Volume 33: Number 68
Tue, 28 Apr 2015
Subjects Discussed In This Issue:
Message: 1
From: Prof. Levine
Date: Sun, 26 Apr 2015 19:54:23 -0400
Subject: [Avodah] The Legacy of RSRH, Zt'L
At 06:52 PM 4/26/2015, R. Ben Waxman wrote:
I gave an answer on Areivim, but I saw a couple of things on Shabbat
which warrant an Avodah response. The first is from Yoma 86:A, Rashi,
B'Amor Lehem (my translation): "Evil comes to chassidim and chachamim
because "They desecrated My Holy name" (note: Rashi is of course
assuming that they didn't do any particular sin to warrant what happened
to them). How did they desecrate (God's name)? In those places to where
they were exiled, the non-Jews say "These are the people of God" and He
can't redeem them. Conclusion: God's name has been desecrated." End quote.
>Therefore the creation of the State is, in of itself, a Kiddush Hashem.
>Rav Soloveitch tz"l wrote about this point in Kol Dodi Dofek and in his
>drashot for the Kinot, as did Rav Zvi Yehuda Kook tz"l.
We all know that there were great Torah scholars who disagreed with
the assertion that " the creation of the State is, in of itself, a
Kiddush Hashem." to name just 3, the Satmar Rebbe, Rav
Breuer, and Rav Schwab. They were also most certainly familiar with
the gemara you quote and the RASHI.
If you had written, "Therefore, according to some Torah scholars the
creation of the State is, in of itself, a Kiddush Hashem." I would
not disagree. However, your blanket statement, "Therefore the
creation of the State is, in of itself, a Kiddush Hashem." is IMO
is not valid.
YL
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Message: 2
From: Jay F. Shachter
Date: Sun, 26 Apr 2015 19:36:27 +0000 (WET DST)
Subject: Re: [Avodah] Making a Berakhah when Lighting for Shabbos
>
> What should someone who forgot to make an eiruv tavshilin (or ate
> the food already, the food went bad, etc...) who for some reason can
> not rely on the rabbi's communal failsafe eruv (perhaps he isn't in
> a neighborhood with an observant community) do for lighting Shabbos
> candles?
>
You light one candle, after plag hamminxa of course, and you say the
appropriate brakha, lhadliq ner shel shabbath. You don't need an
`eruv tavshilin to light one candle, because the Rabbinic prohibition
of performing mlakha on Yom Tov for Shabbath was not intended to
override the Rabbinic commandment of lighting one candle for use on
Shabbath. Since (unlike in ancient times, and unlike a hundred years
ago also) you don't need to have candles burning on Shabbath for their
light, because you already have electric lights in your house that
will stay on, or that will come on, during Shabbath, you therefore
have no reason to light more than one candle (except for minhag, which
you can dispense with when needed), so you don't. One candle is the
Rabbinic commandment. Lighting two candles is a recent frumkeit, or
yhiruth, that started among German Jews and is less than 900 years old.
Jay F. ("Yaakov") Shachter
6424 N Whipple St
Chicago IL 60645-4111
(1-773)7613784 landline
(1-410)9964737 GoogleVoice
j...@m5.chicago.il.us
http://m5.chicago.il.us
"The umbrella of the gardener's aunt is in the house"
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Message: 3
From: Chana Luntz
Date: Mon, 27 Apr 2015 12:58:34 +0100
Subject: [Avodah] RYBS's Talk on Hafkaas Kiddushin, Talmud Torah and
RMB wrote:
<<R' Ari Kahn posted a transcript of that famous talk that people remember
for RYBS's statement about tav lemeisiv.
http://arikahn.blogspot.co.il/2013/03/rabbi-soloveitchik-talmud-to
rah-and.ht
ml
As a teaser, here is all RYBS said on tev lemeis tan du:
Let me add something that is very important: not only the halachos
but also the chazakos [19] which chachmei chazal have introduced
are indestructible. We must not tamper, not only with the halachos,
but even with the chazakos, for the chazakos of which chazal spoke
rest not upon transient psychological behavioral patterns, but upon
permanent ontological principles rooted in the very depth of the
human personality, in the metaphysical human personality, which
is as changeless as the heavens above. Let us take for example
the chazaka that I was told about: the chazaka tav l'meisiv tan
du mil'meisiv armalo [20] has absolutely nothing to do with the
social and political status of women in antiquity. This chazaka is
based not upon sociological factors, but upon a verse in breishis
-- harba arbeh itz'voneich v'heironeich b'etzev teildi vanim v'el
isheich t'shukaseich v'hu yimshal bach -- "I will greatly multiply
thy pain and thy travail; in pain thou shalt bring forth children,
and thy desire shall be to thy husband, and he shall rule over thee"
[21]. It is a metaphysical curse rooted in the feminine personality
-- she suffers incomparably more that the male who is in solitude.
Solitude to the male is not as terrible an experience, as horrifying
an experience, as is solitude to the woman. And this will never
change, mayid shamayim vaaretz [22]. This is not a psychological
fact; it is an existential fact, which is due not to the inferior
status of the woman, but rather to the difference, the basic
distinction, between the female personality and the male personality.
Loneliness frightens the woman, and an old spinster's life is much
more miserable and tragic than the life of an old bachelor. This was
true in antiquity; it is still true, and it will be true a thousand
years from now. So, to say that tan du mil'meisiv armalo was or
is due to the inferior political or social status of the woman
is simply misinterpreting the chazaka tan du mil'meisiv armalo.
No legislation can alleviate the pain of the single woman, and no
legislation can change this role. She was burdened by the Almighty,
after she violated the first [law]. Let me ask you a question --
ribono shel olam, G-d Almighty, if you should start modifying and
reassessing the chazakos upon which a multitude of halachos rest,
you will destroy yehadus. So instead of philosophizing, let us
rather light a match and set fire to the beis yisrael, and get rid
of our problems.
What I think is more typical of the general thesis of this portion of his
talk was the immediately prior statement:
V'chen hakofer b'perusha v'hu torah she b'al peh v'hamach'chish
magideha; he who denies the perfection and the truthfulness of
chachmei chazal -- not of the Torah, but of the chachmei chazal
as personalities, as real persona as far as their character, their
philosophy, or their outlook on the world is concerned -- is a kofer.>>
As I have written before, what I find intensely frustrating about this is
that RYBS's invocation of tan du appears to itself involve a form of
tampering with the chazakos and by implication the denial of the perfection
and truthfulness of chachmei chazal that is then claimed to be kefira.
The gemora in discussing tan du is very clear - both in Yevamos 118b and
Kesuvos 75a: a woman in a tan du marriage commits adultery - "kulan
mezanos"! - THAT is the chazaka from Chazal regarding the nature of women.
Now this could mean: (a) the sort of woman who is prepared to enter a tan
du marriage is prepared to and will commit adultery; or
(b) all women will take a tan du marriage
(RYBS), but if they find themselves in a tan du marriage - the existential
loneliness that RYBS identifies as being the particular province of women
will also, according to Chazal, inevitably drive them to adultery;
But you can't get away from the fact that Chazal set this up as a chazaka.
And if you take these chazakos in the way that RYBS says to do, then there
are inevitable conclusions: A Beis Din faced with what can now clearly be
seen as a tan du marriage HAS to assume adultery as a consequence - that
being the chazaka. If you hold that these statements of Chazal are perhaps
limited in time and place to the times of Chazal, and the nature of women
then, then we cannot necessarily generalise to today, and despite a woman
today being demonstratably in a tan du marriage, one cannot necessarily jump
to conclusions regarding her faithfulness. But if these chazakos are
immutable - then the only question must surely be, was there the possibility
of adultery - and given the freedom of movement of women today, I do not see
how anybody can say that opportunity was not available. Therefore the
result, and the consequence for the marriage, was a foregone conclusion. A
beis din, if it does not treat this marriage as a mekach taus (because the
woman is one who would not have entered a tan du marriage), has to treat it
as one in which the woman has committed adultery and is therefore forbidden
to her husband, and under which the husband is clearly under a Torah
obligation to divorce, according to all opinions ("dvar erva").
And yet note that there is none of this in RBYS's analysis. Women's
loneliness and spiritual pain, yes - a full facing of the consequences of
what is therefore, according to Chazal, endemic in our society and in the
nature of Bnos Yisroel, no. There is a complete glossing over of the
fundamental conclusion by Chazal regarding the consequence of a tan du
marriage. And yet how can you write about tan du as an absolute immutable
principle and yet not mention what, according to Chazal, is the cast iron
result of that absolute immutable principl?
Note by the way that this chazaka, if indeed it is immutable in the nature
of women, has another consequence. Given that having women commit adultery
is clearly (how shall I put this mildly) a highly destructive thing for
society - having women enter into marriages where this is the inevitable
consequence is a very bad thing. Surely any Rabbi who is mesader kedushin
at such a wedding, any eidim at such a wedding, etc have as a matter of fact
engaged in lifnei iver lo titen michshol in the full biblical sense. This
isn't, according to Chazal, a maybe or a possibility, this is an
inevitability. Surely it is obligatory on any Rabbi who agrees to be
mesader kiddushin and on any shadchanim and eidim to investigate very
carefully that this marriage is not of the tan du nature?
That is if, as Rav Lichtenstein is quoted as saying "given the clear cut
evidence in the Rishonim in Yevamot and other places in Shas which clearly
indicated that this hazaka was not one that applied in all contexts and at
all times and in all situations" - then these concerns would be
significantly diminished. After all, any marriage presented to a mesader
kedushin would then at the very least be a sfek sfeka - perhaps this isn't a
tan du marriage, and if it is, perhaps the woman might not commit adultery.
But if it is an inevitable chazaka that a woman in a tan du marriage will
commit adultery, then there is only one safek in relation to a serious issur
d'orisa - in which case must it not be the responsibility of all those who
enable such a marriage to occur to make sure that it is not a tan du
marriage and they are not enabling such adultery to take place?
To my mind, indeed, that is precisely what Chazal were really getting at. A
genuine acknowledgement that - at least in some societies and some
environments, women are pressured into inappropriate marriages and give in
to that pressure. And that where a woman does indeed give in to such an
inappropriate marriage, the consequences are really, really bad for the
general society and we need all to be on guard to try and prevent such
marriages occurring. That to me demonstrates far more clearly the
"perfection and truthfulness of Chazal" than trying to squish them in to
some metaphysical understanding of womenkind that does not reverberate as
true to many. But if one is going to apply this particular analysis to this
particular statement of Chazal, it would seem important to do it honestly
while facing the totality of what it is that Chazal actually said.
>-Micha
Regards
Chana
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Message: 4
From: Kenneth Miller
Date: Mon, 27 Apr 2015 18:00:12 GMT
Subject: Re: [Avodah] RYBS's Talk on Hafkaas Kiddushin, Talmud Torah
Rav YB Soloveitchik zt"l was quoted:
> ... Let us take for example the chazaka that I was told
> about: the chazaka tav l'meisiv tan du mil'meisiv armalo
> [20] has absolutely nothing to do with the social and
> political status of women in antiquity. This chazaka is
> based not upon sociological factors, but upon a verse in
> breishis -- harba arbeh itz'voneich v'heironeich b'etzev
> teildi vanim v'el isheich t'shukaseich v'hu yimshal bach
> -- "I will greatly multiply thy pain and thy travail; in
> pain thou shalt bring forth children, and thy desire shall
> be to thy husband, and he shall rule over thee" [21]. It
> is a metaphysical curse rooted in the feminine personality
> -- she suffers incomparably more that the male who is in
> solitude. Solitude to the male is not as terrible an
> experience, as horrifying an experience, as is solitude to
> the woman. And this will never change, mayid shamayim
> vaaretz [22]. This is not a psychological fact; it is an
> existential fact, ...
In our discussions of this idea, that the chazaka is "an existential fact"
and "based not upon sociological factors", there seems to be a general
assumption that the Rav was speaking of ALL chazakos. However, it seems
possible to me, or perhaps even likely, that he was singling this chazaka
out as different from others.
Note that he does not merely assert this chazaka to be existential, but he
cites a pasuk as proof. To me, this is significant, because we would then
be allowed to treat any NON-pasuk-based chazaka as sociological.
I don't know what implications this might have for the chazaka of
extramarital relations that R"n Chana Luntz mentioned, or for any other
chazakos, but I wanted to mention it in case anyone else wants to comment.
Akiva Miller
____________________________________________________________
Old School Yearbook Pics
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Message: 5
From: Micha Berger
Date: Mon, 27 Apr 2015 17:53:16 -0400
Subject: Re: [Avodah] RYBS's Talk on Hafkaas Kiddushin, Talmud Torah
On Mon, Apr 27, 2015 at 06:00:12PM +0000, Kenneth Miller via Avodah wrote:
: In our discussions of this idea, that the chazaka is "an existential
: fact" and "based not upon sociological factors", there seems to be a
: general assumption that the Rav was speaking of ALL chazakos. However,
: it seems possible to me, or perhaps even likely, that he was singling
: this chazaka out as different from others.
I suggested a third possiliblity. The shiur was all about Talmud Torah and
Qabbalas Ol Malkhus Shamayim. This was a couple of off topic lines in what
was basically a complaint that RER didn't respect the halachic process
(as RYBS saw it). RAL reports that this was RYBS's primary argument
against RER's beis din; I am suggesting that this quick assertion was
an example of that argument, not an independent second reason to reject.
It fits better as an efshar lomar than an actual assertion. How do you
know you can simply repeal this chazaqah? What if it's an existential
statement about the human condition; is it, after all, mentioned in
a pasuq!
Not so much that tav lemeisav was necessarily an existential and
unchanging fact, but that it could be. That one can't simply reason in
a vacuum and buck the trend of millennia of pesaq.
But in any case, RYBS did say it belashon rabbim: "We must not tamper,
not only with the halachos, but even with the chazakos, for the chazakos
of which chazal spoke rest not upon transient psychological behavioral
patterns, but upon permanent ontological principles rooted in the very
depth of the human personality, in the metaphysical human personality,
which is as changeless as the heavens above. Let us take for example
the chazaka that I was told about: the chazaka tav l'meisiv tan du...."
RYBS discusses tav lemeisiv as an example of a general principle not to
tamper with chazaqos. Not as a single case.
Tir'u baTov!
-Micha
--
Micha Berger Today is the 23rd day, which is
mi...@aishdas.org 3 weeks and 2 days in/toward the omer.
http://www.aishdas.org Gevurah sheb'Netzach: How does my domination
Fax: (270) 514-1507 stifle others?
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Message: 6
From: Prof. Levine
Date: Mon, 27 Apr 2015 14:10:28 -0400
Subject: [Avodah] A Halachik analysis of the kosher status of vitamins
See http://tinyurl.com/osf4fh7
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Message: 7
From: Ben Waxman
Date: Mon, 27 Apr 2015 21:51:46 +0200
Subject: Re: [Avodah] The Legacy of RSRH, Zt'L
1) I have to admit I don't get your answer. You asked in what way
could the state be considered a Kiddush Hashem and I gave you an answer.
Now you reply that various rabbis wouldn't agree with that answer. Ok,
but az mah?
2) The Satmar Rebbe wouldn't have said that anything about the state
is a Kiddush Hashem, no matter what it did, so I don't understand why
you included him.
3) Lastly, the reply that you gave reminds me of something that Rav
AY Kook wrote in Orot, Orot HaTechiya, Chapter 20. He was addressing
the question of whether or not the religious should join forces with the
non-religious in order to work together for the Zionist cause. Rav Kook
used the story of the two women claiming to be the mother of a baby as
example of people revealing their true intentions. The woman who agreed
that the baby should be cut in half was in effect saying (according to
RK) that there shouldn't be babies. She used others claims as way of
hiding her true intent, but when the decisive moment came, the truth
came out.
Meaning - was the demand that the religious not work with the
secular the issue or was that a cover story used to mask people's
opposition to Zionism? Or in this case, is the demand that the creation
of the state be a Kiddush HaShem in the eyes of all rabbanim a real
demand or is it simply a cover? If the Breuer community want the state
to reflect certain values, than please, make it happen. If they don't
want to make it happen or aren't willing, than the demand is (at best)
an exercise in dissimulation.
Ben
On 4/27/2015 1:54 AM, Prof. Levine via Avodah wrote:
> We all know that there were great Torah scholars who disagreed with
the assertion that " the creation of the State is, in of itself, a
Kiddush Hashem." to name just 3, the Satmar Rebbe, Rav Breuer, and
Rav Schwab. They were also most certainly familiar with the gemara you
quote and the RASHI.
>
> If you had written, "Therefore, according to some Torah scholars the
creation of the State is, in of itself, a Kiddush Hashem." I would not
disagree. However, your blanket statement, "Therefore the creation of
the State is, in of itself, a Kiddush Hashem." is IMO is not valid.
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Message: 8
From: Chana Luntz
Date: Mon, 27 Apr 2015 22:59:07 +0100
Subject: [Avodah] ashkenazi married to sefardi
RET writes:
<<AFAIK this [ie RSYE's opinion that an Ashkenazia who marries a Sephardi
must continue to abstain from kitniyos] is a very minority opinion.
The more general opinion is
*Spouses with Conflicting Customs*
A question that arises frequently these days, when marriages between
Sephardic and Ashkenazi Jews are common, is what to do when one of the
spouses in a couple is from a family that refrains from eating kitniyot on
Pesach, while the other is from a family that permits kitniyot? Addressing a
similar matter, one of the great Rishonim, Rav Shimon ben Tzemach Doran
(Tashbetz 3:179), writes that they obviously cannot eat together at the
same table while food permissible to one is forbidden to the other.
Therefore, the wife must adopt her husband?s customs, for ?a man?s wife is
like his own body? (Brachot 24a). Should the husband die -if the wife has a
son from him, she must keep her husband?s custom; if not, she reverts to the
custom of her own family.
Rav Moshe Feinstein (Iggrot Moshe, Orach Chaim 1:158) adds that the wife?s
status is similar to that of a person who moves to a place where the
accepted custom is different from his own. If he intends to settle there, he
must nullify his previous customs and accept the customs of his new location
(based on Shulchan Aruch, Yoreh Deah 214:2). When a woman marries, it is as
if she is moving permanently into her husband?s house, and she must
therefore adopt his customs.>>
Note that the Bnei Banim in Chelek 3 siman 29 brings an objection to this
position of RMF, based on the Rema in Even HaEzer siman 75 si'if 1. The
discussion there is regarding the situation where the man literally comes
from one country and the woman comes from another, who can force whom to
move? And while the majority of the rishonim (including the Tashbetz) hold
(absent special considerations such as Eretz Yisrael versus non Eretz
Yisrael) that the man can force the woman to move to his country, Rabbanu
Tam holds the opposite, that the woman can force the man to move. And the
Rema holds l'halacha that we should be choshesh for the position of Rabbanu
Tam, and hence neither can force the other to move.
The Bnei Banim points out that if one cannot force the wife to physically
move to the locale of the husband, l'halacha, how can she be considered to
have moved to his place by mere dint of the marriage? After all, if she has
in fact, halachically, moved to his place by entering the chuppah, what
possible objection can there possibly be to her being made to up sticks and
actually go to his country, Rabbanu Tam or no Rabbanu Tam? So while the
Tashbez is in fact being consistent - being a rishon who holds that in fact
she is required to physically move to the husband's country, the Bene Banim
argues that by being choshesh for Rabbanu Tam, the Rema is clearly not
poskening like RMF and the Tashbetz.
The Bene Banim also discusses other arguments brought by the Tashbetz (such
as ishto k'gufo) - but again rejects this, given that a woman does not take
over her husband's chiyuvim and nedarim (with the possible exception of
Channukah Candles).
>In addition ROY states a similar psak in several places.
One can argue that ROY is in a stronger position than RMF, on the grounds
that he solely follows the Mechaber, and hence not the Rema, and might hold
that one can force a country change.
The Bnei Banim also brings, however, that while ROY comes out
straightforwardly like the Tashbetz in Yabiat Omer chelek 5 siman 37 (there
he is discussing an Ashkenazi woman who married a Sephardi man and whether
she can eat rice on Pesach - answer of course, yes), in Or Torah Iyar 4751
ROY writes (quotation taken from the Bene Banim, I don't have access to the
original):
?????? ??? ???? ????? ????? ????? ?????? ?????? ???? ??????? ????? ??????
??? ????? ????? ???? ??? ???? ?? ?"? ????, ?? ???? ??????? ???? ???? ????
?????? ???? ????? ????? ???? ?' ?? ?????? ????? ???? )??? ?' ???? ?"?(. ???
?????? ???? ???? ?? ???? ??? ???? ???? ????? ?? ??? ????, ??? ??? ???? ?????
????? ????? ???? ???? ???? ???? ????? ???? ????? ????? ???? ?? ?? ?? ?????.
???? ?? ?????? ?????? ?????? ???? ????? ????? ????? ??, ????? ?? ???? ?????
?? ????. ??? ?? ?? ????? ????? ??? ??? ????? ??? ????? ????? ????? ?????.
???? ???? ???? ??????, ?? ??? ????? ?? ???? ?????? ???? ????? ????? ????
????? ??? ???? ????? ?? ??? ?????? ????, ??? ??? ????? ???? ???? ????? ???
?????? ??? ??????? ??? ????? ????? ???"?. ??? ??? ???? ???? ?????? ????????
?????? ???? ???? ???? ???? ???? ?? ??? ??? "??? ???" ???? ?? ???, ?????
????? ?? ????
" customs that are required of the husband of necessity because of the
tradition of his fathers like the Sephardim who accepted on themselves the
rulings of Maran [the Shulchan Aruch] and are not able to be lenient against
his opinion even by way of hatarah, it is required of an Ashkenazi woman to
go after her husband and even to conduct herself leniently like the custom
of her husband like that which I wrote in Yabiat Omer (chelek 5 siman 37).
But stringencies that the husband has placed on himself that if he wants he
is able to nullify them by way of hatarah, there is no need for the woman to
conduct herself like him and he is not able to force on her a stringency
that she does not want to accept as there is to her on whom to rely.
Therefore if she wants to continue to use Tenuva milk she is able to do
this, and the husband if he wants can be stringent upon himself. But not
use any form of compulsion that also she be stringent that there not enter
their house the products of Tenuva. And this is the law with the fruit of
shmitta, if she relies on the heter mechira since there are many great ones
of the world who hold to leniency she is also able to continue to be
lenient, and so she is not forced to accept upon herself the stringency of
not using products which do not have on them the hashgacha of the Badatz.
And if the husband is not able to continue his stringencies when the woman
does not want to accept he should do hatarah on that which he did not say
?bli neder? and be lenient also he, as great is the peace of a house."
The Bnei Banim notes however that ROY does not bring any lamdus to defend
the distinction he makes here between longstanding community customs (such
as rice on pesach or glatt meat) and more recent customs - such as not
eating Tenuva or relying on the heter mechira. To expand on this comment of
the Bnei Banim, one might say that if you base the reason for a woman taking
on the customs of the husband because she moves to his place, why should it
make a difference whether the customs he has established in his place are
longstanding ones, such as eating rice on pesach, or not using the products
of Tenuva? The customs of his place are the customs of his place. And yet
ROY is, in this, reflecting a common (if perhaps inconsistent) practice. In
all the debate regarding husbands not using the eruv and relying on their
wives doing so, and how it shows a lack of derech eretz etc, nobody suggests
that actually it is assur for the wife to use the eruv, on the grounds that
she has moved to the husband's place, and his custom is not to do so, and so
she is stuck with the stringencies of his house.
The Bnei Banim concludes his teshuva by stating:
?????? ???? ??? ????? ???? ????? ???? ??????? ?????? ??? ???? ?????? ??????
???? ?? ????, ?? ????? ?? ????? ?? ???? ????"? ????? ??? ???? ??"? ????
????? ???? ????? ???? ?? ????? ??? ????? ?????? ?????? ??? ???? ???? ?? ??
???? ??? ???? ???? ???????? ??? ???? ???, ??? ?? ?????? ?? ???? ???? ???????
?????? ????? ??????.
"And l?halacha anyway one should not push aside the custom of the world that
a woman frees herself from the customs of her father?s household and conduct
herself according to the customs of her husband if she wants, but she is
able also to rely on the words of [Rav Ovadiah Yosef] in the ma?amer and so
it seems to me that when there isn?t in it [a matter] between him and her,
and there isn?t a matter of inui nefesh she is able to continue like the
customs of the house of her father since behold also if she vowed them from
anew after the marriage the husband could not annul [such vows], and she may
make a condition with her husband before the marriage that she will continue
to conduct herself in accordance with her customs."
This point of the Bnei Banim regarding innui nefesh and matters beno uvena
is interesting. What he is referring to is the fact that a husband can be
mafer (ie nullify) the nedarim of his wife, but only those that either
constitute inui nefesh or are considered beno u'vena (Shulchan Aruch Yoreh
Deah Diman 234 si?if 55). And it seems to me that you can therefore deal
with the Tashbetz's point (as strongly re-iterated by ROY) regarding food
issues - ie that they cannot eat together at the same table where what is
permitted for one is prohibited for the other - with the use of this
concept, without needing to come on to place changes. Because one of the
definitions of inui nefesh brought in the Shulchan Aruch (Shulchan Aruch
Yoreh Deah Diman 234 si?if 60-61) is if the woman forbids an item of food on
herself (although the Shulchan Aruch there in si'if 60 notes that the Rambam
considers this a matter not of inui nefesh but of beno u'vena). So that,
certainly from the perspective of a Sephardi husband, a woman who has has
the practice of not eating rice and kitniyot on Pesach is engaging in inui
nefesh - and if you follow the Rav Poelim I brought in an earlier post, that
if one is forbidden to eat something, one is forbidden to cook it on yom tov
for others who may eat it, then the woman could not cook rice or kitniyot
for the husband either - making the matter clearly one beno u'vena. So it
seems like the whole question of differences in food do not need discussions
of place, they can more readily be handled within the context of the
existing halachic framework surrounding marriage, and what is and is not
appropriate to be waived in the context of a healthy marriage.
That set me thinking about the fact that actually we are talking about a
whole range of different forms of minhagim - and it seems to me that as a
first stab, we are dealing here with four different categories:
a) minhagim that really have no impact on the husband - such as whether she
benches and davens minhag Ashkenaz or minhag Edot Hamizrach (but will have a
major impact on her should she be required to change, both in terms of the
huge learning curve, and also in terms of the emotional impact, eg of the
kol nidrei tunes). One might perhaps say that if she davens a different
nusach, she will want to go to shul to a different place - but she is in a
different place from the husband anyway, by virtue of the mechitza, and of
course many women do not have the custom to go at all, so real impact would
seem to be minimal. That seems to be the underlying message of the Bene
Banim.
b) minhagim that involve inui nefesh of the woman (which the halacha defines
as having an impact on the husband, and which includes her having
prohibitions on food) and those beno u'vena. We already have a halachic
framework to determine these - the relevant sections of Yoreh Deah siman
234. For example, it doesn't seem to me to be a stretch to say that if he
has the minhag of putting food with a majority of solid on the blech on
shabbas, and she has a minhag not to, then her following that minhag will
impact beno u'vena in terms of what gets provided at the shabbas table, and
therefore would fall within the category of minhagim that ought to change in
the interests of a unified household.
c) minhagim that impact the husband financially. The interesting thing is
that these *are* dealt with in the gemora and the halacha based on the
principle "olah imo v'ana yoredes imo" - she goes up with him but does not
go down with him. The case discussed on Kesubos 48a is regarding what it is
necessary for him to hire for her funeral (in the way of flute players and
wailers) where the custom between her family and his family is different.
And while it might have been the case that it was different because they
were from a different socio-economic class, it may also be because she came
from a different place where the custom was to spend more on funerals and
even so (once you accept that the same rule applies in death as it does in
life) he is required to fund the difference - there is no assumption that
because she has moved to his place, she is only entitled to the funeral
according to the custom of his place. It would therefore seem that the
straightforward pshat of this gemora is against the Tashbetz. Similarly the
Shulchan Aruch rules in Even HaEzer siman 80 si'if 10 that the various forms
of work that are required of a woman for her husband are only required if it
is the derech of both her family and his family for a woman to do this - ie
it is the intersection of the two sets of minhagim that make the requirement
binding.
d) minhagim of the husband that cause her tzar: this is in many ways the
flip side of b), in that in b) we are talking about a situation where what
she has been accustomed to doing all her life is, from the perspective of
the husband, a form of inui nefesh, while here, the customs of the husband
are what to her might well seem inui nefesh. This could also perhaps be said
to be dealt with by the gemora. The gemora in Kesubos 61a discusses the
situation where there is a dispute between him and her regarding whether she
should nurse their baby in situations where it is the custom of her family
but not his or vice versa. The question has a financial aspect, if she does
not, then the husband will be put to the expense of hiring a wet nurse, and
also, it would appear, a status/beauty aspect (the husband may not want her
to, either because only lower class women do this, or because it might make
her less beautiful in his eyes). In terms of the financial and status
aspect, the gemora again brings the position of olah imo v'ana yoredes imo
as per c), but there are also other aspects. For example, in the case where
she wants to nurse, and the husband does not want her to, the gemora assumes
that it is straightforward that, if she wishes to nurse, we listen to her,
on the grounds that "tzara dedei hu" - it is her pain. Now Rashi
understands this as the physical pain of having milk and having no-one feed
- but it could also be understood to be psychological. However, it is hard
to know how far to extend this case, nursing might well be considered sui
generis, because (a) it is something very specific to a woman that a man
will never do (regardless of what the women in his family did) and (b) there
are very specific, unusual, physical and/or psychological factors which are
not necessarily duplicated elsewhere. Refraining from specific foods
(despite it being considered inui nefesh) would seem to be a far less
significant matter.
What might perhaps be of more general application is the discussion that
immediately follows the nursing question - in which the gemora attempts to
find a Torah source for the idea of olah imo v'ana yoredes imo. Rav Huna
learns it out of "He beulas ba'al" (Breishis 20:3) [Reference to Sarah
Imanu vis a vis Avimelech] and therefore "beilaso shel baal v'lo yoredaso" -
she goes up with the husband and not down with him while Rabbi Eliezer
learns it out from "ki who eim kol chai" [Breishis 3:20] and therefore
"l'chaim nitna vlo l'tzar nitna" - she was given for life and not for tzar.
Now the Pnei Yehoshua and the Mahrasha attempt to learn different nafka
minas from the bringing of these two different sources - but it seems to me
that a straightforward nafka mina is that the first source appears to
understand the question primarily as being one of financial or perhaps
spiritual improvement (however one understands "going up" rather than "going
down"). While the second source seems rather to focus on the idea that
marriage is supposed to bring with it life rather than pain. So under the
first source one might understand, if one understands prishus from
particular foods or activities as a form of greater spirituality, then a
woman ought to follow her husband in that, even if it is considered innui
nefesh, while following the second source, the key would seem more to be a
question of tzar, and inui nefesh must surely be considered at least some
aspect of tzar. On some level that does seem to be what is driving ROY in
his discussion of customs such as not using tenuva milk or not relying on
the heter mechira - both cases deal with the situation where the man is the
stringent one, and her custom is towards leniency. But where this question
would seem to really bite, is, for example, in the case of a Sephardi woman
contemplating marrying an Ashkenazi man - where she has grown up eating and
cooking rice and kitniyot on Pesach. I know a number of little Sephardi
girls who have told me that they would not contemplate marrying an Ashkenazi
man because of this. Now maybe they will grow out of it - but it does seem
to me to a really bad reason to be rejecting a potential suitor - and yet
the sense of tzar is there, that is what they are saying, I don't want the
tzar of making Pesach, which for many women is tzar enough already, totally
different from the way I grew up and have been taught - especially when it
comes with countless greater stringencies. And even if she does ignore this
in practice and accepts such a marriage, one can easily see a level of
resentment bubbling to the surface at what can be in any event a very
stressful time ("it is your fault that it is so darn difficult so the least
you can do is be more helpful"). And if one could in fact understand a
fundamental halachic principle to be taken into consideration as that of
l'chaim nitna vlo l'tzar nitna - you might end up with something in keeping
with the shalom bayis needs of klal yisrael.
>Eli Turkel
Regards
Chana
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Message: 9
From: Micha Berger
Date: Mon, 27 Apr 2015 18:12:57 -0400
Subject: Re: [Avodah] Making a Berakhah when Lighting for Shabbos
On Fri, Apr 24, 2015 at 12:58:48AM +0000, Kenneth Miller via Avodah wrote:
: > So I'm wondering about this... If someone uses existing lights,
: > ones you used while still Friday, what "lehadliq" is she making
: > a berakhah on? Yes, there is light for enjoying the Shabbos meal,
: > all the same shalom bayis. But there is no actual pe'ulah to make
: > the berakhah on. Is there?
: I don't know where you see anything like this in the AhS. The AhS
: is explicitly talking about lighting after mincha, when it is already
: dark and the light is already useful...
And was used or at least "used" before Shabbos (in some halachic rather
than commonsensical sense), even if just for seconds, since that's the
AhS's grounds for allowing the person who made no eiruv tavshilin to
light her Shabbos candles.
So, how can she make a berakhah on candles she was only permitted to
light because they would be used before Shabbos? What hadlaqah for
Shabbos itself occured?
> omit the bracha, because it explicitly declares one's intentions to be
> of a hachana nature, but that is a separate question not raised by the
> AhS...
I'm taking his silence, the AhS not telling her to light without a
berakhah, as implication that there is no change from the usual WRT
berakhah.
Tir'u baTov!
-Micha
--
Micha Berger Today is the 23rd day, which is
mi...@aishdas.org 3 weeks and 2 days in/toward the omer.
http://www.aishdas.org Gevurah sheb'Netzach: How does my domination
Fax: (270) 514-1507 stifle others?
Go to top.
Message: 10
From: Micha Berger
Date: Tue, 28 Apr 2015 12:01:19 -0400
Subject: Re: [Avodah] Rav Elchanan Wasserman & Why People Sin
On Thu, Mar 19, 2015 at 01:53:10PM -0400, Kaganoff via Avodah wrote:
: For many years i had extreme difficulty with R. Elchanan Wasserman understanding
: as it conflicted with my belief that Judaism (and other religions) was not
: logically provable (contra to Moshe Mendelssohn and his contemporaries) and
: therefore required a "leap of faith" and that a disbeliever could not be
: faulted for failing to take such a jump.
This is a false dichotomy. Logically proving things are not the only
way to justify belief in there.
How do you know that (in a flat space) two parallel lines never meet? If
you're like me, you pictured it in your head. Even though infinite lines
don't exist in the real world. (Nor, does it turn out, does flat space.)
Did you figure out that oppression was evil by logical proof, or by a
combination of imagination and empathy?
My favorite example is answering the question, "Do elephants have hair?"
A logical/verbal approach would be: Elephants are mammals, all mammals
have hair, and so unless elephants are the exception to the rule, they
must have hair. Elephants are well known and discussed animals. Could
they be an exception to the rule and I don't know it? Nah, they must
have hair.
How it is more likely the question jogged your memory of elephants
you saw, or saw pictures of. The detail may be blurry, so you may have
to manipulate the picture a bit. Finally, a version of the picture
which has a tuft of hair at the tail, maybe (if your memory is good)
some downy hair around the eyes and ears, strikes you as the most
familiar, the most real. And again you could reach the conclusion that
elephants have hair.
(See <http://www.aishdas.org/asp/ruach-memalela> for some musings about
the two modes of thought I'm contrasting here.)
In <http://www.aishdas.org/asp/argument-by-design-ver-40> I compare
different versions of the Argument from Design from R' Aqiva's response
to the apiqoreis through the Rambam, through similar approaches based
on more modern science.
"G-d created" (Gen. 1:1): A hereic came to Rabbi Aqiva and asked,
"Who made the universe?". Rabbi Aqiva answered, "HQBH". The heretic
said, "Prove it to me." Rabbi Aqiva said, "Come to me tomorrow".
When the heretic returned, Rabbi Aqiva asked, "What is that you
are wearing?"
"A garment", the unbeliever replied.
"Who made it?"
"A weaver."
"Prove it to me."
"What do you mean? How can I prove it to you? Here is the garment,
how can you not know that a weaver made it?"
Rabbi Akiva said, "And here is the world; how can you not know that
Haqadosh barukh Hu made it?"
After the heretic left, Rabbi Aqiva's students asked him, "But what is
the proof?" He said, "Even as a house proclaims its builder,a garment
its weaver or a door its carpenter, so does the world proclaim the
Holy Blessed One Who created it.
Not very rigorous. Rabbi Aqiva's reply revolves around giving a parable
to make the conclusion self-evident. Not contructing a deductive argument.
The more rigorous we try making it, the more arguable the proof becomes.
R' Aqiva's argument is far more convincing than the Rambam's statement
based on how objects lose form over time, not gain it. Or a similar
argument based on thermodynamics or information theory.
(Ironically, every formal / logical proof is built from givens taken
as self-evident for informal-reasoning reasons.)
Anyway, that's how I understood REW. R' Elchanan argues that on an
informal level, the idea that the universe had to have a Creator is
as obvious as a Euclidean postulate or the injustice of oppression.
To not believe in G-d requires a formal proof, which one's negios then
determine if they find it sound or specious, and whether they accept
the postulates on which it's built.
Notice I didn't invoke any leaps of faith.
Tir'u baTov!
-Micha
--
Micha Berger Today is the 24th day, which is
mi...@aishdas.org 3 weeks and 3 days in/toward the omer.
http://www.aishdas.org Tifferes sheb'Netzach: When does domination or
Fax: (270) 514-1507 taking control result in balance and harmony?
Go to top.
Message: 11
From: Micha Berger
Date: Tue, 28 Apr 2015 12:24:06 -0400
Subject: Re: [Avodah] Peshat and Drash (Was: Re: Meshech Chochmah on
On Sun, Mar 29, 2015 at 11:04:41PM -0400, H Lampel via Avodah wrote:
: But there were such instances where "one said this was how halakhah
: was understood miSinai and another says that this is new." One
: example (noted by the Chavos Yair in his Teshuva 192) is a 3-way
: machlokess in Zevachim 110b, where one Amora says Nissuch HaMayyim
: is miDrabannan, another says it is derived from a posuk, and another
: says it was a halacha l'Moshe MiSinai. Rambam (Temidim uMussafim
: 10:6 ) poskens it is a halacha l'Moshe MiSinai. This is consistent
: with the concept that, as the Rambam writes, "once someone says 'so
: have I received,' there is no more debate." The reason is that once
: one of our sages can demonstrate he is a recipient of explicit data
: originating with Moshe Rabbeynu, a HLMS, it is naturally accepted as
: fact.
I thought it was well accepted that the Rambam's position in HLMS
is inconsistent, that he mentions numberous machloqesin in dinim
he himself labeled HLMS.
I don't have time to summarize the Chavor Ya'ir teshuvah 192, but
I gave up waiting until I did. The examples are numerous.
Possible resolutions:
- No machloqesin in the essence of the matter, but there can be in
details. (the CY's conclusion.)
- Im halakhah hi neqabel -- no machloqesin in something both sides agree
are HLMS.
And what I suggested: That we should distinguish between disputes due
to lack of knowledge and formal machloqesin, with the Rambam saying the
legal term "machloqes" with all the usual rules of pesaq only apply to
the latter. Other disputes, while called machloqes in the colloquial
sense, are resolved using the rules of safeiq -- because (leshitaso)
ignorance does not create a real machloqes (in the technical sense).
And the Rambam here is saying that real machloqes is limited to
conflicting deductions and extrapolations from existing law to new
places. And thus disputes in laws that date back to Sinai can't
have real machloqesin.
I know I'm repeating myself, but it's been "forever" ago in email
list time since I sat on this post awaiting the time to study the
CY.
Tir'u baTov!
-Micha
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