Avodah Mailing List

Volume 05 : Number 067

Wednesday, June 14 2000

• Re: pasul mezuzah (was Ta'am and taste)
• Re: Telzer Derech
• Ta'am and taste
• Re: Ta'am and taste
• Re: pasul mezuzah (was Ta'am and taste)
• RE: pasul mezuzah (was Ta'am and taste)
• Re: Adam Before And After The Chet
• Re: Telzer Derech
• Re: pasul mezuzah (was Ta'am and taste)
• Adam Before And After The Chet
• Re: Adam Before And After The Chet
• Mezuzah - ones
• Re: Mezuzah - ones
• Re: Mezuzah - ones
• Re: Mezuzah - ones
• Re: Telzer Derech
• Re: velo yera'eh becha ervat davar
• Re: Ex Nihilo
• Re: pasul mezuzah (was Ta'am and taste)
• Re: Yesh koach b'yad chachamim
• Re: Telzer Derech
• Re: Telzer Derech
• Re: Mezuzah - ones
• Da'as and Da'as Torah (was Re: Telzer Derech)
• Re: Telzer Derech

From: Micha Berger <micha@aishdas.org>
: Say I hang a mezuzah, check it as required, etc... all the halachos are
: followed. However, a letter happens to crack off of the mezuzah in the second
: year after being last checked. Lima'aseh what I did and experienced until the
: next time it's checked is identical to what would have been had the mezuzah
: stayed kosher. From the perspective I have been pushing, there should be no
: difference between a mezuzah that physically is kosher and one in which I
: permissably relied on a chezkas kashrus.

On a related topic, R'SZ Auerbach was once asked by someone who, after
having his tefilin checked, discovered that they haven't been kosher for
years  (and, therefore, this person had gone several years without
performing the mitzva of tefilin.)

To make this fellow feel better, RSZA showed him the Shu"t Rav Poalim (4:2)
which says that, since he thought all this time that he was wearing kosher
tefilin, and the mistake was an onais, it's as if he performed the mitzva.
(L'chorah, the same reasoning should apply to the pasul mezuzah, except
perhaps the segulah aspect.)

RSZA also told him that from now on, he should wear his tefilin for an extra
amount of time after davening, while learning (and if he didn't want to do
this b'rabim, he should wear only the shel yad during this extra time)	

FWIW, RSZA also says that, nowadays (since tefilin are made b'hidur), one
should not have his tefilin checked without a specific reason.  (Usually, it
is the opening and closing of the batim that cause the most problems.) The
same thing applies to mezuzas that are placed securely "inside" doorposts.  

KT
Aryeh

In a message dated 6/13/00 6:37:41 AM, micha@aishdas.org writes:
> The "mechanics" are all internal to the self. Self-perfection leads to
> perception of HKBH's "yad" -- d'veikus is a product of sheleimus.

Therefore, I take it, the "mechanics," while internal to the self, cannot
be the expression of an internal "da'as." If they were, your paradigm fails.

So, where does the internal da'as stop and the mechanics begin?

David Finch

	I can not really claim to understand this whole idea of Existential
Association in regards to ta'am, but I believe there is a machlokes achronim
how bittul b'shishim works. The Pri Chadash I believe holds that the issur
nehepach l'heter while other achronim understand it to mean that the issur
becomes insignificant an no  longer chashuv. 

	Michah wrote :
> If we were discussing something with mamashus, it would be batul bishishim,
> bitul birov is an understatement.

	I am not sure what was meant by that statement. In general bittul
birov applies to min b'mino and to min b'sheino mino by davar yavesh.
M'dirabanan they were gozeir on min b'sheino mino even by davar yavesh that
you need shishim.

On Tue, Jun 13, 2000 at 10:10:47AM -0400, Markowitz, Chaim wrote:
: 	I can not really claim to understand this whole idea of Existential
: Association in regards to ta'am...

Please let me try to explain again, as I'm enamored of this particular
chiddush. (Perhaps because it's so outrageous, and yet explains so much of
the halachah.) I have a problem communicating in that I tend to fall into
the wrong jargon for the audience I'm speaking to. So let me translate
"Experiential Association" (EA) into yeshivish...


My premise is that ta'am can't be a question of measuring the quantity of
meat left on the keli. Microscopic amounts would be bittul regardless of
which mechanism of bittul applies -- be the item yaveish or lach, of the
same min as the new item (e.g. a pot traif from cheilev now being used for
shuman) or not, be the question d'Oraisa or diRabbanan. We're talking parts
per million -- there's no need to discuss whether one needs rov or shishim.

I apologize if that lack of need to attend to details caused a lack of
precision in my email, and subsequently caused further confusion.

:                             The Pri Chadash I believe holds that the issur
: nehepach l'heter while other achronim understand it to mean that the issur
: becomes insignificant an no longer chashuv. 

This whole approach would suggest that there's not much difference between
the two. Halachah deals with man's perception, not physics. The issur is on
the chashivus, not on the substance itself.

Which is why, in the case of 9 chaniyos, it's also possible for issur to
evaporate. There is no chashivus to the mi'ut, therefore there is nothing
for the issur to apply to.

OTOH, the same principle could create issurim where the physics wouldn't
expect us to find one. As I said above, the physics of the pot would not
warrant an issur of basar bichalav if it were used to boil milk. However,
part of my current perception of the pot is my history with it. The
influence of that history on how I currently think of what I'm doing
I called EA.

(In the case where someone else used the pot for meat, halachah holds me
accountable for not learning of that experience when I could have.)

Bittul would apply to most cases of quantities so small only because they
lack chashivus. But here we have EA giving it chashivus. I'm reminded
of that quantity when I use the pot. Just as I'm reminded of a mi'ut (or
1/60th) if I can directly experience it by tasting it. In both cases,
I'm still perceiving the item, and so an issur still exists.


In the begining of this discussion, I suggested as an aside that "ta'am"
here meant what it does in "ta'am hamitzvah", but I didn't explain myself.
"Ta'am" can mean a nuance to an idea. I was offering that perhaps in our
case the "ta'am" of meat was that I had a notion about meat while cooking
the milchig.

-mi

-- 
Micha Berger (973) 916-0287          MMG"H for 12-Jun-00: Levi, Nasso
micha@aishdas.org                                         A"H 
http://www.aishdas.org                                    Yuma 20b
For a mitzvah is a lamp, and the Torah its light.         

On 13 Jun 2000, at 9:47, Stein, Aryeh E. wrote:

> FWIW, RSZA also says that, nowadays (since tefilin are made b'hidur), one
> should not have his tefilin checked without a specific reason.  (Usually, it
> is the opening and closing of the batim that cause the most problems.) The
> same thing applies to mezuzas that are placed securely "inside" doorposts.  

At all? What happens to SA YD that says you should have tfillin 
checked twice in seven years?

-- Carl

Please daven and learn for a Refuah Shleima for my son,
Baruch Yosef ben Adina Batya among the sick of Israel.
Thank you very much.

From: Carl M. Sherer [mailto:cmsherer@ssgslaw.co.il]
: At all? What happens to SA YD that says you should have tfillin 
: checked twice in seven years?

At all.  To quote: "'Ain nohagin' to check tefilin that are made nowadays
'b'hidur' without a 'sibah m'yuchedes.'"  "Even though the poskim (siman 39,
sif 10, Mishnah Brura 27) write that it is proper to check tefilin even if
they have a chezkas kashrus, because they can often get damaged due to
sweat, nevertheless, with respect to our tefilin nowadays that are made
b'hidur there is no such worry, and on the contrary, usually most problems
arise after opening up the tefilin...."

KT
Aryeh

RD Finch wrote:
> Tell me what you mean by Adam's lack of "internal compunction to sin." You 
> appear to be saying that Adam had no temptation to sin, but, in your words, 
> could be "externally induced" -- i.e., forced -- to sin. 

No, not forced. but he could make a rational decision to sin based on
misinformation. The Arizal said that Adam's sin was an aveirah lishmah.
He thought that he could make more of a tikkun by refraining from sinning
if he had a yetzer hara so he intentionally ate from the tree. However,
he did not understand the power of a yetzer hara and therefore made a wrong
yet rational decision.

Gil Student
gil.student@citicorp.com

In a message dated 6/13/00 6:37:41 AM, I wrote:
:> The "mechanics" are all internal to the self. Self-perfection leads to
:> perception of HKBH's "yad" -- d'veikus is a product of sheleimus.

On Tue, Jun 13, 2000 at 09:51:37AM -0400, DFinchPC@aol.com replied:
: Therefore, I take it, the "mechanics," while internal to the self, cannot
: be the expression of an internal "da'as." If they were, your paradigm fails.

I'm not sure what you mean.  A person could make the conscious choice to "make
His Will your will". That choice involves da'as, and yet involves changing
one's psycho-spiritual stance -- what I called "the 'mechanics'" above.

My point was that this is consistant with the Gr"a who took the sheleimus
side of the "fork in the road". Therefore, to him, striving for ruach hakodesh
could be understood in terms of bringing the proper internal relationship
between various parts of the self.

Since the only part/aspect of the self on can control is the ruach, it means
"moving" the ruach so that it overlaps the neshamah. A notion I used earlier
as a definition of "kedushah".

The means of doing this is explained quite clearly in Michtav Mei'Eliyahu.
One's bechirah point moves with each ma'aseh. If one does a mitzvah, then
one is more predisposed to do future mitzvos. And, G-d forbid, the reverse
for Aveiros. REED assumes there that bechirah is the ability to make a
*conscious* choice. Consciousness is a feature of the ruach -- one's self
awareness. Or, as the Maharal put it, our connection to the universe in which
one has a relationship with oneself.

So, acts of ruchnius or gashmius bring the ruach in line with the neshamah
or nefesh, respectively.

The Michtav Mei'Eliyahu speaks of someone who r"l does an aveirah so many times
that he now doesn't even require a conscious struggle to do it again. This
was the image I was trying to invoke earlier, when I suggested that taharah
and tum'ah speak of the purity (lit translation of "tahor") or adulteration
of the ru'ach. A man who no longer has to think before acting on some ta'avah
of his nefesh short-circuited the ruach. He *adulterated* his decision-making
process with an element of the nefesh.

This notion also fits RYBS's notion of the effects of aveirah -- the
transition from nosei to nisa, from subject to object. (See our chaver's
R' Arnie Lustiger's seifer on RYBS on Yamim Nora'im.) And the removal
of this effect -- "lifnei Hashem tit'haru".

Taharah, if defined as purity of the ruach, is tautologically the ability
to act as a nosei.

All this is internal "mechanics", but since one can most directly change
one's conscious choices, they all involve changing one's da'as tachton.

The connection between da'as tachton and ruach is also seen in the Maharal.
The Maharal, as I mentioned above, defines the ruach as man's connection to
the world in which he relates to himself. He also writes that the pillar of
Torah is the means of perfecting that relationship; Torah is the means to
develop one's ruach. And da'as Torah is da'as tachtonis brought in congruence
(through yichud hayodei'ah vihayadu'a) to da'as elyonah.

-mi

-- 
Micha Berger (973) 916-0287          MMG"H for 12-Jun-00: Levi, Nasso
micha@aishdas.org                                         A"H 
http://www.aishdas.org                                    Yuma 20b
For a mitzvah is a lamp, and the Torah its light.         

In a message dated 6/13/00 10:12:09 AM Eastern Daylight Time, aes@ll-f.com 
writes:
: FWIW, RSZA also says that, nowadays (since tefilin are made b'hidur), one
: should not have his tefilin checked without a specific reason....      The
: same thing applies to mezuzas that are placed securely "inside" doorposts.  

Are these positions generally accepted L'maaseh by the rov am?

KT
Joel Rich

In a message dated 6/13/00 9:02:41 AM US Central Standard Time, 
Gil.Student@citicorp.com writes:
> The Arizal said that Adam's sin was an aveirah lishmah. He thought that he
> could make more of a tikkun by refraining from sinning if he had a yetzer
> hara so he intentionally ate from the tree. However, he did not understand
> the power of a yetzer hara and therefore made a wrong yet rational decision.

This I don't understand. How can one benevolently choose to acquire a yetzer 
hara so that refraining from sinning would be more of a tikkun? Logically and 
by definition, a yetzer hara (of whatever degree of "power") can't be a real 
yetzer hara if selected for well-meaning purposes. It's the heart we're 
talking about, not the head. Anyhow, yetzer hara is immaterial to the issue 
of whether a sin has been committed. So is the issue of "rationality," 
whatever that might mean in this context.

David Finch

On Tue, Jun 13, 2000 at 01:48:04PM -0400, DFinchPC@aol.com wrote:
:                          How can one benevolently choose to acquire a yetzer 
: hara so that refraining from sinning would be more of a tikkun? Logically and 
: by definition, a yetzer hara (of whatever degree of "power") can't be a real 
: yetzer hara if selected for well-meaning purposes.

No, it would be that the selection isn't necessarily an aveirah, or more
likely, that choosing to have a yeitzer hara was an aveira lishmah. It doesn't
mean that the yeitzer hara itself wouldn't then drive one to do aveiros.

You seem to be confusing the nature of the process of acquisition with the
nature of the thing acquired.

-mi

>>>since he thought all this time that he was wearing kosher tefilin, and
the mistake was an onais, it's as if he performed the mitzva<<<

Ones is a ptur onshin - it cannot turn a lack of action into an action (I think
there is a Yerushalmi that says this but I don't have the exact mareh makom).

RC Brown wrote:
> Ones is a ptur onshin - it cannot turn a lack of action into an action (I
> think there is a Yerushalmi that says this but I don't have the exact mareh
> makom).

That is a machlokes acharonim.  I believe that R. Elchonon Wasserman on the
beginning of Kesuvos and Reb Chaim disagree over whether one has a ma'aseh
aveirah or not.

Gil Student
gil.student@citicorp.com

>>>I believe that R. Elchonon Wasserman on the beginning of Kesuvos and Reb
Chaim disagree over whether one has a ma'aseh aveirah or not.<<<

That is an issue of issurim - is a ma'aseh aveira b'ones considered as if
no action was done, or is at a ma'aseh aveira with a ptur. Either way you
acted and now want to reverse the course.

My point was that ones can never turn a lack of action into an action.

In a message dated 6/13/00 2:23:51 PM Eastern Daylight Time,
C1A1Brown@aol.com writes:
> Ones is a ptur onshin - it cannot turn a lack of action into an action (I
> think there is a Yerushalmi that says this but I don't have the exact mareh
> makom).

IIRC the Mokor of the Shut Rav P'olim is the Mishne in Kiddushin 66b about a
Possul who did the Avoda, from "Boreich Hashem Cheiloi".

Kol Tuv

Yitzchok Zirkind

[I'm merging two emails from the same person on the same subject. -mi]

In a message dated 6/13/00 9:54:09 AM US Central Standard Time,
micha@aishdas.org writes:
> I'm not sure what you mean.  A person could make the conscious choice to
> "make His Will your will". That choice involves da'as, and yet involves
> changing one's psycho-spiritual stance -- what I called "the 'mechanics'"
> above.

I understand. But don't you have a boot-strapping problem here? How does the
conscious choice to make HaShem Will one's own change the nature of one's
"psycho-spiritual" stance? Through what pre-existing mechanism does one
acquire Divine spiritual mechanics? It's like a job-listing that says,
"Experience Required." How does one get experience without experience?


In a message dated 6/13/00 11:54:04 AM US Central Standard Time,
micha@aishdas.org writes:
: No, it would be that the selection isn't necessarily an aveirah, or more
: likely, that choosing to have a yeitzer hara was an aveira lishmah. It
: doesn't mean that the yeitzer hara itself wouldn't then drive one to do
: aveiros.

Let me rephrase my point: One simply cannot *choose* to have a yeitzer hara
in a well-meaning effort to please G-d. The choice to please G-d is itself a
choice to have a clean heart. One certainly can be misinformed in acting out
such a choice, and that misinformation may lead one to sin. One's whole life
can be a collection of sins based on sublime motives. But that means only
that the motive, or mental state of being, is irrelevant. It has nothing to
do with causation of sin.

While accidental sin happens all the time, such sin can't be the storyline of
the Chet. That would make the Chet pointless, or almost pointless. Eating the
forbidden fruit in defiance of G-d's command: that's a lesson, a story!
Eating the forbidden fruit in well-meaning ignorance of G-d's command, well,
what's the moral of the story? That one has to be smart in order to be good?

David Finch

Yitzchok Zirkind writes
>>> Torah was Kadma Alpayim Shana Lolom, in it already said Vloi Yeiroeh
>>> Bicha Ervas Davar

R. sadya n targum <targum1@juno.com>  wrote:
>>         Where is this posuk which says "vlo yeiroeh"?

In a message dated 6/11/00 5:26:04 PM Eastern Daylight Time,
ysh@mindspring.com writes:
>  See Devarim 23:15

Actualy RST I stand corrected it says "vlo *Yireh*"

Kol Tuv
Yitzchok Zirkind

In a message dated 6/12/00 1:42:45 PM Eastern Daylight Time,
Gil.Student@citicorp.com writes:
> I believe that the Rambam in Shemoneh Perakim also says that the requirements
> for nevu'ah (ashir, anav, gibor, and chacham) are not absolute requirements
> but the more prepared one is for nevu'ah, the clearer the nevu'ah.

See Hil. Yesodei Hatora 7:1 and Kesef MIshne.

Kol Tuv

Yitzchok Zirkind

OTOH there are many that are Mdakdeik to check Tfilin and Mezuzohs yearly
preferably in Elul.

Kol Tuv
Yitzchok Zirkind

In a message dated 6/12/00 2:17:37 PM Eastern Daylight Time,
C1A1Brown@aol.com writes:
> R' Akiva Eiger in Hil Nesiyas Kapayim (Y"T was a good chance to chazer it)
>  writes that a kohein who is pasul m'derabbanan should exit the shul before
>  nesiyas kapayim bec. even though yesh koach b'yad chachamim to be oiker
>  the mitzva of duchening, the kohein would still be oiver an aseh b'ones.
>  Two chiddushim: 1)yesh koach works even on an issur aseh 2) if you rely on
>  yesh koach b'yad chachamim you are stil oiver the aseh, albeit b'ones.
>

AIUI he doesn't rule that the Kohein must leave, he explains why the Bach
needed to use the permision to stay "because the Shatz doesn't have him in
mind when he calls Kohanim", and not just say because Yesh Koach.

>  (Possible precedent for #1 would be Tos. kashe in Yevamos 90 by tzitzis =
>  an issur aseh to wear a beged of 4 corners without tzitzis?)

In the case of Tzitzis Tos. asks why it is a Shev Val Ta'aseh not an Oveir
Byodayim (by donning the 4 cornered garment), in our case it is a simple Shev
Val Ta'aseh, (like Shofar Lulov and even Maaseir B'heimoh).


Kol Tuv

Yitzchok Zirkind

On Tue, Jun 13, 2000 at 03:12:05PM -0400, DFinchPC@aol.com wrote:
:               But don't you have a boot-strapping problem here? How does the
: conscious choice to make HaShem Will one's own change the nature of one's
: "psycho-spiritual" stance?

There is no "how does A cause B" -- the two are equivalent statements, A is B.
Choosing to follow "Ratzon" haBorei is a change in stance. It's a decision
made with one's mind and soul, so I called it a "psycho-spiritual change" of
stance.

:                            Through what pre-existing mechanism does one
: acquire Divine spiritual mechanics?

You. Your free will is innate to being a human soul. There is nothing to
acquire.

: Let me rephrase my point: One simply cannot *choose* to have a yeitzer hara
: in a well-meaning effort to please G-d. The choice to please G-d is itself a
: choice to have a clean heart.

No, it's a choice to do a single, albeit very major, well-intended thing.
A single choice, even if it's the best possible choice for the situation,
does not equate to human perfection. Adam made such a choice. You're arguing
that he therefore could not have a drive that was imperfect. I don't see it.

:                                                             One's whole life
: can be a collection of sins based on sublime motives. But that means only
: that the motive, or mental state of being, is irrelevant. It has nothing to
: do with causation of sin.

We've discussed "aveirah lishmah" here a number of times. I don't know
whether it's included in the concept you're labeling "sin" because I'm not
sure enough of your choice of English terminology.

-mi

-- 
Micha Berger (973) 916-0287          MMG"H for 12-Jun-00: Levi, Nasso
micha@aishdas.org                                         A"H 
http://www.aishdas.org                                    Yuma 20b
For a mitzvah is a lamp, and the Torah its light.         

In a message dated 6/13/00 1:52:13 PM US Central Standard Time, 
micha@aishdas.org writes:
>:                                                             One's whole life
>: can be a collection of sins based on sublime motives. But that means only
>: that the motive, or mental state of being, is irrelevant. It has nothing to
>: do with causation of sin.
 
> We've discussed "aveirah lishmah" here a number of times. I don't know
> whether it's included in the concept you're labeling "sin" because I'm not
> sure enough of your choice of English terminology.

I can't comment on aveirah lishmah directly, because I'm sort of confused
by the concept. By "sin" I simply mean aveirah, i.e., transgression.

I'm more comfortable trying to look at all of this through R'Israel Salanter's
dichotomy between kibbush ha-yetzer and tikkun ha-yetzer. Maybe we could
throw in another factor (creating a trichotomy, if there is such a thing): the
notion that Torah itself is an antidote to yetzer ha-ra. (See Kiddushin 30b.)

I'll admit that to me its a difficult jumble to unravel, but I've gotten this
far: The sin itself is unimportant. The origin of the sin is important only to
the extent that we know how to combat it: through disciplined force of will
(kibbush ha-yetzer), through transactional spirituality (tikkun ha-yetzer),
or through the discipline of hard-core learning itself (Kiddushin 30b). The
point of the analysis is in the cure, not the etiology.

David Finch

: IIRC the Mokor of the Shut Rav P'olim is the Mishne in Kiddushin 66b about a
: Possul who did the Avoda, from "Boreich Hashem Cheiloi".

Isn't that is a special gezeiras hakasuv by avodah? 

 I was connecting the question to whether we say 'ones k'man d'avid' - pashut
pshat is not, though the Ran discusses it in 25 in dapi haRif in Kiddushin,
also R' Elchanan in the beg. of Kesubos like Gil pointed out, also others.

From: Micha Berger <micha@aishdas.org>
| Da'as tachton is therefore man's da'as, da'as elyon is the cosmic da'as,
| the expression of Hashem's "Da'as" through which our da'as, and everything
| intelligable in creation, exists. There is only one da'as elyon, but there's
| at least one da'as tachton per person.

Not quite. By Mekkubalim, DT is each individual's process of combining chochma
and bimo - the "chibbur" that "yoda" alludes to also in the procreational act;
DE is the same individual's next step, the Da'as that Rshi, on Betzalel,
describes as Ruach Ha'Kodesh.

Yosef Gavriel Bechhofer
http://www.aishdas.org/baistefila    ygb@aishdas.org

On Tue, Jun 13, 2000 at 04:54:30PM -0400, DFinchPC@aol.com wrote:
:>:                                                            One's whole life
:>: can be a collection of sins based on sublime motives. But that means only
:>: that the motive, or mental state of being, is irrelevant. It has nothing to
:>: do with causation of sin.

:> We've discussed "aveirah lishmah" here a number of times. I don't know
:> whether it's included in the concept you're labeling "sin" because I'm not
:> sure enough of your choice of English terminology.

What I means was that if the lishmah outweighs the aveirah, so that the
benefit outweighs the cost, it might not qualify as a sin in the sense of
making the wrong choice.

: I'm more comfortable trying to look at all of this through R'Israel Salanter's
: dichotomy between kibbush ha-yetzer and tikkun ha-yetzer. Maybe we could
: throw in another factor (creating a trichotomy, if there is such a thing): the
: notion that Torah itself is an antidote to yetzer ha-ra. (See Kiddushin 30b.)

AIUI, R' Yisrael sees Torah as the means by which one is koveish or misakein
ones yeitzer. (BTW, note the difference between kibbush vs tikkun hayeitzer
vs Freud's suppression vs sublimation.) So I'd stick to the dichotomy.

: I'll admit that to me its a difficult jumble to unravel, but I've gotten this
: far: The sin itself is unimportant. The origin of the sin is important only to
: the extent that we know how to combat it: through disciplined force of will
: (kibbush ha-yetzer), through transactional spirituality (tikkun ha-yetzer)...
: The point of the analysis is in the cure, not the etiology.

Agreed. But "sublime motives" aren't to be cured. One's goal therefore
addresses a later point -- finding ways the yeitzer hatov can reach the
same goals without crossing the line of halachah.

Tangent:

Aveirah means to cross over, it's a statement about breaking the rules of
halachah. RSRH see cheit as a related root to chatah (with a final hei),
to stir coals (c.f. Shabbos 3:1). Cheit is removing one's soul (I'm using
the English to be intentionally ambiguous and avoid Naran issues) from the
fires of aishdas. It's a statement about "disease". Avon is to get fat,
complacent and insensitive -- a different kind of disease than cheit.

I think this is why we speak of an "aveirah lishmah" using the word aveirah
in particular.

Your earlier statement was:
: Tell me what you mean by Adam's lack of "internal compunction to sin." You
: appear to be saying that Adam had no temptation to sin, but, in your words,
: could be "externally induced" -- i.e., forced -- to sin.

One way of breaking out of your "i.e., forced" is the route we're discussing,
the aveirah lishmah. However, unlike the Ari, the Rambam seems to suggest
the more classical shogeig, which includes mis'aseik since we are not in the
inyan of melachah. Making a mistake -- in the Rambam's terms, confusing a
falsehood for truth. This is a machlokes. We don't necessarily need to get
both opinions to fuse.

-mi

-- 
Micha Berger (973) 916-0287          MMG"H for 12-Jun-00: Levi, Nasso
micha@aishdas.org                                         A"H 
http://www.aishdas.org                                    Yuma 20b
For a mitzvah is a lamp, and the Torah its light.         

********************


[ Distributed to the Avodah mailing list, digested version.                   ]
[ To post: mail to avodah@aishdas.org                                         ]
[ For back issues: mail "get avodah-digest vXX.nYYY" to majordomo@aishdas.org ]
[ or, the archive can be found at http://www.aishdas.org/avodah/              ]
[ For general requests: mail the word "help" to majordomo@aishdas.org         ]