Avodah Mailing List

Volume 07 : Number 065

Wednesday, June 20 2001

• Ramban on Kibbush Haaretz
• Re: Terms for Bnei Yisroel
• Schar VeOnesh
• tztizit on shabbat
• Yibum, Yiud and Commerce
• Re: Ramban on Kibbush Haaretz
• Subject: Re: Umasbia' l'khol chai ratzon
• Re: Umasbia' l'khol chai ratzon
• Torah brachot
• Re: Schar VeOnesh
• Re: bearing bad news
• Machzorim change for Yomim Noro'im
• Re: Schar VeOnesh
• Re: Schar VeOnesh
• Re: Schar VeOnesh
• Re: Schar VeOnesh
• Re: Schar VeOnesh

Excerpt from http://www.ariga.com/ozveshalom/judaism/nachmad.html
A Look Into a Ruling of Nachmanidies and its Practical Implications
by Rabbi Dr. Michael Tzvi Nehorai

: When we look at the words of Maimonides in the beginning of his Laws of
: Kings, and in the comments of Nachmanides to the Sefer HaMitzvot (Pos.
: Command 4; Neg. Command 11), we see that both agree on the following
: points: that the settlement of the Land and the conquest of the Land are
: two separate commandments; that wars, of both the obligatory and optional
: types, are not personal affairs, but are rather the responsibility of
: the King in the time of the Temple and of the Sanhedrin; that a King
: may be installed only by a 71-member Rabbinical court (Kings 1,3); that
: the appointment of a King precedes the obligatory war against Amalek
: (ibid. 1,2); that a High Priest, anointed with the Oil of Anointment,
: must be appointed to speak with the nation at a time of war (ibid. 7,1);
: and other points.

: Ramban, in fact, even adds conditions that must be present for war that
: Maimonides did not list. In his opinion, the King must consult with
: the Sanhedrin not only for an optional war, but even for an obligatory
: one. In Ramban's words: "It appears to me that the King (or whoever
: is in control of the Nation) is Biblically commanded to consult with
: the Urim V'Tumim before beginning an obligatory or optional war, and
: to act in accordance with its directions... It is known that wars and
: conquests shall be carried out only with a King and by directive of the
: Sanhedrin and the High Priest; this is truly not a recommendation but a
: commandment in effect for all generations" (-end of 17th neg. commandment
: of Nachmanides in Sefer haMitzvot).

: However, there is a dispute between them concerning two laws. Maimonides
: does not count the commandment of conquering the Land as one of the
: King's obligations. In his opinion, the King is commanded to wage war
: only against a) the Seven Nations, whose existence endangers the Jewish
: religion (and who by now have already disappeared from the face of the
: earth), b) Amalek - when we are certain of their identity, and c) enemies
: who are planning to attack Israel. Nachmanides, however, in his list of
: positive commandments in Sefer HaMitzvot, opposes Rambam on this point,
: and writes: "Don't err and think that this commandment [of conquering the
: Land] is the command to war against the Seven Nations." Rather, he says,
: conquest of the Land is an additional commandment incumbent upon the King
: of Israel - "and this is that which the Sages call an Obligatory War."

: It is apparent that the above dispute revolved around the question
: whether the conquest of the Land is included among the obligatory wars
: in which the Messiah King will be obligated. To show the irrelevancy
: of this dispute to our present reality, note the words of Nachmanides:
: "It appears to me that the King (or whoever is in control of the Nation)
: is Biblically commanded to consult with the Urim V'Tumim..."

: The second point in dispute is related to the commandment of living in and
: settling the Land. The Rambam expounds greatly upon the merits of this
: command: "It is forbidden to leave the Land of Israel; the Great Sages
: would kiss the ground upon arriving in the Land; even one who walked
: four cubits in the Land merits the World to Come; one should always
: prefer to live in the Land of Israel, even in a city that is mostly of
: Gentiles..." and the like. However, he does not count this as one of the
: 613 Biblical commandments. The Ramban comes out against this opinion, and
: states: "I say that this commandment that the Sages so greatly praise -
: living in the Land of Israel - is part of the positive Biblical command
: to inherit the Land and dwell in it; it is binding forever, and each and
: every one of us is obligated to fulfill it, even in the time of Exile..."

: In other words, the Ramban holds that the commandment of dwelling in
: the Land is derived from the command to conquer it, and that both are
: Biblical. The difference between them is that the command to inherit -
: i.e., conquer - the Land is for the times of the Messiah, while the
: command to dwell in the Land is applicable even during the times of
: the Exile. This tells us clearly that there is nothing in the words of
: Nachmanides anything to support the ideological position mentioned above;
: for he holds that the command to conquer the Land is not applicable in
: our day. It appears that the command to dwell in the Land, which is in
: effect today, applies equally to any place within the Land.

Does anyone disagree with this reasoning?

Note that Rabbi Nehorai uses this as a basis to permit returning land for
peace, even according to Ramban, as he believes that Ramban merely requires
yishuv haaretz (in any part of E"Y) rather than kibbush E"Y (which will
occur only in the time of Moshiach).

Kol tuv,
Moshe

On Tue, 19 Jun 2001, Micha Berger wrote:
> Just double checking: Are you defining a "goy" as a "lashon" that also
> preserves names and attire? 

Yes.

> An "eidah" he defines as a community of destiny, which is why we find it
> first in parashas Yisro. An eidah is a group of people who strive for a
> common purpose. Be it good, or the "eidah ra'ah" of meraglim. 

It actually (as well as kohol) is first found in Bo, in Chap. 12, re
Korban Pesach.

> Which is why RYBS excludes apikursim and minim from the concept of Adas
> Yisrael. Am Yisrael, yes. Adas Yisrael, no -- they don't strive for the
> mission we were given at Har Sinai; they don't even necessarily believe
> there was a mission given to us there. 

I do not recall Am Yisroel being cast as an Eidah at Mattan Torah.

> Li nir'eh a third position -- that "kahal" and "eidah" are different
> positive traits. After all, if one were a higher level of the other
> (same trait, to different extents) then why woul there be an idiom of
> "kehal adas"? 

A refinement of an Eidah to the level of a Kohol.

Compare Bamidbar 10:3 to Bamidbar 10:7.

> Which fits the two meanings given to "kareis", once you translate RYGB's
> "kohol" to my "kehal eidah". The person who dies with no physical legacy
> does not share in the community's destiny. He is therefore cut off from
> the "am". And one who is cut off from olam habah is no longer amongst
> "kol Yisrael yeish lahem cheilek". 

But I do nott think the dichotmy is between kareis qua arriri (a very
limied application of kareis) vs. kareis as a spiritual punishment.
Perhaps I misunderstand your distinction?

KT,
YGB
Yosef Gavriel Bechhofer
ygb@aishdas.org, http://www.aishdas.org/rygb

From: gil.student@citicorp.com
> But I'm not convinced. I could envision HKBH having given all of the
> mitzvos as a chok so that we accept on ourselves His yoke. Performing
> those mitzvos would not be rewarded and would not make us better people.
> HKBH told us to do them and we are obligated to do so.

Just to add my 2 cents to the discussion. I believe the Maharal in th
ebeginning of Tiferes Yisroel has a long discussion on the purpose of
mitzvos. He says that the mitzvos themselves affect a person and they
were not just given for schar v'onesh. Each mitzva is tailor made to
devlop/affect a different aspect of a person.

From: kennethgmiller@juno.com
> This line of thinking seems to strengthen my claim that on Shabbos, this
> mitzvah (and all its details) lacks the force of a d'Oraisa.

I don't think this is correct. I think you are mixing up 2 different
ideas. What the S"A and MG"A are talking about is whether koved habriyos
overrides the bittul aseh of "not putting tzitzis on a beged that you
are wearing". which is only one of "shev v'al taaseh" . The MG"A holds
that since on Shabbos you can't put tzitzis on (since it is assur to
tie a knot) the bittul aseh is only a d'rabanon. Since it is only a
d'rabanon, koved habriyos overrides the bittul aseh. However, during
the week since one can put tzitzis on the bittul aseh is d'oreisah and
unless it is a big b'zayion, koved habriyos does not override the bittul
aseh. However, this in no way tells us what kind of kiyum you get for
wearing the tzitzis. Even on Shabbos if I where tzitzis I am m'kayeim a
d'oreisah. The only issue is if the bittul aseh is d'oreisah or d'rabanan.

What a have a hard time understanding is the sevara of the MG"A
(although it really comes from the Mordechai so I gues my kasha is on
the Mordechai). Why does the fact that one can't tie a knot on Shabbos
change the bittul aseh from a d'oreisah to a d'rabanan. I'm being m'vateil
an aseh-who cares why I can't change the situation. Do we ever find a
similar idea elsewhere ?

In a message, Carl Sherer <sherer@actcom.co.il> writes:
>> I think he's referring to "talyuha v'zavin zvinei zvinei." That does not 
>> seem to be connected to Beis Din.

On Fri, 15 Jun 2001 18:42:52 +0100, Chana Luntz 
<Chana/Heather@luntz.demon.co.uk> wrote:
> Yes (I thought I said the forced sale was a different case, something
> found in Western legal systems as well for good logical reasons, but
> noted that Beis Din had the power to unravel the sale should it choose
> to do so). My comment above was on the second part, ie relating to a
> korban. However, vis a vis kiddushin, the Shulchan Aruch (Even HaEzer
> siman 42 si'if 1) poskens like Mar bar Rav Ashi who holds that such
> kiddushin is uprooted by the Rabbanan (see the Nosei Kelim there who
> state this explicitly).
...
> It is only the position of Abba Shaul re yibbum that has the extra
> mental element required for the mitzvah (a higher state than ratzon
> even) which it would seem to me prima facie rules out the yibbum
> actually being effective in a rape situation.

FWIW, I have several comments.

1) The S'vara behind a forced sale (Talyuha V'Zavin) being effective,
IIRC, is that ALL such sales are really against the will of the
seller. From the Gemara's perspective, property was to be held onto at
(almost) all costs and a person did not sell unless he was extremely
strapped for cash. Thus, if a person sold, because his creditors
figuratively held a gun to his head, or because some ruffian literally
did so, the sales were equally effective.

2) I'm sure alot of what I am about to say has either been said before
or is almost too Pashut to say. Abba Shaul's arrangement whereby Yibum
was to be discontinued in favor of Chalitzah had less to do with the
aspect of force than it did with proper Kavanah. If a Yavam felt very
strongly about continuing his brother's name and insisted on Yibum,
there are Poskim, who would probably allow the Yibum to take place, even
today (there is a Shvut Yaakov to that effect). However, until such a
thing actually happened, one could not really know what effect, if any,
the Yevamah's opposition might have. Certainly, as the Gemara says,
if he is a Mukat Shechin, Beit Din would not force her. But otherwise...?
And how flexible might the concept of Mukat Shechin become?

I think the use of the word "rape" found in some of the discussions
vis-a-vis the aspect of force inherent in Yiud and Yibum were a little
over the top. If we discount for the moment, any considerations of
emotion such as love or respect, and we viewed marriage as a sort of
commercial transaction entered into by 2 people where the man will do X
for the marriage and the woman will do Y for the marriage, then Kidushei
Ketanah would be such an arrangement, engineered by the father. Yiud
would be a similar arrangement, provided to the Adon as his right,
by the Torah. Marital relations are simply, included. There is no more
force inherent in a Yiud marriage than in any other. In any relationship,
one party applies pressure of different kinds on the partner, to achieve
their goals. Granted, 2 people could enter into a platonic marriage for
companionship only, but then, that isn't what the Torah wants either,
is it ? Yibum is not the only scenario where the Torah is "interested"
in procreation.

Is the Yiud distinction that the girl did not enter into this relationship
of her own choosing ? Would you also consider her being forced to
cook or clean for the Adon as rape-like ? Perhaps, from a 21st-century
perspective, surrounded as we are with everything from animal rights to
criminal rights (or is that not really a stretch), the idea that someone
may be coerced into something undignified in a Western civilization is
hard to accept. But consider for a moment the theory that the Dinim of
Eved Ivri and Amah Ivriyah were arranged to PROTECT the servant. Human
rights were never at the top of the list if history is any indicator
and servants were traditionally viewed as chattel, to be owned, used or
abused, as a master saw fit. Despite the standards or lack of them in any
society, the Torah's view on servitude was constant. If an enlightened
father/daughter relationship could not countenance the right of an Adon
to perform Yiud, then the father would best seek other means to seek
employment or security for his daughter. If it were possible to arrange
Avdut of this kind today, those who might for some reason be interested,
would have to consider the consequences very carefully and having done
so, would make their choice with open eyes. Some might say that marrying
off one's daughter to an inappropriate man who has ALOT of money is no
different. I'm not sure where I am anymore re: the topic so I'll quit
for now and let someone else speak.

Stuart Goldstein

> Note that Rabbi Nehorai uses this as a basis to permit returning land for
> peace, even according to Ramban, as he believes that Ramban merely requires
> yishuv haaretz (in any part of E"Y) rather than kibbush E"Y (which will occur
> only in the time of Moshiach).
     
I don't have it in front of me, but doesn't the Ramban specifically say that 
part of yishuv E"Y is that we should not leave any part of it unsettled?

Gil Student

Concerning then separation of words in l'khol chai ratzon, R'Michael
Poppers wrote that the ta'am munach is a mafsik in sifrei Eme"t. AFAIK
this is not so. Although Ta'amei Eme"t is a field I've never really
delved into in detail, all sources with which I'm familiar state that
the Munach is a mesharet and mechaber.

RMP is correct in his comment on the tipcha (or tircha = tarcha as it
is often called in ta'amei emet). It is a mesharet, not as in the 21
sefarim. but its symbol is different from that of the dechi because
the dechi, a mafsik, is always written before the word and not on
the accented syllable. BTW there is a fairly rare mesharet in the
21 books that looks like a tipcha but it ain't. It is the m'aila,
a.k.a. 'ilui-m'aila, and appeared last shabbat in shishi: l'doroteikhem

As to the query on the term shofar: It is used both in 21 and in eme"t as
a general term for the "V" shaped or shofar shaped symbols. The mahpakh
is a V on the side and the munach is also a V shape with a right angle.
The old books call them shofar-mahpakh and shofar-munach.

In the 21 books the munach symbol and name are used today for three
different meshar'tim. Just look at a listing of shemot hat'amim (Ashkenaz)
and you will see the word munach repeated numerous times. Shouldn't
once be sufficient as it is for the other t'amim? In days of yore there
were shofar-munach, shofar-'ilui and shofar-karbolta. They are all
meshar'tim and therefore mechab'rim. They are used before different
t'amim mafsikim and would seem to indicate the different introductory
tunes for different t'amim.

Just as an example, when we today see two "munachim" in a row, such as
before etnachta or zarka, the first is a munach and the second is an
'ilui.

And let's not forget that I have not written here about the l'garmei
which is a mafsik that includes the munach symbol and thus looks the
same as the other three.

If any of you wanted to know the important facts above or anything
at all about this uncommon subject, you would be on the mesorah list
where peculiar people discuss weird subjects and weird people discuss
peculiar subjects..

K"T,
David

I honestly feel privileged to again engage in conversation with R'DBannett
on Avodah. That said...

> If any of you wanted to know the important facts above or anything at
> all about this uncommon subject, you would be on the mesorah list where
> peculiar people discuss weird subjects and weird people discuss peculiar
> subjects..

...I would have suggested he post any reply re these matters to Mesorah,
but I guess he's implying that he's neither peculiar nor wierd. In any
case, ....

> Concerning then separation of words in l'khol chai ratzon, R'Michael
> Poppers wrote that the ta'am munach is a mafsik in sifrei Eme"t. AFAIK
> this is not so. Although Ta'amei Eme"t is a field I've never really
> delved into in detail, all sources with which I'm familiar state that
> the Munach is a mesharet and mechaber.

Heidenheim would agree with you, Rabbi EMTeitz would not agree with you,
and, IMHO, there are so many p'sukim in Saifer T'hilim which make sense
only if (in Rabbi Teitz's words) the munach is a "minor mafsik" that I'd
much rather hear RDB defend the Heidenheim viewpoint than be somaich on
"familiar sources."

> It [the tipcha] is a mesharet, not as in the 21 sefarim. but its
> symbol is different from that of the dechi because the dechi, a mafsik,
> is always written before the word and not on the accented syllable.

To repeat what I said in RDB terms, its symbol is different from that of
the d'chi just as the symbol for the mahpach is different from that of
the y'siv. Perhaps RDB can explain on Mesorah precisely what he meant by
"its symbol is different," since the two look the same in recent-vintage
prints.

> BTW there is a fairly rare mesharet in he 21 books that looks like a
> tipcha but it ain't. It is the m'aila, a.k.a. 'ilui-m'aila, and appeared
> last shabbat in shishi: l'doroteikhem

Good point. The m'sora on that word says that there are five instances
of this rare bird, and I think it's saying that they all appear on words
which are also denoted with a sof-pasuk, which would help reveal its
presence to us grasshoppers.

> As to the query on the term shofar...

Hey, it was just a thought, given what the shoresh of "munach" implies.

All the best from
Michael Poppers * Elizabeth, NJ

I just came across a rather pretty problem.  I don't think there's a
solution, but the problem itself is interesting (to textualists, anyway)

Are the Torah brachot in the morning two or three?  Should one say Amen
after "laasok bedivrei Torah?"

The basic gemara which mandates them is kind of ambiguous (Brachot 11b).

Shmuel said AKB"V laasok bedivrei Torah.
R' Yochanan would finish "vehaarev...BAH melamad tora l'amo yisrael"
R' Hamnuna said "asher bachar banu...BAH notein hatorah"
R' Hamnuna said this is the highest of the brachot, therefore we should
say all of them.

Now, part of the problem is what does it mean "R Yochanan would finish".
Another part is what does "all of them" mean.  Looking at it myself,
I would say that pshat is that each would say one bracha, starting
with BAH EMH.  Shmuel would finish his way, RY would finish his way,
RH would finish his way.  That's what I get from "finish".  And "all
of them" implies more than just "both" - leading to three brachot.

What do the Rishonim say?  Rashi sees "finish" as "would add to what
Shmuel said", rather than "instead of Shmuel's way of finishing the
bracha after BAH EMH".  Rambam (Hil Tefillah 6?), Rashba citing Maor,
Avudraham, all see three brachot (those were RY Emden's citations). 
Tosfos (Brachot 46a d"h col habrachot) holds that it's two brachot.  

Now we get into the girsa problems.  The Rif has a girsa that attributes
the "say all of them" to Rav Papa - but that's not crucial for the 2/3 
question.  Rosh claims that R' Tam had a different girsa that had R'
Papa saying "therefore let us say *both* of them."

The Mishna Brura holds that it's two, and claims that this is the opinion
of "rov haacharonim", citing three, including Magen Avraham.  But RY Emden
holds that it's 3 brachot, and mandates saying amen between 1 and 2.  He
also says that the Arizal held the same way, despite the vav-conjunction
in v'haarev.  The Mechaber doesn't seem to take a position one way or the
other.

It seems, then, that this was a machloket at least as far back as the
savoraim, if there really are two girsaot (tarvayyhu vs. culhu), or
even as far back as the tannaim - which do you say, one or two or three?

And if the MB is right that "rov haacharonim" hold that it's two, while
from my brief look most of the rishonim hold that it's three, why would
there have been a shift from three to two?

Fortunately, there isn't a big problem in practice - most shuls don't
say the torah brachot aloud.  But it's an interesting problem.

Any thoughts?

      Jonathan Baker     |  Ehh, you Sivan Sinaitic revelation, you've
      jjbaker@panix.com  |  seen 'em all.
   Web page <http://www.panix.com/~jjbaker> Update: Rambam 13 Principles

Harry Maryles wrote:
> Discussion ensued as to whether the Torah should be adhered to even if there
> is no Schar VeOnesh. Obviously it is a higher standard to adhere to G-d's will
> because we know it is his will and not becuase we seek reward or fear
> punishment. Never-the less I maintain that there must be an undercurrent of
> reward and punishment for the willof G-d to be demonstarted.

From: gil.student@citicorp.com
>The Sefer HaIkkarim (1:10) says that any divine religion must have some 
>component of sechar ve'onesh, even if only spiritual...

>But I'm not convinced.  I could envision HKBH having given all of the 
>mitzvos as a chok so that we accept on ourselves His yoke. Performing those 
>mitzvos would not be rewarded and would not make us better people. 
>HKBH told us to do them and we are obligated to do so.  We could also invoke
>the Chovos HaLevavos's concept of hakaras hatov.  Without HKBH we would not
>be alive...  

>Of course, this is only an exercise in pilpul.  It is an ikar of our 
>emunah that there is sechar ve'onesh.

Yes, this is of course only a theoretical exercise because we know that
there exists Schar VeOnesh. But as such, the topic came up in yesterday's
Daf Yomi and RYGB pointed out that the Torah never speaks of any post
mortem reward. It only speaks of a worldly reward as in "Leman Yarichin
Yamecha" It is only the Gemarah which posits that it may be talking about
Olam Habah. If one were to take the Mikra K'Pshuto, one would not see any
reference to post mortem rewards. Of relevance to the theoretical issue
is the practical issues presented by one of the questions I asked: How
can one do Mitzvos strictly Me-Ahava? Since we know that Schar VeOnesh
exists it is impossible to separate the act from knowledge that it will
produce reward for a mitzvah and punishment for an Aveirah. Yet we say we
love G-d and we do his Mitzvos out of Hakaras Hatov and that this is the
higher level of service to G-d. I find it difficult if not impossible to
believe that anyone would do a single Mitzvah Bein Adam LaMokom, If G-d
would say that I'm telling you to do but you won't gain anything by it,
not corporeally or spiritually, not now, not ever. If you are saying
that there is ultimately some spiritual gain at some point, than you've
conceded "reward". I maintain that even if we do a Mitzvah Me-Ahava,
there still has to be some reward at some level or there is no reason
to do it at all.

I re-ask the question. Is there any reason to do a Mitzvah if there is
no reward or punishment?

Why bother.

HM

In a message dated 6/18/01 10:21:23am EDT, fish9999@012.net.il writes:
> The sources  for not delivering bad news are in Mo'ed Katan 20a Pesachim 3b
> and Yoreh De'ah 402:12. Stuart Fischman
 
By why only by death and not other cases as indicated by the gemora - perhaps 
it's more a mida tova than an issur?

KT
Joel

From: "Yosef Gavriel and Shoshanah M. Bechhofer" <sbechhof@casbah.acns.nwu.edu>
> Do other Machzorim besides the Machzor Rabbah change for Yomim Noro'im?

All the Ashkenaz machzorim that I have seen.

SBA

Harry Maryles wrote:
> .... the topic came up in yesterday's Daf Yomi...
>                  I asked: How can one do Mitzvos strictly Me-Ahava? Since we 
> know that Schar VeOnesh exists it is impossible to separate the act from 
> knowledge that it will produce reward for a mitzvah...

> I re-ask the question. Is there any reason to do a Mitzvah if there is
> no reward or punishment?

Why bother stopping at a STOP sign? Perhaps those are simply the rules
one must follow when living in a society that has such regulations. I
don't recall ever being rewarded for driving safely, other than being
alive and not being responsible for the death or injury of another. I
believe this may be what Antigonos wanted - do mitzvot "SheLo Al Menat
LeKabel Pras", as opposed to saying "Al Menat SheLo LeKabel Pras". His
language characterizes the ultimate perspective of becoming that person
who does mitzvot without needing the motivation of Sechar. "Al Menat Shelo
LeKabel Pras" would imply making a decision with each mitzvah to do it
in spite of the fact that we will receive no reward. If we were created
by HKBH for the specific reason that He wanted us to do His Mitzvot,
then that is our raison d'etre, not that life gives us opportunities to
accumulate Sechar. "Noach L'Adam SheLo Nivra".

Stuart Goldstein

Harry Maryles wrote:
> I re-ask the question. Is there any reason to do a Mitzvah if there is no
> reward or punishment?
     
There is a story about the Vilna Gaon that he wanted a special type of esrog and
there was only one person who could sell it to him.  The man was willing to give
it to the Vilna Gaon in exchange for any sechar mitzvah the Gaon got from the 
esrog.  The Gaon was very happy about this exchange because he could finally do 
a mitzvah without getting any reward.

> Why bother.

Hakaras hatov, kabalas ol malchus shamayim, idealism to do what is "right".
     
Gil Student

--- Stuart Goldstein <stugolden@hotmail.com> wrote:
> Why bother stopping at a STOP sign ? Perhaps those are simply the rules one 
> must follow when living in a society that has such regulations. I don't 
> recall ever being rewarded for driving safely, other than being alive and 
> not being responsible for the death or injury of another....

You ask why bother stopping at a stop sign? The obvious answer is that
there is a consequence to the action of stopping or not stopping. You
might hit someone or something, or you might get a traffic ticket.
This is why I specified Mitzvos Bein Adom L'Mokom. We can humanisticly
devise a system of rules to live by so that we can improve our physical
existence, both as an individual and as a society. The Mityzvos Bein
Adam L'Chavero are like that. There is a payoff, or "Schar" if you will.

My sense of the meaning of the Mishnah in Avos's directive to do Mitzvos
"SheLo Al Menat LeKabel Pras" is not one that excludes the knowledge of
Schar. it is that one should do Mitzvos because this is what G-d wants...
and we want G-d to love us which he will if we follow his Torah. That in
and of itself is "Pras" or Schar. But it is a higher level of Schar the
Pras that the Mishneh might be reffering to is the lower level of Schar
sort of a "tit for tat" type of Schar. I think the Mishneh means to tell
us that we should not have ulterior motives of some sort of "payoff"
even if that payoff is spritual. The mishneh is instead telling us
that Yes, there is Schar, but you don't know what the Schar is so don't
concern yourself with the "Scahr" aspect of your Mitzva., Instead put
your faith in Hashem's Love for Klal Israel and do the Mitzva MeAhava,
and the Schar will be forthcoming. It's kind of HaShem saying "Trust Me".

BUT, if there is absolutely no Schar at all I maintain that there is
absolutely no reason to comply with the Creator's demands. There will
be no consequences to eating cheeseburgers. As I said it is like G-d
saying do as I say and your acts will be inconsequential, as far as your
physical and spiritual welfare is concerned. It may be our raison d'etre,
but who cares! If I choose not to do it so what! My life will not be
improved thereby and neither will my afterlife. Otherwise it concedes
the existence of Schar VeOnesh.

I therefore must conclude that it is only logical to assume that there
is an undercurrent of reward and punishment inherent in every Mitzvah
and/or Aveirah mentioned in the Torah. We deduce this logically and we
don't need Chazal to tell us this. We would know it anyway.

HM

Harry Maryles replied:
> You ask why bother stopping at a stop sign? The obvious answer is that
> there is a consequence to the action of stopping or not stopping. You
> might hit someone or something, or you might get a traffic ticket.
> This is why I specified Mitzvos Bein Adom L'Mokom. We can humanisticly
> devise a system of rules to live by so that we can improve our physical
> existence, both as an individual and as a society. The Mityzvos Bein
> Adam L'Chavero are like that. There is a payoff, or "Schar" if you will.

<snip>

> Instead put your faith in Hashem's Love for Klal Israel and do the Mitzva
> MeAhava, and the Schar will be forthcoming. It's kind of HaShem saying
> "Trust Me".

> BUT, if there is absolutely no Schar at all I maintain that there is
> absolutely no reason to comply with the Creator's demands. There will
> be no consequences to eating cheeseburgers. As I said it is like G-d
> saying do as I say and your acts will be inconsequential, as far as your
> physical and spiritual welfare is concerned. It may be our raison d'etre,
> but who cares! If I choose not to do it so what! My life will not be
> improved thereby and neither will my afterlife. Otherwise it concedes
> the existence of Schar VeOnesh.

I therefore must conclude that it is only logical to assume that there
is an undercurrent of reward and punishment inherent in every Mitzvah
and/or Aveirah mentioned in the Torah. We deduce this logically and we
don't need Chazal to tell us this. We would know it anyway.

I feel like we're beating a dead horse here but all your "so what ?" and
"who cares ?" remarks are pushing my buttons.

A "consequence" does not necessarily translate into reward. Highway
regulations may seem like Bain Adam L'Chaveiro but in a perfect Jewish
world, w/o Shibud Malchiot or distractions, the Torah would be our Tax
Code, Penal Code and Uniform Commercial Code, all rolled up into one. If
2 witnesses saw you eat a cheeseburger, they would shlep you into Beit
Din, who would administer the proper punishment. Aha ! Punishment, not
as an Onesh but as a consequence of what you did. It is only because
we don't have any "Gott's Polizei" around to enforce the law, that
you so cavalierly claim that you need not care about mitzvot without
some clearer message about what's in it for you. OTOH, the absence
of a specific reward for one's behavior does not make that behavior
inconsequential. WADR to RYGB's take on the communal nature of the
Torah's directives, we find clear references in the Torah to Mitzvah
Goreret Mitzvah (Shiluach HaKan==>Maakeh==>Kilai-Kerem==>etc), which
seems at least to imply that a good deed has consequences, even for the
individual. Even if you characterized that as Schar Mitzvah Mitzvah,
I believe it still qualifies as non-compensatory Schar.

Not to limit ourselves with Taamei HaMitzvot, but if the problem with
a cheeseburger is Timtum HaLev, then shouldn't you keep Kashrut so as
not to be negatively affected ? Your mother's promise of ice cream if
you eat your vegetables does not mean that the only good thing about
eating vegetables is the ice cream that follows. Granted, "Ratzah HKBH
L'Zakot Et Yisrael" and therefore we have 613 mitzvot instead of 25,
so as to accumulate Schar. But I think we subscribe to the belief that
mitzvot are good for you. The fact that society could also devise an
equivalent set of laws that benefited the individual and the Tzibur is
not relevant. Societies such as 1930's Germany developed just such a
set of laws for themselves. Besides, the Torah was here first.

Stuart Goldstein

I think RGS well established from mekoros what I suggested based on a
web of li nir'eh philosophizing.

If the person actually had nothing to gain, then HKBH wouldn't have
commanded it. Not that sechar is for a mitzvah, but that a mitzvah is
instructions about how one is capable of getting sechar.

The metaphor of stopping for a red light is apt. The law exists for our
own benefit -- if it didn't reduce risk of an accident, they wouldn't
make us stop for street lights.

The metaphor does have limits, though.

The key to getting sechar is to live up to being a demus E-lokim.
Doing the right thing in order to get the effects thereof isn't vehalachta
bidrachav. Unlike traffic lights, part of the "act" being prescribed is
an attitude. And therefore lo lishmah doesn't work as well, as acting
lishmah and letting HKBH worry about the results.

So, to answer RHM: If there was no sechar, there would be no mitzvah
about which to ask your question. However, if one does it /for/ the
sechar, one gets less sechar.



On Mon, Jun 18, 2001 at 11:59:23AM -0400, gil.student@citicorp.com asked
me in a related thread:
:> Onesh without teshuvah means that the person's yeitzer hara for the thing
:> is the same as it always was.
:> So in what sense is the blemish gone?

: Your assumption is that the person's yeitzer hara is the blemish.
: Since when is having a yeitzer hara a bad thing?

Rest assured that I agree that having a Y"H is a good thing.

However, my assumption is that having one's "bechirah point" (to use R'
Aryeh Carmell's terminology for REED's model) closer to na'aseh lo kiheter
is at least part of the pegam of the aveirah. If not definitionally
that pegam in its entirety -- with the inclination toward the cheit being
the cause of the onesh.

-mi

-- 
Micha Berger                     Time flies...
micha@aishdas.org                        ... but you're the pilot.
http://www.aishdas.org       		    - R' Zelig Pliskin
(973) 916-0287               

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