Avodah Mailing List

Volume 40: Number 79

Thu, 01 Dec 2022

• 1. evolving ethics? (Joel Rich)
• 2. Re: evolving ethics? (Zev Sero)
• 3. Re: evolving ethics? (Micha Berger)
• 4. Living in EY (Marty Bluke)
• 5. Re: evolving ethics? (Zev Sero)
• 6. Re: evolving ethics? (Micha Berger)
• 7. V?sain Tal Umatar (Prof. L. Levine)
• 8. Re: Can One Add Water To A Hot Water Urn on Yom Tov (Joe Slater)
• 9. Re: evolving ethics? (Micha Berger)

At what point in Jewish history did the concept of halacha as an objective
ethical standard (max and min) vs a floor become a topic of discussion
(consciously or subconsciously)? Example ?is slavery presumed to be an
existential institution supported by halacha or an institution which must
be dealt with halachically but not encouraged?
KT
Joel Rich
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On 29/11/22 22:58, Joel Rich via Avodah wrote:
> Example ?is slavery presumed to be an existential institution supported 
> by halacha or an institution which must be dealt with halachically but 
> not encouraged?

If it were not to be encouraged, then it wouldn't be forbidden to free a 
slave.

-- 
Zev Sero            ?Were we directed from Washington when to sow
z...@sero.name       and when to reap, we should soon want bread.?
                    ?Thomas Jefferson: Autobiography, 1821.

On Wed, Nov 30, 2022 at 01:46:25AM -0500, Zev Sero via Avodah wrote:
> On 29/11/22 22:58, Joel Rich via Avodah wrote:
> > Example ?is slavery presumed to be an existential institution supported
> > by halacha or an institution which must be dealt with halachically but
> > not encouraged?

> If it were not to be encouraged, then it wouldn't be forbidden to free a
> slave.

If the reason for forbidding (in normal cases) shichrur eved Kenaani were
because of a position on the morality of EK, why would it be permissed
lesheim mitzvah? Implied is that the problem with shichrur E"K is
something that their having a mitzvah purpose obviates.

See the Chinukh #347:
    And since the yesod of this mitzvah is in order to increase people's
    Avodas Bar'am, Chazal permitted [to transgress]* this mitzvah
    whenever its bitul would cause a different mitzvah - and even for
    the sake of a mitzvah derabbanan, such as if there were not ten [men]
    in the shul and they needed to free the slave to complete the minyan
    (see Berakhot 47b).

    * Hebrew has "[la'avor]", not a translation interpolation. The
    later "[men] is my interpolation.

If Tevi wants to be counted for a minyan, he isn't someone too likely to
be going back to his old life-style. If the problem were that freeing
a slave was inherently immoral, halakhah would have required davening
without a minyan as a mitzvah habaah ba'aveirah.

And if the requirement is that it be a mitzvah derabbim, perhaps the
machloqes there is whether the eved needs to prove both halves of
"ameikh ami veElokayikh Elokai", which a personal mitzvah does not.

So even without the Chinukh, simply working from first principles, it
is more in conformity with the din to conclude that the problem is an
eved kenaani who was freed would too likely become a Jew who reverts to
AZ. After all, this is why Chazal talk about the sexual license he had
in his slavery years, to explain why being freed isn't a case of zakhin
le'adam. Shichrur the only case of "geirus" without the prerequisite of
qabbalas ol mitzvos. And that's dangerous.


That's 

Tir'u baTov!
-Micha

-- 
Micha Berger                 We look forward to the time
http://www.aishdas.org/asp   when the power to love
Author: Widen Your Tent      will replace the love of power.
- https://amzn.to/2JRxnDF              - William Ewart Gladstone

Professor Levine wrote:
> Is it not true that living in Israel is contingent upon Torah observance?
> Are not the non-religious Jews living there today weakening our right
> to live in the land?

The Yalkut Shimoni [Eicha 1038] comments on the posuk in Ezekiel "The house
of Israel, as long as they lived on their own Land, they defiled it by
their way and by their misdeeds" -- "God said: 'Would that My children would
be with Me in Eretz Yisrael, even though they defile her.'" According to
this, God's will is that His children be in the Land even if they commit
sins which defile her!

Prof. Levine tells us that Rav Zeira did not leave for the Land of Israel
until he had a favorable dream that showed him that any possible sins of
his were already forgiven;
t(herefore, he was worthy of living in the Holy Land.") and then asks:

I have never heard of anyone considering making Aliyah have Ravi Zeira's
approach in mind. Have you? I wonder why

The story of Rav Zera is a cryptic Gemara in Berachos 57. I looked
at the Yalkut Biurim in the mesivta Gemara and they quote 9 different
interpretations of this Gemara. I will mention 2 that directly contradict
Professor Levines point.

1. The Oneg Yom Tov explained that Abraham was only zoche to get EY because
of the Mitzva of the Omer which is barley. Therefore the dream of barley
told Rav Zera to move to EY.

2. The Sifsei Chachamim explains that EY is mechaper on a persons sins so
we might have thought that Rav Zera moved to EY for this reason. Therefore
Rav Zera said that he didn't need this and this was not the reason he was
moving as he had no sins and therefore he saw barley in his dream.

Professor Levine quoted a Ramban "that the stories of the expulsion from
the Garden of Eden, and the eradication of humanity at the time of the
flood, and the dispersion
of the population in the wake of the building of the Tower of Babel,
all come to warn the Jewish people (and explain to the gentiles) that
our connection to the land is contingent."

The Ramban explains the 2 Tochachas that we have in Vayikra and devarim as
referring to the 2 exiles, the rebuke in *Vayikra* is a prophecy concerning
the destruction of the First Temple, while the rebuke in *Devarim*
foretells the destruction of the Second Temple. The most important
implication of Ramban's interpretation is that there can be no third
destruction, since the Torah offers no third set of curses. After the
ingathering of the exiles described in *Parashat Nitzavim*, there may be
terrible suffering -- as foretold in the song of *Haazinu* -- but there is no
room for a third destruction.

--



I will simply quote the Rambam in Hilchos Melachim perek 5 about living in
EY which is restating the Gemaras at the end of Kesubos. I don't see any
qualifications whatsoever about a person needing to be a tzadik to live
there. The Rambam is crystal clear, a Jew should live in EY.

    "Great sages would kiss the borders of *Eretz Yisrael*, kiss its
    stones, and roll in its dust. Similarly, Psalms 102:15 declares:
    'Behold, your servants hold her stones dear and cherish her dust.'
    The Sages commented: 'Whoever dwells in *Eretz Yisrael* will have his
    sins forgiven as Isaiah 33:24 states: 'The inhabitant shall not say
    'I am sick.' The people who dwell there shall be forgiven their sins.'
    Even one who walks four cubits there will merit the world to come
    and one who is buried there receives atonement as if the place in
    which he is buried is an altar of atonement as Deuteronomy 32:43
    states: 'His land will atone for His people.' In contrast, the
    prophet, Amos [7:17, used the expression] 'You shall die in an impure
    land' as a prophecy of retribution.
    There is no comparison between the merit of a person who lives in
    *Eretz Yisrael* and ultimately, is buried there and one whose body
    is brought there after his death. Nevertheless, great Sages would
    bring their dead there. Take an example, from our Patriarch, Jacob,
    and Joseph, the righteous.
    At all times, a person should dwell in *Eretz Yisrael* even in a city
    whose population is primarily gentile, rather than dwell in the
    Diaspora, even in a city whose population is primarily Jewish.
    This applies because whoever leaves *Eretz Yisrael* for the Diaspora
    is considered as if he worships idols as I Samuel 26:19 states
    'They have driven me out today from dwelling in the heritage of
    God, saying 'Go, serve other gods.' Similarly, Ezekiel's (13:9)
    prophecies of retribution state: 'They shall not come to the land
    of Israel.'"

On 30/11/22 12:42, Micha Berger via Avodah wrote:
> On Wed, Nov 30, 2022 at 01:46:25AM -0500, Zev Sero via Avodah wrote:
>> On 29/11/22 22:58, Joel Rich via Avodah wrote:

>>> Example ?is slavery presumed to be an existential institution supported
>>> by halacha or an institution which must be dealt with halachically but
>>> not encouraged?

>> If it were not to be encouraged, then it wouldn't be forbidden to free a
>> slave.

> If the reason for forbidding (in normal cases) shichrur eved Kenaani were
> because of a position on the morality of EK, why would it be permissed
> lesheim mitzvah? Implied is that the problem with shichrur E"K is
> something that their having a mitzvah purpose obviates.

You have it backwards.   The premise Reb Joel proposed was that slavery 
might be something that halacha doesn't really like; it deals with it 
only because it has to, but it is not to be encouraged.

My reply is that if that were the case, the halacha would not forbid 
freeing a slave.  The fact that this issur exists means that the halacha 
has no objection to slavery at all, but rather sees something positive 
in it.  Of course that positive thing can be outweighed by things that 
are even more positive, but the point is that it is not a negative or 
even parev.

Thus the first prong of Reb Joel's question must be the correct one: It 
is an existential institution supported by halacha.

Indeed I often point out in discussions of this subject that when Moshe 
is sent to confront Par'oh, he does not say one word to him about the 
fact that the Egyptians enslaved the Jews.  Hashem seems to have no 
objection to that.  He simply tells Par'oh that you have been using My 
property, with My permission, but now I want it back.  If you give it 
back immediately, then we will remain on good terms, because what you 
did in the past was not wrong.  But if you keep My property after I have 
demanded its return, then you will be sorry.

Yetzias Mitzrayim would also have been the perfect time for Hashem to 
tell the Jews "You know what slavery is like, you're glad you're no 
longer slaves, so don't own slaves".  But rather than saying that, right 
in the Aseres Hadibros Hashem tells them it's fine for them to own 
slaves, and the very first Mishpat they are told after Matan Torah is 
how to treat an Eved Ivri.


-- 
Zev Sero            ?Were we directed from Washington when to sow
z...@sero.name       and when to reap, we should soon want bread.?
                    ?Thomas Jefferson: Autobiography, 1821.

On Tue, Nov 29, 2022 at 10:58:18PM -0500, Joel Rich via Avodah wrote:
> At what point in Jewish history did the concept of halacha as an objective
> ethical standard (max and min) vs a floor become a topic of discussion
> (consciously or subconsciously)?

I am reminded of what I learned about the Sho'el uMeishiv's position
on copyright law in 2001. This was from a Lunch-n-Learn given at YU's
office in Manhattan by R Zev Reichman, then of REITS' Kollel Elyon.
Since I don't recall the SuM itself, I'm going to post my notes from his
survey of the topic. (The post is dated 2015, since I had then learned
R Asher Weiss's position from R Jonathan Ziring and added it.)

See my dilemma: If ethics do evolve, how do we distinguish between
ascending standards and assimilation?

   2- Our Torah Must be Moral

   The Sho'el uMeishiv (1:44) says that if secular society saw the moral
   obligation to protect an author's creation and publisher's investment,
   and this is in accord with our natural morality, it is impossible
   that the Torah would less moral. He therefore assigns ownership of
   ideas to their creator.

   This goes beyond dina demalkhusa dina; it is not an obligation to
   obey secular law, but to obey the moral goals that drove its creation.
   Since, in halakhah, ownership is eternal (barring proactively making
   a qinyan), he pasqened that copyrights are lehalakhah also eternal.

   I just want to note the SuM's assumption, and the importance he
   assigns moral rights identified by the surrounding culture.

   RZR wondered if the SuM would also recognize the French philosophy of
   copyright: that the artist could sell reproduction and profit rights,
   but eternally retains rights to controlling how the idea is changed.
   (So even if you sell a painting, the owner is allowed to copy it,
   but not modify it.) After all, this is also a secularly identified
   moral right. Would it be a halakhah only in France?

   I personally have a more complicated problem... How do we know when
   our instinctive moral compass is verifying some need identified by
   civil legislators, and when it is being influenced by external culture
   and thus a consequence of that law. It could be that halakhah must
   accept a true moral value, but it could also be that halakhah must
   help us correct a moral error.

   How do we know which is which?

So, the SuM deals with the question of either evolving morality or evolving
expectations from others creating new moral demands.

Which I guess also underlies Cheirem deR Gershom on polygamy. Was polygyny
suddenly too immoral to allow? Or were 11th cent women getting into marriage
in a world which shifted the morality?

We get a parallel issue in halakhah. Where it looks like the din changed,
but really some aspect of the situation is new and the old pesaq doesn't
really apply to the same case. One would not say that precedent is violated
and the halakhah itself changed; the metzi'us did.


Now, on to the example, slavery:
>                                  Example -- is slavery presumed to be an
> existential institution supported by halacha or an institution which must
> be dealt with halachically but not encouraged?

Third possibility: slavery is an acceptible option when the alternative was
not having enough food to go around. And therefore had no offsetting value
afterward.

This would be a change in mezi'us. Whereas slavery is tolerated when
it was the only way to get a sufficient food and clothing supply with
the given resources, it wouldn't necessarily be as tools and machines
improved efficiency.

And speaking of offsetting values, I mentioned the Chinukh offering a
one...

On Wed, Nov 30, 2022 at 04:08:55PM -0500, Zev Sero via Avodah wrote:
> You have it backwards.   The premise Reb Joel proposed was that slavery
> might be something that halacha doesn't really like; it deals with it only
> because it has to, but it is not to be encouraged.

And I provided the Chinukh, which says that while slavery is a negative,
releasing someone who already was an eved has the offsetting bigger
negative of creating a likely sinful Jew.

> My reply is that if that were the case, the halacha would not forbid freeing
> a slave...

Unless the prohibition isn't about slavery being good, but that there
is another factor that itself would be worse. You're taking something
that was deemed the lesser evil and calling it outright moral.


And last, halakhah isn't morality. There is Hilkhos Dei'os, which
obligates one to be moral, but most of morality is subsumed under ve'asisa
hatov vehayashar. With no specific black-letter din what that consists
of in your particular situation.

Halakhah provides data points one can use to deduce values. But
experimental data isn't the actual moral principle. No more than timing
given objects falling is Newton's Law of Gravitation.

Sticking to that mashal, the Chinukh seems to be saying the parallel to:
"Feathers are subject to wind drag." Whereas Zev supposes something
more akin to, "Gravity pulls different objects different amounts." The
nimshal to the feather's wind drag is the undesirability of creating a
sinning Jew, and clouds the results too much to determine anything about
gravit... I mean slavery.

Tir'u baTov!
-Micha

-- 
Micha Berger                 "Someday I will do it." - is self-deceptive. 
http://www.aishdas.org/asp   "I want to do it." - is weak. 
Author: Widen Your Tent      "I am doing it." - that is the right way.
- https://amzn.to/2JRxnDF                 - Reb Menachem Mendel of Kotzk

From today's OU Kosher Halacha Yomis


Q. This Sunday evening, December 4th, 2022, we begin reciting V?sain Tal
Umatar in the Shmoneh Esrei of Maariv. What happens if one forgot to say
V?sain Tal Umatar and what is the halacha if one is uncertain?

A. If a person said ?v?sain bracha? instead of ?v?sain tal umatar livracha?
and he realized his error after ending Shmoneh Esrei, the entire Shmoneh
Esrei must be repeated.


If the error was caught while in the middle of Shmoneh Esrei, corrective
action may be taken by inserting the phrase of v?sain tal umatar livracha
in the bracha of Shema Koleinu, before the words ?Ki ata shomeiya?.
However, if the bracha of Shema Koleinu was already completed, the
individual must return to the beginning of the bracha of Bareich Aleinu and
use the proper phrase of v?sain tal umatar.


What if a person does not remember if he said v?sain bracha or v?sain tal
umatar? Since he has no recollection, we assume the bracha was recited
without thought, out of habit, in the manner that he was accustomed to
saying it. Halacha assumes that habits of davening are established with
thirty days of repetition. As such, up until thirty days from December 4th,
it can be assumed that the wrong phrase (v?sain bracha) was used, and
Shmoneh Esrei must be repeated. After thirty days have elapsed, when in
doubt, Shmoneh Esrei need not be repeated. It can be assumed that v?sain
tal umatar was said out of habit and second nature.


The Mishna Berura (114:38) qualifies this last halacha and says that if the
person intended to say ?v?sain tal umatar? in Shmoneh Esrei, and later in
the day he cannot remember what he said, he need not repeat Shmoneh Esrei.
This is because it can be assumed that he recited the bracha properly,
since that was his intent. The fact that he cannot remember is
inconsequential because people do not typically remember such details after
a significant amount of time has passed. Rav Shlomo Zalman Auerbach, zt?l
(Shmiras Shabbos Kehilchoso 57:17) notes that each person?s memory span is
different. For someone whose memory is poor, the last halacha would apply
even if one cannot remember soon after reciting Shemoneh Esrei.


Professor Yitzchok Levine

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> Rav Belsky explained that there are two heaters in an electric urn. The
> larger heater turns on when the urn is filled with cold water. Once the
> proper temperature is reached, the first heater turns off and a second
> smaller heater turns on to maintain the temperature.
>

Rav Belsky never saw my electric urn or he would no doubt have paskened
differently. In fact every electric urn I have ever owned  (perhaps five or
six, made by at least two different manufacturers) had but a single
element, operated via a simple bimetallic thermostat. I suppose things may
be different in the US where you use lower voltages, but I'm frankly
surprised that a manufacturer would use such a complicated apparatus
instead of the simple design I'm familiar with.
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On Wed, Nov 30, 2022 at 05:10:49PM -0500, Micha Berger via Avodah wrote:
> We get a parallel issue in halakhah. Where it looks like the din changed,
> but really some aspect of the situation is new and the old pesaq doesn't
> really apply to the same case. One would not say that precedent is violated
> and the halakhah itself changed; the metzi'us did.

I gave a mashal on my blog.

Following the Torah ought to be like being a Focault's Pendulum. This
is a pendulum, typically found in science museums (or for a while, I had
a small model on my desk) that continues to swing back and forth on the
same plane, but because the world turns, it looks to the observer like
the pendulum slowly changes its axis as the day progresses. And the museum
would put pegs or such for the pendulum to knock down every 15 minutes
or something to illustrate the point.

The Torah itself doesn't change, the world changes under it.

I'm saying it's not the values that change, it's the context we assess
them in. What misleads people is that so much of that context is taken
for granted.

In the blog post
<https://aspaqlaria.aishdas.org/2015/09/03/my-life-as-pendulum>
I linked this to the tannaim who were asked how they merited long life
and answered "miyamei lo..." (Megillah 28) Writing something about
the value of consistency, and what consistency means.

The introduction to the Ein Yaakov has a machloqes about the Torah's
kelal gadol in hiwch (1) Ben Zomas says "Shema Yisrael", (2) Ben Nanas
says "ve'ahavta lerei'akha" and then (3) R Shimon ben Pazi saying it was
a pasuq about the Qorban Tamid:

    Rabbi Shimon ben Pazi says: We have found a more inclusive verse
    than that, and it is, "The first lamb you shall sacrifice in
    the morning and the second lamb you shall sacrifice in the
    evening." (Shemos 29:39, Bamidbar 28:4)
    Rabbi Ploni stood up and said: The halachah is like Ben Pazi, as it
    is written, "As all that I show you, the structure of the Mishkan
    and all its vessels, so shall you do." (Shemos 25:9)

It seems Rabbi Anonymous (Ploni) is saying that we are supposed to
learn our middos from the mishkan's structure and avodah. And that in
particular, RSbP's learning the steadfast consistency to our values is
exemplary of the Torah's central principle.

Tir'u baTov!
-Micha

-- 
Micha Berger                 You want to know how to paint a perfect
http://www.aishdas.org/asp   painting?  It's easy.
Author: Widen Your Tent      Make yourself perfect and then just paint
- https://amzn.to/2JRxnDF    naturally.              -Robert Pirsig


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