Avodah Mailing List

Volume 33: Number 82

Tue, 26 May 2015

• 1. Ways to find non-meat or non-milk - The BP Project (Rabbi Meir G. Rabi, its Kosher!)
• 2. Re: Another Chumera ends up Involving a Kula (Kenneth Miller)
• 3. zilzul shabbat (Eli Turkel)
• 4. Re: Another Chumera ends up Involving a Kula (Chana Sassoon)
• 5. What is the Law? (Prof. Levine)
• 6. Another Chumera ends up Involving a Kula II (Micha Berger)
• 7. Re: Another Chumera ends up Involving a Kula (Zev Sero)
• 8. Brisker Theory of Everything (Rich, Joel)
• 9. Lifnei Iveir (Kenneth Miller)
• 10. Who Wrote the Mishna Brura? (Prof. Levine)
• 11. Re: Rav Elchanan Wasserman & Why People Sin (Kaganoff)
• 12. Re: Rav Elchanan Wasserman & Why People Sin (Micha Berger)

I am happy to engage in discussion regarding the Halachos of BP, with
anyone who is interested.
For the time being such discussions must be and remain private

I can confirm that I have been in contact with R Chaim Kanievsky about this
for some years now and that he supports the Lomdus and proofs that I have
proposed.

Best,

Rabbi Meir G. Rabi


*Its Kosher* <http://www.kosherveyosher.com> and *Exodus Matza
<http://www.realmatza.com/>*

*it's kosher Authority Pty Ltd    **ABN: *77 160 144 374


ra...@itskosher.com.au     +61 0423 207 837
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R' Micha Berger wrote:

> Actually, they were part of the 100 qolos, and in nusach Ashkenaz they
> still are. It's only because y'all starting blowing during chazaras
> hashatz that it's not obvious.

R' Zev Sero responded:

> No, these kolos are not part of the 100.  These are an extra 30,
> *after* the 100, and their only purpose is le'arvev es hasoton.
> And yet that doesn't count as "bechinam".

Okay, folks, I think it is clear that some of us have been exposed to
minhagim that the others are unaware of. I suggest that we clarify the
various minhagim, and tally up the different ways of dong it.

From what I've seen, the vast majority of Nusach Ashkenaz shuls blow 30
times before Musaf, 30 during Chazaras Hashatz, 40 during or after Kaddish
Tiskabel, and that is the end, for a total of exactly 100.

I have been in a Nusach Sfard shul where they blow 30 times before Musaf,
30 during the silent Musaf, 30 during Chazaras Hashatz, 10 during or after
Kaddish Tiskabel, and that is the end, for a total of exactly 100.

Here in Elizabeth, we blow 30 times before Musaf, 60 during Chazaras Hashatz, 10 during Kaddish Tiskabel, and that is the end, for a total of exactly 100.

R' Zev, could you describe for us how the first 100 are blown, and when the extra 30 come in? And if anyone else wants to add to the list, please do so!

Akiva Miller
KennethGMil...@juno.com

____________________________________________________________
Old School Yearbook Pics
View Class Yearbooks Online Free. Search by School & Year. Look Now!
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REMT wrote
> True; but not putting a light on or off *has* been a defining feature
> of the Shabbos experience since the mitzva of Shabbos was given, so
> accomplishing it by any means might properly be considered a zilzul
> Shabbos.  (Of course, by this argument, putting an electric light on or off
> should be prohibited even if the use of electricity is not a m'lacha.)

In particular using an preset switch to turn lights and off should
be prohibited.
While RMF originally did object he later changed his mind when it became
the norm.
In fact even the kosher lamp might be prohibited



Can someone come up with a definition of zilzul shabbat?
Is every modern way of doing any melacha that does not technically
violate hilchot shabbat zilzul?

The gemara allows using the sun for cooking on shabbat - why isn't that
zilzul shabbat?

-- 
Eli Turkel

RZS writes:

>That's not a kulah, because the issur is davka when it's bechinam,

I don't think that is exactly the correct phrasing to explain the situation.
Rather, there is the general blanket rabbinic issur on playing musical
instruments on yom tov, into which sounding shofar prima facie falls.  This
general issur is pushed aside by the d'orisa positive mitzvah of blowing
shofar (noting that, at least according to the famous Taz, because rabbinic
power doesn't stretch far enough to allow the banning of something which is
a mitzvah d'orisa in every circumstances in which it would occur, as this
would do - but is only in allowed situations where only sometimes the
mitzvah would not end up being performed, such as Rosh Hashana on shabbas).
This rabbinic issur of playing musical instruments on yom tov vis a vis the
shofar is also pushed aside in other rabbinically recognised circumstances -
including (according to the majority rishonim, Shulchan Aruch and Rema,
although there are major rishonic dissenters) nachas ruach d'nashim.  The
case of the katan may well be different, given that the fundamental issue
with katanim is chinuch (which might perhaps be said to cut both ways here).

> and so long as there's a reason it's not chinam. Their wish to hear shofar
>the way this rishon or that one wanted it heard is at least as good a
>reason as our "le`arvev es hasoton", or giving women a "nachas ruach".

Leaving aside nachas ruach, which has (according to those who hold by it at
least rabbinic weight - ie power to push aside at least rabbinic
prohibitions) - what is the justification for le'arev es hasoton?  My
instincts are that, to the extent that le'arvev es hasoton is taken
seriously, the argument there is one of pikuach nefesh, which of course
would push aside the rabbinic issur of playing musical instruments (think
about it, if you can get a few extra years out of confusing the soton, how
could that not be considered pikuach nefesh)?

Don't think that helps with being choshesh for minority shitos.

>However, your chashash brings up an interesting suggestion. if they
>are worried about all possible chashshos, then maybe they should worry
>about yours too, and they can easily solve it: let them go on mivtzo'im
>and find Jews who have not yet heard shofar at all, and blow for them
>according to these opinions. That way, not only will they have heard
>shofar according to all possible opinions, and not only will they have
>the zechus of those Jews having heard shofar according to at least
>one opinion (which is certainly kosher, as you correctly point out),
>but their "extra" tekios will be with a bracha!

But aren't they then denying those Jews who have not yet heard shofar at all
the chance to hear shofar according to the majority opinions by only blowing
for them according to the minority opinions?  Or are you proposing that they
*then* blow for them according to the majority opinions?  Either way you
seem to me to be opening a real can of worms.  The principle on which
somebody who has fulfilled their obligation can then fulfil the obligation
of another is based on kol yisrael areivim zeh b'zeh.  But to what extent is
that applicable in a situation in which that person would never, had the
situation been reversed, have accepted the form of fulfilment they are
offering the other.  Ie since the person who is blowing the shofar refused
to have these alternative ways of blowing as the fundamental method of
fulfilling their own mitzvah, is it really areivus to then foist that form
of fulfilment on others?

>Zev Sero
z...@sero.name

Shabbat Shalom

Chana

See http://web.stevens.edu/golem/llevine/rsrh/sivan_v.pdf

YL

llev...@stevens.edu 

I came across another one, more inyana deyoma...

According to the AhS (OC 494:3) we used to wait for "laylah mamash"
to make Qiddush the first night of Shavu'os, so that the omer could
be "sheva shabasos temimos".

Presumably this is following the MGA who has us wait until tzeis
for Qiddush, and the AhS's "laylah mamash" means tzeis.

The Taz (494:haqdamah) and the MB (s"q 1) have us waiting for tzeis to
start *Ma'ariv*.

The Qorban Nesanel (on the Rosh, Pesachim 130b) brings the Rosh as
a ra'ayah against the MGA. The Rosh says that even though on Shabbos
*and the other YT-im* we add from the chol to the qodesh and eat before
it gets dark, we do not do so for the seder night. So the QN QN takes
the implication that "she'ar yamim tovim" includes Shavuos. So the QN
treats Shavuos like Shabbos, and presumably let you daven maariv and
make Qiddush right after pelag.

The QN is machmir in omer, the MGA is machmir in tosefes YT. And each
is being correspondingly meiqil in the other.


I would presume that the silence in the Tur, the BY and the SA about
any waiting means that the Tur, the Mechaber and the Rama hold like
the QN and treat erev Shavuos like erev Shabbos, RH, Sukkos, etc...
(But not Pesach.)

:-)BBii!
-Micha

-- 
Micha Berger             Today is the 48th day, which is
mi...@aishdas.org        6 weeks and 6 days in/toward the omer.
http://www.aishdas.org   Yesod sheb'Malchus: What binds different
Fax: (270) 514-1507             people together into one cohesive whole?

On 05/22/2015 10:59 AM, Chana Sassoon via Avodah wrote:
>> >However, your chashash brings up an interesting suggestion. if they
>> >are worried about all possible chashshos, then maybe they should worry
>> >about yours too, and they can easily solve it: let them go on mivtzo'im
>> >and find Jews who have not yet heard shofar at all, and blow for them
>> >according to these opinions. That way, not only will they have heard
>> >shofar according to all possible opinions, and not only will they have
>> >the zechus of those Jews having heard shofar according to at least
>> >one opinion (which is certainly kosher, as you correctly point out),
>> >but their "extra" tekios will be with a bracha!

> But aren't they then denying those Jews who have not yet heard shofar at all
> the chance to hear shofar according to the majority opinions by only blowing
> for them according to the minority opinions?

AFAIK everyone agrees that all these methods are kosher, so those Jews
are definitely yotzei the mitzvah.


> The principle on which
> somebody who has fulfilled their obligation can then fulfil the obligation
> of another is based on kol yisrael areivim zeh b'zeh.  But to what extent is
> that applicable in a situation in which that person would never, had the
> situation been reversed, have accepted the form of fulfilment they are
> offering the other.  Ie since the person who is blowing the shofar refused
> to have these alternative ways of blowing as the fundamental method of
> fulfilling their own mitzvah, is it really areivus to then foist that form
> of fulfilment on others?

They're not foisting anything. The people they're blowing for would
otherwise not hear shofar at all, so they're clearly better off hearing
even some obscure form of it, so long as they're yotzei.



On 05/21/2015 09:55 PM, Kenneth Miller via Avodah wrote:
> R' Zev, could you describe for us how the first 100 are blown, and when the extra 30 come in? And if anyone else wants to add to the list, please do so!

I'm talking about 30 kolos blown at the very end of davening, just
before going home, and well after all 100 kolos have already been heard
(30 meyushav, 30 in each musaf, and 10 in kaddish). Their purpose is
le'arvev es hasoton. And I've never heard it suggested that there is
any chashash issur. Thus my conclusion that shofar-blowing is allowed on
RH for *any* valid purpose, and the only blowing that remains forbidden
as usual on Yomtov, is when it is truly "bechinam".

-- 
Zev Sero
z...@sero.name

1. The gemara (Ketuvot 5b) discusses whether causing a certain type of
blood flowing is considered a Sabbath violation. The first attempt to
resolve the question turns on whether "mifkad pakid or chaburei mechbar"
(is the blood in the womb stored up or is it the result of a wound?). Rashi
there (please look) seems to define this as a physical question. Is this
acceptable or must we say Rashi was leaving out the "obvious"
philosophical/halachic question (i.e. the physical was known, it's a
question of how to categorize it halachically)?
 2. That gemara continues to try to resolve the question and is willing to
 entertain the possibility that the halacha is like Rabbi Yehuda (vs. Rabbi
 Shimon) in mekalkeil (destroying) and like Rabbi Shimon (vs. Rabbi Yehuda)
 in davar sheino mitkavein (the result was not the major one intended). If
 these two issues were interconnected, could the gemara entertain this
 possibility?
 3. If the answer to 2 is no, must we assume that when the Shulchan Aruch
 said he would decide the psak based on majority 2 of big 3, did he really
 mean this as a primary tie breaker, or only when he did not have a clear
 understanding of the underlying philosophy that resulted in their final
 opinions.
4.Is it possible that R'YBS limited his "canon" to only a few major
rishonim (in contradistinction to R" A Lichtenstein) because the more data
points included in trying to determine the underlying theoretical
construct, the more likely a single errant point would skew the results?

Kt
Joel Rich

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After Machlon and Kilyon died, we find in Ruth 1:8-13 that Naami tells both
Orpah and Ruth to go back home. Didn't Naami realize that they would return
to avodah zara if they'd do that? Even if they had not converted yet,
wouldn't this be an example of Lifnei Iveir?

One answer I can think of is that perhaps this eventuality didn't occur to
Naami. But several pesukim later, in 1:15, Naami tells Ruth that Orpah has
"returned to her people and to her god; go back with your sister-in-law."
Naami persists not only in trying to convince Ruth to leave, but she
explicitly urges Ruth to return to her former god!

This question is certainly relevant according to those who understand that
Orpah and Ruth converted prior to marrying Machlon and Kilyon. But it is
relevant even to those who hold that Ruth did not convert until afterward.

It is one thing to dissuade a prospective ger from joining us. But Ruth had
been living with a Jewish family for ten years! How can Naami urge her to
go back to avoda zara? I know that the meforshim give various reasons why
Naami did not want them to accompany her back to Eretz Yisrael, but do
those reasons justify this Lifnei Iveir?

Akiva Miller



____________________________________________________________
Fast, Secure, NetZero 4G Mobile Broadband. Try it.
http://www.netzero.net/?refcd=NZINTISP0512T4GOUT2

I am sure that most will answer "The Chofetz Chaim"  Israel Meir 
(HaKohen) Kagan.  However, he apparently did not write all of it.

I have been reading Marc Shapiro's latest book "Changing the 
Immutable" How Orthodox Judaism Rewrites its History.  See 
http://www.littman.co.uk/cat/shapiro-orthodox.html  Shapiro points 
out that Rabbi Aryeh Leib Cohen,  a son of the Chofetz Chaim,  wrote 
in his biography of his father that he wrote parts of the Mishna 
Brura and that is why there are contradictions in some parts of the 
MB.  Which parts Aryeh Leib wrote are not indicated.

Does anyone know?

YL

PS.  I have found this book an eye opener and recommend it highly.

llev...@stevens.edu 
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On Tue, Apr 28, 2015 at 12:01 PM, Micha Berger <mi...@aishdas.org> wrote:

> On Thu, Mar 19, 2015 at 01:53:10PM -0400, Kaganoff via Avodah wrote:
> : For many years i had extreme difficulty with R. Elchanan Wasserman
> understanding
> : as it conflicted with my belief that Judaism (and other religions) was
> not
> : logically provable (contra to Moshe Mendelssohn and his contemporaries)
> and
> : therefore required a "leap of faith" and that a disbeliever could not be
> : faulted for failing to take such a jump.
>
> This is a false dichotomy. Logically proving things are not the only
> way to justify belief in there.
>
> How do you know that (in a flat space) two parallel lines never meet? If
> you're like me, you pictured it in your head. Even though infinite lines
> don't exist in the real world. (Nor, does it turn out, does flat space.)


Actually non-euclidean geometry is an excellent example. We cannot say with
absolute certainty that two parallel lines will never meet or that there is
only one line that goes through a particular point that is parallel to
another line, as there is a well developed body of literature on
non-Euclidean geometry (such as Riemannian Geometry).

One might "feel" strongly that Euclidean Geometry is true and non-Euclidean
Geometry is false. But someone might also feel that chocolate ice cream is
superior to vanilla ice cream. But neither can be proven.


>
> Did you figure out that oppression was evil by logical proof, or by a
> combination of imagination and empathy?
>

Calling anything "evil is not meant to be logical but rather to pull at an
audiences' heartstrings. Evil is neither logical nor illogical. Nor can one
"prove" that the Nazis are evil and that circumcision is not.

However, that is a red herring. Again, emotions are not proof. Feelings are
neither true nor false.



> My favorite example is answering the question, "Do elephants have hair?"
> A logical/verbal approach would be: Elephants are mammals, all mammals
> have hair, and so unless elephants are the exception to the rule, they
> must have hair. Elephants are well known and discussed animals. Could
> they be an exception to the rule and I don't know it? Nah, they must
> have hair.
>
> How it is more likely the question jogged your memory of elephants
> you saw, or saw pictures of. The detail may be blurry, so you may have
> to manipulate the picture a bit. Finally, a version of the picture
> which has a tuft of hair at the tail, maybe (if your memory is good)
> some downy hair around the eyes and ears, strikes you as the most
> familiar, the most real. And again you could reach the conclusion that
> elephants have hair.
>

That is a proveable thesis. One could prove either way whether or not
elephants have hair. Unlike the two earlier examples.

As for whether one could prove the existence or non-existance of God, I
don't have time now to start that discussion.


>
> (See <http://www.aishdas.org/asp/ruach-memalela> for some musings about
> the two modes of thought I'm contrasting here.)
>
> In <http://www.aishdas.org/asp/argument-by-design-ver-40> I compare
> different versions of the Argument from Design from R' Aqiva's response
> to the apiqoreis through the Rambam, through similar approaches based
> on more modern science.
>
>     "G-d created" (Gen. 1:1): A hereic came to Rabbi Aqiva and asked,
>     "Who made the universe?". Rabbi Aqiva answered, "HQBH". The heretic
>     said, "Prove it to me." Rabbi Aqiva said, "Come to me tomorrow".
>
>     When the heretic returned, Rabbi Aqiva asked, "What is that you
>     are wearing?"
>
>     "A garment", the unbeliever replied.
>
>     "Who made it?"
>
>     "A weaver."
>
>     "Prove it to me."
>
>     "What do you mean? How can I prove it to you? Here is the garment,
>     how can you not know that a weaver made it?"
>
>     Rabbi Akiva said, "And here is the world; how can you not know that
>     Haqadosh barukh Hu made it?"
>
>     After the heretic left, Rabbi Aqiva's students asked him, "But what is
>     the proof?" He said, "Even as a house proclaims its builder,a garment
>     its weaver or a door its carpenter, so does the world proclaim the
>     Holy Blessed One Who created it.
>
> Not very rigorous. Rabbi Aqiva's reply revolves around giving a parable
> to make the conclusion self-evident. Not contructing a deductive argument.
>
> The more rigorous we try making it, the more arguable the proof becomes.
> R' Aqiva's argument is far more convincing than the Rambam's statement
> based on how objects lose form over time, not gain it. Or a similar
> argument based on thermodynamics or information theory.
>
> (Ironically, every formal / logical proof is built from givens taken
> as self-evident for informal-reasoning reasons.)
>
> Anyway, that's how I understood REW. R' Elchanan argues that on an
> informal level, the idea that the universe had to have a Creator is
> as obvious as a Euclidean postulate or the injustice of oppression.
>

I believe that such an explanation is disrespectful to REW. I am assuming
that REW believed what he wrote and wrote down clearly what he believed as
opposed to assuming that REW believes one thing and wrote another.


>
> To not believe in G-d requires a formal proof, which one's negios then
> determine if they find it sound or specious,  and whether they accept
> the postulates on which it's built.
>

To believe and to not believe in God can be pulled off without formal
proofs.

However, it is intellectually dishonest to state that one has an arguement
for God's existance and than say that we are not talking about formal
proofs when a counterarguement is made.


> Notice I didn't invoke any leaps of faith.
>
> Tir'u baTov!
> -Micha
>
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On Tue, May 26, 2015 at 01:19:53PM -0400, Kaganoff wrote:
: > How do you know that (in a flat space) two parallel lines never meet? If
: > you're like me, you pictured it in your head. Even though infinite lines
: > don't exist in the real world. (Nor, does it turn out, does flat space.)
: 
: 
: Actually non-euclidean geometry is an excellent example. We cannot say with
: absolute certainty that two parallel lines will never meet or that there is
: only one line that goes through a particular point that is parallel to
: another line, as there is a well developed body of literature on
: non-Euclidean geometry (such as Riemannian Geometry).

Well, if we know the curvature of the space we're dealing with, we know
which Geometry to use. And only one is correct for that particular
space.

:> Did you figure out that oppression was evil by logical proof, or by a
:> combination of imagination and empathy?
: 
: Calling anything "evil is not meant to be logical but rather to pull at an
: audiences' heartstrings. Evil is neither logical nor illogical. Nor can one
: "prove" that the Nazis are evil and that circumcision is not.

I disagree with your reisha. Evil is an objectively meaningful predicate.
Yahadus wouldn't work is evil were subjective.

As for your seifa... that's kind of my point: there are truths that can
be justified even when they are not amenable to formal proofs.

: However, that is a red herring. Again, emotions are not proof. Feelings are
: neither true nor false.

Although the notion that John is feeling happy at 2:55pm EST May
26, 2015 is either true or false. Or some fuzzy state in between.
It is a predicate, even if it needn't be a boolean predicate.

All three of these comments are interrelated:

Euclidean geometry is the only accurate description of flat space. Not
every space, but flat space.

People may disagree about what is evil, and Nazis may be able to fool
themselves about what the word means, but HQBH did create a concept of
good that has an objective definition. Even if -- again -- we cannot
find it via proof.

: > My favorite example is answering the question, "Do elephants have hair?"
: > A logical/verbal approach would be...
: > How it is more likely the question jogged your memory of elephants
: > you saw, or saw pictures of...

: That is a proveable thesis. One could prove either way whether or not
: elephants have hair. Unlike the two earlier examples.

As I said in the first paragraph, before the first ellipses. However,
in practice, people aren't likely to use proofs to reach the conclusion.
We justify our belief that elephants have hair in a different way.

: As for whether one could prove the existence or non-existance of God, I
: don't have time now to start that discussion.

But my whole point is that proof isn't the only grounds for justifying
knowledge!

...
: > Anyway, that's how I understood REW. R' Elchanan argues that on an
: > informal level, the idea that the universe had to have a Creator is
: > as obvious as a Euclidean postulate or the injustice of oppression.

: I believe that such an explanation is disrespectful to REW. I am assuming
: that REW believed what he wrote and wrote down clearly what he believed as
: opposed to assuming that REW believes one thing and wrote another.

Um... That /is/ what Rav Elchanan wrote. I'm arguing that he is being
misread because they think that REW invoking the notion of knowledge
(as opposed to belief) is equivalent to his invoking the notion of proof.

Instead, he invokes the synthetic a priori, of the self-evident, or
whatever your theory of justification is of R' Aqiva's answer to
the atheist or that letters aren't the product of ink spilled on paper.

AISI, REW is saying that humans know there is a G-d, without his saying
anything about the possibility of proving it. And that people then go about
creating proofs for His non-Existence or Deism, to hide from that
knowledge. Or, to be more loyal to his original wording -- because they took
shochad to buy into a proof against the obvious.

He might be saying that at some level, that knowledge lingers, no matter
how much someone buries it under layers of counter-proof and convincing
themselves. But I don't see that in REW either.

Quoting:
    Now, of course, we shouldn't be astonished that so many great
    philosophers had difficulty believing that the world was created
    by a Purposeful Creator. Their minds were surely great, but their
    desire to gain benefit from the pleasures of this world overcame their
    ability to think straight. Such a powerful bias can divert a person's
    mind to the point that he can say two plus two does not equal four...

After my signature, I'll quote Qovetz Maamariv par 5-7 from a translation
provided by Pirchei Shoshanim. You'll notice it's nothing like the
Rambam's attempt to formally prove an Argument from Design in Moreh
sec. II.

Really, all he says is that monotheism woul be self-evident if people
didn't want to escape its implications on their lifestyle. Not proven,
self-evident, and not that those who argue against it are less than
fully convinced of their atheism (or Deism, or polytheism).

:> To not believe in G-d requires a formal proof, which one's negios then
:> determine if they find it sound or specious,  and whether they accept
:> the postulates on which it's built.

: To believe and to not believe in God can be pulled off without formal
: proofs.

: However, it is intellectually dishonest to state that one has an arguement
: for God's existance and than say that we are not talking about formal
: proofs when a counterarguement is made.

Not "argument", any more than your acceptance of Euclidean (or Reimann)
postulates are based on argument.

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Theory_of_justification#Theories_of
_justification
and http://www.iep.utm.edu/epistemo/#H3
may be clearer than I have been.

Tir'u baTov!
-Micha

-- 
Micha Berger             "Man wants to achieve greatness overnight,
mi...@aishdas.org        and he wants to sleep well that night too."
http://www.aishdas.org         - Rav Yosef Yozel Horwitz, Alter of Novarodok
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   5. If you ponder it, however, you shall find that the belief that the
   Holy One, blessed by He, created the world is self-understood by any
   intelligent being -- unless a person is a complete imbecile. And there
   is no need for any [knowledge of] philosophy to grasp this principle.

   The author of the Duties of the Heart (Shaar HaYichud 6) thus wrote:

     There are people who say that the world came into existence by
     chance, without a Creator who caused it and formed it. I wonder
     how any rational being in a normal state of mind can entertain
     such a notion. If one holding such a opinion would hear a person
     expressing a similar view in regard to a water-wheel that revolves
     in order to irrigate a portion of a field or garden -- and were to
     say that he thinks it had been set up without any intention on the
     part of a mechanic who labored to put it together and adjust it,
     using all his tools to obtain this useful result -- the hearer would
     wonder, be exceedingly astonished, and think the man who made such
     a statement extremely foolish. He would promptly charge him with
     lying, and would reject his assertion.

     Now, if such a statement is rejected in regard to a small and
     insignificant wheel, the fashioning of which requires but little
     contrivance and which serves for the improvement of but a small
     portion of the earth, how can anyone permit himself to harbor
     such a thought concerning the immense sphere that emcompasses the
     whole earth with all the creatures on it; which exhibits a wisdom
     so great that the minds of all living creatures, the intellects of
     all rational mortals, cannot comprehend it; which is appointed for
     the benefit of the whole earth and all its inhabitants – how
     can one say that it came into existence without a wise and mighty
     designer purposing and conceiving it? Whatever takes place without
     purpose shows, as is well known, no trace of wisdom or power.

     Do you not realize that if ink were poured out accidentally on a
     blank sheet of paper, it would be impossible that proper writing
     should result, legible lines such as are written with a pen? If a
     person brought us a fair copy of script that could only have been
     written with a pen, and said that ink had been spilt on paper
     and these written characters have come of themselves, we would
     charge him to his face with falsehood, for we would feel certain
     that this result could not have happened without an intelligent
     person's purposeful action to produce it. Since this appears
     to us an impossibility in the case of characters whose form is
     conventional, how can one assert that something far finer in its
     art, and which manifests in its fashioning a subtlety infinitely
     beyond our comprehension, could have happened without the purpose,
     power and wisdom of a wise and mighty designer?

   How could anyone say that the universe came into existence on its own,
   seeing that everywhere we look we see signs of such inconceivably
   profound wisdom? How wondrous is the wisdom and design in the human
   body, how wondrous the arrangement of its limbs and organs, as all
   doctors and surgeons attest. How is it possible to say, with regard
   to such a wondrous machine, that it came into existence on its own
   without a purposeful designer? If anyone would claim that a watch
   had just come into existence on its own, he would be considered insane.

   We see this in the Midrash (Midrash Temurah in Midrash Aggadot
   Bereshit):

     An athiest came to Rebbi Akiva. "Who created the world?", he
     queried. R. Akiva answered, "The Holy One, blessed be He." The
     athiest replied, "Show me proof." R. Akiva said, "Come back to me
     tomorrow and I shall prove it to you."

     When the man returned the following day, R. Akiva began by asking,
     "What is that you are wearing?""A piece of clothing,"the athiest
     replied."And who made it?" R. Akiva continued. "The weaver", he
     replied. "Show me proof", R. Akiva demanded. "But how can I show you
     proof if it isn't already obvious to you that it is the work of the
     weaver?!"

     With this R. Akiva said, "Have you not heard what your own lips have
     spoken? Isn't it obvious to you that the Holy One has created this
     world? Doesn't the clothing testify to the weaver; the house and the
     door to a builder and a carpenter? Just so does the world testity to
     the One who made it."

   Imagine a human being born with a fully developed intellect. We can't
   imagine his great astonishment upon seeing, suddenly, the heavens and
   their hosts, the earth and all that is upon it. What would this man's
   answer be to our question: Did the world that he is seeing now for the
   first time come into existence on its own, without any conscious
   intent, or is it the work of a wise Creator? Behold, without a doubt,
   after contemplating for a moment, he would respond that all this was
   made with wondrous wisdom and extremely subtle order (fine-tuning).

   [We find this concept expressed in any number places in our classical
   literature.] The Psalmist said, "The heavens declare the glory of
   G-d"(Psalms 19:2). [According the Duties of the Heart 2:5] this is also
   the meaning of Job's words when he declared, "From my flesh, I will see
   G-d!"(Job 19:26) [The Psalmist saw proof of G-d's existence in the
   magnitude of the universe. Job was saying that the very fact that
   something as wonderful as his body could exist demonstrates that it is
   the work of a wise Creator.]

   In view of all this it is therefore extremely puzzling, a great enigma:
   How could some of the greatest philosophers who ever lived have
   concluded that the world was brought into existence by chance?

   6. The resolution of this enigma can be found in the Torah. The Torah
   reveals something profound about human psychology when it commands, "Do
   not take bribes, for bribery blinds the eyes of the wise!" (Deuteronomy
   16:19).

   What is bribery? In legal terms, the smallest amount necessary to
   constitute a bribe is a "shaveh prutah"(not much more than a penny),
   similar to the minimum amount needed [for a court] to find a person
   guilty of stealing or of taking interest. This negative commandment, to
   never take a bribe, is directed not only at a judge, but at every man,
   even the wisest of men, even the most righteous, even Moses himself.
   Yes, if it could be imagined, even if Moses would take the tiniest
   bribe, a prutah, his perception of reality would be distorted; he would
   be incapable of bringing forth a just ruling.

   At first sight, this is nothing short of amazing. Can we imagine Moses
   or Aaron twisting the law and judging falsely merely for the sake of
   receiving such miniscule benefit? But the Torah itself testifies to the
   possibility, and "the testimony of G-d is trustworthy" (Psalms 19:8).

   We must therefore say that it is a psychological law: A person's will
   or desire [to gain some benefit] influences his mind [his ability to
   think straight]. Of course, it depends how strong the desire and how
   resolute the mind. A small desire will not exert much influence on a
   great mind, whereas on a lesser mind it will. A powerful desire [for
   gain] will exert even more influence. One thing is certain: no matter
   how miniscule, a desire for gain will always have some affect. Even the
   tiniest desire can cause the greatest mind to waver a fraction.

   This is exemplified in the Talmud (Ketuvot 105b):

     Rebbi Yishmael bar Yossi had a land tenant who used to bring him
     fruits from his [R. Yishmael's] orchard every Friday before Shabbat.
     Once, he came on a Thursday. R. Yishmael asked him: "What's changed
     this week?" "I have a court case this week", he answered."Since I
     was coming to town anyway, I thought I would bring you your
     fruits."R. Yishmael refused to take the fruits [even though they
     were his]. "I am disqualified from judging your case."Two [other]
     rabbis sat and began to hear the land tenant's case. R. Yishmael sat
     [on the sidelines] watching. At every turn in the discussion, R.
     Yishmael felt himself wanting to give advice to his land tenant. "If
     only he would say this now... if only he would say this..."After the
     case was decided, he exclaimed, "O that the spirit of those who take
     bribes would explode! I refused to take what was rightfully mine
     [and I still couldn't help being biased and wanting to see him come
     out winning]. How much more those who actually take what it is not
     theirs!

   It is known that the sages [of the Talmud] were angelic in terms of
   their expanded consciousness and saintly character. We nevertheless see
   that the smallest degree of bias could cause them to incline away from
   the truth. How much more so the rest of us who are sunken in the
   desires of this world! The desire for gain literally bribes us, saying,
   "Hey, look, the world is free to do with as you please!"How powerful
   this bias is! How easily it distorts our perception and blinds us! For
   when a person has "bought into"a certain bias, he is incapable of
   recognizing any truth that flies in the face of that bias. As far as
   that truth is concerned, he might just as well be in a drunken stupor.
   He doesn't recognize its existence.

   Now, of course, we shouldn't be astonished that so many great
   philosophers had difficulty believing that the world was created by a
   Purposeful Creator. Their minds were surely great, but their desire to
   gain benefit from the pleasures of this world overcame their ability to
   think straight. Such a powerful bias can divert a person's mind to the
   point that he can say two plus two does not equal four, but five. A
   person cannot judge whether something is true unless his mind is free
   from any distorting influence vis a vis the thing he wishes to judge.
   On the contrary, if recognizing a particular truth in any way
   contradicts a bias that a person has bought into, no amount of
   intellect, even the intellect of a great person, can remove or overcome
   that bias.

   7. We learn from this that the foundations of true faith are simple and
   unquestionable for anyone who isn't an idiot. It is simply impossible
   to doubt their veracity. This is only true, however, on the condition
   that one does not allow oneself to be bribed. One must be disinterested
   in and free from the desires and allures of this world, and his own
   personal desires [for gain].

   If so, the root of God-denial lies not in the distortion of the
   intellect in and of itself. It lies in the heart, i.e., in one's desire
   to gain benefit [from this world], which distorts and blinds the
   intellect.

   It is clear now why the Torah commands, "Do not stray after your
   hearts..." (Deuteronomy 15:39), concerning which the sages commented,
   "Do not follow after the heart's desire to deny G-d"(Sifri Shlach
   15:70). A person is obligated to subdue and sublimate his desires [for
   personal gain], because this is the only way his intellect will be free
   of any blinding influence! He will then automatically recognize the
   truth of the existence of a Creator. This is what Rebbi Akiva meant
   when he said that the world attests to the Holy One, blessed be He, who
   created it.

   God-denial really has no place in a person's mind. Its place, if man
   allows it to exist there, is the heart; in a person's desire for gain.
   And if one would be careful not to allow his desires to overcome him,
   he could never come to deny G-d's existence or atttribute reality to
   any form of idolatry. It is a sign that one's desires have grown out of
   proportion if one is incapable of understanding this simple truth.

   And the commandment to believe in G-d? It is a commandment not to allow
   one's desires to overcome his intellect so that he will automatically
   come to believe. In other words, there is no need to struggle to
   believe. One must simply remove the obstacles that stand in the way of
   believing. It will then come naturally, of itself...


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