Avodah Mailing List

Volume 35: Number 12

Fri, 27 Jan 2017

• 1. Re: pikuach nefesh? (Micha Berger)
• 2. Re: pikuach nefesh? (Isaac Balbin)
• 3. Re: Land ownership (Akiva Miller)
• 4. Feminine plural imperative (Zev Sero)
• 5. Praying for a miracle (Saul Mashbaum)
• 6. Re: Land ownership (Zev Sero)
• 7. Re: Land ownership (Rich, Joel)
• 8. Re: Land ownership (Micha Berger)
• 9. Starting Chumash with Vayikra (Micha Berger)
• 10. Re: Starting Chumash with Vayikra (Zev Sero)
• 11. Headlines podcast (saul newman)
• 12. Tznius Standards for Women and Men (Professor L. Levine)
• 13. Re: Tznius Standards for Women and Men (Micha Berger)
• 14. Mesorah? (Rich, Joel)

I stumbled across another data point in Hilkhos Askanus researching
something that came up in another internet contretemps.

In Yabia Omer vol 7 YD #12, ROY pasqens that an Israeli politician that
is invited to pray in a Mosque is permitted to do so rather than offend
the contact inviting him.

This is not as extreme as some of the other cases. For example, most
posqim allowed davening at Me'aras haMachpeilah even when it was entirely
mosque.

But an interesting "coincidence" none-the-less. (Interesting to me,
that is.)

Tir'u baTov!
-Micha

-- 
Micha Berger             It isn't what you have, or who you are, or where
mi...@aishdas.org        you are,  or what you are doing,  that makes you
http://www.aishdas.org   happy or unhappy. It's what you think about.
Fax: (270) 514-1507                        - Dale Carnegie

RMB claimed Amira Lenochri. 

It is not. It is Amira LeAmira which is permitted by Rishonim (Ritva
from memory) There are plenty of Kulos for this.

I was going to ask (but R' Zev Sero beat me to it):

> What has a king got to do with land ownership?

R' Joel Rich explained:

> So then how does the king acquire all the land so that
> those who understand dina dmalchuta as being based on
> the king owning all the land have a case?

Is that the ONLY reasoning behind DDD? I always thought that DDD derives
from the Sheva Mitzvos Bnei Noach, specifically the obligation to set up a
fair government. That government does not necessarily involve a king. And
even if it does, the king does not necessarily own all the territory.

Akiva Miller
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What is the standard Biblical suffix for the feminine plural imperative? 
  -n, or -na?   I had always thought it was -na, as in "ts'ena ur'ena", 
and that "kiren lo" in last week's parsha is an exception.  But someone 
pointed out to me that there's also "vahamiten" in the same parsha, and 
claimed that in the language of the Chumash this is the standard form, 
but it had changed by the time Shir Hashirim was written.  Can anyone 
shed light on this?

-- 
Zev Sero                May 2017, with its *nine* days of Chanukah,
z...@sero.name           be a brilliant year for us all

On 18/01/17 01:51, Saul Mashbaum via Avodah wrote:

>  one cannot pray that
> the outcome of an event which already took place should be favorable.
>

RZS:

>>Of course one can.  The only thing one can't pray for is that the past
event should *not have >>happened*.

We're getting bogged down in language usage here. One cannot pray that the
child a pregnant woman is carrying is a boy, or a girl, because the sex of
the child has already been irreversibly determined. I called the desired
sex a "favorable outcome" of the event of the woman's pregnancy. Similarly,
if one knows that someone's house was damaged in a fire, he cannot pray
that it was not his house. I called the fire occurring elsewhere a
"favorable outcome"  of the already established fact of the fire
(obviously, from the point of view of the person involved). *Perhaps*
"desired outcome" would be a better formulation than "favorable outcome";
at most it is only marginally so.

Saul Mashbaum
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On 23/01/17 18:09, Akiva Miller via Avodah wrote:
>
>> So then how does the king acquire all the land so that
>> those who understand dina dmalchuta as being based on
>> the king owning all the land have a case?

> Is that the ONLY reasoning behind DDD? I always thought that DDD derives
> from the Sheva Mitzvos Bnei Noach, specifically the obligation to set up
> a fair government. That government does not necessarily involve a king.
> And even if it does, the king does not necessarily own all the territory.

This is Shitas HaRan on why DdMD.  Since the king owns the land, and has 
the right to expel anyone he likes from his land, and therefore by 
residing in the land one is agreeing to keep his laws.  If one doesn't 
like it, one is free to leave.   Therefore, he says, it doesn't apply in 
EY, since no king has the right to expel a Jew from EY.   The Maharshal 
further explains that if a king were to rule the whole world he would 
not have the right to impose laws on people, because there would be 
nowhere for objectors to go.

It seems to me that it would also follow that since nowadays it is 
accepted that every country belongs to its citizens, and they may not be 
expelled from their country no matter what crimes they have committed, 
therefore according to the Ran DdM is no longer D anywhere.


-- 
Zev Sero                May 2017, with its *nine* days of Chanukah,
z...@sero.name           be a brilliant year for us all

Is that the ONLY reasoning behind DDD? I always thought that DDD derives
from the Sheva Mitzvos Bnei Noach, specifically the obligation to set up a
fair government
===========================
There are a number of theories amongst the rishonim as to the basis of  the unsupported (in the gemara) statement of DMD.
KT
Joel Rich
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On Tue, Jan 24, 2017 at 06:56:51AM +0000, Rich, Joel via Avodah wrote:
: There are a number of theories amongst the rishonim as to the basis
: of the unsupported (in the gemara) statement of DMD.

Just to be clear, in 2007, RAF identified three different dinim under
the name name DDD <http://www.aishdas.org/avodah/vol23/v23n020.shtml#14>:

1- A derivative of the general rule that qinyan follows expecations,
along the lines of qinyan situmta and minhag hasokherim, and
therefore DDD can define new forms of qinyan or limit existing ones.

2- The power of taxation.

3- Civil law as an implementation of the chiyuv to maintain a safe and
orderly society.

We discussed the number of theories for DDD #1 in the past. I listed
5 theories of DDD from an article by RMJBroyde
<http://www.shmadigital.com/shma/200912?pg=3#pg2> back in 2010. The opinion
not being attributed to the Rosh RMJB found in the Ran.

> 1- Rashi (Gittin 9b "kesherin", "chutz"): Society's laws are a fulfillment
>      of the 7 mitzvos benei Noach, and the 7MBN in general apply to Jews
>      as well, with very specific excaptions.

>     This would give authority to any law that doesn't contradict halakhah.

>  2- Maharshal: "If it were not [for secular law], the nation could not
>      stand and would be destroyed." Simply, the law has authority because
>      we need law.

>  3- Rashbam: The ruler has power with the consent of the governed, and
>      therefore his laws are binding even if you don't agree with the
>      particular law.

>      (This predates the whole "social contract" view of law that was
>      brought to the field of western philosophy by Hobbes, Locke, Rousseau
>      etc... in the 17th and 18th cent.)

>      Implied in the Rashbam is that DDD wouldn't apply to dictators who
>      rule despite the will of the people. It may also exclude laws that
>      aren't commonly observed. (Although RMJB says it does, I see the
>      Rashbam as explicitly including one-off exceptions. That we're
>      talking about the source of the legislator's authority, not the
>      particular law's.)

>  4- Ran (Nedarim 28a): The king is our host, as we can only live where
>      we do by their consent. DDD is simply obeying the host in his home.

>      Kayadua (from previous iterations here, if nowhere else), many take
>      the Ran as implying that DDD wouldn't apply to EY. It just hit me
>      that it might be relevent that DDD is a statement by Shemuel, of
>      the first generation of amora'im, and who lived in Neharda'a. IOW,
>      one of the earliest voices in chu"l among Chazal.

>      The Rashbam's and the Ran's sevaros would give no reason to consider
>      international law binding.

>  5- R' Tam: The gov't has power through hefqer BD hefqer.

>      Which limits DDD to fiscal law.

> The SA appears to be even more limited than R' Tam, saying that DDD
> only applies to laws that aid the governments finances. Not all of fiscal
> law, mostly taxation and the like.

> However, Ashkenazim can't use this heter, because the Rama adds all laws
> that aid society. (Which sounds like the Maharshal, to my ear.) The Shakh
> agrees with the Rama, only adding that DDD doesn't violate halakhah.
> (RMJB suggests the example that if secular law allowed rooftop railings
> of only 9 tefachim, we would still be obligated to put up a full maaqah.)

See threas like
http://www.aishdas.org/avodah/getindex.cgi?section=C#C
OPYRIGHT%20AND%20DINA%20DEMALKHUTA

http://www.aishdas.org/avodah/getindex.cgi?section=D#DINA%20DEMAL
CHUSA%20DINA
(and following threads)

Floating around is also my open question whether anyone distinguishes
between civil crimes and midemeaners.

Tir'u baTov!
-Micha

-- 
Micha Berger             Man can aspire to spiritual-moral greatness
mi...@aishdas.org        which is seldom fully achieved and easily lost
http://www.aishdas.org   again. Fulfillment lies not in a final goal,
Fax: (270) 514-1507      but in an eternal striving for perfection. -RSRH

Rav Assi (a Bavli amora and talmid-chaver of Rav, not to be confused with
Rabbi Assi of EY), in Vayiqra Rabba 7, is the source of the minhag to
start teaching chumash from Vayiqra, "yavo tehorim veyis'asqu betaharos".

I think this is the same amora who says on Shabbos 52a that the yeitzer
hara starts out like thread of spider-web, but ultimately becomes like
a cart rope.

In short, R Assi holds of the innocence of youth.

But this isn't the only shitah. Avos deR' Nasan 16:2 says that the yh"r
develops during gestation, but the yeitzer hatov first starts when the
child is 13.

Does this machloqes with what R' Assi says in Shabbos mean that AdRN
wouldn't call children tehorim and thus not advise starting with Vayiqra
in particular?

Tir'u baTov!
-Micha

-- 
Micha Berger             Feeling grateful  to or appreciative of  someone
mi...@aishdas.org        or something in your life actually attracts more
http://www.aishdas.org   of the things that you appreciate and value into
Fax: (270) 514-1507      your life.         - Christiane Northrup, M.D.

On 25/01/17 13:33, Micha Berger via Avodah wrote:
> Does this machloqes with what R' Assi says in Shabbos mean that AdRN
> wouldn't call children tehorim and thus not advise starting with Vayiqra
> in particular?

I don't agree that it's a machlokes.  Children are clearly born with a 
strong will, a YhR unmoderated by a YT, but they are also incapable of 
sin. The YT comes when the child needs it, when he becomes capable of sin.

I don't think anyone disputes the characterisation of the learning of 
tinokos shel beis rabban as "hevel she'ein bo chet", or as "Mipi olelim 
veyonkim yisadta oz", etc.

-- 
Zev Sero                May 2017, with its *nine* days of Chanukah,
z...@sero.name           be a brilliant year for us all

http://podcast.headlinesbook.com/   i  can  recommend  this  show in
general .  but with attention to the last show , they are doing something
different and fascinating--- topical halachic current issues , with
opinions of  six very distinguished poskim as the llist shows.

the listed show covered techelet  and the spiritual risk non-frum guests
present to the kiruv family and how to balance those issues.

there is no right-left [machmir-meikel ]  characterization of the guests,
in that their particular viewpoint on a given issue is not predictable
based on eidah,background or malbush...
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To some extent Tznius standards are a function of the society in which one
lives.	However,  there are certain basic guidelines that are independent
of societal norms.


Some time ago rabbis in Far Rockaway sent out guidelines which contained the statement

"Please note that these laws represent the position of the Shulchan Aruch and contemporary Poskim."


I have posted these guidelines at

https://web.stevens.edu/golem/llevine/levine/TzniusInformation.pdf


While one hears a lot about Tznius for women,  one rarely hears about Tznius for men.


The following is from

http://www.aish.com/ci/s/Guys_and_Modesty.html


The Talmud discusses men's clothing at least as much as it discusses women's. Just a few examples:

  *   In Yoma (35b), we are told that Rabbi Elazar ben Harsom's colleagues
  would not permit him to wear a finely-woven robe because it was too sheer
  and his form was visible through the translucent material;
  *   In tractate Shabbos (114a), clothes are referred to as the things
  that honor a person. It continues that it's considered shameful for a
  scholar to wear stained or patched clothing, as such are beneath his
  station;
  *   Also in tractate Shabbos, on page 113a, we are told that it is
  unseemly for a person to be overly concerned with fashion, except when it
  comes to wearing one's best for Shabbos.

These are just a few of the statements about clothing that are directed at
men. But even though tzniyut is concerned with clothes for both men and
women, that's not the entirety of it by any stretch. What one has on the
outside is important, but it's more important that it truly reflect what's
on the inside.


See the above URL for much more.


YL

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On Thu, Jan 26, 2017 at 09:30:45PM +0000, Professor L. Levine via Avodah wrote:
: To some extent Tznius standards are a function of the society in
: which one lives. However, there are certain basic guidelines that are
: independent of societal norms.

We have a number of discussions in the archive in which RYHHenkin (the
Benei Banim) discusses das Moshe (absolute standards) and das Yehudis
(the issur against violating social norms).

Taam hamitzvah theory:

Being tzanu'ah is a way of relating to the world, the clothing thing
is a consequence. The issue is about not seeking the limelight, getting
self-worth from one's tafqid, not others' attention. Since "Sex Sells",
the clothing we call "not tzeniusdik" are those that draw that limelight.

If so, das Yehudis would include anything that draws attention, thus
out of the norm.

Whereas das Moshe would include anything that Hashem would want a person
with a healthy normal libido would notice in their zivug. And therefore
shoudn't be noticing outside the realm of taharas hamishpachah.

Tir'u baTov!
-Micha

-- 
Micha Berger             The waste of time is the most extravagant
mi...@aishdas.org        of all expense.
http://www.aishdas.org                           -Theophrastus
Fax: (270) 514-1507

In Shiurim L'zecher Aba Mori Z"L, R'YBS posits (see page 230) that in a
difference of opinion concerning a Halacha Moshe Misinai, if one side has a
kabbalah (tradition) and the other doesn't, the decision is always in favor
of the side with the tradition. [Me - assumption being a tradition must be
correct and not a transmission error?] Whey then would we not apply the
same logic with a Gzeira Shava (unless you assume there was not one where
there was a clear tradition of which cases were related with which words?)?

KT
Joel Rich

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