Avodah Mailing List

Volume 35: Number 83

Wed, 14 Jun 2017

• 1. Re: Redemption (Lisa Liel)
• 2. Re: Shelach (Micha Berger)
• 3. Re: Meraglim and Zionists (Ben Waxman)
• 4. Re: Support? (Ilana Elzufon)
• 5. Q. Can one enter a non-kosher establishment to buy a can of soda or use the bathroom? (Professor L. Levine)
• 6. Re: Meraglim and Zionists (Micha Berger)
• 7. Re: Redemption (Akiva Miller)
• 8. Anyone have access to HaRav Sh Goren's Terumas HaGoren? (Rabbi Meir G. Rabi)
• 9. Re: Redemption (Zev Sero)
• 10. Re: Redemption (Marty Bluke)
• 11. Re: Redemption (Zev Sero)
• 12. Re: Redemption (Ben Bradley)

On 6/13/2017 2:37 PM, Akiva Miller via Avodah wrote:
> R"n Lisa Liel wrote:
>> Anything in (B) is necessarily a subjective and personal
>> judgment that should not be attributed to the Torah.

> My example of B was Lashon Hara. Would you put Lashon Hara in Category
> A (Assur D'Oraisa to talk lashon hara about non-Jews) or Category C
> (Mutar - even D'rabanan - to talk Lashon Hara about non-Jews)?

I would have to say that, by definition, if it's permissible to speak LH 
against non-Jews, it isn't immoral.  But of course there are numerous 
subcategories of LH, and it'd be interesting to see if all of them are 
mutar against non-Jews, and if so, why?

Lisa

On Sat, Jun 10, 2017 at 10:11:31PM -0400, Cantor Wolberg via Avodah wrote:
: The following is a Midrash in which God rebukes the spies:
: "I take no objection to your saying: 'we looked like grasshoppers to
: ourselves,' but I take offense when you say 'so we must have looked to
: them.' How do you know how I made you to look to them?
: Perhaps you appeared to them as angels!" (based on Numbers Rabbah 16:11).
...
: Judaism's preference of the optimist over the pessimist is made clear
: not only by what the Torah has to say on the subject of the spies
: but even more so by the first remark attributed to the Creator upon
: His completion of the work of creation. "And God saw all the He made,
: and behold it was very good..." (Gen. 1:31).

Good -- is the yeitzer hatov,
*very* good -- is the yeitzer hara.

But in any case, the spies are an imperfect example, because they had
G-d's promise that this specific mission would succeed.

We don't have such reason to be optimistic.

Related: I wonder if the difference between Chassidic or the Alter of
Novhardok's view of bitchon is related to history. The AoN said that
sufficient bitachon generates success, to the extent that he felt that
being a "baal bitachon is an objective reality provable by experience and
he signed his name with a B"B without fear of it being bragging. The CI's
view is that bitachon is not prognostic, but the attitude that everything
is happening according to Hashem's plan. I may fail and suffer, ch"v,
but knowing it is all for a purpose makes it easier to cope. The history
that I think divides them -- the CI's Emunah uBitachon was written in
the shadow of the Holocaust. (It was published in 1954, a year after
the CI's passing.)

Similarly, if someone wants to argue that the Torah wants us to be
optimistic, don't we have to address what the Torah would tell a Jew
living in Lodz in 1939?

Tir'u baTov!
-Micha

-- 
Micha Berger             I have great faith in optimism as a philosophy,
mi...@aishdas.org        if only because it offers us the opportunity of
http://www.aishdas.org   self-fulfilling prophecy.
Fax: (270) 514-1507                              - Arthur C. Clarke

Or they were part of a self fulling prophecy. Instead of going in 
confident in themselves and in God's ways, they chose to second guess 
God. The Bnei Yisrael who had actually seen Yitziat Mitzrayim would have 
gone into Israel. Instead a weakened Bnei Yisrael went in and almost 
immediately got trapped in the lure of the local idol worship.

Ben

On 6/13/2017 5:07 AM, saul newman via Avodah wrote:
 > R Sommerfeld commented that the meraglim saw the sins of the jews in 
the land down to the Zionists and therefore felt better not to enter the 
land on behalf of such future sinners. The faithful two said don't mix 
into hashem's business.       And thus their sin was making cheshbonot 
on the future even though they were right.  One surmises he would not 
have been surprised that the sinning side succeeded in the land...

Does it make a difference that the woman in the hypothetical scenario is -
unfortunately - no longer an eishet ish, and presumably at her stage of
life also not a niddah?
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From today's OU Halacha Yomis


Q. Can one enter a non-kosher establishment to buy a can of soda or use the bathroom?


A. Igros Moshe (OC II:40) was asked whether one may enter a non-kosher
restaurant to purchase something kosher. He writes that this would be a
violation of both maris ayin (possibly causing those who witness the action
to become more lax in their Torah observance) and chashad (giving the
appearance of impropriety). However, he rules that if one is extremely
uncomfortable and there is no other available location to buy food (or use
the bathroom) it is permissible to enter the store. He explains (based on
the Gemara Kesubos 60a) that the prohibition is waived in situations of
financial loss or extreme discomfort. Nonetheless, every effort should be
made to minimize the maris ayin if possible. (Editor's note: For example,
one should enter when there are no people standing outside the facility.
Alternatively, it would be better to wear a baseball cap rather than a
yarmulke.) If there is no choice and there are Jews outside the store, Rav
Moshe Feinstein, zt"l writes that one shou
 ld explain to the bystanders that he is entering because of the need to purchase kosher food.


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On Tue, Jun 13, 2017 at 10:57:19PM +0200, Ben Waxman via Avodah wrote:
: Or they were part of a self fulling prophecy. Instead of going in
: confident in themselves and in God's ways, they chose to second
: guess God. The Bnei Yisrael who had actually seen Yitziat Mitzrayim
: would have gone into Israel...

Or not. After all, Hashem didn't pick that generation for a reason.
Apparently they didn't just sin, but they sinned in a way that made
working with them a bad idea.

And even before that
    Vayehi beshalach Par'oh es ha'am
    velo nacham E-lokim derekh Eretz Pelishtim
    ki qarov hu,
    ki amar E-lokim,
    "Pen yinacheim ha'am bir'osam milchamah veshavu Mitzrayim"

Remember, they were also stuck with a slave mentality.

But I agree with your point, about the self-fulfilling prophecy.

Tir'u baTov!
-Micha

-- 
Micha Berger             I thank God for my handicaps, for, through them,
mi...@aishdas.org        I have found myself, my work, and my God.
http://www.aishdas.org                - Helen Keller
Fax: (270) 514-1507

R' Zev Sero wrote:

> It seems to me that all the mitzvos that enjoin special
> consideration for one's fellow yidden are based on the mitzvah
> of V'ahavta.  Since you must love him, therefore you must not
> hold grudges against him, let alone take revenge, must lend
> him what he needs without charging interest, must not gossip
> about him, must not stand by while he's in danger, etc.

I would think that killing and stealing are in this category too. But
you would then point to the phrase "special consideration". In other
words, there is a particular shiur of consideration. Some actions are
below that shiur; they are so basic that they apply even to non-Jews.
And other actions are above that shiur; it is "special" consideration
that we extend to family, but not to outsiders.

I would accept such a response, but it isn't very helpful. Exactly
what is that shiur? Where do we put the line? I have always thought
that *all* these things are basic menschlichkeit, and apply to
everyone, Jewish or not.

> Where do you see that LH about strangers is to be avoided?
> The pasuk says "lo telech rachil *be`amecha*", and "makeh
> *re`ehu* basater".

That's just two pesukim. Sefer Chofetz Chayim brings a lot more than
that - 31 if I remember correctly. Granted that one doesn't violate
these particular mitzvos if the object of the Lashon Hara isn't
Jewish. But the others aren't so simple. At the very least, you're
gambling that the Lashon Hara will remain secret and not result in a
Chilul Hashem.

> Ribis.  Lanochri tashich is a mitzvat asei.

True. I have always thought of ribis in a class of its own, for the
simple reason that the entire world considers it to be a generally
acceptable business practice. This includes Chazal, who felt it
important to find a way to structure certain business activities in
ways that would skirt this issur. The point is that ribis is NOT
inherently immoral. It *can* be abused and thereby *become* immoral.
But if done properly, it is a neutral (or even benevolent) business
tool.

Akiva Miller

Anyone have access to HaRav Sh Goren's Terumas HaGoren?
I am looking for 3 pages to be copied [pictured?] and sent to me -
meir...@gmail.com

Best,

Meir G. Rabi

0423 207 837
+61 423 207 837
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On 13/06/17 21:33, Akiva Miller via Avodah wrote:
> R' Zev Sero wrote:

>> It seems to me that all the mitzvos that enjoin special
>> consideration for one's fellow yidden are based on the mitzvah
>> of V'ahavta.  Since you must love him, therefore you must not
>> hold grudges against him, let alone take revenge, must lend
>> him what he needs without charging interest, must not gossip
>> about him, must not stand by while he's in danger, etc.

> I would think that killing and stealing are in this category too.

No, those are inherently wrong, no matter who is the victim.  You don't 
need to love someone in order not to kill them, hit them, steal from 
them, damage their property, etc.  They have the right not to have these 
things done to them, so you may not do so even if you actively hate 
them.  They have the right to be treated with common decency.  Or, in 
the lashon of libertarianism, non-aggression, i.e. not to have you 
initiate force or fraud against them.  Whereas they have no right to any 
favors from you; you have no duty to lift a finger to help them or to 
give them anything.  Doing favors for people is a gift which you 
naturally give only to those you love; the Torah therefore commands you 
to give it to those whom it wants you to love.

> But
> you would then point to the phrase "special consideration". In other
> words, there is a particular shiur of consideration. Some actions are
> below that shiur; they are so basic that they apply even to non-Jews.
> And other actions are above that shiur; it is "special" consideration
> that we extend to family, but not to outsiders.

No, it's not a matter of degree but of kind.

> I would accept such a response, but it isn't very helpful. Exactly
> what is that shiur? Where do we put the line? I have always thought
> that *all* these things are basic menschlichkeit, and apply to
> everyone, Jewish or not.

No, they are not.

>> Where do you see that LH about strangers is to be avoided?
>> The pasuk says "lo telech rachil *be`amecha*", and "makeh
>> *re`ehu* basater".

> That's just two pesukim. Sefer Chofetz Chayim brings a lot more than
> that - 31 if I remember correctly.

The hakama to CC is mussar, so he piles on pesukim, but it you look at 
them they all pretty much flow from a very few sources, all of which 
specify "re'echa" or "amecha", etc.

> The point is that ribis is NOT
> inherently immoral. It *can* be abused and thereby *become* immoral.
> But if done properly, it is a neutral (or even benevolent) business
> tool.

So are all these other things.  They're normal and natural behaviour 
between people who don't necessarily like each other, but one would 
never treat someone one genuinely loved like that, so the Torah tells us 
that we must not treat our fellow yisre'elim like that.


[Email #2]

Google produced this: http://www.havabooks.co.il/article_ID.asp?id=1046


-- 
Zev Sero                May 2017, with its *nine* days of Chanukah,
z...@sero.name           be a brilliant year for us all

The Sefer Hachinuch (Mitzvah 241) explains the prohibition of lo sikom as
follows (my rough translation):

"A person should understand in his heart that everything that happens to
him good or bad is caused by Hashem and between people there is nothing but
the will of Hashem. Therefore when someone bothers or hurts you, you should
know that your sins caused this and whatever happened is a gezera from
Hashem. Therefore, you should not think about taking revenge because the
other person is not the cause of your troubles, rather your sins are the
cause. "

Based on the Chinuch's explanation there should be no difference between
taking revenge on a Jew or a Goy. In either case they are not the cause of
your suffering they are just the instrument of Hashem and therefore there
is no reason for revenge.
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On 14/06/17 03:50, Marty Bluke via Avodah wrote:
> The Sefer Hachinuch (Mitzvah 241) explains the prohibition of lo sikom 
> as follows (my rough translation):
> 
> "A person should understand in his heart that everything that happens to 
> him good or bad is caused by Hashem and between people there is nothing 
> but the will of Hashem. Therefore when someone bothers or hurts you, you 
> should know that your sins caused this and whatever happened is a gezera 
> from Hashem. Therefore, you should not think about taking revenge 
> because the other person is not the cause of your troubles, rather your 
> sins are the cause. "
> 
> Based on the Chinuch's explanation there should be no difference between 
> taking revenge on a Jew or a Goy. In either case they are not the cause 
> of your suffering they are just the instrument of Hashem and therefore 
> there is no reason for revenge.

That is the basis for Chazal's dictum that "Whoever gets angry [over 
*anything*] is as if he serves idols", but there is no actual mitzvah 
against anger.   Obviously one who truly believes in and fully accepts 
what we on Avodah have dubbed "strong HP" has no need for either of 
these two mitzvos, because it will never occur to him to hold a grudge, 
let alone to take revenge; but one who *does* gets angry or upset at 
what a fellow Jew does to him, but doesn't hold a long-term grudge 
against him over it is not violating a mitzvah.  One mitzvah is that 
even if you *do* feel upset you shouldn't hold it against the person who 
did it, and another mitzvah is that even if you do hold it against him 
you shouldn't punish him for it.  Therefore despite the Chinuch's 
relating this mussar idea to these two mitzvos, it cannot be the actual 
reason.


-- 
Zev Sero                May 2017, with its *nine* days of Chanukah,
z...@sero.name           be a brilliant year for us all

Akiva Miller wrote:
 'I must admit that I never before noticed that "lo sikom v'lo sitor"
only applies to Jews. I had always presumed it to be a general law of
 morality and ethics, much like Lashon Hara. I never thought it to be
in the "Ribis" category.
There seem to be three categories: (A) Things that may may not do even
to non-Jews, such as stealing. (B) Things that are technically allowed
against non-Jews, but we are taught to avoid it, such as Lashon Hara.
(C) Things that we may not do to a Jew, but are clearly allowed with a
non-Jew, such as Ribis.'

I think this categorisation may need refining. It assumes that the Torah
doesn't want us to do unethical things to non Jews either by black letter
law or by unlegislated preference. The problem with this is that the Torah
assumes that non-Jews are ovdei Avoda Zara and some mitzvos are
specifically intended to malign them as such. Take Lo Sechaneim - The
gemara learns that we can't even praise a non Jew, never mind be kind in a
more concrete way. Gerei Toshav don't have this prohibition but the pshat
din of the Torah is that it applies to non-Jews stam.

In other words the mitzvos of the Torah treat non-Jews as transgressors and
so it's likely that at least some of thing the otherwise unethical things
we are allowed to do to them are due to this status.

So we need at least to distinguish between what is allowed to any non-Jew and what is prohibited to a Ger Toshav.

For example Ribis is clearly allowed even to a Ger Toshav. It's not unethical per se, just prohibited to a family member viz a Jew.



So we need possibly, categories of:

A) forbidden to everyone

B) Forbiden to Jews and Gerei Toshav but totally allowed to Ovdei Avoda Zara

C) Technically allowed to non-Jews of whichever category but best avoided as a bad midda

D) Forbidden to Jews but totally allowed to all non Jews



Re nekama, I think, subject to correction, that it is only ever positive
when by Hashem or on his behalf. The nekama on Midian is 'nikmas Hashem
m'es HaMidianim'. We needed to be commanded in order to do it.	Hashem is
'El nekamos Hashem' in Tehilim. If anyone has a source for it being a
positive thing to take personal revenge then let's hear it. Not sure the
agadeta of Yaakov waking and smiling fits that bill. Otherwise the Rambam's
placing of nekama in De'os as a bad midda should tell us what we need to
know about it. That would be consistent with nekama being forbidden against
Gerei Toshav, although we haven't found a source for that (yet).



Lisa Liel wrote:

'I would argue that the very idea of (B) implies the imposition of an
outside ideology onto the Torah.  Because the Torah certainly doesn't
label anything as morally wrong and yet permitted against non-Jews.  '



The Torah clearly allows things which it considers morally wrong - Shivya
Nochris for example. And the gemara says that's assur to bring one's wife
as a Soteh, yet it's a whole parsha in the Torah. And the Ramban's naval
birshus haTorah. Seems to me the Torah sets a floor, not a ceiling, and
prompts growth through the mitzvos. Isn't that the whole thrust of Hilchos
De'os?



Ben




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