[The biblical source for returning a lost item is Deut 22:3: And so you shall do with his donkey, and so you shall do with his garment, and so you shall do with any lost item belonging to your brother which is lost from him and you find; you may not hide yourself.]
[We have translated the term "katav Ra'hmana" (which appears several times in today's text) as "the Torah wrote." Literally, "Ra'hmana" means "the Merciful One," referring to G-d as the Torah's Author.]
Mishna: The "garment" is included in all of these (items which must be returned); so why was it explicitly mentioned (in the Torah)? To draw an analogy between it (and all other kinds of lost items). To tell you that, just as a garment is distinct, in tha t it has identifying marks and claimants (i.e., it is a manufactured item rather than a natural one, so it must have an owner) and has a (potential) claimant, so you must announce any lost item that has identifying marks and (potential) claimants.
Gemara: What does "included in all of these" mean? Rava said: Included in the (biblical) phrase "any lost item belonging to your brother."
[The next bit of gemara refers to Deut 22:1: "You should not see your brother's ox or his lamb wandering and hide yourself from them; you must surely return them to your brother."]
Rava said: Why did the Torah write "ox," "donkey," "lamb," and "garment?" [A fundamental rabbinic assumption is that every word of the Torah is meaningful, so that each of these four kinds of items were specified for a reason.] They are all necessary.
For if the Torah had written "garment," I would have believed that this rule (requiring returning the lost item) applied only where there are witnesses (who can identify) the item itself or identifying marks on the item itself. But in the case of the donk ey, where there are witnesses who can identify the saddle or there are identifying marks on the saddle, I would have said we do not return (the donkey, although we would return the saddle). The Torah wrote "donkey" (in addition to "garment"), so that even the donkey would be returned on the basis of identifying marks on the saddle.
Why did the Torah write "ox" and "lamb?" "Ox" teaches us that even the shearing of the ox's tail (which has minimal value) must be returned (with the ox when it is identified and claimed), and "lamb" for _it's_ shearing.
[Tosafot asks an interesting question about the shearings of the ox's tail. Recall that we learned before (based on a gemera that will appear in our next installment) that one need return an item only if it is worth more than a prutah. If the shearing is worth more than a prutah, we would know that we would have to return it even without the biblical phrase, and if it is worth less than a prutah, we do not have to return it! Tosafot answers that this comes to teach us that we must shear the tail now, even if it is currently worth less than a prutah, presumably on the grounds that the accumulation of multiple shearings will be worth more than a prutah.]
So let the Torah write "ox," so that even the ox-tail shearings must be returned, and (we will understand that it applies) even more so to the (more valuable) lamb shearings, so why was the "lamb" mentioned explicitly)?
[The gemara concedes:] Instead, Rava said: "Donkey" (is superfluous in the talmudic discussion of liability for items falling into) a pit according to R. Yehuda, and "lamb" (is superfluous in our present discussion of) lost property according to all opini ons -- these are difficult to explain!
[The gemara in Baba Kama 53b discusses liability of a person who opens a pit in a public place. According to the rabbis, the word "donkey" in the relevant verse there teaches that the owner of the pit is liable for damage to animals but not inanimate obje cts, but R. Yehuda extends liability to both animals and inanimate objects. Thus, according to R. Yehuda, the word "donkey" is superfluous in that context.]
Perhaps "lamb" comes to teach that even the feces must be returned. [The feces are worth even less than the ox-tail shearings, but can be used for fertilizer.]
[The gemara rejects that possibility:] The owner renounces ownership of the feces.
[The gemara tries again to explain why the Torah explicitly mentions "lamb":] Perhaps ("lamb") is to teach that identifying marks (are as effective as witnesses in proving ownership), for we were asked "Are identifying marks biblical or rabbinic?" The Tor ah wrote "lamb" to show that we return an item even on the basis of identifying marks, because identifying marks are biblically-ordained.
[The gemara rejects this possibility:] The tanna of our mishna taught identifying marks in conjunction with "garment" -- "just as a garment is distinct, in that it has identifying marks and claimants, so you must announce any lost item that has identifyin g marks and claimants."
[The gemara thus concedes that it has no explanation for why the Torah explicitly mentions "lamb."]
[The gemara now addresses the question of the minimum value an item must have if it must be returned. The methodology is a classic example of talmudic exegesis of a biblical verse, extracting meaning from every phrase, and insisting that a defensible posi tion must derive something from every superfluous phrase.
[The relevant part of Deut. 22:3 reads: "...and so you do with any lost item of your brother's, which is lost from him, and you have found it ..."]
Our rabbis taught: (Deut 22:3): "which he hath lost"; (this implies) the exclusion of an item that is not worth a "prutah".
R. Yehuda says: "And you have found it" [another apparently superfluous phrase in that same biblical verse comes) to exclude an item not worth a prutah.
What is the difference between (these two positions)?
Abbaye said: The difference between them is the exegesis. One (the "tanna kama," [literally, the "first tanna," i.e., the anonymous authority of the mishna) derives it from "which is lost," and one (R. Yehuda) derives it from "and you have found it." [In other words, Abbaye suggests that there the difference between the two tanna'im has no practical halakhic consequences.]
And according to the one (the tanna kama) who derives it from "which is lost," what does he do with the verse "and you have found it?" That is required to teach what Rabbana'i said: "and you have found it" -- that came to your hand. [The gemara in Baba Ka ma explains that the phrase "your brother" in that verse limits the requirement of returning items only to items lost by a Jew. The gemara there considers the possibility that one need not go out of one's way to return an item to a nonJew, but if such an item "comes to your hand" effortlessly, one must return it. In that context, Rabbana'i ruled, on the basis of this verse, that even if an item lost by a nonJew came to your hand effortlessly, you do not have to return it.]
[Hameiri, here as well as elsewhere, insists that any nonJew who is "bound by religious precepts" ( i.e. is not an idolator) must be treated like a Jew in civil matters.]
And according to the one [R. Yehuda] who derives it from "and you have found it", what does he do with "which is lost?" He needs it to derive the teaching of R. Yohanan. For R. Yohanan said in the name of R. Shimon b. Yohai: How do we know that a lost ite m swept away by a river is permitted (to whoever finds it)? (From the verse) "Which is lost from him ["from him" is superfluous] and you find it" -- that which is lost to him but available to anyone else, to exclude an item lost to him and inaccessible to anyone else [like an item swept away by a river]. [See bm 22b, where R. Yohanan is said to be citing R. Yishmael b. Yehotzadak.]
And the other (R. Yehuda, who uses the phrase "and you have found it" for items swept away by a river) -- on what does he base the teaching of Rabbana'i? He derives it from "_and_ you have found it." [The Torah only needed the phrase "you have found it" t o teach the law of an item worth less than a prutah. The fact the Torah's phrase is "_and_" you have found it" is the basis for Rabbana'i's ruling about an item with came to your hand effortlessly.
And the other (the tanna kama, who uses "which is lost" to teach about an item worth less than a prutah) -- on what does he base the teaching of R. Yohanan? He derives it from "which is lost _from him_" [the last two words being superfluous].
And the other (R. Yehuda -- why does he derive it from the entire phrase "which is lost from him?" Why couldn't he derive it only from the superfluous "from him?")? He does not regard "from him" as suitable for extracting a derivation.
[This concludes the discussion of the exegetic basis of the rule that a lost item must be worth at least a prutah to justify the effort of the finder to return it. The gemara then considers the question of whether or not there are halakhic consequences to the different exegeses of the tanna kama and R. Yehuda,]
Rava said: The (practical) difference between them is a lost object worth a prutah that depreciated. The one (the tanna kama) who derives (the exclusion of items worth less than a prutah) from "which is lost" would say that there is a requirement (to retu rn such an item, since it was worth a prutah when it was lost). And the one (R. Yehuda) who derives (the less-than-a-prutah exclusion) from "and you have found it" would say that there is no obligation (since it was not worth a prutah when it was found) < P> [The counter-argument:] But even according to the one (the tanna kama) who derives it from "and which is lost," we must certainly meet the requirements of "and you have found it"(and the item, when found, was not worth a prutah)? [Thus, both the tanna kam a and R. Yehuda would agree that the depreciated item now worth less than a prutah need not be returned, and we have not yet identified the difference between them.]
Instead, the difference is with an item worth less than a prutah (when lost) that appreciated (and is worth more than a prutah when found). The one who derives it from "and you have found it" says that there is an obligation to return the item, and the on e who derives it from "and which is lost" would hold that there is no requirement to return it.
{This is challenged too:] But even according to the one who derives it from "and you have found it" would require that we meet the requirement of "which is lost," (i.e., the item must be worth a prutah when lost _and_ when found) and this is not the case. [Again, both the tanna kama and R. Yehuda would agree that there is no requirement to return the item ... and we still have not discovered a practical difference between the two derivations.]
Instead, the difference between them is with an item worth a prutah (when lost) [that appreciated,] that depreciated, and then appreciated again. [The first "that appreciated" is in the text of the standard edition of the talmud, but is deleted by the Ba' Ch (R. Yoel Sirkis) in a marginal note. The Ba'Ch's emendation makes sense.]
According to the one (the tanna kama) who (derives the exclusion) from "which is lost," there is an obligation to return it (since it was worth a prutah when lost and when found). But according to the one (R. Yehuda) who derived the exclusion from "and yo u have found it," we require that the item have the value of a found item (i.e., a prutah) from the time of loss to the time of finding. [Thus, we finally can see the practical distinction between the two derivations!]
[We are now on the last line of 27a.]