right.

Mezayef, no I wouldn't have thought so. And if there is a daas yachid,
that gets you out of bal tosif (was it the Aruch L'Ner who held that
if it wasn't clear which side of a door to put the mezuzah, put it on
both sides, and there is no baal tosif because of the sufek). But I do
wonder whether or not that person might be putting themselves into sfekos
of mi dvar sheker if they would not normally posken like a daas yachid.
Are not public policy motives a form of ulterior motives (even if they
may be praiseworthy motives)? A judge is not allowed to favour a poor
man over a rich one, because of the breach of emes that would involve.
Is this not a similar type case? The motive may be praiseworthy (and
meritorious when done a different way - eg by straight out giving of
tzedaka), but to disguise tzedaka as din is a breach of emes - is it
clear it is not so here?

> However, in order to effectuate a public policy
>pesak one cannot, in this day and age, simply say that it is 
>assur due to public policy reasons. You might as well not 
>bother giving a public policy answer.

Is that necessarily true? After all, the daas torah discussion has loads
of public policy implications, and the macro half of daas torah seems to
me to be indistinguishable from public policy. In fact, a psak to stay
in Europe, or, for that matter, to go, is that not about public policy?
Whether or not to meet with Reform groups/clergy etc, is that not clearly
public policy? In fact, whether or not you are obligated to seek out
daas torah in and of itself appears to have public policy ramifications.
Or are you restricting your comments to communities were daas torah is
less highly regarded?

regards
Chana

From: Micha Berger [mailto:micha@aishdas.org]
> On Wed, Oct 23, 2002 at 11:31:18AM +0000, Eli Turkel wrote:
>: In fact takkanot rabbenu Gershom are takkanat hakahal which 
>: certainly exist even today...

> ... and just to close the loop, and therefore RMF would have the power
> to make takkanos for the US of his generation.

Au contraire!

IIRC it is generally accepted by scholars of that period that Rabbenu
Gershom did make the takkanos via personal fiat, but through agreement of
all the major rabbanim in the Shu"m communities (Speyer, Worms, Mainz).
Therefore, Rav Moshe would be unable to make any takkanah by himself
w/o getting all major rabbanim in America to agree.

Kol tuv,
Moshe

 From my brother-in-law, Rabbi Dr. Eddie Reichman <<Saraneddie@aol.com>:

Dear Moshe,

Many have written about the resuscitation episodes in Tanakh, including
ben haShunamis. Subarachnoid hemorrhage and heat stroke seem to be
the most popular diagnoses. While there is debate amongst poskim as to
whether the child resuscitated by Eliyahu was actually dead, there does
not appear to be such debate in the Elisha case. I include two things
below: 1) a list of references about the topic, and 2) an excerpt from
an article of mine on a different angle, the historical one.

Kol Tuv,
Eddie

F. Rosner, "Artificial Respiration in Biblical Times," New York State
Journal of Medicine 69:8(April 15, 1969): 1104-05; Z. Rosen, "Rhinological
Aspects of Biblical Resuscitation," Archives of Otolaryngology 95:5(May,
1972): 488-89; Z. Rosen and J. Davidson, "Respiratory Resuscitation
in Ancient Hebrew Sources," Anesthesia and Analgesia 51:4 (July-August,
1972): 502-05; L. Wislicki, "A Biblical Case of Hypothermia-Resuscitation
by Rewarming (Elisha's Method)," Clio Medica 9:3 (September, 1974):
213-14; R. B. Howard, "...And There is Nothing New Under the Sun,"
Postgraduate Medicine 65:3(March, 1979): 25; J. H. Comroe, jr., "...In
Comes the Good Air," American Review of Respiratory Diseases 119:6(June,
1979): 1025-31; . S. Abraham, "Hanshamah Melakhutit bi-Tanakh,"
Ha-Ma'ayan 28:3(Nisan, 5748): 72-76; E. Tratner, "Intubation mentioned in
the Talmud and by Jacob ben Asher," Koroth 8:7-8(August, 1983), 333-338;
J. A. Paraskos, "Biblical Accounts of Resuscitation," Journal of the
History of Medicine and Allied Sciences 47:3(July, 1992): 310-21.

(Excerpted from an article of mine which appeared in TUM Journal)
Resuscitation Episodes of Elijah and Elisha There are two accounts of
resuscitation in Tanakh, both performed by prophets, with the actual
resuscitation procedures being similar. The first was performed by Elijah
on the son of the widow from Zarfat: "And he stretched himself upon
the child three times, and cried to the Lord and said, 'O Lord my God,
I pray thee, let this child's soul return to him again', and he revived"
(1 Kings 17:21-22).(see footnote below) The second was performed by
Elisha on the son on the Shunammite woman: "And he went up, and lay upon
the child, and put his mouth upon his mouth, and his eyes upon his eyes,
and his hands upon his hands and he stretched himself upon the child;
and the flesh of the child was warmed. Then he returned, and walked in
the house to and fro; and went up, and stretched himself upon him and
the child sneezed seven times, and the child opened his eyes" (2 Kings
4:34-35).
While many have drawn upon our modern understanding of physiology and
resuscitation in order to shed light on these episodes, I would like to
focus on how the pre-modern commentator understood the strange maneuvers
of Elijah and Elisha? While the miraculous element of both resuscitations
seems clear, R. David Kimhi suggests that the method of resuscitation
was chosen so that these miracles, like others in Tanakh, would have
some basis in the natural world order. He therefore posits, based on
his contemporary understanding of nature, that the prophets positioned
their mouths against those of the victims in order to transmit their
innate heat, via respiration and exhalation, into the victims' lifeless
bodies. The inspired air was thought to travel directly to the heart,
where it came in contact with the innate heat. When the air was released
during exhalation, it was now a higher temperature, having been warmed
by the heat of the heart. As innate heat is required for the generation
and preservation of life, the method employed by both Elijah and Elisha
represents, according to R. Kimhi, a natural physiological basis for
resuscitation upon which the miracle was based.

(footnote) There is debate amongst the commentaries whether the child had
actually died, or whether his condition was so grave that he appeared to
be dead but was, in fact, barely alive. See, for example, Radak, ad loc;
Maimonides, Guide for the Perplexed 1:42; She'elot u-Teshuvot Hatam Sofer,
Yoreh De'ah #338. Targum Yonatan implies that the child may not have died,
and Josephus (Antiquities 8, 13:3.325) is explicit in saying that the
child's illness was so severe that he "ceased to breath and seemed to be
dead." This debate has a number of halakhic ramifications. According to
rabbinic tradition, Elijah was thought to be the embodiment of Pinhas. As
Pinhas was a kohen, it is logical to assume that this distinction would
have likewise been conferred upon Elijah. If he was, in fact, a kohen, it
would have been forbidden for him to come into contact with a corpse. How,
then, could he have performed the resuscitation? This issue is addressed
in She'elot u-Teshuvot ha-Radbaz #2203. Furthermore, this discussion
impacts on the halakhic definition of death. See She'elot u-Teshuvot
Hatam Sofer, cited above. For a discussion on how an understanding of
medical history impacts on the halakhic definition of death, see my
"The Halakhic Definition of Death," above, n. 3.

In a message dated 10/20/2002 10:12:22 AM EDT, gershon.dubin@juno.com writes:
> Any reason, besides lo plug, that we end the tefila "oseh shalom
> bimeromav" with "ve'imru amen" even in the silent shemoneh esrei?

Baer's Avodas Yisrael discusses this - Ayein Sham
Bepasthus there is a 2nd question:
How come we say Oseh Shalom Bimromav at the end of Kaddish when we
already say yehei Shlama Rabbah min Shmaya?

Answer:
Oseh Shalom is the end of Shmoneh Esrei. It was transposed to Kaddish
. Once in Kaddish the "v'imru amein" was added on. Then in order to be
consistent {IOW lo plug} v'imru amein wound up at the end of Shmoneh
Esrai where it really does not belong at all. Then, once there the
ardshainim seized upon it <smile>

Kol Tuv - Best Regards
Richard Wolpoe
RabbiRichWolpoe@aol.com

So after shul, we had an argument over phrasing. The old president says

Yhei shlama rabba min shmaia vechaim, aleinu v'al col ysrael v'imru amein

while the gabbai who is big on grammatical issues and I think it oughta be

Yhei shlama rabba min shmaia, vechaim aleinu v'al col ysrael v'imru amein

My reasoning being a) that shlama rabba should be for all humanity, not
just for col ysrael, and b) the language changes there. The gabbai's
reasoning being that it makes more grammatical sense to say "life for
us", rather than "life. for us" - what's for us? And the president's
view being based on asking God to give us both peace & life.

Baer says nothing. Anyone have any sources or grammatical points? R'
Seth Mandel, do you have another piece of your long-promised article on
Kaddish that might shed some light on this?

> Well, wouldn't therefore the argument for family balancing be stronger 
> for frum Jews than others?  ie you could ensure that people fulfilled 
> their d'orisa mitzvah a lot faster if you had them have the first kid 
> naturally, and the second kid with selected sperm to be the opposite 
> sex.  It seems a bit odd, but I was trying to work out what the counter 
> arguments were, and being a bit stumped.

Assuming that a child conceived in other than the natural way is a
fulfillment of p'ru urvu, which is a safek -- see the nos'ei keilim to
EH 1:6.

Parenthetically, one can question whether a child born to a non-Jewish
surrogate has the yichus of the contributors or the bearer. Regardless
of the p'sak in that case, though, it would seem that a child born of
sperm and ovum of a Yisrael and bas Yisrael, respectively, but borne by
a bas Kohein or bas Levi, would be exempt from pidyon haben, based on
the g'mara in B'choros 47a that "b'feter rechem talya Rachamana."

Elazar M. Teitz

> Well, wouldn't therefore the argument for family balancing be stronger 
> for frum Jews than others?  ie you could ensure that people fulfilled 
> their d'orisa mitzvah a lot faster if you had them have the first kid 
> naturally, and the second kid with selected sperm to be the opposite 
> sex.  It seems a bit odd, but I was trying to work out what the counter 
> arguments were, and being a bit stumped.

Assuming that a child conceived in other than the natural way is a
fulfillment of p'ru urvu, which is a safek -- see the nos'ei keilim to
EH 1:6.

Parenthetically, one can question whether a child born to a non-Jewish
surrogate has the yichus of the contributors or the bearer. Regardless
of the p'sak in that case, though, it would seem that a child born of
sperm and ovum of a Yisrael and bas Yisrael, respectively, but borne by
a bas Kohein or bas Levi, would be exempt from pidyon haben, based on
the g'mara in B'choros 47a that "b'feter rechem talya Rachamana."

Elazar M. Teitz

> Perhaps what R"n Rena Freedenberg *meant* to write was <<< Rav Eliyashiv
> holds in regard to IVF that it is not forbidden, but if a wife chooses
> not to undergo IVF treatments, she would not be considered a moredes
> who would thereby forfeit her kesuba. >>> Would this be accurate?

Yes, that would be accurate. I am pleased that I have such eagle-eye
editors watching over me :-) to keep me accurate.

I could not imagine anyone reading anything else but what you said from my
words. If a rav is ruling whether a wife can be required to do something,
how else would one understand it than whether or not she is halachically
required to do it?

---Rena 

REMT
>Just as sperm from someone other than the husband does not make the
>child a mamzer, since it requires birth by act of biah to produce a mamzer
>(as opposed to b'ambati ibrah), so too should it not require bias kohain,
>rather than just a kohain's sperm, to make the child a kohain?

RMF's vort was that although one's father is determined by seed, the
passul of mamzer requires the issur of biah. Therefore, kehuna should
depend on biological father and not on bias kohain.

Shlomo Goldstein

From: "SBA" <sba@iprimus.com.au>
>>>>I was a young yeshiva bochur in the early 60s when RMF issued
his psak. IIRC there was a huge hullaballoo about it - and those days
(especially compared to today's dor yosom) it was still something of a dor
deyoh with many great Rabbonim, RYs and rebbes.
I didn't quite understand the topic (I couldn't even pronounce the Hebrew
word be used in the Tshuvos - 'hazro'eh melachosis' ...), but IIRC many
gedolim came out strongly against the RMF's psak. The SR z'l wrote a
very sharp tshuva (probably printed in his Tshuvos Divrei Yoel). I recall
a letter/tshuvo from the late Bobover Rebbe z'l in the Hamaor journal -
where he stated that besides the halachic aspect which has already been
explained (probably refering to the Tshuvo of the SR), he describes his
strong concerns about kedushas am yisroel etc.<<<<
.............

Subject: Interesting article re artificial insemination and associated
...
> ....Artificial insemination with a donor's sperm, as we noted, is not
> universally accepted. In fact, it was one of the issues that generated a
> most heated debate between two of the major poskim of the previous
> generation. Rabbi Yoel Teitelbaum (the Satmar Rav) considered donor
> insemination (DI) to be adultery pure and simple, while Rabbi Moshe
> Feinstein argued that a charge of adultery could not be sustained in a
> case where there was no physical intercourse.
>
> While Rabbi Feinstein argued that DI involved no technical halakhic
> violation, he too had serious reservations about it because it violated
> the exclusivity of relationships that should characterize a marriage.
> He was willing to allow it only in the case of a distraught woman who
>  could not be  reconciled to a childless marriage. ......
> http://www.daat.ac.il/daat/english/ethic/grave_1.htm
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>

Further to my above posts, over Shabbos I had a quick look at the IM and the
DY on this.

I may have missed it - but I did not notice RMF saying that he "allows
it only in the case of a distraught woman who could not be reconciled
to a childless marriage"

And indeed he writes that the donor should be a goy.
However, even if we don't know this for certain, the child is not a
mamzer - as most donors are goyim.
But even if the donor IS a Jew - there is no mamzerus because there was
no act of 'beeyeh'.

The SR responds (Shu't DY V2 p 401) with several interconnecting tshuvos
totalling 27 pages. [IMHO any person considering a hetter for AI-D
should at least study these tshuvos - where the SR lechoireh - and of
course LAD - completely deconstructs RMF's psak.]

IIUC, one of their main points of disagreement is that RMF holds that
'beeyeh' is the key to mamzerus while the SR holds that the 'zera' is.
(But there is much, much more in the DY tshuvos - ayin shom.)

 From my 1-hour glance through those tshuvos I see that where the donor
was a Jew the SR definitely considers the child a mamzer - ("...ledina
hamevi'im zera shel ish achar l'toch eishes ish ovrim al issurei aroyos
shel issurei krisos veho'isho ne'eseres al baaloh v'havlad mamzer..").

In a case where we unsure - the child is a sofek mamzer - (which I
understand is a worse situation than a vadai mamzer - who at least can
marry a mamzeres - whilst a sofek cannot marry anyone).

And where the donor is positively a goy - and the child is halachically
kosher, the SR calls it an act of "maaseh zimoh v'toyevoh bli sofek"
and the women is a 'zoneh bevadai' RL.

Incidentally, towards the end of these tshuvos (siman 110) the SR quotes
the Pri Megodim "...ub'inyonei hoyro'eh hamoyrim merubim vehayodim
mu'otim..." and has a very interesting maamar on the quality of hoyroeh
these days and in the past, elaborating on the lament of the Ri Migash
about many Moyrei Hoyro'eh.

The Shu"t Minchas Yitzchok [V4 p12] also writes similarly. But I
found it interesting that in his later Tshuvos [V6 - Siman 140] - he
has a short letter responding to a case very similar to what began this
thread - regarding the wife of a Cohen who couldn't have children. So
she undertook AI-D and the son that was born - was now becoming bar
mitzva and wishes to duchen etc.

Rav Weiss z'l paskens that it is a 'pshita' that he may not duchen and
it is a mitzva "lefarsem matzovoy shelo lovoy liy'dey michshol...".

But although he refers to his earlier Tshuvo, he doesn't mention the
mamzerus problem at all!

Re the chiyuv of mitzvas PvR - the SR writes that if a person marries
and does whatever he can - he has been mekayem his obligations - and
the rest is in the hands of the RSO...

(Seems to me that our Reb. T. Katz was mechaven a fair bit to the SR's
psak...)

Finally, an interesting Midrash in Parshas Nosoy [Rabba 9], [and Tanchuma
2] cited both by the DY and the MY - which again brings up the Cohen
factor.

I will not quote all of it as it isn't short - just l'inyoneinu...

The Midrash says that both the 'hano'ef vehano'efes' are 'oiver' on the
'aseres hadibros' and goes on to explain 9 of these -
but asks how are they oiver of 'Zochor es Yom HaShabbos' !?

It answers, that if the no'efes was an eishes Cohen and became pregnant
to the no'ef - their son - who doesn't know of his true background -
eventually does the avodah in the BHMK - "..Ve'oyrech eitzim umaaleh
oylos beShabbos - nimtzo mechalell es haShabbos..."

Shlomo B Abeles

<He (RAL) has another unpublished essay, written in the 1960's, on
the importance of developing independent judgment, which starts from
the assumption that one would always want guidance from the dwellers in
migdal ha-shen, banuy l'talpiyot.>

When one is in doubt is always good to ask advice. I think an excellent
example is indeed the relationship of RAL to RSZA. In one case RAL
asked RSZA whether he should join some organization. RSZA answered
that he only tells talmidim what to do not others it is up to RAL to
decide by himself. It is obvious that RAL did not ask RSZA about every
decision. Only in cases in which he was undecided did he go for help.

I have always claimed that is not just coincidence that RAL chose RSZA
as a mentor and not one of the many other gedolim in Jerusalem. It is
precisely this quality of RSZA that attracted him to RAL. I am sure that
had he gone for advice to many others the first sentence would have been
that their advice is to leave a hesder yeshiva.

As to the difference between orders and advice please look at the posters
in BB and Jerusalem. The opinions of rabbanim are not given as advice
but as piske dinim binding on everyone including those who didn't ask.

--
 Eli Turkel, turkel@math.tau.ac.il on 23/10/2002

Micha Berger <micha@aishdas.org> wrote:
> On Sun, Oct 20, 2002 at 08:09:18AM -0700, Harry Maryles wrote:
>: Connections to the Heavens? Exactly what do you mean? This strongly
>: implies supernatural powers. There is no Nevuah today...

> Ru'ach haqodesh?
 
> (I see it raised, but never resolved. Do we claim there is zero ru'ach
> haqodesh bizman hazeh? That's against the Rambam, who has a scale that
> goes well below into the kind of 'inspiration' artists claim.)

I asked whether RYGB was reffering to RH and which I conceed exists
today. I don't think any knowledgable person wouyd deny it. In fact
Dr. Berkovitz told me that he had experienced it. My question was whther
it was the reason that RYGB believes that Gedolim are to be asked for
advice. He answered that the opposite id the case.

HM

You may recall my email of 4 Marchevan (Oct 10th) which began:
> AishDas will soon be starting local Ve'adim, groups of chaveirim working
> together on avodas Hashem and sheleimus ha'adam. These will not simply be
> another chaburah or shi'ur. The ve'adim will be groups of people working
> together to apply the words of mesorah to their own particular lives,
> abilities and situations.

> To do so, these ve'adim will need organizers, people who know what a
> va'ad is and how AishDas will be implementing the idea. They will then
> be able to set the expectations and tone of the group.

The Leadership Seminar will be this Motza'ei Shabbos, or layom Marcheshvan
28, November 2nd 2002. It will be iy"h at my home, 129 Ascension Street,
Passaic NJ. RSVP to this email address.

The meeting will be aimed at people who have learnt R' Wolbe's Kunteres
al Limud Mussar, however, attendence is open to others who believe they
can follow -- or even better, contribute!

The agenda is to (1) tweak out the final details about how to implement a
va'ad for this generation's ba'alei batim, (2) guidance on how to run such
a va'ad and in particular how to find potential members and get started.

-mi

-- 
Micha Berger                 It isn't what you have, or who you are, or where
micha@aishdas.org            you are,  or what you are doing,  that makes you
http://www.aishdas.org       happy or unhappy. It's what you think about.
Fax: (413) 403-9905                            - Dale Carnegie

I wrote:
> IIRC it is generally accepted by scholars of that period that Rabbenu
> Gershom did make the takkanos via personal fiat, but through agreement of
> all the major rabbanim in the Shu"m communities (Speyer, Worms, Mainz).

I made a typo.  That should read:
> IIRC it is generally accepted by scholars of that period that Rabbenu
> Gershom did NOT make the takkanos via personal fiat, but through agreement of
> all the major rabbanim in the Shu"m communities (Speyer, Worms, Mainz).

-------Sent from my BlackBerry Wireless Handheld (www.BlackBerry.net)

My debates with RYGB truly amaze me at the lengths some will go to defend
what I am sure is a deeply felt position.

I will summarize my position as follows:

It is impossible for any objective person learning the Rambam moreh
nevuchim and other philosophical articles not to realize that his approach
to hilchot deot is not based on a pshat understanding of maamre hazal,
even those maamre hazal that seem to reflect a deliberate statement
on hilchot deot rather than merely ma'asim. This is zil kare be rav.
(I wonder how one could, for example, learn the rambam on what it means
that hashem is menasse bne adam without such an understanding_

This, of course, made the rambam very controversial. Even those who
didn't ban him try to minimize the impact of his statements. This is
clearly RYGB's approach, who tries to minimize every statement only to the
very minimal and precise context that it occurs in, regardless of the fact
that the rambam is quite clear that he is making a very general statement.

The statement in the letter on gzerat hacochavim is related to
astrology,as RYGB points out. However, the rambam doesn't frame his
objections in that way. He doesn't say," you know, astrology is a
controversial subject, often rejected by hazal themselves, as in these
maamarim", as RYGB would. He uses the example of astrology to explicitly
explain a methodology. This is plain in the language and meaning.
To cite again,

This should not cause you any difficulty, that it is not appropriate that
a man should leave halacha lemaa'se and go after different questions and
and answers, and similarly it is not appropriate for a man to leave the
words of reason that were already proven by proofs, and shake his hands
from them, and rely on a statement of one of the chachamim, that it is
possible that he forgot something, or that there is in those words a
hint (remez), or he said that according to the hour and an event that
was before him.

These words are crystal clear. The reason is not because other statements
of hazal can be cited in opposition, nor that it is that these statements
are clearly allegorical, but the fact that something has been proven
by reason means that a statement by hazal apparently to the contrary
needs to be reinterpreted, because clearly that statement of hazal
can not mean what you think it means. This is why the rambam expands
this and says that this principle was used by hazal themselves, which
is why onkelos translated several psukim against their pshat meaning.
No other reading of the paragraph makes any sense, in spite of your
attempts to limit it to astrology.

Lastly, the conclusion of the rambam is precisely my fourteenth ikkar
(I am surprised by the issue of bal tosif of the 13 ikkarim, but in
polemics, everything is acceptable)

A man should never leave his reason behind, that the eyes are in front
and not in back.

With your citation of the mishna:

Yes, I am familiar with that mishna, but I think (WADR) that you
completely misunderstand the mishna. (it is perhaps paradigmatic that
in your attempts to defend the "truth" against the modern "kofer" that
you view me to be that you clearly misstate pshat in a simple mishna,
something I am sure you would never otherwise do)


It doesn't say muttav li lihyot shotteh, rather muttav li lehikkare
shotteh. Clearly, my avodat hashem should not be dependent on external
opinion, and I should rather be called a shotte by others than to be
considered a rasha before hashem - I think simple pshat in the mishna
(I believe, though haven't checked recently, that that is the Rambam'
pshat as well). However, I don't think that there is a choice between
being a shotte or being a rasha - and I doubt that the rambam would have
considered that as a choice, although, as I stated in my ikkar, "and the
other 13 ikkarim should be understood, as much as possible, so as not to
contradict the 14th." - the 14th is not an absolute, given limitations
of human reason. However, remember what the rambam says (and means)


A man should never leave his reason behind, that the eyes are in front
and not in back.

To paraphrase you, RMS has brough a good proof, and you can only say
that he doesn't mean it, it is only about astrology, and misinterprete
a mishna.

With regard to the other statements in my post and your response, I think
again, that you are deliberately minimizing the clear meaning of the
rambam only to the specific issue that he is discussing. The hakdama to
the perush hamishnayot seems clear that it takes the approach to aggadot
hazal of reinterpreting the pshat. The issue is not merely that there
isn't a concrete daled amot, but that the plain meaning of that midrash,
whihc is also the way it is commonly understood) is also reinterpreted.

Similarly with the eyn makshin - the issue isn't allegory, and the gmara
in question isn't allegory. The rambam defines the categories of maamre
hazal shemakshin bahem - that is, that have normative meaning so their
meaning has to be specifically understood and reconciled with the rest
of the torah shebealpe. Things that are

 lo divre kabbala, velo asor velo muttar, velo din min hadinin,

do not fall in the normative category - simple pshat, consistent with
everything else in the rambam.

lastly, the fact that you find some of the 13 ikkarim irrational,
so therefore I should reject them (note that I am not talking about
arational - no rational proof is required), so would think that I should
question them - suggests that ultimately, you do view the criteria of
reason to be threatening, and that is our difference. However, the
fact that you view the ikkarim to be irrational says more about you than
either me or the ikkarim.

Meir Shinnar

On Fri, Oct 25, 2002 at 12:36:37PM -0400, Feldman, Mark wrote:
:> ... and just to close the loop, and therefore RMF would have the power
:> to make takkanos for the US of his generation.

: Au contraire!

: IIRC it is generally accepted by scholars of that period that Rabbenu
: Gershom did NOT make the takkanos via personal fiat, but through agreement of
: all the major rabbanim in the Shu"m communities (Speyer, Worms, Mainz)....

If beis din makes a takanah and the tzibbur never accept it, then the
takanah was never chal. Even Sanhedrin can't make a takanah entirely
by fiat. Are you sure that Rabbeinu Gershom's cases were different?

-mi

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