Avodah Mailing List

Volume 01 : Number 049

Tuesday, September 15 1998

• Re: "Min"
• Re: "min" as acronym
• Re: "min" as acronym
• Re: "min" as acronym
• RE: panim hadashot -- women
• Re: "min" as acronym
• Re: Women reciting sheva berakhot
• Re: Rambam on Sanhedrin's overturning decisions
• halachah and science
• Re: Yeridas HaDoros
• Query - text of english torahs
• Yeridoh
• Rishonim/Acharonim and the Dor Shivi'ie
• Ki'basroi and Dwarves on Giants
• RE: panim hadashot -- women
• Disputing previous generations

Has anyone done a search of early Rabbinic literature that existed BCE to
determine if the word min appears?  My biased hunch is it does, but I'm
just a skeptic.



Interesting tidbit that I never knew until yesterday. The Darchei Teshuva
says that the word Min - often censored out of Shas because it connotes
Christians - is an acronym:

          *M*italmidei *Y*eshu Ha*N*otzri.

YGB:
> Interesting tidbit that I never knew until yesterday. The Darchei Teshuva
says that the word Min - often censored out of Shas because it connotes
Christians - is an acronym: *M*italmidei *Y*eshu Ha*N*otzri. <
My off-the-cuff reaction: see RaMBaM Hilchos T'Shuva 3 (halachah 6, or
close to it) -- some of his categories don't fit Christian belief (and
RaAVaD even disputes whether some of the do-fit-C-belief categories should
be cause for "ain lo chailek l'olam ha'boh").  Nevertheless, as you say,
"min" does connote a Christian -- e.g., consider the history of the birchas
tz'dukim, which was revived in some parts of the Jewish world as birchas
ha'minim (and whose text, as per Siddur Avodas Yisroel and certain
German-tradition congregations, still contains "v'chol haminim..." rather
than "v'chol horish'ah...").

My best wishes to all for a k'sivah v'chasimah tovah.

                                   Michael

I don't understand. Isn't the word the same as "min b'mino" and the like?
Maybe its possible that this evolved from "heretic" but it seems unlikely
at first glance.

Does anyone know the reason for minhag Chabad's not saying Slichos
after Tzom Gedalya?

On Thu, 10 Sep 1998, I wrote, in response to Gershon Dubin's question
"How about ponim chadoshos-do women qualify?"

> yes.

R YGB then noted:

>Uh, the Nimukei Yosef in Kesuvos, Pischei Teshuva EH 62:14 and Sova
>Semachos 1:7 say: No.

and Gershon then wrote:

>You need to **wait**  until I **ask** you for sources?

Sorry to keep you waiting.  It has been a while since I went through the
sugya in Ketubot.  Last night, I had a chance to refresh my memory.  I
admit I was surprised by R YGB's post.  To my eyes, it did not reflect
the sort of careful research that is his trademark.

As many are aware, the Gemara at the bottom of Ketubot 7b cites R.
Yehuda's view that birkot hatanim are recited during the first seven
days after the wedding only when there are "panim hadashot."  The
Rishonim present a multiplicity of views regarding who would qualify as
panim hadashot.  There is some disagreement whether panim hadashot
requires at least two people, whether panim hadashot must have been
absent from the ceremony as well as the seudah, whether absence from
only the previous day's seudah would be sufficient, and whether the
panim hadashot must actually eat in order for the berakhot to be
recited.  According to Ri, panim hadashot are people "she-marbim
bishvilam ha-simhah yoter."  This is consistent with the overall thrust
of the Rishonim that simhah is the defining element of panim hadashot.
There are also a variety of leniencies: According to Tosafot, the advent
of Shabbat itself qualifies as panim hadashot.  Some extend this to yom
tov.  Some say a devar Torah at seudah shelishit is sufficient as well.
Tosafot say that if there are panim hadashot at an evening meal, one
recites birkot hatanim at the meal the following day as well.  All of
these views are reflected in the Tur, Shulhan Arukh and nosei kelim.

R. YGB quotes the Nimukei Yosef's view that women are not considered
panim hadashot.  I believe that the originator of this view is Ritva who
writes that "even though she is hashuvah, there is no [status] of panim
hadashot except for one who is eligible to be counted among the ten
[adult males required] for birkot hatanim."  So far as I can tell, this
is virtually a da'at yahid.  Among Rishonim who define panim hadashot,
this view is not shared by:
Rashi,
Tosafot,
Rambam,
Ramban,
Rashba,
Ran,
Sefer ha-Arukh,
Talmidei Rabbenu Yonah,
Sefer ha-Ittur,
R Yitzhak Or Zarua,
Rosh,
Mordekhai and
Meiri.  Neither later Rishonim nor early Aharonim cite this view.  It is
not mentioned in the Tur, Shulhan Arukh or the classic nosei kelim.
Ritva's view is not even quoted for the purpose of rejecting it.
[Indeed, the editor of the critical edition of Ritva on Ketubot writes
in a footnote that he could find no one who shares this view.]

Apparently, the first Aharon to cite this Ritva is the author of the
work cited by the Pithei Teshuvah (which R. YGB cited in his post) the
Zekhor le-Avraham.  This work attributes the Ritva's view  to a "R.
Betzalel."  I admit that I do not know who wrote the Zekhor le-Avraham
or when.  Nor can I say I am familiar with the other work cited by R.
YGB, the Sova (could it be "Sovea"?)  Semahot.  Is it a work of pesak or
a yalkut?

I would certainly not criticize anyone who wishes to rely on a da'at
yahid in the Rishonim cited by a handful of obscure Aharonim.  For my
part, I feel comfortable relying on the overwhelming majority of
Rishonim and Aharonim whose defintion of panim hadashot does not include
being counted in a minyan.

Kol tuv,

Eli Clark

> I don't understand. Isn't the word the same as "min b'mino" and the like?
<
If you believe, as I do, in the special nature of Loshon HaKodesh, you
might not understand the relationship between similarly-spelled words, but
that wouldn't prevent you from positing, and perhaps even seeking, such a
relationship.  To continue the question, is there any relationship between
"min" with a 'yud' and "min" without a 'yud' (usually translated as
"from")?  "min," as used in the Torah, refers to a category of animate
matter; the "min" that YGB mentioned refers to a Jew who is considered to
have split himself off from the Jewish people, so one could say he was "min
[without a 'yud'] b'nai Yisroel."  I'm sure you can think of many such
relationships, and I encourage you to peruse the Torah commentary of Rav
Hirsch (who sought to reveal similarities between word roots in order to
gain an understanding of the text and the message) if you're interested in
the topic.

                                         Michael

Early last week  Gershon Dubin asked:
>	This is a weird situation.  However,   have you seen anywhere whether
>the sheva brochos (I know that you need a minyan,  but if you have a
>minyan) can be made by women?

I just came across a teshuvah in the third volume of ShuT Benei Banim on
the subject.  R. Henkin assumes that a woman cannot recite sheva
berakhot in the context of a minyan.  However, where no minyan is
present, and there are three (or more) women and fewer than three men,
he rules that a woman can recite asher bara.  (Asher bara does not
require a minyan.)  The ruling is premised on an earlier teshuvah of his
that, when there are fewer than three men present, the men may answer to
the zimmun of the women.
	
Also to reopen a related issue, I had asked R. YGB about berakhah
le-vatalah:
>> But what if two different people recite the same
>> berakha under the huppah?  The question turns on the precise status of
>> the sheva berakhot recited under the huppah.  If they are birkot shevah,
>> is it clear that each may be recited only once?  If so, why?

To which R. YGB replied:
>The berachos cannot be recited at will. Otherwise, the whole issue of
>panim chadashos at Sheva Berachos would be moot, plus, we could have all
>given out a lot more of those kibbudim at our Chasunas!

Of course sheva berakhot cannot be recited at will.  Of course panim
hadashot are required.  That is not the question.  The question is, in a
situation where the requirements for reciting the berakhot are met
(huppah/minyan/panim hadashot, etc.), is there some reason, other than
minhag (and a limit on kibbudim!), that each berakha is recited only
once?

>They actually are a chiyuv on the chosson and kalla, who are supposed to
>be yotzei the takkana of birchos nisuin with them. Once they were yotzei,
>additional berachos are she'einan tzerichos/l'vatala. See Pischei Teshuva
>EH 62:7.

Forgive me for not accepting this view as the only possible one.  In
particular, I do not understand how this explanation relates to the
repetition of the berakhot on successive nights, but only in the
presence of panim hadashot.  If the hatan and kallah had a hiyyuv in the
berakhah, they would presumbaly have fulfilled it once and need not do
so again.  If the answer is simply: This was the takkanah, then we have
no more to discuss, because this is a one-size-fits-all explanation that
is not subject to analysis.  I will simply note that the Arukh
ha-Shulhan (EH 62) has an alternate understanding.  I do not know who
else has addressed the question.

Kol tuv,

Eli Clark 

Daniel Eidelsohn wrote:

>David Glasner wrote:
>> the Rambam so codifies in Mamrim 2:1 that the Sanhedrin of a later
>> generation may overturn the decision of an earlier Sanhedrin based on
>> an alterantive derivation of the Biblical text.  The requirement that
the later
>> Sanhedrin be greater in wisdom and numbers is mentioned only in
>> connection with changing a takanah or gezeira of an earlier
Sanhedrin.

>This view of the Rambam is not mentioned in chazal 
>and I believe he is a das yachid in making this >distinction. 

A chapter of "Dynamics of Dispute" by Rabbi Tzvi Lampel
is devoted to this Rambam and possible sources for it.

One source is brought from the Shulchan Aruch
Ha-atid: a baraita in which an Amora states that one
should write to himself that he "consumed amount X
of chelev"(b'shogeg) rather than that he is obligated
to bring a korban - the reason being that a future
Sanhedrin might revise the shiur.  A disagreeing Amora
states that the shiurim are halacha l'moshe mi-sinai.

The apparent implication is that decisions resulting from analysis or
drashot are subject to review by
a subsequent Sanhedrin.
 
See R. Lampel's excellent work for the precise source
and analysis.

- Telly





_________________________________________________________
DO YOU YAHOO!?
Get your free @yahoo.com address at http://mail.yahoo.com

Daniel Eidensohn writes concerning Yad, Mamrim 2:1
>>> 
This view of the Rambam is not mentioned in chazal and I believe he is a
das yachid
in making this distinction. Without the distinction between rabbinic and
Torah
mitzvos the rest of the discussion based on the kesef mishna is
irrelevant.
>>>

Unless you can cite a contrary position, I don't think that it's fair to call
this a das yachid.  I think that it is reasonable to infer from the silence of
the Ra'avad here that he agreed with the Rambam, so we have at least
two heavyweight Rishonim who subscribed to this position.  Besides the
comments of Chazal in connection with the Rambam's proof texts: 
"hashofet asher yihiyeh bayamim haheim" and "lo tasur min haTorah
asher yorucha yamin u'smol" seem to be completely consistent with the
Rambam's codification.  And even if there were evidence of opposing
opinions, I still find it surprising to see a codification of the 
Rambam casually dismissed as a "das yachid." 

Actually this opinion of the Rambam is perfectly reflected in a story about
Reb Chaim.  One rainy Shemini Atzeret night, Reb Chaim woke up the
members of his family, after the rain had stopped to leave their beds and
spend the rest of the night in the Succah.  His rebbetzin was not happy
with him and reminded him that except on the first night of Succot, there
is no obligation to go back into the Succah once you have been forced
out of the Succah by inclement weather.  Reb Chaim replied that the G'ra
had decreed that (k'dai l'hotzi mi-libam shel z'dokim) on Shemini Atzeret
one had the same obligation to return to the Succah as on the first night. 
The rebbetzin was still not convinced.  Since when do you always
follow the opinion of the Gra? she queried.  Don't you pasken, in
opposition to the G'ra that there is no requirement to read megilat kohelet
from a klaf?  (Or is it the other way round?)  Reb Chaim replied calmly.  I
am within my rights to disagree with a p'sak of the Gra, such as whether
the megilah must be read from a klaf.  But going back into the Succah is
not a p'sak of the Gra, it is an akshonus of the Gra.  I have no right to 
transgress an akshonus of the Gra.

>>>
The idea expressed that the mere writing down of the Mishna and
gemora imposed an
obligation not to argue with it is an interesting idea - but there seems to
be no
source for this idea. Furthermore we have authorities such as the Rosh
and Rav
Chaim Brisker who say than in principle an Amora could argue with a
Tanna. The
gemora itself was not finalized with the actives of Ravina and Rav Ashi
because the
Saboraim modified it and apparently the gaonim were not totally reluctant
to
dispute it. In sum - the opinion that  the widespread acceptance of the
Mishna and
Talmud is the source of authority  - is more in agreement with the facts
than the
view that the writing down at a particular moment in history imposed its
authority.
>>>

Could you please cite for me the sources for the view that you attribute
to the Rosh and Reb Chaim?  If we combine that view with the
codification of the Rambam, the scope for change in halachah would
appear to be considerably greater than we are used to think it is.  I don't
think that the question which view about the source of the authority of
the Talmud is more consistent with the facts can be resolved without
taking into account a broader set of facts than we have considered so
far.  But whichever side of the issue we come down on, I think we
ultimately have to admit that, in accordance with the principle lo
bashamayim hi, what we follow as halachah depends to a very large
extent on the decisions, choices and practices of human beings and that
the answer to every halachic question was not predetermined at Sinai
and that there is no theological difficulty with a conflict between the
accepted halachah and objective truth.  What we call emunas
Chachamim is a belief not in their infallibility, but that their halachic
decisions were rendered le'shem shamayim, not for any ulterior motives
so that they did not, ch. v., attempt to misuse the power vested in them
by the Torah to determine what the halachah would be.  That's also why
there is no paradox latent in the concept of eilu v'eilu divrei elokim
chayim.  

David Glasner
dglasner@ftc.gov

<<
See Igros Moshe Y.D. I # 101 on page 186. "... we can
definitely argue with achronim and also on occassion on certain rishonim when
there
is appropriate proofs - because a dayan only has what he sees and since the
ruling
is not against the well known poskim of the shulchan aruch that have been
accepted
everywhere...but one should not be arrogant in hora'ah and one should restrain
himself except in a case of great need..."
>>

In Choshen Mishpat, siman 25, there is a lengthy discussion concerning to'eh
bid'var mishna.  While the general thrust of the halacha concerns dayanim and
situations where their piskey din can be overturned, it does shed light on our
issue as well, since the assumption about a d'var mishna is that it is
something than we ( at whatever generation the reader find himself ) may not
argue against.

Mishna and g'mara are accepted by all to be d'var mishna - meaning explicit
piskey din in these texts ( dinim hamefurashim ).  The Mechaber adds divrey
haposkim, not a very exact term, to this list.  The Nos'ey Keylim have
differing views as to what constitutes "haposkim".  The Mechaber, for obviuos
reasons, did not include himself; however, later authorities do include him.
Some say that for B'ney Ashkenaz, the Rama is included.  Later authorities go
so far as to add Shach and S'ma.

There is a further discussion of to'eh b'shikul hada'as, which is defined as
an unresolved machlokes where a clear precedent has been set to follow one of
the two opinions.  A Dayan who makes a mistake in this area also has his psak
overturned ( and he might be personally liable as well ).

What we see from all of this, and the nos'ey keylim as well, is that there are
many areas where we do not accept disagreement, and if someone does disagree,
that position is rejected.

However, we also see, that in areas where there is no clear consensus, one has
latitude to disagree.

One last, unrelated, point:  There is a discussion in the Rama about an
unresolved machlokes and how to decide.  Rama says that one may not choose to
follow the "katan" against the "gadol", rather follow the one who is "gadol
b'chochma u-b'minyan", with minyan defined as the one who has the most
followers ( see S'ma 18 ).  I do not know if this list has dealt with the
issue of minyan when the issue of one Beis Din being greater than another, and
there are differing opinions as to the definition of minyan in that context,
so I offer this up as an interesting point that in this context minyan
obviously can not mean number of people in the beis din, as it is a one-on-one
machlokes.

Eliyahu Teitz

I spent last shabbos in London and while davening (at both Munk's and Dayan
Eherentreu's shuls) I noticed to my surprise that the standard chumosh with
rashi used by the congregants to follow leining spelled pitzuoh dacoh in
divorim 23 with an aleph in the dacoh. While this is indeed the correct, or at
least authentic ashqenazi minhog, I had thought that all the ashqenazim had
abandoned their original minhog in favor of the sephardic versions following
assimilation of the minchas shai into the miqro'os gidolos and its wide
acceptance. I gained this impression by generalizing from a very sparse data
set, basically all the torahs I've personally leined from in the US, which
spell it with a hey.  Also, most of the standard shul chumoshim in the US spell
it with a hey (though some note the old minhog in a footnote). So my question,
directed at any english (as in UK) readers, do the UK torahs conform to their
printed chumoshim and spell dacoh with an aleph as well? are there any re3al
ashqenazim still left out there? I wasn't in town long enough to locate anybody
who actually knew the answer.

Mechy Frankel			frankel@hq.dswa.mil    

E.Teitz writes:
<< What does popular CURRent thimking mean, the gemar shabbos 112b "if the
 early generations are angels then we are mere humans, and if they are
 humans we are donkeys...." it would seem that this principle has always
 been known. >>

<And yet, we find that the gmara states that from one particular amora and
onward, the halacha follows the LATTER opinion, thus arguing AGAIBST any
yerida.>

I think that was not the gemoroh but seder tanoim and amoroim (rovoh was the
amoroh - though I recently ran across a new pishat in that reading which
essentially eliminates the rovoh restriction). also following a latter
authority does not argue against a concept of yeridoh as there are other
reasons which come into play. these include yiftach bidoro ki'shimuel bidoro
for independent authority of later lesser generations, and the dwarf on the
eshoulders of giants concept - though this admittedly did not come into formal
circulation in that particular formulation until the 12th century. 

I have been thinking about the assertions of yeridoh for some time and, if my
energy and this thread hold up, my share some additional thoughts at a future
time. 

Mechy Frankel 		  frankel@hq.dswa.mil

My friend and one-row-to-the-rear shul neighbor, the Dor Shivi'ie, writing
about his favorite acharon, the Dor Rivi'ie, mentioned inter alia that: 

<Whether any such agreement not to argue on the opinion of a Rishon ever
occurred is by no means clear, if for no other reason than there is no clear
line of demarcation between Rishonim and Aharonim>.

While I hesitate to take issue with Dr. David Glasner's legendary (at least
between rows 10 and 15 at Southeast Hebrew Congregation) erudition, and I also
hesitate to open old mail-jewish wounds, I would like to at least note my
strong conviction that the rishonim-acharonim period is indeed strongly marked
at least for the ashqenazim - by the black death (let's round that to 1350).
Thus the terumas hadeshen, maharil, mahri weill, mahariq etc are all acharonim.
The shulchon aruch is also an acharon (though sefardi rishonim include ribash
and nimuqei yosef, extending rishonic period another 90 years or so).  I took a
lot of flack for these assertions during the first go around, including from
various local rebbes and my kid's history teacher, but rather than quote myself
(always tacky) i would refer the interested reader to my posting "Who's on
First" in the mail jewish (may it have a ri'fuoh shileimoh)  archives (Vol 27
#48, see also 27:54) which contains most of the source references for my
assertions (bi'qitzur nimrotz, the claim rests on two pillars: 1) the self
recognition of the dawn of a new era as expressed in the writings of the
immediate post black plague generation, and 2) the votes of the only people who
should count in this determination, i.e. the category characterizations of
posiqim themselves over the last 400 years, but see MJ posting for specific
miqoros.  sadly to say, I learnt from another poster - i think it was D.
Eidensohn - during that exchange that Rav J. Soloveichik z"l, as quoted in the
Nefesh Harav did not agree with me - but none of my arguments are vitiated by
this regrettable discordance.)

watching my back in silver spring
Mechy Frankel				frankel@hq.dswa.mil

J. Margolies writes: 
<I was wondering when someone was going to mention the concept of halachah
k'basrai.  However, I believe, at least according to the understanding of the
maharik (I think) - this only applied during one portion of history.> 

On the contrary, the Maharik understood the principle to apply to all phases of
history, (brought down in S"uT Maharam Alshaqar, simon 54, also S"uT Mahariq,
94) . However the Maharik's understanding is essentially the last stage of a
long evolution of this concept (I would commend Tashma's article on this
subject in his latest book on ealy ashqenazic minhogim published by Magnes
Press.) It was originally articulated in this form by the post talmudic work,
seder tano'im vi'amoroim, and only applied to chazal. (BTW Tashma offers an
interesting chidush, that the restiction of this kilal to amoroim after Rovoh
is a misread, the Rovoh constraint only applies to the special case of talmid
and rabbo, but absent this relationship, it was in fact permitted to apply this
kilal in the pre-Rovoh era, even amoro'im against tano'im - a striking example
is a citation to R' Hai Gaon who applied it in favor of R.Yochonon against
Rebbe himself). In any event it is highly intersting that for a period of about
800 years following the close of the amoroic period it never occurred to
anybody to propose (at least in any preserved writing) that halochoh kibasroi
extended to include any post amoroic figures (see the rambam's into to mishne
torah for a striking formulation of this rejection of any temporal preferences
in favor of the best shiqul ha'daas no matter where it leads).  Only after this
long period of conceptual stasis do we suddenly start to get radically
escalating expansions of this kilal by the posiqim - a dovor she'omeir
darsheini-. Apparantly the earliest recorded was by the sons of the Rosh (first
R. Yehudo - zichron yehuda, simon 23, and then the Tur) who attempted to apply
this principle to give precedence to their father's pisaq against a contrary
position by the sefer ha'tirumos). The earliest formulations of this expansive
view did not literally extend it to their own contemporaries, but generally
restricted it to some earlier authoritative rishon  such as the Maharam
mi'Rutenberg or the Rashboh. Subsequently this was broadened yet further to
include posiqim right up to contemporary times.    However, this has alsways
been something of an ashqenazic shitoh.  Thus the maharam alshaqar mocked the
tishuvoh of mahariq (essentially on the reasonable grounds of nosatoh
divorechoh li'shiurin, i.e. any cutoff is pretty arbitrary), while the remoh
(intro to darchei moshe) gives one of his reasons for writing precisely to
counter the Shulchon Aruch's rejection of the principle of basroi (after all,
the SA looked to the big three, essentially ignoring lesser though later
lights, which remoh didn't like). 

The Dwarves and Why Then?
We mentioned the 800 year stasis in the halachic scope of this qilal before its
expanded application by at least the ashqenazi posiqim.  J. Margolis has
implicitly recognized this problem and offered an innovative chdush to explain
it.  Thus he writes: <The earliest generations didn't have all of the toseftas
and braisos in front of them and each rebbe taught only the braisos that he had
a mesorah for.  This meant that each school really didn't have all of the
information necesary to make a psak.  As technology and communication improved
and the braisos and toseftas became more well known (and I guess codified)
giving everyone access to all of the pertinent information on an issue - the
concept of halacha k'basrai came into effect as the later generations were
better equipped to pasken as they had access to a better collection of the
previous generation's literature >  
this would neatly solve our problem if true. Unfortunately (imho of course) it
is not.  After the close of the talmud there is absolutely no reason to think,
absent specific proof, that each rebbe only taught those baraisos "he had a
mesoroh for" or that lists of baraisos/tosephtos/etc only existed in widely
separated components awaiting some technological/communications advances to
unite them.  The unification work in fact was completed long before the close
of the talmudic period.  if anything, one might suspect that individual
collections would tend to become even more lost over the course of the
intervening centuries, as happened with many other works.  Secondly -though
irrelevant to the argument - communications technology didn't actually improve
that much. 

Thus one must look elsewhere for a catalyst.  It is Tashma's interesting
suggestion that we have Christian scholasticism to thank, precisely by their
contribution of the powerful metaphor of dwarves riding giants mentioned by
Joel, and thus seeing further.  The dwarf-giant moshol was first formulated by
Bernard of Chartres, a younger contemporary of Rashi's and made an immdediate
and deep impression on the intellectual elite of the day.  The Christians too
had to cope with the intellectual problem of extreme reverence for early
authorities while needing to disagree with them in the face of evolving
scientific and philosophic appreciations.  The dwarf-giant metaphor neatly
solved their problem, preserving an appreciation of the unequaled
intellectual/spiritual genius of yore, but satisfyingly rationalizing greater
understanding or authority by the pygmies of the present.  this metaphor also
infltrated and powerfully affected the intellectual jewish world as well, at
least the ashqenazi world which became familiar with it. the first explicit
citation of dwarves and gisnts in a jewish context was, seemingly, by the
Tosephos Rid (R. Yeshaya DeTrani, tishuvoh #2) in 1250.  Interstingly his
tishuvoh explicitly cites the "chachimei hapilosophim" probably christian, as
his source for this metaphor.  The metaphor also neatly explains the mahariq's
apparently new demand that the basroi would need to actally have seen all of
the qamoi's works, else the qilal would not apply - if the dwarf will not
actually ride the giant we no longer assume that he sees further. With the
conceptual problem thus solved, it is not hard to posit how a qilal like
halochoh kibasroi might find it easier to flourish.  Interestingly as well,
this metaphor was not well known in the eastern world, and with the
intellectual spade work not done, the early sephardim, specifically including
the shulchon aruch - and possibly the very latest ones as well - do not seem to
have ever accepted this qilal.  Thus the dwarf on the sholders is the perfect
complement to the notion of yeridas hadoros, whatever that may mean, and Joel's
final comment that: < I have always understood the concept of yeridas hadoros
to be in direct opposition to the shoulders theory.  Any other opinions?> would
seem misplaced. (I actually don't mean to pick on joel, whose contributions
have always seemed interesting,  but what's a guy gonna do?) 


Mechy Frankel			frankel@hq.dswa.mil

My dear Eli, you are "rishioning!" You are building an assumption and
paskening on its basis.

Alternate sevara:

In fact, early in my yeshiva career, second year in Sha'alvim, at the age
of 17, I remember very vividly doing this sugya in some depth because I
was surprised at the shittas HaRambam that Panim Chadashos is two. Going
from Rebbe to Rebbe to discuss it, the best opinion I got was that of R'
Yitzchol Goldberg, that it is a din in making a zimun, because it is a din
in bentsching, and 2 + Chosson = a Zimmun.

Even one pan chadash is likely a din in bentsching, as the berachos are a
snif thereof. Since women are not mitztaref to a zimmun with men, they
cannot be panim chadashos.

On Tue, 15 Sep 1998, Clark, Eli wrote:

> is virtually a da'at yahid.  Among Rishonim who define panim hadashot,
> this view is not shared by:  Rashi, Tosafot, Rambam, Ramban, Rashba,
> Ran, Sefer ha-Arukh, Talmidei Rabbenu Yonah, Sefer ha-Ittur, R Yitzhak
> Or Zarua, Rosh, Mordekhai and Meiri.  Neither later Rishonim nor early
> Aharonim cite this view.  It is not mentioned in the Tur, Shulhan Arukh
> or the classic nosei kelim.  Ritva's view is not even quoted for the
> purpose of rejecting it.  [Indeed, the editor of the critical edition of
> Ritva on Ketubot writes in a footnote that he could find no one who
> shares this view.]


> YGB, the Sova (could it be "Sovea"?)  Semahot.  Is it a work of pesak or
> a yalkut? 
>

Both, by R' Seraya Debilitski of Bnei Brak, the exhaustive work on Hil.
Sheva Berachos.

YGB 

Yosef Gavriel Bechhofer
Cong. Bais Tefila, 3555 W. Peterson Ave., Chicago, IL, 60659
ygb@aishdas.org, http://www.aishdas.org/baistefila

David Glasner wrote:

> Daniel Eidensohn writes concerning Yad, Mamrim 2:1
> >>>
> This view of the Rambam is not mentioned in chazal and I believe he is a
> das yachid in making this distinction. Without the distinction between rabbinic
> and
> Torah mitzvos the rest of the discussion based on the kesef mishna is
> irrelevant.
> >>>
>
> Unless you can cite a contrary position, I don't think that it's fair to call
> this a das yachid.

I retract the term das yachid - but still can't think of a better description. R.
Lampel Chapter 6 page 103 states, "...The Rambam states a surprising principle
regarding this second function: Law details that had been newly generated through
a drash could be overruled by a later Great Sanhedrin."  [page 107] Armed with the
Rambam's principle one may anticipate answering how many disputes in the Talmud
arose:namely by explaining them as situations wherein which one Sanhedrin decided
to challenge the drash of a previous one or wherein which the members of a
Sanhedrin were disputing whether to do so. However, we are confronted with a
disappointment. _THERE IS NO PASSAGE IN THE TALMUD WHICH CLEARLY INDICATES SUCH A
BACKGROUND FOR ANY MACHLOKESS... " [PAGE 109] If there is no mention of the
Rambam's principle in the Talmud, on what did he base it?"
R. Lampel finally concludes that the Rambam was based on Rav Hai Gaon as quoted by
Yad Ramah Sanhedrin 33a.from Bava Basra 130b

How would you describe a psak concerning a major parameter of the authority of
chazal  in which there is no apparent source in chazal and which scholars for
hundreds of years have tried to justify?

> >>>
> The idea expressed that the mere writing down of the Mishna and
> gemora imposed an obligation not to argue with it is an interesting idea - but
> there seems to be no source for this idea. Furthermore we have authorities such
> as the Rosh and Rav Chaim Brisker who say than in principle an Amora could argue
> with a
> Tanna.
>
> Could you please cite for me the sources for the view that you attribute
> to the Rosh and Reb Chaim?

Rav Chaim is quoted by Rav Elchonon Wasserman (Kovetz Shiurim Bava Basra #633 page
170) . The Rosh is on the third chapter of Berachos (24a) #35. The gemora
discusses the appropriateness of putting tefilin under the pillow when together
with ones wife. Shmuel permits it but he is refuted by a braissa. The gemora
emphatically states Teyufta. But then apparently we still posken like Shmuel. The
Rosh states that an Amora has the ability to declare a braissa to be invalid and
this is apparently what Shmuel did. Rabbeinu Yona on the gemora states that while
an Amora can not argue with a Tanna he can concerning dikdukei mitzvos. This is
issue of shmira is such a case where the Amora can directly disagree with a Tanna.
The Pnei Yehoshua, however, asserts that Shmuel was relying on another tannaic
source and not his own sevora.

Aside from the position of the Kesef Mishna that there was an acceptance of Klall
Yisroel we have an alternative which is stated by the Maharal (Baer HaGolah
beginning of 6th Baer) that the Amoraim recognized their inferior state in
relationship to the Tannaim and therefore didn't argue with them. The is also the
position of the Chazon Ish. Rav Elchonon Wasserman in an exchange of letters with
the Chazon Ish argues that there had to also be a Kabbala not to argue.


Bottom line. I don't see any source justifying the assertion that the mere writing
down of the Mishna or the gemora created an authority that could not be argued
with by subsequent generations.


                               Daniel Eidensohn

********************


[ Distributed to the Avodah mailing list, digested version.           ]
[ To post: mail to avodah@aishdas.org                                 ]
[ For control requests: mail the word "help" to majordomo@aishdas.org ]