Avodah Mailing List

Volume 36: Number 6

Thu, 11 Jan 2018

• 1. Should One Go To Shul Today? (M Cohen)
• 2. Napoleon (David Riceman)
• 3. Pesak vs Eitzah (Micha Berger)
• 4. Re: Be Careful With What You Say in Lashon HaKodesh (Zalman Alpert)
• 5. Re: Should One Go To Shul Today? (Rich, Joel)
• 6. Dina D'Malchusa Dina (Professor L. Levine)
• 7. Source of Emunah (Micha Berger)
• 8. Pets on Shabbos, according to R' Asher Weiss (Micha Berger)
• 9. Re: Source of Emunah (Lisa Liel)
• 10. Brisker Methodology (Rich, Joel)
• 11. Psak recognizing human nature? (Rich, Joel)
• 12. Re: Source of Emunah (Micha Berger)
• 13. Re: Source of Emunah (Lisa Liel)
• 14. Re: Source of Emunah (Micha Berger)

RAM wrote ..I did not go to shul for maariv last night, precisely because of
the weather and safety issues. However, I was very conflicted about this..

I don't know of any obligation to doven maariv b'tzibur. 

The obligation of b'tzibur only applies to tefilot that were 'obligatory' ie
incl chazaras hashas.

Shacharis, musaf, mincha

Mordechai Cohen




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Some friends and I are (very slowly) studying some classics of mahshavah. 
We?ve recently moved boldly into the Napoleonic era by studying Tanya, with
Nefesh HaHayyim to follow (DV).  Last night we looked at chapters 10-12.

Here are two claims I think he made:

  1: There is a large group of people who never do anything wrong by commission or omission, and a smaller group who never desire to do anything wrong.

  2: One transitions into these groups, not via Torah uMitzvos, but via enthusiasm ("rishpei shalheves mislaheves? in chapter 9).

The problems are:

(a)  I know of no precedents for these opinions (see Koheles 7:20, Mishlei 24:16)

(b)  While I?m woefully ignorant of Hassidic literature, I also know of no one who accepts this opinion.

Can someone cite precedents and influences?

Thanks,

David Riceman

One of the issues that come up in the discussions about women as rabbis
is the formal definition of hora'ah. If someone (like myself) wishes to
claim that there is a qualitative difference between hora'ah given by a
rav and advice given by someone else, it's kind of important to pin down
the nafqa mina lemaaseh.

Well, AhS Yomi seems to have touched on one such difference -- CM 25:5.
CM 25 discusses when a BD can reverse its decision. If the error is in
established halakhah, yes. But if it's in a subject that required shiqul
hadaas... it depends on whether the dayanim are stam Jews, mumchim, or
the gadol sheba'ir.

But in se'if 5 he writes about mistakes in issur veheter, and how hora'ah
differs from din.

If a mumcheh gives hora'ah that follows a valid shitah that happens
not to be the shitah that was nispasheit, it's hora'ah and he cannot
normally back out. (Without the backing of a gadol dechakham yafeh, as
he has more authority to define the town's pesaqim).

Hora'ah isn't just informing someone of the din. It *creates* a din.
His words are what defines which valid answer is the correct one.
In contrast, your learned friend giving advice can err. Even if every
other chicken in your town in this condition would be kosher, this
chicken is treif.

Tir'u baTov!
-Micha

-- 
Micha Berger             Take time,
mi...@aishdas.org        be exact,
http://www.aishdas.org   unclutter the mind.
Fax: (270) 514-1507            - Rabbi Simcha Zissel Ziv, Alter of Kelm

On Jan 8, 2018 5:02 AM, "Professor L. Levine" <llev...@stevens.edu> wrote:
> The following is from page 45 of Lashon HaKodesh, History, Holiness, &
> Hebrew by Rabbi Reuven Chaim Klein.
...
> *Based on this concept, Rabbi Aharon Roth (1893-1946) and Rabbi Yoel*
> *Teitelbaum note that a verbal sin (e.g., immoral speech, slander,
> blasphemy) committed in Lashon HaKodesh is a much more serious offense than
> such a sin committed in any another language.*

Strange because the Satmarer rebbe notes in all his seforim that the
languagr of the Zionists and Israel is not loshon kodesh but Ivrit and thus
it hasno kefusha see his maamar ladhon kodesh for an in depth treatment

I don't know of any obligation to doven maariv b'tzibur.

The obligation of b'tzibur only applies to tefilot that were 'obligatory' ie
incl chazaras hashas.
----------
I think it's a bit more complex than that, see the following link for more detail:
Kt
Joel rich

https://www.ou.org/torah/machshava/tzarich-iyun/tzarich_iyun_davening_with_a_minyan/
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There are some within the Orthodox community who claim that

Dina D'Malchusa Dina does not apply in a democracy.  They are wrong.


For a detailed discussion of this topic with examples of how it applies to our lives, see

https://www.google.com/url?...<;https://disq.us/url?url=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.google.com%2Furl%3Fsa%3Dt%26rct%3Dj%26q%3D%26esrc%3Ds%26source%3Dweb%26cd%3D1%26cad%3Drja%26uact%3D8%26ved%3D0ahUKEwjFnOm0_8rYAhXQUd8KHQiwCzAQFggpMAA%26url%3Dhttp%253A%252F%252Fwww.workplacehalacha.com%252Fwp-content%252Fuploads%252F2014%252F12%252FChapter-23-Dina-DeMalchusa.pdf%26usg%3DAOvVaw3xGJkFcDbo14GG1AV5TaEu%3ALn-FRZmcFdjlzAYmP87dtR_mYsI&;cuid=1406015>

or https://goo.gl/dLGcRi<;https://disq.us/url?url=https%3A%2F%2Fgoo.gl%2FdLGcRi%3Axmb3HAC-cWxwM9zgP3NpMRjLizE&;cuid=1406015>


Prof. Levine

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I have long argued that emunah doesn't come from philosophical proofs or
other intellectual arguments. All such proofs are build upon a set of
givens. Therefore no matter how stong a proof may seem to one person,
there will be another person who doesn't find its givens compelling,
or even likely.

As the Chaver says in Kuzari 1:13:
    That which you talk about is religion based on speculation and
    methodolgy, the research of thought, but open to many doubts. Now
    ask the philosophers, and you will find that they do not agree on
    any 1 action or 1 principle, since some doctrines can be established
    by arguments, which are only partially satisfactory, and still much
    less capable of being proved.

So how do people believe? Because what is proven, or at least the givens
on which the argument is based fits the world as the person experiences it.

And so, we never really know for certain if our proofs are solid. If they
read conclusions we already expect, we can miss errors. And if they reach
conclusions that don't fit our experience, we find errors that may or may
not be real.

This is where cynical remarks about kiruv and a good chulent come from.
Because it's the experience of Shabbos that convinces, the acceptance of
the proof follows.


More recently R/Dr Moshe Koppel started a blog, "Judaism without Apologies".
His discussion is in terms of archetypes. The three central ones are:
Shimen: raised a Gerer chassid, his life still revolves around the shteibl
and its gang of regulars.
Heidi: typical "Tikkun Olam" liberal Jew
Amber: the Post-Modern child of a Heidi

And he uses them to contrast where each obtains their ethics, who they
think should be charged with responsitibility, and to explain why Shimen's
system is the more effective. (Hopefully, that will convince you to spend
the time to read the blog.)

R/D MK just started a new section of posts on faith. Of course you know
by this point I'm going to point out how eloquaently he posts a position
much like my own. See <http://j.mp/2qSyET1> or
<https://moshekoppel.wordpress.com/2018/01/07/jewish-belief-round-1>
It begins:

   Jewish Belief: Round 1

   For the past 25 posts, I have been harping on the differences between
   Shimen's and Heidi's respective values and traditions. One frequent
   objection I've gotten is that I should be talking about their beliefs,
   not their lifestyles. After all, aren't the disagreements between
   Shimen and Heidi about how to live merely second-order differences
   that follow inevitably from their irreconcilable beliefs about nature,
   history and theology?

   Well, if you insist, we can talk about these irreconcilable differences
   of belief. But, I've got to tell you right up front that the answer
   to your semi-rhetorical question is (spoiler alert!) no. Young Shimen
   didn't contemplate nature and history and conclude, like our forefather
   Abraham, that there must be a "ruler of the castle". He was raised to
   honor particular values and traditions long before he had the most
   rudimentary ability to contemplate the stuff of belief. And among
   the traditions that he honors is the affirmation of certain claims
   about the world.

   Simply put, the direction of the causality implicit in the question
   above is exactly backwards: in fact, values and traditions are primary
   and beliefs are derivative. This raises lots of obvious questions
   (how can we choose to believe something?) all of which we'll get to
   soon enough. For now, I want to briefly outline, in a perfectly naive
   way, traditional Jewish beliefs about the world. In subsequent posts,
   we'll take a deeper dive and reconsider both the content and nature
   of traditional Jewish belief...

Tir'u baTov!
-Micha

-- 
Micha Berger             The same boiling water
mi...@aishdas.org        that softens the potato, hardens the egg.
http://www.aishdas.org   It's not about the circumstance,
Fax: (270) 514-1507      but rather what you are made of.

The teshuvah is at https://en.tvunah.org/2018/01/07/pets-on-shabbat

Interestingly, before even getting to heterim based on tza'ar ba'alei
chaim, R Asher Weiss discusses whether the concept of animals being
muqatzah even applies to pets. Tosafos (Shabbos 45b "hakhah") quotes
R"R Yoseif that a live chick, since it is used to entertain a crying
baby, may be carried on Shabbos. However, they end up rejecting that
shitah, and in Mes' Beitzah (2a "dilma") they say it's a muqtza gamor.

Shu"t Halakhos Qetanos (1:45) raises the question of carying a bird
to chear up a baby and doesn't quote the Tosafos in Shabbos. (RAW is
surprised.) Instead he brings Tos BM (36b "peirei") about shor and chamor
being keilim -- the focus being about qinyan chalifin, but he concludes
this would also be true to exclude them from muqatza.

And Chiqrei Leiv (OC 1:59) limits this to a shor ha'omeid lacharishah.
Unlike the bird, which isn't omeid for chearing up babies.

RAW questions the extrapolation from qinyan chalipin to muqtza.

The Or Zarua #81 permits tiltul of songbirds that are kept for singing.
But in the next siman (#82) quotes Teshuvas haRash who was unhappy to be
meiqil for baalei chai, like pebbles (even those in your own yard) --
they aren't really keilim.

So, machloqes rishonim. R"R Yoseif and Halakhos Qetanos say usable
animals are not muqtza. The Rosh says they are plausibly not muqtza,
but it's a qula he's unhappy relying on. The Chiqrei Leiv and Or Zarua
permit animals like pets, if they are designated for use like a keli.

RAW then explores the concept of lo pelug, and whether one can be meiqil
on pets, or whether we should (like the Rosh) assume lo peluq.

First then RAW discusses the topic I expected to hear about, tzaar ballei
chaim. He has a fine survey, but of ideas I had encountered before (and
therefore think it's likely you did too). See the link.

Tir'u baTov!
-Micha

-- 
Micha Berger             I always give much away,
mi...@aishdas.org        and so gather happiness instead of pleasure.
http://www.aishdas.org           -  Rachel Levin Varnhagen
Fax: (270) 514-1507

Aside from the fact that I disagree with your equating emunah and 
belief, you're overgeneralizing.? It might be correct to say that *for 
some people*, it's the experience of Shabbos that convinces, and the 
acceptance of the proof follows, but it's certainly not the case for 
everyone.

Lisa

On 1/11/2018 12:27 AM, Micha Berger via Avodah wrote:
> I have long argued that emunah doesn't come from philosophical proofs or
> other intellectual arguments. All such proofs are build upon a set of
> givens. Therefore no matter how stong a proof may seem to one person,
> there will be another person who doesn't find its givens compelling,
> or even likely.
>
> ...
>
> This is where cynical remarks about kiruv and a good chulent come from.
> Because it's the experience of Shabbos that convinces, the acceptance of
> the proof follows.
>


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I'd welcome some feedback on some Brisker methodology thoughts. Brisker
dialectics sometimes seem like Newtonian physics(more Boolean in
nature-there are 2 dinim or two explanations and it's 100% one or the
other), which explains a lot, but not all, the data. I wonder if a more
quantum mechanics, less Boolean approach might explain more (but be much
more difficult to prove).

KT
Joel Rich

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Interesting example of psak reflecting human nature- Kohanim don't leave
the duchen before kaddish because of the minhag of saying Yasher Koach (and
thus people won't answer the required kaddish responses) So how is it
decided when to educate and when to have workarounds?
KT
Joel Rich

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On Thu, Jan 11, 2018 at 09:57:20AM +0200, Lisa Liel wrote:
: Aside from the fact that I disagree with your equating emunah and
: belief, you're overgeneralizing.? It might be correct to say that
: *for some people*, it's the experience of Shabbos that convinces,
: and the acceptance of the proof follows, but it's certainly not the
: case for everyone.

Well, even if you follow the Rambam that emunah is knowledge, "knowledge"
in the Rambam's universe is "justified and true belief". So you need
belief in there either way. The Rambam insists that the justification
must be philosophical proof. He rules out trusting mesorah (which I would
wall a kind of reliabilism), believing because one trusts ones teachers
explicitly.

(And if you side with the Rambam about knowledge, do you agree with him
[last ch. of the Moreh], that perfection of knowldge is a higher ideal
than perfection of character? That it is knowledge that causes one to
have a place in the World to come [Hil' Teshuvah 8:2-3], that earns on
hashgachah peratis [Moreh 3:18], and knowledge that makes one capable of
prophecy [1:2, see the opening 2 chapters also about Adam haRishon and
knowledge as human perfection]? The Rambam's attitude toward knowledge
is so distinctly Aristotilian. <http://www.aishdas.org/asp/akrasia>)

My problem is that few philosophers since Kant believe that solid proofs
of the sort the Rambam is talking about are even possible. The field
that studies this thing ended up (so far) siding with R' Yehudah haLevi
over the Rambam about the nature of their own field.

And few psychologists would agree with your assertion that we could
retain enough objectivity to identify a solid proof if we bumped into one.
Just as people need a motivation whether to choose whether an unanswered
question is a disproof, or to decide it's merely something interesting
to shelve for later because some answer must exist. We need motivation
to even look for that question. We need motivation to find a first
principle compelling.

Yes, the result is still knowledge according to the classical definition
-- justified, true, belief. Just that the justification for believing
the something that is true is that it accords with experience.

So yes, I feel comfortable saying that even people who think they are
believing because of proof are really believing in the authenticity of
the proof because they already believed in the conclusion. The proof
serves as chizuq emunah. But people are incapable of initiating belief
because of proof. Not some people; there are independent reasons bullt
into the limitations of philosophy, and into the human condition.

Tir'u baTov!
-Micha

-- 
Micha Berger             We look forward to the time
mi...@aishdas.org        when the power to love
http://www.aishdas.org   will replace the love of power.
Fax: (270) 514-1507                - William Ewart Gladstone

On 1/11/2018 12:45 PM, Micha Berger wrote:
> My problem is that few philosophers since Kant believe that solid proofs
> of the sort the Rambam is talking about are even possible...
> And few psychologists would agree with your assertion that we could
> retain enough objectivity to identify a solid proof if we bumped into one.
...
> Yet, the result is still knowledge according to the classical definition
> -- justified, true, belief. Just that the justification for believing
> the something that is true is that it accords with experience.
>
> So yes, I feel comfortable saying that even people who think they are
> believing because of proof are really believing in the authenticity of
> the proof because they already believed in the conclusion...

I have to disagree again. Belief is emotional. Conviction is, at least
ideally, rational/intellectual. I would maintain that the latter is a much
better fit for the Hebrew emunah, derived as it is from emet, or truth.

Labeling something as Aristotelian doesn't mean it's wrong. Even a
broken Greek can be right twice a day. As far as knowledge vs character,
I think it's a false dichotomy. Both are vital. Neither one is enough
by itself. Whistling in shul instead of davening may indicate belief,
but I don't think it actually indicates emunah. You might guess that
Hassidut isn't exactly my cup of tea.

However, I recognize that there are those for whom Hassidut is precisely
their cup of tea. The fact that I feel otherwise doesn't mean I dismiss
them as not existing. You seem to be doing just that when you say that
kishkes are the real source of Judaism for everyone, and that everything
else comes later.

I also have a problem with most philosophers, so saying that they believe
(there's that word again) that solid proofs may not even be possible
is like saying that they question objective reality. Sure they do. Or
at least they claim to. I think that when push comes to shove, none of
them would step off the top of the Empire State Building because the
reality of what that would result in isn't objective enough for them.

And lest the social "sciences" get neglected, I find the idea that our
perceptions of reality are "our reality" to be laughable, and very, very
20th/21st century in their solipsism. Just because many psychologists
think that doesn't make it so. Rather than call psychology a "social
science" (implying that it's fundamentally a science, but of the social
sort), I'd call it a field of applied philosophy (implying that it is
fundamentally not a science, but only a kind of mental game).

To get more concrete and less theoretical, you know me. You must
know that I have no emotional draw to a Torah life. If anything, the
opposite is true. And yes, most people I know in similar situations
do come up with reasons for disbelieving in the Torah b'dieved, after
they're already OTD. Which is a data point in favor of your theory.
But as I said, it's not universal. If it was, I would have no emunah,
and that's clearly not the case.

Lisa

On Thu, Jan 11, 2018 at 01:30:29PM +0200, Lisa Liel wrote:
: I have to disagree again. Belief is emotional. Conviction is, at least
: ideally, rational/intellectual. I would maintain that the latter is a much
: better fit for the Hebrew emunah, derived as it is from emet, or truth.

It was Plato who first defined knowledge as "justified true belief".
Aristo agreed, and so I assumed the Rambam did as well. Until the Gettier
Problem, this was the standard definition of knowledge. And Edmund Gettier
is still alive.

You might think of emotionally founded belief when you use the word. But
I told you I am talking about "belief" in the sense of "justified true
belief". My point of contention is that philosophical proof, or any
argument from first principles, doesn't work as justification. People end
up choosing which proofs they find compelling.

What I am saying is that deeply held beliefs, like religion (or the
superiority of vi over Emacs <grin>) are generally justified by first-hand
experience. And so it's experience that make those beliefs instances of
knowledge. That's not about emotion. After all, it's experience, not
emotion, that justify my belief that my tefillin batim are black. It's
not philosophically proven knowledge, but it's knowledge.

Similarly, it's the redemptive experience of a well-done Shabbos, or the
aesthetic beauty of a good piece of lomdus or the like that justify
my belief in the revalatory nature of halakhah and of Torah in general.
Those experiences turn the belief into knowledge. They are also what
make me willing to accept the proofs that further buttress and provide
more confidence in my knowledge. To accept the givens those proofs
are based upon. And to shelve attempted arguments against as interesting
open questions, rather than thinking they could realistically be
disproofs.

And I don't think there is a single school, orientation or modality of
psychology that would question this.

: Labeling something as Aristotelian doesn't mean it's wrong...

No, but pointing out that the idea was dismissed by people who study
and critique Aristo for a living does mean you shouldn't be so quick
to accept it. Even if the Rambam did.

One school of thought about Aristotle's position on akrasia (why people
make decisions they know are bad) is that he believes that bad choices
came from bad opinions. Rather than mussar's discussion of hergel, taavah,
and nequdas habechirah (that there are decisions made preconsciously,
without fee will). Or the typical psychological approach seeing reasn
and emotion in a two-way feedback loop. I argue in
<http://www.aishdas.org/asp/akrasia> that this belief that proper opions
is what leads to good behavior and proper dei'os is what underlies the
Rambam's focus on knowledge as the key to personal redemption.


:                                        As far as knowledge vs character,
: I think it's a false dichotomy. Both are vital.

I believe Chazal are clear that we are judged by our character. Knowledge
is vital -- as a handmaiden for character. You won't emulate G-d without
knowing something about Him. And even in a two-directional feedback loop,
there is still knowledge's role as cause of emotion (c.f. CBT).

...
: I also have a problem with most philosophers, so saying that they believe
: (there's that word again) that solid proofs may not even be possible
: is like saying that they question objective reality. Sure they do. Or
: at least they claim to. I think that when push comes to shove, none of
: them would step off the top of the Empire State Building because the
: reality of what that would result in isn't objective enough for them.

You are equating knowing a reality with philosophically proving it from
first principles. I am "only" dismissing the latter. Which is not only
the commonly accepted position among people who do epistomology, it's
R' Yehudah haLevi as well.

: And lest the social "sciences" get neglected, I find the idea that our
: perceptions of reality are "our reality" to be laughable, and very, very
: 20th/21st century in their solipsism...

All this is non-sequitur.

: To get more concrete and less theoretical, you know me. You must
: know that I have no emotional draw to a Torah life....

And, as I said about your detour into Chassidus, we aren't talking about
knowledge "justified" on emotion.

Tir'u baTov!
-Micha

-- 
Micha Berger             When faced with a decision ask yourself,
mi...@aishdas.org        "How would I decide if it were Ne'ilah now,
http://www.aishdas.org   at the closing moments of Yom Kippur?"
Fax: (270) 514-1507                            - Rav Yisrael Salanter


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