Avodah Mailing List

Volume 35: Number 120

Tue, 10 Oct 2017

• 1. Re: OU paper (Noam Stadlan)
• 2. Re: going to the amud (Michael Poppers)
• 3. Re: Eruv Tavshilin - who makes it? (Zev Sero)
• 4. Re: Eruv Tavshilin - who makes it? (Akiva Miller)
• 5. Re: Eruv Tavshilin - who makes it? (Micha Berger)
• 6. Re: OU paper (Micha Berger)
• 7. Re: OU paper (Noam Stadlan)
• 8. Re: OU paper (Micha Berger)
• 9. Re: future impact of deeds (Micha Berger)
• 10. Re: Oseh Hashalom (Micha Berger)

R. Micha- thank you for taking the time to read the paper.  Having read
your list of criticisms, I think that in your search for reasons to oppose,
you missed many of the points completely.  Poskim are certainly entitled to
their opinions. They are not entitled to their own facts.  If their logic
doesn't hold up, it is reasonable to call them on the lack of logic.  Which
is why the paper is NOT about my opinions versus the OU 7, but about the
lack of facts and logic.  Furthermore, I illustrated that what poskim hold
regarding these issues isn't always or exclusively a result of all their
learning and shimmush.  It is a demonstrable fact that many attitudes
reflect what they grew up with and were indoctrinated with early on, not
the list of influences that they write about.

You dismiss my quote regarding REB, and claim that it is my responsibility
to prove what the motives are or aren't.  This is ridiculous.  The OU
authors did not talk to any of the principles involved.  Since when is it
acceptable for any responsible posek or beit din to make important
judgments without making absolutely sure regarding the facts?  Especially
when they are making a significant deal about motivation and  it would have
been a very simple matter of making a phone call or two.  Isn't that a
basic obligation of a posek?  And then to claim that it is my
responsibility to prove that they were wrong?  And, by the way, since I
personally know many of the people involved, I have a much greater
familiarity with what people involved think.

I suggest that if you think that an organization with 'feminism' in its
name is inherently problematic, we may be starting from basic assumptions
far to wide apart  to see any common ground.

The OU paper wrote about Mesorah versus modern values.  I was just using
their words and addressing the role of modern values in how Halacha and
values have changed.  The fact that they define Mesorah a bit differently
doesn't change the issue nor change the fact that modern values have always
been incorporated into the Halakhah and Halakhic values(in case you dont
want to use the word Mesorah).  And to counter your point, some of the
ancient values have gone out the window, whether you want to call them
mesoretic or not.

I didn't have time to get into all the particulars of the halachic aspects
of the Rama and shechittah,   R. Brody and Broyde address and dismiss the
argument in their paper(I am pretty sure that is in a footnote somewhere).
I thought it was adequate to illustrate that he was factually wrong.


I could go on and on but I sense that in the end it will not matter.  I
would have to go through each and every line of your critique and point out
where your assumptions are wrong.  For example "JOFA....seeking value in
the same sorts of roles and activities".  NO, that is not what JOFA is
about.  It is about not creating Halachic boundaries when there shouldn't
be any, and the women can decide what roles and activities they can and
should assume(within Halacha of course, just like the men).  And what is
wrong with  anyone finding value in learning Torah, teaching Torah, helping
people celebrate s'machot, organizing davening, etc? women should not find
value in that????



Thank you again for taking the time to read the paper.
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In Avodah V35n119, RJR wrote:
> I also wonder about why the practice of sending youngsters up developed
given the S?A?s psak concerning the priorities for a chazzan. <
(RJR made other points that listmembers have responded to; I thought this
point, for which the latest digest listed no response, was worthy of a
response.)
In many *shuls*, much less *minyanim*, so perhaps in the noted "chareidi
shul in RBS", those "priorities" (married, beard, age, etc.) are seemingly
(except for the Yamim Noraim) secondary to the hierarchy of "*chiyuvim*"...but
one "priority", being "*m'rutzah laqahal*", might be upheld when
appointing/allowing a young adult to lead the *tzibbur*....

*Gut Moeid*/*Mo'adim l'Simcha!*
and all the best from
*Michael Poppers* * Elizabeth, NJ, USA
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On 09/10/17 12:44, Akiva Miller via Avodah wrote:

> Note: I admit there's a certain weakness in everything that I've written 
> above. Namely, the idea that one can rely on the Eruv Tavshilin that was 
> made by the rav of the town. Let's set aside the fact that this is not 
> the best way of doing the eruv, and that various conditions are imposed 
> on one who wants to rely on it. Let's focus on the fact that it is valid 
> *at* *all*. How does the eruv made by someone outside of my home help 
> me? What sort of *reminder* does his eruv provide? I have never 
> understood this, nor have I heard any explanation of it, only assertions 
> that it does work. Any help in this area would be appreciated.

IIRC the gemara offers two explanations for ET.  Either it was made 
lichvod Shabbos or lichvod Yomtov.

The first explanation is that cooking on Yomtov for Shabbos was always 
done by pretending to be cooking for a late Friday meal, but Chazal felt 
about the Shabbos after Yomtov the way many nowadays do about the 
Shabbos after Thanksgiving: that it's wrong to rely entirely on 
leftovers, and one must prepare at least one thing just for Shabbos. 
According to this explanation, the fact that one must ask the rabbi (or 
the neighbor, or whomever) before relying on their eruv accomplishes the 
same thing. One has provided for Shabbos, not by cooking but by 
arranging an invitation to eat out.

The second explanation is that originally there was no ha`arama; it was 
permitted to openly cook on Yomtov for Shabbos.  Chazal legislated that 
one must save Yomtov's face by pretending to be cooking for that day. 
According to this explanation it's very simple; the important thing is 
not the eruv itself, but the need for the ha`arama.   The eruv's 
function is merely to give the ha`arama some surface plausibility.  So 
it makes no difference whose eruv one uses; the fact that one is 
pretending not to be cooking for Shabbos *is* the kevod Yomtov that 
Chazal required.   The enabling notion that on Shabbos one will be 
eating the rabbi's eruv is only barely less plausible than the one that 
one will be subsisting on ones own eruv.


-- 
Zev Sero                May 2017, with its *nine* days of Chanukah,
z...@sero.name           be a brilliant year for us all

.
I asked how one could ever rely on the Rav's eruv:
> How does the eruv made by someone outside of my home
> help me? What sort of *reminder* does his eruv provide?

R' Zev Sero answered:

> ... that it's wrong to rely entirely on leftovers, and one
> must prepare at least one thing just for Shabbos. According
> to this explanation, the fact that one must ask the rabbi
> (or the neighbor, or whomever) before relying on their eruv
> accomplishes the same thing. One has provided for Shabbos,
> not by cooking but by arranging an invitation to eat out.

I don't follow this logic at all. One who relies on this did NOT
"prepare at least one thing just for Shabbos." If you respond that the
one thing he prepared was "arranging an invitation to eat out", I will
say that he did NOT arrange such an invitation; he is merely aware
that the rabbi/neighbor had him in mind.

You write about "the fact that one must ask the rabbi", but I never
saw such a halacha. One does not need to do any sort of action at all,
not even speaking. All one needs is to be aware that the
rabbi/neighbor had him in mind. So what is being accomplished?

> The second explanation is that originally there was no ha'arama;
> it was permitted to openly cook on Yomtov for Shabbos.  Chazal
> legislated that one must save Yomtov's face by pretending to be
> cooking for that day. According to this explanation it's very
> simple; the important thing is not the eruv itself, but the need
> for the ha'arama.  The eruv's function is merely to give the
> ha'arama some surface plausibility.  So it makes no difference
> whose eruv one uses; the fact that one is pretending not to be
> cooking for Shabbos *is* the kevod Yomtov that Chazal required.
> The enabling notion that on Shabbos one will be eating the rabbi's
> eruv is only barely less plausible than the one that one will be
> subsisting on ones own eruv.

Focusing on the last sentence here, we agree that relying on the
rabbi's eruv is indeed less plausible than one's own. I think our
disagreement is that you feel it has a sufficient shiur of
plausibility, and I don't. Alternatively, you feel that relying on the
rabbi constitutes "pretending to be cooking for that day", but I think
it doesn't even constitute "pretending".

And this is especially true in the case where one genuinely forgot to
make the eruv, and remembered on Yom Tov; surely you'll agree with me
that this person did absolutely *nothing* before Yom Tov as a Shabbos
preparation, right? Not even to ask the rabbi to have him in mind!

Akiva Miller

On Tue, Oct 10, 2017 at 06:47:36AM -0400, Akiva Miller via Avodah wrote:
: You write about "the fact that one must ask the rabbi", but I never
: saw such a halacha. One does not need to do any sort of action at all,
: not even speaking. All one needs is to be aware that the
: rabbi/neighbor had him in mind. So what is being accomplished?

Beqitzur: "be aware" is sufficient for heker.

Can't we ask the same thing of a neighborhood eiruv? How many people
think about the eruv every week?

The Rambam (Shevisas YT 6:2) seems to me to be the reason for calling
eiruv tavshilin an "eiruv" is merely by comparison to eruv chatzeiros.
Both are hekerim: There (ECh), so that people would thing that carrying
from reshus to reshus is mutar on shabbos. Here (ET), that it is okay
to cook on YT even if it's not for YT.

Awareness that the rabbi (or whomever) had me in mind means I am thinking
about eiruvin and there is a recognition (heker) that there is an issur.

It seems the Rambam holds like R' Ashi (that ET is to reinforce melakhah
on YT) over Rava (it's to reinforce Shabbos prep). But even according
to Rava, that moment of awareness of the rabbi's eruv is sypposed to
reserve as a reminder to make something nice for se'udos Shabbos.

I would agree with Zev that the plausibility requirement is quite low,
as all we're doing is a mnemonic.

Tir'u baTov!
-Micha

-- 
Micha Berger             None of us will leave this place alive.
mi...@aishdas.org        All that is left to us is
http://www.aishdas.org   to be as human as possible while we are here.
Fax: (270) 514-1507            - Anonymous MD, while a Nazi prisoner

On Mon, Oct 09, 2017 at 08:26:41PM -0500, Noam Stadlan via Avodah wrote:
: R. Micha- thank you for taking the time to read the paper.  Having read
: your list of criticisms, I think that in your search for reasons to oppose,
: you missed many of the points completely...

As I wrote, the reply was delayed by my attempt to put down the paper
every time I thought I was reading solely for the sake of finding points
to oppose. "Fisking", as it's called. Admittedly, I could still have failed.

:                                            Poskim are certainly entitled to
: their opinions. They are not entitled to their own facts.

Which is why I didn't dispute claims of fact, such as whether women
were shochetim in Italy. I did dispute your use of a fact turning that
Rama's point into a hypothetical to deny his whole "[if] we [hadn't]
ever seen women as shochetim, we have a mesorah that woman aren't to
serve as shochetim". Yes, his given is false, but we do see the
implication statement in the Agur and the Rama. So, how do you dismiss
applying the parallel syllogism here -- since we do not have a history
of women rabbis, wouldn't the Rama's methodology mean that there is
a mesorah not to ordain women?

At least -- doesn't this topic need addressing, rather than writing that
one can ignore the whole flow of logic because the antecedent is false?

:                           Furthermore, I illustrated that what poskim hold
: regarding these issues isn't always or exclusively a result of all their
: learning and shimmush.  It is a demonstrable fact that many attitudes
: reflect what they grew up with and were indoctrinated with early on, not
: the list of influences that they write about.

But you gave up on the question of which new values pass the resonance
test mention early in the paperr and which do not. My argument is that

: You dismiss my quote regarding REB, and claim that it is my responsibility
: to prove what the motives are or aren't.

I dismiss the quote as necessarily applying to anyone but REB. It is
not like he's the communal leader or primary poseiq of the people in
question.

In particular because of the word "feminism" in JOFA's name. To which you
replied:

: I suggest that if you think that an organization with 'feminism' in its
: name is inherently problematic, we may be starting from basic assumptions
: far to wide apart  to see any common ground.

RCS summarized REB's position (on your pg 10), as being of "moral
ends derive from internal Jewish sources.... dissatisfaction with
mainstream Halakhah regarding women is rooted, not in the pressures of
contemporary egalitarianism, in his judgment about biblical conceptions
of justice." (ellision yours)

But JOFA's name is taken from "contemporary egalitarianism".

I am not saying it's inherently problematic. I am saying it creates
the likelihood of a gap between REB's position and JOFA's attitude,
one that then creates a burden of proof you didn't take up.

In short I am saying that:

1- Feminism assumes egalitarianism, not only equality, as it assumes that
roles historically closed to women as "men's roles" should be open to all.
Equality only assumes that everyone should be eligible for roles of equal
value. (For some measure of value.)

2- Feminism assumes Locke's language of rights and priviledge. Why should
someone *be deprived* of the opportunity to be an .... -- in our case, to
serve as rabbi?

But halachic values aren't framed in these terms. (At least not in
general; I can think of notions like geneivas da'as, gezel shinah or
tovas han'ah as exceptions.)

Rather, the rabbinate is supposed to be a burden. Even if it is really
being treated as an honor, the value which would differentiate between
a positive halachic change and one that is anti-mesoretic would be that
of duty, not opportunity.

3- Making the argument that feminist egalitarian opportunity is or is not
resonant with mesoretic values requires those guys with shimush, as it is
an art. Your counter-argument is on the wrong plane for discussing the
topic of the first section of your paper -- "mesorah".

... And we don't even agree on how RIETS-trained rabbis are most likely
to use the word "mesorah" to agree on what we're debating!

Tir'u baTov!
-Micha

-- 
Micha Berger             Man is equipped with such far-reaching vision,
mi...@aishdas.org        yet the smallest coin can obstruct his view.
http://www.aishdas.org                         - Rav Yisrael Salanter
Fax: (270) 514-1507

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Take 2. I didn't like what I read in the Avodah queue, so I rejected my
first version and elaborated.


On Tue, Oct 10, 2017 at 10:53:24AM -0500, Noam Stadlan via Avodah wrote:
:> 1- Feminism assumes egalitarianism, not only equality, as it assumes that
:> roles historically closed to women as "men's roles" should be open to all.
:> Equality only assumes that everyone should be eligible for roles of equal
:> value. (For some measure of value.)

: This is starting off on the wrong foot. I dont claim to speak for all
: Orthodox Feminists. But the first question to be asked is why is a role
: 'historically closed to women?' ...

I see this as an equally valid question, but who is to say which ought to
be asked first?

REBerkowitz rightly deprecates the modification of halakhah out of
concern for external values. He dismisses the role of the "pressures
of contemporary egalitarianism." (As RSC put it.) This puts REB in a
different place than people who unite under the word "feminism" are
indeed advocating halachic change. What he denies being a valid motive
JOFA is putting in their organizational name.

:                                      It is very reasonable, just like in
: the cases of the chereish, slavery etc, to investigate why it is
: 'historically closed." ...

Which you fail to actually do. You rebut your understanding of some
arguments for why the clsure is grounded in mesorah. After all, this is
a rebuttal paper.

The one mention of an alternative motive for change, rather than a lack
of motive for status quo, is one that is inconsistent with feminism,
as above.

: litany of reasons as to why women were forbidden to do things and he
: himself agreed that those reasons have gone by the wayside.  If you want to
: say that something is historically closed, and therefore it is assur-
: fine.  Now you dont need an Halachic reasons, because historically closed
: is the final word....

Strawman. I am not asserting that we have to hold like the Rama that being
historically closed means the option is halachically closed; identifying
history with mesorah, and thus absence of tradition with tradition of absence.

I would say, though, that if you want to buck the Rama, you have to make
an argument for doing so, and not just dismiss his rule because he
applied it to a misunderstood case.

: everyone seems to be giving Halachicly justification, both pro and con,
: then it means that historically closed is open for discussion, and it is on
: the plane of halacha, not history.  So the bottom line is that if there is
: Halachic justification for particular gender roles- of course that trumps
: everything.  But it also means that stating something is historically assur
: is not the end of the story. history is not Halacha. That is what I
: illustrated in part one.  Because you could also make the same argument
: that the chereish shouldn't have an aliyyah...

Yes, I agreed with your formulation of the problem in terms of resonant
values, and at times a contemporary value can highlight the neglect of a
Torah one.

But you don't follow through with it. Instead you end up altogether
rejecting the say of mesoretic values to decide which halachic innovations
are proper.

I would add that at times a contemporary value can change expectations,
and thus change the morality of an act. After all, it may be okay to
do something to someone when they expect it, but not if it violates
assumptions behind things they committed to. I could see making that
argument WRT monogyny and the validity of cheirem deR Gershom. Mental
images of what marriage should be changed, and so it's only moral to
satisfy the resulting emotional need rather than some older definition
of marriage. As long as the definition itself isn't inferior.

To take that poorly explained idea and possibly be clearer by making it
less general and more about our case:

Perhaps one could form the argument that while it was moral for women
not to be eligable for the rabbinate in the past because it was less
likely for the option to cross their minds. Such a practice would
cause fewer feelings of deprevation. But now that women can become CEO,
such a position does mesoretically-wrongly create feelings of deprivation.
And so societal change causes a change in application of values; just as
it can an application of law.

This is pretty close to an argument you do indeed make.

Just (as below), I don't think having a role is a right, because I do
not believe religious roles are as much opportunities as they are
duties. Unlike secular roles, which could be either, depending on how
the society in question chooses to frame them.

Your neglect of the "how", which changes are valid and which not, reminds
me of the argument of non-O rabbis who point to pruzbul and heter isqa as
justifications for their radical changes. It's not the same thing by a
lng shot. But half-way through you make the same error of considering
proof that there are valid kinds of change as proof that the topic in
question provides no barriers to change altogether.

As you say in this same paragraph (!):
:                                               Any role that is historically
: closed to any group that isn't Halachically assur is open for discussion as
: to what the Halacha actually mandates and why exactly it was closed in the
: first place....

So, it's black-letter law closure, or the change is allowed? No "resonance
of values" needed after all?

And the problem with demanding "resonance of values" is that it takes the
autonomy out of it for most of us. Because by enlarging the problem beyond
black letter halakhah we guarantee there is a non-formal aspect to the
answer, one that is for the practiced artist rather than any bright
researcher.

And the notion that one is validating a value system that then sets the
person up for a very hard collision with the actual not-so-glass ceiling
black-letter halakhah defines is very related to this. The mere existence
of such a ceiling implies the likelihood of non-resonant values.

The concept of asei lekha rav, having a poseiq, moves us away from
autonomy in our behavioral decisions, and forces a heteronomy of a manner
that too violates contemporary values.


:> 2- Feminism assumes Locke's language of rights and priviledge. Why should
:> someone *be deprived* of the opportunity to be an .... -- in our case, to
:> serve as rabbi? But halachic values aren't framed in these terms...

: Being a rabbi is fulfilling the mitzvah of service to the community, talmud
: torah etc.  Whether it is a burden or an opportunity, it is a mitzvah and
: a choice of profession and communal service...

But asking about opportunity and opening doors is inherently asking
different value questions than the mesoretic ones. It's not just ancient
that we frame our moral choices in terms of duty to others and the Other,
it's mesoretic.

: Furthermore, the OU paper went way beyond opposing rabbis. they forbid a
: woman from officiating at a baby naming or other things.  that too is a
: burden that women should be forbidden from shouldering?

This misses my point. When I spoke of rights vs duties I am talking about
the entire framing of questions of values, not this specific decision. If
the rabbinate, baby naming or whatever is a duty rather than a right,
the whole question of "limiting their options unneccessarily" goes off
the table. It's not about the right to choose a boon. Your whole question
is framed non-traditionally.

Looking at feminism as a goal is an inherently un-mesoretic way of framing
the question. Rather, the nearest mesoretic equivalent would be to ask
whether men have a duty that can only be discharged by sharing the pulpit,
"officiating at a baby naming of other things".

Feminism doesn't enter the mesoretic discussion because there is no door
to be opened or closed, there is no region of personal-expression space
to discuss whether someone is given too much or too little.

The Torah is a beris, not a bill of rights.

Tir'u baTov!
-Micha

-- 
Micha Berger             When one truly looks at everyone's good side,
mi...@aishdas.org        others come to love him very naturally, and
http://www.aishdas.org   he does not need even a speck of flattery.
Fax: (270) 514-1507                        - Rabbi AY Kook

On Wed, Sep 27, 2017 at 06:29:05PM +0000, Rich, Joel via Avodah wrote:
: In one of his shiurim, R'Reisman questioned a common (my) understanding
: of how those who are no longer with us could be judged based on the
: future impact of their deeds on an ongoing basis. The specific example
: was two individuals (A & B) separately caused two other individuals (C &
: D, who were totally equivalent) to become religious. C dies a day later,
: while D lives a long, productive, and fruitful life. Does it make sense
: that A gets more credit(schar) than B?
: 
: My answer is no, but this does not refute the basic premise. The schar
: is based on the % of their potential that C & D actualized-only HKB"H
: knows that, so, in this case in fact, A might even get more credit than B.

Who said that sekhar is indeed based on actualized potential?

"Lefum tz'ara agra", not "lefum tzalach".

And wouldn't judging someone by something out of their control violate
Middas haDin?

HOWEVER, perhaps (thinking out loud) we could invoke megalgalim zekhus
al yedei zakai to say that hashgachah peratis's choice of D's long life
includes among an infinite other factors, the ways in which his mashpia
was mora zekai.

But personally, I would question your conclusion. (But in a personal-belief
sense. Not that it doesn't require understanding in an eilu-va'eilu way.)

Tir'u baTov!
-Micha

-- 
Micha Berger             Rescue me from the desire to win every
mi...@aishdas.org        argument and to always be right.
http://www.aishdas.org              - Rav Nassan of Breslav
Fax: (270) 514-1507                   Likutei Tefilos 94:964

On Wed, Sep 27, 2017 at 10:34:34PM -0400, Akiva Miller via Avodah wrote:
: I went looking at the siddurim that were common in the shuls that I
: grew up in, and I noticed an interesting pattern: Every single one
: gave Oseh Hashalom as the closing bracha at the end of the Amidah; not
: even one suggested saying Hamevarech like the rest of the year.
: Further, every single one used the words Oseh Shalom at the ends of
: Kaddish and Elokai N'tzor; not even one suggested saying Oseh Hashalom
: during the Aseres Yemei Teshuva.
...
: My questions are these: If you're old enough to remember davening
: Ashkenaz in the 1970s or before, do you remember what was said during
: Aseres Yemei Teshuva? And do you know of any siddur from that era
: which included the newfangled text?

I know my father was saying "hamvarekh" at this time.

However, our minhagim are a hodge-podge of practices from those retained
from the Ottoman Empire before my ancestor's arrival in Litta, mainline
Litvish, R/Dr Mirsky's idiosyncricies (my grandfather came to America as
a teen, and so the rav who met him at Ellis Island was became rav of his
shul determined much of what he did), and what my father picked up Tues
nights (and from YU alumni friends) from RYBS. I did some restoration
of pre-American Biergehr minhag based on R Dovid Lifshitz's memories of
what it was.

AND that brings me to a theory... Minhagim that Chabad, Talmidei haGra
and Sepharadim have in common are bound to become Minhag EY. And Minhag
EY is bound to be known globally, at least by the 1970s.

Maybe this is just a thing that universalized faster.

Anecodtally, I notice fewer and fewer people wearing tefillin on ch"m
each year. Although Passaic, a neighborhood with some 40% BT rate, is
going to have weaker ties to minhag than ones in which more people have
childhood memories of what dad does.

I also noticed more an more shuls moving Shir shel Yom and Hoshanos
from the end of mussaf to before leining.

One thing all three of the communities that dominated the Yishuv haYashan
had in common was an attachment to Qabbalah. We may be seeing more and
more Tzefat-originating practices coming to the fore in the comming years
as a new Minhag EY (and ch"v if galus lasts long enough Minhag America)
emerges.

Much to R' Ovadiah's poshumous dismay, I would presume.

Tir'u baTov!
-Micha

-- 
Micha Berger             "I hear, then I forget; I see, then I remember;
mi...@aishdas.org        I do, then I understand." - Confucius
http://www.aishdas.org   "Hearing doesn't compare to seeing." - Mechilta
Fax: (270) 514-1507      "We will do and we will listen." - Israelites


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