Avodah Mailing List

Volume 32: Number 75

Fri, 02 May 2014

• 1. Re: obsession with kitniyot (Kenneth Miller)
• 2. Re: obsession with kitniyot (Lisa Liel)
• 3. Selling Chometz Gomer Before Pesach (Prof. Levine)
• 4. Re: obsession with kitniyot (Micha Berger)
• 5. Kohein and Transplant from Cadaver (Micha Berger)
• 6. Re: Selling Chometz Gomer Before Pesach (Zev Sero)
• 7. Re: obsession with kitniyot (Micha Berger)
• 8. Re: help with 2 sugyot (Kenneth Miller)
• 9. Re: obsession with kitniyot (Lisa Liel)
• 10. Re: help with 2 sugyot (Samuel Svarc)
• 11. Re: help with 2 sugyot (Lisa Liel)
• 12. Re: Kohein and Transplant from Cadaver (Moshe Y. Gluck)

R"n Lisa Liel wrote:

> Some of my daughter's friends came over last Shabbat and were
> hanging out.  We had some nosh for the kids, and one girl
> asked if we keep kitniyot, because she wanted to be sure she
> could eat in our house.  Seriously?  And there's no sense in
> pointing out that she's only 14-ish. That's how she was taught
> by her parents.  And I know plenty of adults who do the same.
> It's pathological.

Previously, I had suggested comparing this to gebrochts. Now I'll draw a
different comparison: Chalav Hacompanies. Can one of these shed any light
on the other?

In my community, most people will use government-supervised milk, but a
notable minority will not. When we have guests -- adults or children is
irrelevant -- who are makpid on Chalav Yisrael, we try to serve either
pareve food or chalav yisrael, or at least to have enough options available
that no one feels excluded. I hope we've succeeded.

But in any case, I have not noticed any backlash. I have not noticed any
movements growing among the youngsters to get rid of this practice. I
wonder why. I would think that a year-round difference would be much more
annoying than a Pesach-only difference.

I could very easily say that Chalav Yisrael is an ancient d'Rabanan, while
Kitniyos is "merely" a modern minhag, but is that enough for the kids to
accept it despite the difficulty and annoyance?

Speaking only for my own emotions, I'd say that Chalav Yisrael has the
virtue of being clearly and simply defined. The idea that we want to be
sure that the milk is from a kosher animal is pretty easy to grasp, and the
practical differences of minhag (can treif milk become butter; is gov't
supervision adequate) are relatively few. In sharp contrast, it is
exceedingly difficult to get a clear definition of what "kitniyos" even
*means*, let alone *why* it was established. The acharonim have multiple
opinions about whole fresh legumes vs ground dry beans, for example, and
whether it forbids only the actual vegetable or even its oil. And the
modern poskim have a free-for-all every time a new possibility comes up
(cottonseed, canola, quinoa).

In Avodah Digest 32:67, R' Ben Waxman offered a very interesting list of
varying groups and the very different objections they have to keeping
kitniyos. Without disagreeing at all, I'd like to add an additional
thought: There are people who see themselves as faithful followers of
Chazal and Halacha, but they'd prefer things to be clearer. The
*difficulty* of kitniyos is real, but it wouldn't bother us so much if the
rules were clear and fixed. I dare say that every new vegetable seems to be
automatically judged as kitnios in some quarters, and this has a reflex
action of causing rebellion in other quarters.

Akiva Miller

____________________________________________________________
Fast, Secure, NetZero 4G Mobile Broadband. Try it.
http://www.netzero.net/?refcd=NZINTISP0512T4GOUT2

On 5/1/2014 9:32 AM, Kenneth Miller wrote:
> R"n Lisa Liel wrote:
>
>> Some of my daughter's friends came over last Shabbat and were
>> hanging out.  We had some nosh for the kids, and one girl
>> asked if we keep kitniyot, because she wanted to be sure she
>> could eat in our house.  Seriously?  And there's no sense in
>> pointing out that she's only 14-ish. That's how she was taught
>> by her parents.  And I know plenty of adults who do the same.
>> It's pathological.
> Previously, I had suggested comparing this to gebrochts. Now I'll draw
> a different comparison: Chalav Hacompanies. Can one of these shed any
> light on the other?
>
> In my community, most people will use government-supervised milk, but
> a notable minority will not. When we have guests -- adults or children
> is irrelevant -- who are makpid on Chalav Yisrael, we try to serve
> either pareve food or chalav yisrael, or at least to have enough
> options available that no one feels excluded. I hope we've succeeded.

Families choose whether to keep chalav Yisrael or not.  That's a huge 
difference.  And when a kid moves out on their own, they get to decide 
anew for themselves.  They don't have to keep it because their parents did.

I'm not part of the people who lived in Eastern Europe any more than I 
am the people who lived in Spain.  That's the thing.

Lisa

At 04:39 PM 5/1/2014, R. Akiva Miller wrote:


>R' Yitzchok, could you please clarify your position? It sounds like 
>you are insisting that modern commercial flour is NOT chometz, but 
>the very website that you quoted brings a three-way difference of 
>opinion. Would you be willing to concede that the experts disagree about it?

My positions are

1.  Flour is not "real Chometz"  as the Star-K 
asserts.  However,  one should include one's flour in the sale of 
one's chometz.

2.  A private individual is definitely allowed to see chometz 
gomer.  I think that to throw away edible chometz to avoid the sale 
of chometz gomer is Baal Tashchis.

However,  let me quickly point out that I am not a rabbi and am in no 
position to pasken anything like this.  I am only recording what I 
personally do.

YL
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On Tue, Apr 29, 2014 at 01:54:07PM -0400, T6...@aol.com wrote:
:> I think this perception is uniquely modern.

:> Before  crispy matzvos, before matzah bakeries, before qitniyos, how did
:> Pesach diet  differ from the rest of the year? 

...
: It looks like three out of four questions have to do with food.  Is  the 
: Mah Nishtaneh uniquely modern?

And all three questions (as does the fourth) say "halaylah hazeh". They're
about the seider. For that matter, only one of the four questions mention
chameitz umatzah and could possibly be about the rest of the yom tov
even without those words. The questions are about the seder, your claim
was about all 7 days. (7 because I said before all the derabbanans and
minhagim, what experience was HQBH setting up? So we can ignore YT Sheini
shel goliyos too.)

And I obviously wasn't saying that it's modern to avoid chamaeitz, but
that it wasn't a huge experience of changed diet whether one was careful
to make sure one's laffa were made in 18 min. Laffa bakes in less than
5, so deOraisa you can make actual KLP but otherwise normal flatbreads
(laffa, taboon, naan, whatever.) Unless their diet was full of pas haba
beqisnin and cake, the meals before the desert wouldn't change much.

Unless you were the baker, of course.

So the kids would still ask why ima was so busy rushing to make sure
the bread qualified as matzah rather than chameitz even if the end result
was the same or nearly the same bread.

Tir'u baTov!
-Micha

-- 
Micha Berger             Today is the 16th day, which is
mi...@aishdas.org        2 weeks and 2 days in/toward the omer.
http://www.aishdas.org   Gevurah sheb'Tifferes: What type of discipline
Fax: (270) 514-1507                             does harmony promote?

Seen on FB:
    Question: A friend of mine, a Kohen, recently underwent surgery to
    repair a herniated disc. In this particular procedure, the surgeon
    implanted a bone taken from a cadaver into my friend's spine. Given
    the additional issur of a Kohen coming into contact with the dead,
    even though we are all temei meit, is such a procedure permitted
    to a Kohen, if it's only function, at this time, is to relieve
    pain? (note: I don't know what my friend's condition was and why
    he had the surgery. I'm merely using his surgery as a springboard
    to ask these questions as an intellectual curiosity. I don't at
    all intend to impugn my friend's observance of Halacha.) Might
    the Kohen be obligated to wait for some nerve degeneration to
    occur, thus making his condition a sakanah before undergoing the
    surgery? Can he duchen? Does it make a difference why he had the
    surgery (i.e. merely to relieve pain or discomfort vs. addressing
    nerve or bone degeneration) If the Beit Hamikdash were functioning,
    what might the Halachik ramifications be? Would he disqualified
    from participating in the sacrificial rites? Would he be allowed to
    ever eat Trumah? Would a non-Kohen who had such a procedure be in a
    perpetual state of "tumat meit" and unable to ever be oleh regel? Or,
    perhaps would the ashes of the para adumah remove the tumah from the
    bone itself? But if that were the case, why not subject every corpse
    to the red heifer, and remove the possibility of impurity altogether?

Tir'u baTov!
-Micha

-- 
Micha Berger             Today is the 16th day, which is
mi...@aishdas.org        2 weeks and 2 days in/toward the omer.
http://www.aishdas.org   Gevurah sheb'Tifferes: What type of discipline
Fax: (270) 514-1507                             does harmony promote?

On 1/05/2014 5:34 PM, Prof. Levine wrote:
>
> 2. A private individual is definitely allowed to see chometz gomer. I
> think that to throw away edible chometz to avoid the sale of chometz
> gomer is Baal Tashchis.

I don't think bal tashchis can apply when there is an explicit *mitzvah*
"tashchis"!   However, you can make the same point using a different
source: Hatorah chasah al mamonan shel yisrael.  The Torah commands that
when a house is suspected of tzara'as it should be emptied before the kohen
comes to inspect it, so that in case he declares it tamei these items will
be exempt from the mitzvah of destroying the house and its contents.  Thus
we see that even when there is a mitzvah to destroy, the Torah wants us to
try to avoid having it apply to valuable items.   (Is there a similar mitzvah
to empty out an Ir Hanidachas before pronouncing sentence on it?)

-- 
Zev Sero             Sufficiently advanced incompetence is indistinguishable
z...@sero.name        from malice.
                                                          - Eric Raymond

On Thu, May 01, 2014 at 04:30:08PM -0500, Lisa Liel wrote:
: Families choose whether to keep chalav Yisrael or not.  That's a
: huge difference.  And when a kid moves out on their own, they get to
: decide anew for themselves...

Are you sure about that last one?

: I'm not part of the people who lived in Eastern Europe any more than
: I am the people who lived in Spain.  That's the thing.

We've done this more than annually since 2009. Search "minhag avos and
minhag hamakom" in the archive. In Pesachim pereq 4 ("Maqom sheNahagu"),
boh shasin have examples of people moving to a place that has no
established minhag, and they are told to keep their ancestors'.

Here the case is somewhat different, because a generation or two has
gone by. The slate isn't blank anymore. But we're still waiting for
the "new" communities' minhagim to emerge.

In the past I noted that this is much like the convergence of refugees
at the birth of the Ashkenazi community, and that I can't think of
another example. And then it took centuries for a minhag Ashkenaz to
be born.

There is also R' Herschel Schachter's shiur
<http://www.y
utorah.org/lectures/lecture.cfm/735162/Rabbi_Hershel_Schachter/%D7%94%D7%A9
%D7%91%D7%A2_%D7%94%D7%A9%D7%91%D7%99%D7%A2>
or <http://bit.ly/582Fqz>

and RGS's blog post
<http://hirhurim.blogspot.com/2009/12/keeping-your-customs.html>:

   ...
   Today, however, we have cities that contain different communities with
   divergent customs ....

   The Mahari Ben Lev (vol. 3 no. 14), Maharshdam (YD no. 40) and R.
   Eliyahu Mizrachi (Responsa no. 13) all agree that when a large group of
   people come together then they must establish their own sub-community
   and retain their prior customs. The Peri Chadash (Orach Chaim 496:19)
   rules accordingly -- every sub-community (perhaps even synagogue) is
   considered a city unto itself. Therefore, it would seem that a city
   which has groups of Ashkenazim and Sephardim with their own synagogues
   and schools, each must keep their own customs.

   But what if you want to switch teams? ... Can someone move from one
   synagogue to another and adopt new customs?

   R. Yechiel Ya'akov Weinberg (Seridei Esh vol. 2 no. 11 par. 26) rules
   that he may not. While he admits that this is a complex issue that
   requires further research, he does not think it can be that easy to
   change one's customs.
   ...

I am not sure chalav yisrael is actually a minhag in the sense of this
conversation, though. There are two things called minhagim -- extra
practices, and communally accepted but non-universal pesaqim. Does the
conversation in the gemara include both?

Tir'u baTov!
-Micha

-- 
Micha Berger             Today is the 16th day, which is
mi...@aishdas.org        2 weeks and 2 days in/toward the omer.
http://www.aishdas.org   Gevurah sheb'Tifferes: What type of discipline
Fax: (270) 514-1507                             does harmony promote?

As R' Eli Turkel understands it, the halacha allows:

> any gardener who doesnt have enough jobs should just go into yards
> and cut mow the lawn or remove the snow without permission and then
> demand full compensation.

R' Zev Sero answered:

> No, becuase the home owner might have intended to let it go unmown
> or unshovelled.  Perhaps he just doesn't care, and if so you
> haven't done him any favour by mowing or shovelling.  If, however,
> you saved him from a ticket, then ein hachi nami, you are entitled
> to either your costs or the amount you saved him, whichever is less.

Is this really so? I'm not disputing you. As I wrote, I've only heard this
"outside", and never really learned it in any depth at all. But this would
seem to be a critically important detail, which would overturn almost any
attempted application of this halacha. In the VAST majority of cases, it is
indeed no favor at all, as you wrote. Perhaps he wanted to do the work
himself, or perhaps he didn't even want it done at all.

I am a person who understand that the gemara and poskim often discuss
extreme cases, because that is often the best way to illustrate a concept.
But this case is such a "karov l'vadai" that I am surprised that the
halacha discusses it at all. The only case I can think of where the
gardener might have a claim, would be the rare case where I have already
decided that I am going to hire someone to do this work, but I have not yet
selected any particular worker for the job.

If I have already selected someone for the job, then the case is
complicated by the fact that this squatter/gardener is stealing parnasa
from the guy I contracted with, or agreed with, or even simply mentally
chose.

And if I did not yet decide whether I will hire someone, or do it myself,
or let it go undone, then there's a good chance that part of the reason
that I haven't decided is because I don't know the price. What is going to
happen if the Beis Din says, "He did $100 of work for you. Pay him." - and
my response is, "If that's what it costs, I'd rather do it myself! I would
have paid $40, but not $100!" I'm really very curious about this case.
Would the Bais Din tell the squatter/gardener (I call him that specifically
to disrespect him) to accept the $40 because that's what it's worth to me?
Would they tell me to pay the full $100 because that it what it is worth to
an average person, even though it's not a favor to me? Maybe $70? Maybe
zero?

> The key point here is that if you can't explain rationally why
> you object to what he did, then the only explanation that remains
> is that you're a mean person, a churl who has his feelings hurt
> when people trespass on what's *his*, even when they leave him
> better off than before.  And that is a bad midah to have, so beis
> din can make you act as if you didn't have that midah.

I accept this wholeheartedly, PROVIDED that "I'd rather do it myself and
save the money" counts as a rational explanation. I am not trying to be
mean. I'll give the guy some tzedaka if he wants. And I understand that
giving him a job is the highest form of tzedakah. But for all we know, he
is a *wealthy* squatter/gardener. Or do these halachos apply only to *poor*
ones?

On a related, but much more general topic, RZS also wrote:

> Get over it.  Zachin le'adam shelo befanav, and he did you a
> favour; if someone were to deposit money into your bank account
> would you complain that they didn't ask first?!

At first glance, you're totally correct. Nothing is better than "free",
right? But one must realize that people have sensitivities about certain
things, and sometimes these things backfire. I once phoned a florist, to
order some flowers to be sent to my wife. I don't remember how the subject
came up, but he told me that his policy is to never accept an order from
someone who wants to send the flowers anonymously. You'd think no one would
refuse a gift, even an anonymous one. But he had seen so many people who
were hurt and confused by not knowing who sent the flowers, that he decided
to never do it again.

My point is that the squatter/gardener may indeed be doing a favor for the
baal habayis. But it is very risky, and I don't know why the halacha would
not only sanction the trespass, but allow him to demand payment.

This is not about rights. It's not about keeping people off my property
simply because it is mine. Rather, it's about: Is this gardener my father?
Why does he presume to know what I want and what is good for me? And then I
have to pay for it too?

Akiva Miller
____________________________________________________________
Hot New Stock Pick
How to Invest in the $70 Billion Bottled Water Boom
http://thirdpartyoffers.juno.com/TGL3131/536304cdf01494cd7cc5st04vuc

On 5/1/2014 10:31 PM, Micha Berger wrote:
> On Thu, May 01, 2014 at 04:30:08PM -0500, Lisa Liel wrote:
> : Families choose whether to keep chalav Yisrael or not.  That's a
> : huge difference.  And when a kid moves out on their own, they get to
> : decide anew for themselves...
>
> Are you sure about that last one?

Pretty sure.

> : I'm not part of the people who lived in Eastern Europe any more than
> : I am the people who lived in Spain.  That's the thing.
>
> We've done this more than annually since 2009. Search "minhag avos and
> minhag hamakom" in the archive. In Pesachim pereq 4 ("Maqom sheNahagu"),
> boh shasin have examples of people moving to a place that has no
> established minhag, and they are told to keep their ancestors'.

Which ancestors?  Again, why are my ancestors in Belarus more important 
than my ancestors in Spain?

Lisa

Simply tell BD that he trimmed your favorite rose bush in a way that will
now take it at least a year to regrow, he pulled out the wild weeds that
you were keeping because they reminded you of the walks your mother used to
take you on down country roads. He ran rampant destroying the aesthetic
vision you had for your personal space. He is a mazek and you demand
recompense for his actions. He trimmed the grass? You wanted long wavy
grass to simulate ocean waves. Bankrupt the 'vilde chayah'. And what about
'hezek reiah'? Someone walking through private property? The invasion of
personal space, not respecting boundaries? A true BD would order maakos
mardos for our squatter/gardener.

The Steipler states that since BD can stop a a squatter from entering a
house to squat, it's apparent that it's 'assur' to do so. Again, 'assur'.

If our squatter is such a dreg of society, a boor with no yiras shmayim,
and he does squat, BD can't be 'mchayiv' him. But we should know that the
squatter is an 'avaryon'.


KT,
MSS



On Thu, May 1, 2014 at 10:36 PM, Kenneth Miller <kennethgmil...@juno.com>wrote:

> As R' Eli Turkel understands it, the halacha allows:
>
> > any gardener who doesnt have enough jobs should just go into yards
> > and cut mow the lawn or remove the snow without permission and then
> > demand full compensation.
>
> R' Zev Sero answered:
>
> > No, becuase the home owner might have intended to let it go unmown
> > or unshovelled.  Perhaps he just doesn't care, and if so you
> > haven't done him any favour by mowing or shovelling.  If, however,
> > you saved him from a ticket, then ein hachi nami, you are entitled
> > to either your costs or the amount you saved him, whichever is less.
>
> Is this really so? I'm not disputing you. As I wrote, I've only heard this
> "outside", and never really learned it in any depth at all. But this would
> seem to be a critically important detail, which would overturn almost any
> attempted application of this halacha. In the VAST majority of cases, it is
> indeed no favor at all, as you wrote. Perhaps he wanted to do the work
> himself, or perhaps he didn't even want it done at all.
>
> I am a person who understand that the gemara and poskim often discuss
> extreme cases, because that is often the best way to illustrate a concept.
> But this case is such a "karov l'vadai" that I am surprised that the
> halacha discusses it at all. The only case I can think of where the
> gardener might have a claim, would be the rare case where I have already
> decided that I am going to hire someone to do this work, but I have not yet
> selected any particular worker for the job.
>
> If I have already selected someone for the job, then the case is
> complicated by the fact that this squatter/gardener is stealing parnasa
> from the guy I contracted with, or agreed with, or even simply mentally
> chose.
>
> And if I did not yet decide whether I will hire someone, or do it myself,
> or let it go undone, then there's a good chance that part of the reason
> that I haven't decided is because I don't know the price. What is going to
> happen if the Beis Din says, "He did $100 of work for you. Pay him." - and
> my response is, "If that's what it costs, I'd rather do it myself! I would
> have paid $40, but not $100!" I'm really very curious about this case.
> Would the Bais Din tell the squatter/gardener (I call him that specifically
> to disrespect him) to accept the $40 because that's what it's worth to me?
> Would they tell me to pay the full $100 because that it what it is worth to
> an average person, even though it's not a favor to me? Maybe $70? Maybe
> zero?
>
> > The key point here is that if you can't explain rationally why
> > you object to what he did, then the only explanation that remains
> > is that you're a mean person, a churl who has his feelings hurt
> > when people trespass on what's *his*, even when they leave him
> > better off than before.  And that is a bad midah to have, so beis
> > din can make you act as if you didn't have that midah.
>
> I accept this wholeheartedly, PROVIDED that "I'd rather do it myself and
> save the money" counts as a rational explanation. I am not trying to be
> mean. I'll give the guy some tzedaka if he wants. And I understand that
> giving him a job is the highest form of tzedakah. But for all we know, he
> is a *wealthy* squatter/gardener. Or do these halachos apply only to *poor*
> ones?
>
> On a related, but much more general topic, RZS also wrote:
>
> > Get over it.  Zachin le'adam shelo befanav, and he did you a
> > favour; if someone were to deposit money into your bank account
> > would you complain that they didn't ask first?!
>
> At first glance, you're totally correct. Nothing is better than "free",
> right? But one must realize that people have sensitivities about certain
> things, and sometimes these things backfire. I once phoned a florist, to
> order some flowers to be sent to my wife. I don't remember how the subject
> came up, but he told me that his policy is to never accept an order from
> someone who wants to send the flowers anonymously. You'd think no one would
> refuse a gift, even an anonymous one. But he had seen so many people who
> were hurt and confused by not knowing who sent the flowers, that he decided
> to never do it again.
>
> My point is that the squatter/gardener may indeed be doing a favor for the
> baal habayis. But it is very risky, and I don't know why the halacha would
> not only sanction the trespass, but allow him to demand payment.
>
> This is not about rights. It's not about keeping people off my property
> simply because it is mine. Rather, it's about: Is this gardener my father?
> Why does he presume to know what I want and what is good for me? And then I
> have to pay for it too?
>
> Akiva Miller
> ____________________________________________________________
> Hot New Stock Pick
> How to Invest in the $70 Billion Bottled Water Boom
> http://thirdpartyoffers.juno.com/TGL3131/536304cdf01494cd7cc5st04vuc
> _______________________________________________
> Avodah mailing list
> Avo...@lists.aishdas.org
> http://lists.aishdas.org/listinfo.cgi/avodah-aishdas.org
>
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On 4/30/2014 9:41 PM, Zev Sero wrote:
> On 30/04/2014 4:43 PM, Kenneth Miller wrote:
>
>> The American in me, of course, is totally offended by these
>> limitations on my right to keep people off my property. And that's
>> why I'm grateful to halachos like these, which remind me that "my"
>> property isn't really mine at all.
>
> It's not about your right as a property owner, it's about whether you 
> have
> the right to *assert* that right, and deny someone a favour when you have
> no reason at all not to grant it.

I imagine this wouldn't apply in the US, since under US law, allowing it 
could result in your yard being considered a public accomodation.

Lisa

R' MB:
Seen on FB:
    Question: A friend of mine, a Kohen, recently underwent surgery to
    repair a herniated disc. In this particular procedure, the surgeon
    implanted a bone taken from a cadaver into my friend's spine. Given
    the additional issur of a Kohen coming into contact with the dead,
    even though we are all temei meit, is such a procedure permitted
    to a Kohen, if it's only function, at this time, is to relieve
    pain? (note: I don't know what my friend's condition was and why
    he had the surgery. I'm merely using his surgery as a springboard
    to ask these questions as an intellectual curiosity. I don't at
    all intend to impugn my friend's observance of Halacha.) Might
    the Kohen be obligated to wait for some nerve degeneration to
    occur, thus making his condition a sakanah before undergoing the
    surgery? Can he duchen? Does it make a difference why he had the
    surgery (i.e. merely to relieve pain or discomfort vs. addressing
    nerve or bone degeneration) If the Beit Hamikdash were functioning,
    what might the Halachik ramifications be? Would he disqualified
    from participating in the sacrificial rites? Would he be allowed to
    ever eat Trumah? Would a non-Kohen who had such a procedure be in a
    perpetual state of "tumat meit" and unable to ever be oleh regel? Or,
    perhaps would the ashes of the para adumah remove the tumah from the
    bone itself? But if that were the case, why not subject every corpse
    to the red heifer, and remove the possibility of impurity altogether?
--------------------------- 


Someone sent this to me months ago - it deals with this question. I don't
know anything about the source other than what you see here. I copied the
email it was forwarded from in case the author wishes to comment.

From: "Micha Cohn" <mgc...@yeshivanet.com>
Date: January 17, 2014 at 9:51:50 EST
To: "Micha Cohn" <mgc...@yeshivanet.com>
Subject: Kohain Receiving an Organ Transplant - Medical Halacha Email for
Professionals

[This post is for educational and enrichment purposes only, not a final
halachic decision]
 
Kohain Receiving an Organ Transplant
 
Q: Is it permitted for a Kohain to receive an organ transplant from a
deceased person?
 
A: A Kohain is not allowed to come in direct contact with a deceased person,
which includes organs as well. By accepting the transplant a patient who is
a Kohain will be in direct contact with the organ all the time. With the
advent of organ transplantation, contemporary halachicists looked to clarify
this question and not simply rely on reasons of pikuach nefesh.  Here is an
overview of this most interesting discussion;
 
1. In the late 1950s when the entire concept of organ transplantation was in
its infancy, Rabbi Yitzchok Isaac Leibes, a distinguished European Rabbi
living in New York, was approached to write a treatise on potential halachic
questions about the novel concept of transplantation. In his work titled
'Kuntres Rofe Kol Bassar' he dealt with many possible issues, including
deriving benefit from a deceased person's body, Kohain issues, as well as
the possible ramifications of transplanting reproductive organs.
(Interestingly, some of the concepts could be applied to egg donation and
surrogacy)
 
2. In a twenty page response dated Rosh Chodesh Av 5718 (1958), Rabbi Moshe
Feinstein, a contemporary of Rabbi Leibes, reviewed many of the arguments
made in 'Kuntres Rofe Kol Basar' and offered his own perspective as well
(Igros Moshe YD 1:230) . Rabbi Leibes had raised the issue that if the size
of the tissue being transplanted is more than an olive it could give off
tumah (ritual impurity) and a Kohain would be prohibited from coming in
contact with it even in today's times. Rabbi Leibis offered a number of
possible arguments to permit a Kohain to accept a transplant, such as
relying on less mainstream opinions that maintain that there is not a Torah
prohibition for a Kohain to defile himself in contemporary times when he is
already ritually impure, as well as the opinion of the Maharshdam that
questions the reliability of a Kohain's tradition on his lineage. Rabbi
Moshe Feinstein did not view these reasons as being so substantial, and
offered a perspective of his own.
 
3. Firstly, Rabbi Feinstein pointed out that if the tissue will be put
inside the body, there is a concept of 'tumah baluah', that ritual
impureness is not transferred inside the body. The commentary of Rabbeinu
Shimshon explains, since it is inside the body it looses its own
significance and is considered a part of the body. Based on this idea, if
the tissue is transplanted beneath the skin the patient will not become
tamai since it is not in contact with the external part of the recipient's
body. This would be a significant argument to permit a Kohain to receive a
transplant since most transplanted organs are not visible externally
 
4. Furthermore, the Rambam writes that although human skin from a deceased
person is ritually impure, if it is chemically treated it looses its tumah
seemingly because of a general concept that when an item takes on a new form
it can loose its previous status. Based on this concept Rabbi Feinstein
understands that if tissue from the deceased takes on a new role, like being
used in a transplant, it removes the tumah status from it. As such, a Kohain
would be allowed to accept a transplant (given certain previsions) and even
if it is not bellow the skin, because the very fact that it is now part of a
living person gives it a new status and removes the tumah.
 
5. Another interesting point raised by Rabbi Leibes is since the patient is
under anesthesia during the operation he should not have a prohibition to
become tamei in that unconscious state. Rabbi Feinstein offered a
enlightening perspective. He explains that a sleeping person is only exempt
from mitzvos if it is an 'ones' - beyond their control. However, in a
situation where a person willingly goes into surgery they have chosen a
course of action and are responsible for what happens when they are
sleeping. The only exemption would be if the person's state of
unconsciousness is irreversible without outside intervention, which would
make it a more permanent status than a person who is sleeping. In that
situation the person's status would change and could be considered a shoteh
- a person without proper mental capacity, even if it was willfully induced.
Based on this differentiation Rabbi Feinstein explains that a state of
unconsciousness induced by anesthesia would only render a person a shoteh,
mentally incapacitated, if medical intervention is needed in order to arouse
the patient.  However if the anesthesia would wear off on its own if not
continuously induced, the patient would not have the status of a shoteh, but
rather that of a sleeping person, since the unconsciousness is only
transient.    
 
6. As a final thought, generally organ transplants are done to deal with
life threatening illnesses and therefore on a practical level a Kohain would
be allowed to accept the transplant regardless. None the less, according to
Rabbi Moshe Feinstein, if done with certain provisions, transplantation
would not pose a halachic problem for a Kohain since the organ becomes a
part of his body.   
 
(Refer a friend! send a request to mgc...@yeshivanet.com to subscribe)

---------------


MYG



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