Mishna: If a person told two people "I robbed one of you of a maneh, but I do not know which one," or "The father of one of you deposited a maneh with me, and I do not know which one," he gives a maneh to one and a maneh to the other, for he himself has a dmitted the claim.
If two people deposited money with one custodian, one a maneh and one two hundred zuzim, and (later, when they come to claim their deposits) this one says the two hundred zuzim are mine and this one says the two hundred zuzim are mine; the custodian gives one a maneh and the other a maneh [since both agree that each deposited at least one maneh], and the remainder remains (undistributed) until Elijah comes. [Traditionally, the prophet Elijah will resolve all such disputes when the Messianic era arrives.]
R. Yosei says: If so [i.e., if each gets a maneh], what has the swindler (who deposited 100 zuzim and claimed 200) lost [there is no disincentive for lying]? Instead, all the money remains undistributed until Elijah arrives.
Similarly, two people who deposit two utensils, one worth a maneh and one worth a thousand zuzim, and this one claims "The expensive one is mine" and the other one claims "The expensive one is mine:" the custodian gives the less expensive one to one of th em, and takes the value of the less expensive one from the expensive one and gives it to the other claimant, and the rest remains undistributed until Elijah arrives. [The expensive utensil is sold, the cash value of the less expensive utensil is given to the second claimant, and the remaining cash is held indefinitely.]
R. Yosei says: If so [i.e., if each gets a maneh], what has the swindler lost [there is no disincentive for lying]? Instead, all remains undistributed until Elijah arrives.
Gemara: [The gemara begins by commenting on the first case in the mishna, in which the custodian must pay a maneh to each claimant:]
It appears from here that we require payment even in doubtful cases, and we do not say "Let the money remain with its current holder". [The custodian is not certain to whom the money is owed, yet we require payment to both.]
And they asked [i.e., the rabbis saw an inconsistency between this first case in the mishna and the second case, which was]: Two people deposited money with one custodian, one a maneh and one two hundred zuzim, and this one says the two hundred zuzim are mine and this one says the two hundred zuzim are mine, the custodian gives one a maneh and the other a maneh, and the remainder remains until Elijah comes.
He said to him [i.e., one scholar responded to the questioner]: Are you comparing a deposit [the second case] with robbery [the first case]? In the case of robbery, where there was a transgression, the rabbis penalized him [the robber by requiring him to pay both possible victims]; in the case of the deposit [in which the custodian didn't commit any transgression], the rabbis did not penalize him [by requiring payment to both claimants].
And there are contradictions to the mishna both within (the discussion of) deposits, and within (that of) robbery.
Within deposits [our mishna is contradicts itself]: We learned in the beginning: "If the father of one of you deposited a maneh with me, but I do not know which one, he gives a maneh to this one and a maneh to the other". But (it goes on to say) "If two p eople deposited, etc." [The mishna rules that if two people deposited money, one gave 100 zuzim and one gave 200 zuzim, the custodian forgot who gave which amount, and both claim the 200 zuzim deposit, each gets 100 zuzim {which are not disputed}, and the disputed 100 zuzim remain undistributed. Why is the disputed money distributed in the first case, but held in abeyance in the second case?]
Rava said: The custodian in the first case (there was only one depositor) is like one who accepted two separate deposits in distinct bundles; the custodian should have paid attention (to the identity of each depositor). [Thus, the custodian was negligent, and must pay both claimants.] In the second case, it is as if two people deposited money in a single bundle, and the custodian is not required to pay attention {to who gave how much). Thus (in our case), if the two people had deposited money at the same time, he (the custodian) can say to them "You yourselves were not particular with one another [i.e., you apparently trusted one another] -- should I be expected to be particular?" [Since the custodian was not negligent, we do not obligate him to pay both claimants; instead, the disputed funds remain in abeyance.]
There is (also) a contradiction in the case of robbery: Here (in our mishna) we were taught: If a person told two people, "I robbed one of you of a maneh, but I do not know which one", or if a custodian told two people, "The father of one of you deposited money with me, but I do not know which one", he gives a maneh to this one and a maneh to the other. But this is in contradiction to another mishna (on Yebamot 118b): If he robbed one of five and does not know which one, and this one says he robbed me and that one says he robbed me, he (the robber) puts the robbed item between them and leaves; these are the words of R. Tarfon.
We can derive (from the mishna in Yebamot) that we do not extract money in case of doubt; we say that the (disputed) money should remain with its current possesor. [Thus, the mishna in Yebamot seems to contradict our mishna, which rules that the robber mu st pay both claimants.]
[The gemara answers:] How do you know that our mishna reflects the position of R. Tarfon? We learned a b'raita on that mishna (in Yebamot]: R. Tarfon concedes that if a thief says I stole a maneh from one of you, but I don't know from which one, he must g ive each one a maneh. [Thus, R. Tarfon _does_ agree with our mishna. So we still have the contradiction between our mishna and the mishna in Yebamot. The Tosfot say that an alternative question might be "Why does R. Tarfon rule differently in the two case s?".]
[The gemara resolves the contraction:] There (in Yebamot], the claimants are suing for payment. [The issue is purely monetary, and none of the claimants can prove their right to reimbursement. In such a doubtful case, the robber is not required to pay the m all, but just to restore what he has taken.] Here (in our mishna), the [repentant] robber wants to fulfil his Heavenly obligation [which he can do only by offering restitution to all the claimants].
The precise language (in our mishna) also teaches that the robber "acknowledged the claim himself" -- so we can infer that [the he came forth voluntarily and wanted to fulfil his moral obligation, and that he had not been sued by the potential claimants].
[We are now on the next to the last line of 37a.]