Avodah Mailing List

Volume 35: Number 69

Mon, 29 May 2017

• 1. Re: Maharat (Noam Stadlan)
• 2. Re: Maharat (Micha Berger)
• 3. Re: Naso (Akiva Miller)
• 4. Re: Naso (Micha Berger)
• 5. Re: Maharat (Akiva Miller)
• 6. Re: [Areivim] L'sheim shmayim (Ben Waxman)
• 7. Re: [Areivim] L'sheim shmayim (Micha Berger)
• 8. Re: Maharat/R. Micha (Noam Stadlan)
• 9. Re: [Areivim] L'sheim shmayim (Lisa Liel)
• 10. Re: Maharat (Micha Berger)

It seems to me that the opponents of ordination of women are hiding
behind conflation of terms. What is first needed is an understanding of
what ordination is in this day and age. The plain meaning of the Shulchan
Aruch YD 242:14 is that it is permission from a teacher to a student to
instruct in issur v'heter. it is perhaps more instructive to go through
the process step by step and see where those who object have a problem.
1. women learn the subject matter
2. the teacher thinks they are capable
3. if the teacher dies, according to SA YD 242:14, nothing further
   is needed
4. the teacher gives the student permission(to avoid transgressing on
   the prohibition of moreh l'fnei rabo)

So, if there is a problem, which step is the problem and why? is it that
a teacher cant give a women permission to be mora l'fnei raba? what is the
source for that?
Essentially what we use the term semicha today is a teacher giving the
student immunity from transgressing a particular prohibition.

If the issue is that of a woman giving hora'ah, then it is necessary to
establish exactly what that is in this day and age. Is it just 'mareh
mekomot'? is it more formal hora'ah? we should keep in mind that R.
Schachter, in defining terms for converts, writes that hora'ah in issur
v'heter is NOT serarah, and that according to some opinions, judging
dinei mamanot is not serarah. Furthermore, he writes of a difference
of opinion whether semicha is a din in dayanus, or a din in hora'ah.
So, if semicha is a din in dayanus, and not hora'ah, then there is no
reason to bring the restrictions from dayanus over to hora'ah. and,
if semicha is a din in hora'ah, then the restrictions on dayyanus don't
apply to semicha.

I would add that the entire basis for the claim that women cant get
semicha starts with the restriction on women being witnesses, then that
being extended to judges, and then being extended again to semicha.
It is not necessarily a given that these extensions should be made. We
should note that there are a number of others who are prohibited
from being witnesses- those who lend with interest, deaf, blind, etc.
The internet reports that there are those who were deaf that recieved
orthodox semicha. I dont have any information on semicha for the blind.
However, it does not appear that the OU has taken a position on these, nor
has anyone accused the deaf and the blind who are seeking semicha of being
heretics nor have they been threatened with being kicked out of Orthodoxy.

On Sun, May 28, 2017 at 10:01:37AM +0000, Ben Bradley via Areivim wrote:
:  'that a pesaq is by definition someone eligable to be a dayan,'

: Which surely most community rabbis are not, since most have yoreh yoreh but not yadin yadin.

1- Eligable, not qualified.

2- Who said one has to have Yadin Yadin to serve as a dayan? Yes, to
judge fiscal matters, we need someone who knows CM, but for someone to
decide questions of YD?


On Sun, May 28, 2017 at 04:21:20PM -0400, Akiva Miller via Areivim wrote:
: I was thinking along very similar lines. In which case, the main
: (only?) difference between the yoetzet and the community rabbi is that
: the rabbi's job also includes "masculine" roles like leadership, while
: teaching and paskening are neutral and shared.

As I wrote in every other iteratrion of this question, there is a
difference between teaching halakhah pesuqah and applying shiqul hada'as.

Someone who follows a rav's pesaq is obeying lo sasur, and therefore
did the right thing even if the rabbi's shiqul hada'as was faulty. Any
hypothetical qorban chatos would be the rabbi's. If the person is not
among those covered by mikol asher yorukha, then the qorban chatas is
yours for listening to her, not the Maharat's.


On Sun, May 28, 2017 at 02:31:52PM -0500, Noam Stadlan via Avodah wrote:
: It seems to me that the opponents of ordination of women are hiding
: behind conflation of terms. What is first needed is an understanding of
: what ordination is in this day and age. The plain meaning of the Shulchan
: Aruch YD 242:14 is that it is permission from a teacher to a student to
: instruct in issur v'heter...

I cwould use the word "hora'ah" rather than the misleading "instruct".
One does not need to have smichah to give a shiur in QSA in the same
town as one's rebbe.

...
: 3. if the teacher dies, according to SA YD 242:14, nothing further
:    is needed
: 4. the teacher gives the student permission(to avoid transgressing on
:    the prohibition of moreh l'fnei rabo)

I disagree with both of these. YD 242 is about kavod harav. IOW, it says
that such permission is necessary, but not that anyone with permission
is necessarily a rabbi. IOW, we have no indication that when the Rama
says that if the rebbe was niftar, nothing else is needed that he is
talking about anything more than needed to satisfy kavod harav ONLY.

IOW, one of these two criteria is necessary, but -- even assuming
competency is a given -- are they sufficient?

Semchiah could well be hetero hora'ah plus.

Both R/Prof Saul Lieberman and RHS argued they are not. And so it
appears from Taosafos. And since we have no indication that the Rama is
disagreeing with Torafos...

For that matter, since the form "yoreh yoreh" is peeled off of the formula
for ordaining a member of sanhderin -- "Yoreh? Yoreh! Yadin? Yadin! Yatir
bekhoros? Yatir bechoros!" -- there is sme connection to dayanus as per
Tosafos implied in the traditional ordination text itself.

...
: I would add that the entire basis for the claim that women cant get
: semicha starts with the restriction on women being witnesses, then that
: being extended to judges, and then being extended again to semicha.
: It is not necessarily a given that these extensions should be made. We
: should note that there are a number of others who are prohibited
: from being witnesses- those who lend with interest, deaf, blind, etc.
: The internet reports that there are those who were deaf that recieved
: orthodox semicha...

Deaf? To you mean cheireish, a caegory we rule refers to the uneducable
and thus does not mean today's deaf mutes? Blind? Chalitzah has a special
gezeiras hakasuv, "l'einei", specifically because a blind man is allowed
to serve as a dayan.

(And as RHS points out, geirim can be dayanim for other geirim, so we
see their disqualification to serve in most courts is not athat they
are outside of lo sosuru, but another issue.)

But I do not think those who lend with interest are kosher rabbanim.
Refardless of social ills which may cause that din to be largely ignored
in practice.

Our discussion here should not be about whether you or I agree with
the OU's priorities, but whether the shitah they are supporting in
the particular question at hand is well-founded in principle.

Tir'u baTov!
-Micha

-- 
Micha Berger             Today is the 47th day, which is
mi...@aishdas.org        6 weeks and 5 days in/toward the omer.
http://www.aishdas.org   Hod sheb'Malchus: What is glorious about
Fax: (270) 514-1507               unity-how does it draw out one's soul?

Cantor Wolberg cited a story with an apparent contradiction, and
resolved the contradiction this way:

> Rebbe Yossi HaKohen taught that when it comes to sins between
> man and God, God can 'turn His face' towards a person. He can
> show favor and forgive, even where it isn't warranted. But
> when it comes to interpersonal sins, God does not lift His
> face. It is up to the person who has been wronged to lift his
> or her face towards the offender.
>
> So just as religious or ritual behavior is important, the
> Torah delivers a clear message that behaving appropriately
> towards other human beings is equally important.

It seems to me that although religious or ritual behavior is
important, Rebbe Yossi HaKohen is teaching us that behaving
appropriately towards other human beings is EVEN MORE important.

Akiva Miller

On Sun, May 28, 2017 at 07:53:42PM -0400, Akiva Miller via Avodah wrote:
: It seems to me that although religious or ritual behavior is
: important, Rebbe Yossi HaKohen is teaching us that behaving
: appropriately towards other human beings is EVEN MORE important.

Look at the list of holidays in parashas Emor. 23:21-22 describe Shavuos.
Look which mitzvos are associated with Shavuos.

Go to the instructions for how to prepare a conversion candidate on Yevamos
47b. We teach some mitzvos qalos and some mitzvos chamuros, and which
mitzvos are listed specifically?

Interestingly, these same mitzvos are central to Megillas Rus, our choice
of Shavu'os reading.

To my mind, this is because while we may think of "observant" in terms
of Shabbos, Kashrus and ThM, Tanakh and Chazal assume the paragon of
observance is leqet, shichekhah, pei'ah and ma'aser ani.

We really need a flavor of O that takes Hillel's "de'ealh sani", or
R' Ariva's or Ben Azzai's kelalim gedolim, or for that matter the
oft-quoted medrash "derekh eretz qodma ... leTorah" as one's actual
first principle for life. And not just a platitude for the early
grades, a truism repeated unthinkingly to get nods during the rabbi's
sermon.

Tir'u baTov!
-Micha

-- 
Micha Berger             Today is the 47th day, which is
mi...@aishdas.org        6 weeks and 5 days in/toward the omer.
http://www.aishdas.org   Hod sheb'Malchus: What is glorious about
Fax: (270) 514-1507               unity-how does it draw out one's soul?

.

R' Micha Berger wrote:

> Someone who follows a rav's pesaq is obeying lo sasur, and
> therefore did the right thing even if the rabbi's shiqul
> hada'as was faulty. Any hypothetical qorban chatos would be
> the rabbi's. If the person is not among those covered by
> mikol asher yorukha, then the qorban chatas is yours for
> listening to her, not the Maharat's.

L'halacha, I totally agree.

L'maaseh, it is critical to determine who is a "rav" and who isn't.
That is, who is "covered by mikol asher yorukha" and who isn't.

It is my opinion that the typical yoetzet and maharat are at least
equally qualified (and likely more so) than the typical gemara rebbe,
because they have been trained in answering such questions, but he has
not. And yet, it is an everyday occurrence for students (myself
included, until I learned better) to ask all sorts of shailos to these
teachers, because, after all, *Rabbi* Ploni is obviously a rabbi!

> I disagree with both of these. YD 242 is about kavod harav.
> IOW, it says that such permission is necessary, but not that
> anyone with permission is necessarily a rabbi.

I agree that YD 242 is about kavod harav. And if the rav is niftar,
then that permission is no longer necessary, but that's not what the
discussion is about. The discussion is about who is covered by mikol
asher yorukha. So why wouldn't the semicha place a musmach into that
category?

In other words: Suppose a certain person *is* in that category, and
then gives semicha "yoreh yoreh" to another individual. Doesn't the
semicha announce to the world that the second individual is now
covered by mikol asher yorukha?

Akiva Miller

If "black letter law" is the criteria, then issues like womens Megila 
readings and women dancing with a Sefer Torah disappear. All the 
opposition because these practices are not "Torat Sabba" doesn't even 
begin if all we do is ask "Muttar? Yes? Fine".

Ben

On 5/28/2017 9:34 PM, Micha Berger via Avodah wrote:
> : It is extremely dangerous to attempt to use non-halakhic elements of
> : Torah in a way that gives them primacy over the halakha...
>
> Again, I agree. But it's also not quite halakhah to only follow the black
> letter law and not recognize the overlap between the aggadic values that
> halakhah must conform to and the law itself.

On Mon, May 29, 2017 at 05:15:03AM +0200, Ben Waxman wrote:
: If "black letter law" is the criteria, then issues like womens
: Megila readings and women dancing with a Sefer Torah disappear. All
: the opposition because these practices are not "Torat Sabba" doesn't
: even begin if all we do is ask "Muttar? Yes? Fine".

I am totally at lost as to your intent. Megillah reading or dancing with
a sefer Torah are reducible to black-letter law. In contrast to, for
example, deciding how to triage my tzedaqah donations.

Wehther that reduction can be done within vanilla halachic process or
by appeal to metahalakhah, or by appeal to the general "feel" of halakhah
-- like the Rambam's "li nir'eh" -- is a different question.

But either way, the question exists.

So, what do you mean?

Tir'u baTov!
-Micha

-- 
Micha Berger             Today is the 47th day, which is
mi...@aishdas.org        6 weeks and 5 days in/toward the omer.
http://www.aishdas.org   Hod sheb'Malchus: What is glorious about
Fax: (270) 514-1507               unity-how does it draw out one's soul?

R. Micha,
thanks for the response.
so we agree that we are discussing hora'ah.
And, we agree that references in YD 242 are only to kavod ha'rav, and don't
necessarily apply to anything else.  But the OU authors claim that some of
YD 242 is based on classic semicha, and therefore all the restrictions of
classic semicha should apply.  But that makes no sense of you are claiming
that YD 242 ONLY applies to the teacher/student relationship.  So your own
argument works against your claim.  There is not a single hint that
anything else about classic semicha applies to what we currently call
semicha. (Incidentally I wonder when the first claim of more extensive
connections were made, and why, if there is such a close connection, we
dont mandate that semicha be done only in Israel, and all the other
attributes of classic semicha, it seems that the ONLY aspect of classic
semicha that is being brought forward is the prohibition on women).

You think that there is the possibility of more, but cannot say exactly
where it fits in, and I suggest that the wording of YD 242:14 is very much
against that possibility.  It states:

??????? ???????????? ??????????? ????????? ??????, ?????? ??????????? ????
????? ??????????? ?????????? ????? ??????????? ???? ?????????? ??????
???????????, ??????? ??? ?????? ??? ?????? ???? ??????? ????????????. ?????
??????????? ?????, ????????? ?????????????? ??????, ????????? ???????
??????? ??????? ???? ??????? ?????????.(???''? ?????? ??''? ???????
?????????? ?????? ?' ?????? ????????). ?????? ????????? ?????? ?????????
???????? ?????????? ???????? ???????? ???????????, ???? ????????????
???????, ?????? ??????? ????????? ??????????? ?????????, ??? ???
??????????? ?????? ??????????? ????????? ???? ??? ?????????? ???????
??????????? ?????? ????????? ??????????. (???''? ?????? ??' ?' ?????''? ??'
?''? ???''?). ?????? ????????? ???????????(?????????? ???''?
?????''?). ??????????
??????? ???? ??????? ??? ?????? ????? ???????? ???????????, ????? ???
????????? ?????, ???? ????????? ???? ?????????? ???????, ???? ?''?. ??????
?''? ?????????? ????? ???????? ??????? ???????????? ????????, ????? ???
???? ??????????? ??????????? ????????????? ????????????? ??? ????? ???????
?????, ?????? ?????? ???????? ?????? ?????? ???????? ??????? ??????????
????????.

specifically, semicha IN THIS TIME, so that people know that....he has
permission.  So if his teacher died, there is no need for semicha.

The only possible conclusion is the semicha is permission. period. and the
ending: "now it is only the extension of permission in general"

It is very forced to claim that there is more here.  You basically have to
read things into it that are not there.

I am not sure if you are claiming that women cant have semicha? or that
they cannot be moreh hora'ah.  because it seems very clear here that those
who can be moreh hora'ah can get semicha b'zman hazeh..And there is a long
list of poskim who agree that women can be moreh hora'ah.

Thank you for agreeing that the statement that "all who are cannot be
witnesses cannot judge" is not universally applicable.  And also, that even
though the Talmud specifically states that someone in a particular category
cant be a judge or witness, when the understanding of that person's
abilities changes, there is potential for them to be witnesses and/or
judges- essentially in some cases, where the understanding of the Talmud
was at variance with what we know now, the restrictions on some categories
is not fixed.

If I am reading correctly, R. Herschel Schachter in b'din ger dan et
chavero (available at YUTorah August 2002), seems to state that hora'ah in
issur v'heter is NOT a issue of serarah. and, according to some opinions,
being a dayan for dinei mamanot is similarly not an issue of serarah.

Perhaps more to the point, In 'Kuntrus HaSemicha"(published in eretz hatzvi
and it seems to be the basis for a talk given at an RCA convention- the
talk is available at YUTorah(1985) Smicha in the talmud and today), if I
understand correctly, R. Soloveitchik made a distinction as to whether
Smicha was a din in dayanus or in Hora'ah.  It would seem that such a
distinction would indicate that restrictions on dayyanus via semicha do not
automatically apply to hora'ah.
-------------- next part --------------
An HTML attachment was scrubbed...
URL: <http://lists.aishdas.org/pipermail/avod
ah-aishdas.org/attachments/20170528/5ff5ed0a/attachment-0001.htm>

On 5/28/2017 10:34 PM, Micha Berger wrote:
> On Sat, May 27, 2017 at 10:11:02PM +0300, Lisa Liel via Avodah wrote:
>: And I disagree with you about it being a halakhic response to
>: reality...

> It's clear from Avodah's LW that that's how they see it. If there are
> other, less defensible, ideologies, that's not their problem.

I'm not sure that the views of Avodah's LW are the point.  To the extent 
that they argue in favor of those with "other, less defensible, 
ideologies", it's reasonable to argue against those "other, less 
defensible, ideologies".  And I would be willing to supply examples of 
where members of Avodah's LW do appear to see it that way, but I suspect 
such examples would be bounced as "adding more fire than light to the 
discussion".

On 5/28/2017 11:52 PM, Ben Bradley via Avodah wrote:
> 'It is extremely dangerous to attempt to use non-halakhic elements of
> Torah in a way that gives them primacy over the halakha.'

> I don't think that is what R' Micha is doing. The mitzvos such as 
> kedoshim tihyu and v'asisa hatov v'hayashar are not non-halakhic in 
> the sense of being like aggadeta.

I don't see that.  They are halakhic in the sense that they are 
commandments.

> Using aggedata to try to trump established halachos would be 
> incorrect. Rather these and other similar pesukim explicitly give the 
> value system by which the whole of Torah functions. As such they are 
> part of the framework of Torah which informs the way Chazal darshan 
> pesukim and thus arrive at the deoraisa details of mitzvos.  Most 
> often that's implicit but there are plenty of explicit examples in the 
> gemara of value based pesukim being part of the cheshbon at the 
> expense of what looks otherwise like the ikar hadin, in particular 
> dracheha darchei noam is cited.

There is an enormous difference between what the acknowledged leaders of 
all Jewry can do -- such as during the time of the Gemara -- and what 
can be done today.  When members of the left claim that brachot should 
be thrown out and other fundamental practices should be modified on the 
basis of "kavod ha-briyot", for example, they are not using "kavod 
ha-briyot" as Jews have always used it, but rather using it as a label 
to apply to external cultural norms that aren't even a century old.

> I.e. such pesukim are not non-halachic, they are meta-halachic.
> Or to put it another way the system of halacha doesn't and can not 
> operate in an ethical vacuum, even if we sometimes struggle to get how 
> the value system underlies invidual sugyas or details of sugyas. We 
> ignore meta-halachic pesukim at our peril.

The question is what you mean by "ethical vacuum".  If you mean that the 
system of halakha doesn't and can't operate without paying heed to the 
ethical imperatives of the society surrounding us, I have to 
respectfully disagree.  The ethics must themselves come from within our 
own cultural framework, based on our own traditions.

Lisa

On Sun, May 28, 2017 at 10:11:37PM -0400, Akiva Miller via Avodah wrote:
: It is my opinion that the typical yoetzet and maharat are at least
: equally qualified (and likely more so) than the typical gemara rebbe,
: because they have been trained in answering such questions, but he has
: not. And yet, it is an everyday occurrence for students (myself
: included, until I learned better) to ask all sorts of shailos to these
: teachers, because, after all, *Rabbi* Ploni is obviously a rabbi!

I do not think the typical yo'etzet is qualified under mikol asher
yrukha regardless of how capable she is. The term only applies to be
elegable to recieve full semichah -- if the chain hadn't been lost,
or could be restored.

THat's the thesis of what I'm pushing here; that even the most able
woman would never be covered by lo sasur, and therefore can't be a
"rav" in the sense of pesaq.

Then I have separate problems with changing the "Men's Club" feel of
shul, believing that it was (1) intentional and that (2) still of use
to today's man. IOW, I have problems with women as synagogue rabbi
in a role that changes who is running or speaking during services.

And, since this seems ot be turning into a full reprise, even though
we should all know the other's position by now, my third problem is
with egalitarianism in-and-of itself.

It runs counter to much of halakhah to say that we should try for
egalitarianism in religious roles. First, such an attempt would be
frustrated, as we can't reach full egalitarianism within halakhah.
By justifying finding worth in this way, we are indeed teaching girls
their traditional role is inferior and they can't reach equality. Rather
than trying to find equal meaningfullness without egalitarianism. Second,
the fact that we can't reach full eqalirianism implies something about the
anature of gener roles, and whether egalitarianism as a value is entirely
consistent with our religion. It should mean that we should really think
through our even wanting to make halakhah more egalitarian, and how to
balance that with the clear message of laws like davar shebiqdushah,
talmud Torah, esrog, sukkah, shofar...

Again:
1- Who can pasqen
2- Who was shul designed to serve
3- Trying to accomodate agalitarianism is both strategically and in terms
   of values, a bad idea.

Notice the absense of the word "serarah". Trying to minimize or eliminate
the role of serarah in our conversation won't do much to sway me, as it
has little to do with my arguments to begin with.

Now, back to R/Dr Stadlan's email:

:> I disagree with both of these. YD 242 is about kavod harav.
:> IOW, it says that such permission is necessary, but not that
:> anyone with permission is necessarily a rabbi.

: I agree that YD 242 is about kavod harav. And if the rav is niftar,
: then that permission is no longer necessary, but that's not what the
: discussion is about. The discussion is about who is covered by mikol
: asher yorukha. So why wouldn't the semicha place a musmach into that
: category?

It could or couldn't -- I believe couldn't. (Following R/Prof Lieberman
and RHS.) But SA 242 can't be cited on the topic either way, since the
se'if is not on topic for our discussion. R/Dr N Stadlan brought it as
the defintion of the role of semichah, so I wanted to dismiss taking
this siman that way.`

"Mikol asher yorukha" is written in the context of dayanim. The only
reason why we say it applies to today's musmachim, despite the lesser
kind of semichah and the lack of sanhedrin is that "yoreh yoreh" is
framed as a splinter of dayanus (which is where the phrase "yoreh yoreh"
comes from) and that they are appointed to act as the surrogate of the
last (so far) sanhedrin.

None of which pro forma can be applied to women. Only someone who could
be a dayan, if the situation were such that they could become qualified
and real semichah were available can serve as their fill-in.


On Sun, May 28, 2017 at 10:06:06PM -0500, Noam Stadlan via Avodah wrote:
: so we agree that we are discussing hora'ah.

: And, we agree that references in YD 242 are only to kavod ha'rav, and don't
: necessarily apply to anything else.  But the OU authors claim that some of
: YD 242 is based on classic semicha...

They note that the Rama in 4-5 is drawing from the Mahariq, and
then explain that the Mahariq tells you he is basing his conclusion on
the idea that what's true for classic semichah should be true for our
current Yoreh-Yoreh (YY). They also cite the AhS 242:30, who assumes
that only those eligable for classic semichah can be ordained YY.

Those are the ony two mentions of siman 242 in the paper, neither of which
refer to the se'ifim you did. And what you are attributing to the OU is
actually the Mahariq and the Ah -- a source and an interpreter (who is
for us a source in his own right) of the SA -- not their own take.

: You think that there is the possibility of more, but cannot say exactly
: where it fits in, and I suggest that the wording of YD 242:14 is very much
: against that possibility.  It states:
...
: The only possible conclusion is the semicha is permission. period. and the
: ending: "now it is only the extension of permission in general"

YD 242:14 isn't trying to define semichah. It's in a siman about kevod
harav, not a siman about semichah. You are nit-picking in the wording
about se'ifim that are only tangentially related, and ignoring the Rama's
stated source.

I disagree with how you read the se'if, since his "only" would be about
kevod harav, not "semichah is only". But really that's tangential. Your
read of the Rama contradicts one of the sources he names.

...
: Thank you for agreeing that the statement that "all who are cannot be
: witnesses cannot judge" is not universally applicable...

I do? Where do I say that?

Tir'u baTov!
-Micha

-- 
Micha Berger             Today is the 48th day, which is
mi...@aishdas.org        6 weeks and 6 days in/toward the omer.
http://www.aishdas.org   Yesod sheb'Malchus: What binds different
Fax: (270) 514-1507             people together into one cohesive whole?


------------------------------



_______________________________________________
Avodah mailing list
Avo...@lists.aishdas.org
http://www.aishdas.org/avodah
http://lists.aishdas.org/listinfo.cgi/avodah-aishdas.org


------------------------------


**************************************

Send Avodah mailing list submissions to
	avodah@lists.aishdas.org

To subscribe or unsubscribe via the World Wide Web, visit
	http://lists.aishdas.org/listinfo.cgi/avodah-aishdas.org
or, via email, send a message with subject or body 'help' to
	avodah-request@lists.aishdas.org

You can reach the person managing the list at
	avodah-owner@lists.aishdas.org

When replying, please edit your Subject line so it is more specific
than "Re: Contents of Avodah digest..."


A list of common acronyms is available at
        http://www.aishdas.org/lists/avodah/avodah-acronyms
(They are also visible in the web archive copy of each digest.)