Volume 32: Number 55
Thu, 27 Mar 2014
Subjects Discussed In This Issue:
Message: 1
From: Micha Berger <mi...@aishdas.org>
Date: Wed, 26 Mar 2014 18:21:51 -0400
Subject: Re: [Avodah] Why We Drink
On Sun, Mar 23, 2014 at 10:47:05PM +0200, Liron Kopinsky wrote:
: Any thoughts on the below?
...
: In other words, the reason why Kohanim are prohibited to drink wine before
: serving in the Beit HaMikdash is because the wine will impair their ability
: to distinguish between pure and impure and between holy and mundane.
:
: However, this is very strange because almost every time we use wine in
: Judaism is in order to make a distinction. We use wine to sanctify Shabbat
: and Yom Tov and to make Havdalah as we separate from Shabbat back into the
: week ahead. We have wine at a Brit Mila and at a wedding, both events that
: fundamentally change the status of a person.
:
: If wine is something that impairs our ability to make distinctions, then
: why do we use wine to distinguish things?
....
: When we make Kiddish, we make the distinction between Shabbat and the week
: that preceded it. But then we drink, reminding ourselves that really the
: distinction isn???t as great as we think. Friday is fundamentally different
: from Shabbat, but Friday is also a holy day meant to be used in service of
: Hashem. And when we make Havdalah, we remind ourselves that Sunday and the
: rest of the week are also days to grow spiritually...
To rphrase your idea in very different terms, to make sure I got your
conclusion as intended: You answer is about the need to balance the
concept of making distinctions with the need to remember that both
sides of the havdalah are for the same Ultimate Purpose.
But I think this idea requires more work. The rite itself is called
Qiddush, Havdalah, Qiddhsuin... I can see the value in the idea, but
I think you're taking mitzvos that should be /about/ the distinction
side of the dialectic and making it instead about the dialectic itself
(both sides).
Also, alcohol isn't a necessary element to any of these. Havdalah
can be with any significant drink, and we allow grapejuice for all
the others.
Nor would a revi'is of wine get anyone drunk enough to blur their
categories (even if it would pasul a kohein for avodah). Chazal's wine
required a minimum of 1:3 dilution. So the original 12% alcohol (the
most the yeast can produce naturally before the alcohol kills them)
is now at most 4%. Probably less -- we are better at sealing to prevent
evaportation than they were, and alcohol evaporates far more readily
than water. A CI revi'is is only 5.3 oz (150 cc), and evidence is the
extant pesaq in Chazal's day was closer to RCNa'eh's 3 oz (86 cc).
Tir'u baTov!
-Micha
--
Micha Berger A sick person never rejects a healing procedure
mi...@aishdas.org as "unbefitting." Why, then, do we care what
http://www.aishdas.org other people think when dealing with spiritual
Fax: (270) 514-1507 matters? - Rav Yisrael Salanter
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Message: 2
From: "Chana Luntz" <Ch...@kolsassoon.org.uk>
Date: Wed, 26 Mar 2014 22:53:06 -0000
Subject: Re: [Avodah] Aliyyot to the Blind vs Aliyyot for women vs
On 24 March 2014 21:17, Esther and Aryeh Frimer <frim...@zahav.net.il>
wrote:
>In our paper we argue that for the oleh's berakha not to be a berakha
le-vatala, the oleh and ba'al korei must both be obligated in keri'at
haTorah (Major Male) so that the ma'aseh ha-mitsva (reading >aloud) is
transferred to the oleh who makes the
> berakha. Thus, a blind man may receive an aliyya and make the berakha,
since he is obligated in Keri'at haTorah and the ba'al korei can read for
him >and transfer the action to him. A women who is not obligated, may not
read for others. [We do >reaffirm, however, that a woman and a minor may
read for themselves.]
Just as a side note, what is not clear from what you have said is how you
would consider a woman reading for another woman, or a minor reading for
another minor, these being equivalent obligations, but not the same as it
was in the times of the Mishna.
>Ms. Chana Luntz correctly notes that if this analysis were correct a minor
could not serve as a ba'al korei for others. Yet, she testifies that in many
sefardic communities minors indeed do read for >others. Over the past few
days, Dov and I have spoken to >many Sefardic Rabbis who have confirmed that
this practice is indeed found in some sefardic communities, though it is
certainly a minority >practice - not the general custom. Several of these
Sefardic Rabbis were adamant that such a practice is
> forbidden.
I think it would be useful to take a step back and outline what seem to be
the key halachic facts, which as far as I can see are agreed:
The position of the Shulchan Aruch/Beis Yosef/Maran:
(A). The mechanism which validates the brachos over kriyas haTorah
when there is both a ba'al koreh and an oleh is due to the oleh reading
along quietly with the ba'al koreh.
(B). Shomeah k'oneh, while brought by a minority of rishonim as the
applicable mechanism when there is both a ba'al koreh and an oleh, is
specifically rejected as a valid mechanim.
(C). A blind man cannot therefore be an oleh because (i) shomeah
k'oneh does not work (ie B above) and (ii) a blind man may not recite
anything by heart or after the ba'al koreh (enabling the brachos) because
kriyas haTorah falls into the category of torah shebichtav which is not
permitted to be said ba'al peh (SH OH 139:3).
The Position of the Darchei Moshe/Rema:
Brings the Meharil that the custom is to call up a blind man as an oleh. In
the Darchei Moshe (OH 141:1) the Rema says he disagrees with this custom,
preferring the position of the Beis Yosef, but in his commentary to the
Shulchan Aruch (OH 139:3)he merely brings the Meharil as saying that now is
the custom to given aliyos to blind men like we give aliyos to the ignorant
(am ha'aretz). Neither the Meharil not the Darchei Moshe give a reason or
justification for the custom of calling up a blind man besides linking it to
the am ha'aretz.
A number of commentators, most notably the Taz (Orech Chaim 141:3) argue
that this custom of calling up a blind man is based on application of the
principle of Shomea K'oneh and the rishonim (rejected by the Shulchan Aruch)
who postulate this principle.
I think so far this is undisputed.
Logical Analysis
Now let us apply some analysis. Vis a vis Maran/the Shulchan Aruch we have
the following logical possibilities:
(a) Maran is right about (A), (B) and (C), and therefore we cannot call up a
blind man. We might, but are not necessarily able, to call up a minor or
have a minor be the ba'al koreh, because there could be other reasons why we
do not want to do that, such as kavod hatzibbur, or kabalistic reasons or
simply minhag. But vis a vis the question of the brachos said by the oleh,
there is no reason not to call up a minor for either position.
(b) Maran is right about (A), (B) and (C)(i), but not C(ii). In this case
we could call up a blind man, but not because of shomea k'oneh, but because
he can either say the parsha by heart, or repeat it after the ba'al koreh.
The Aruch HaShulchan advances this argument in Orech Chaim 139 siman 8
(based on the gemora in Yoma 70a).
(c) Maran is right about (A), (B) as well as (C)(i) and (C)(ii), but wrong
in essence about (C) overall, the calling up of a blind man, as there is
some other halachic mechanism that works in that case.
(d) Maran is right about (A), but wrong about (B) and hence (C). That is,
both the mechanism of reading along quietly *and* shomea k'oneh work, the
first in the normative case, and the second in the case of a blind man.
(e) Maran is wrong about all of (A), (B) and (C)(i). That is, his quiet
reading along mechanism does not work, the only mechanism that does work is
shomea k'oneh and hence you can call up a blind man, but you cannot allow a
minor to be ba'al koreh when not reading for himself and similarly a woman.
In order to hold as RAF/RDF do in their article, you have to hold position
(e). In any other situation, the brachos are not b'vatala. And if a minor
can be ba'al koreh for a gadol, then this position (e) cannot be right.
However, the fact that a minor might not be able to be ba'al koreh does not
necessarily support position (e), as there may be other reasons, not linked
to shomea k'oneh, why one cannot or does not allow a minor to be a ba'al
koreh.
Thus in order for the various Sephardi Rabbis and poskim you cite to
actually support your position you need them to hold the following:
(I) a blind man can be given an aliyah (if not, then shomea k'oneh cannot be
a valid mechanism as shomea k'oneh has to work for a blind man); and
(II) A minor cannot be ba'al koreh for gadolim, but he can for himself. If
however he is prohibited from being ba'al koreh even for himself then the
mechanism at work is not shomea k'oneh, but some other reason prohibiting
the minor from reading.
Merely having numerous poskim prohibit minors from reading does not assist
you if the reasons are not based on shomea k'oneh. But on the other hand,
those communities that do allow minors to read for adults are in direct
contradiction to your postulated halacha.
So I started working my way through the list of Sephardi poskim that you
cite to see into which category they fall, but gave up part way, because not
very surprisingly none of them really support your position. The most they
generally support was that minors could not (or should not) be called upon
to be ba'al koreh. For a start, any of your list who allow it b'shas
hadchak by definition does not support you. Because a bracha l'vatala is,
according to the dominant Sephardi view, an issur d'orisa. Were shomea
k'oneh the only operative mechanism, giving rise to a bracha l'vatala where
it failed, then no shas hadchak is going to permit the engagement with such
an issur d'orisa. It is only if there are some other reason (a reason that
falls short of an issur d'orisa) why one should not have a minor as a ba'al
koreh that one might consider waiving that reason in a shas hadchak
situation.
But that in general your list is not going to support you is not very
surprising, because let's take a step back and think about what you are
asking. It is certainly true that many if not most Sephardi poskim are not
quite as Maran centric as Rav Ovadiah Yosef, but just let us quote what Rav
Ovadiah says in his principles of hora'ah at the back of the first volume of
Yechave Daat:
"3. One who turns from the words of Maran left or right, behold he is
mezalzel in the honour of his rabbaim, and all the rulings of Maran that he
is the Mara d'atra and we accept his rulings, and they are fixed like the
halacha of Moshe from Sinai, that there isn't in them any dispute at all.
And therefore one is not to rule even a stringently against Maran if he is
lenient on a matter. And in any event it is permitted to be stringent on
himself (privately) when he does not do this why way of a neder and he knows
that the essence of the halacha is to permit."
And yet you are asking and expecting all these Sephardi poskim to say that
Maran is wrong, not just once, but on three counts - ie all of (A), (B) and
(C) must be wrong to get to your position. And yet as I have shown above,
these are not the only logical options - there are options not just of
following Maran fully as in (a) (even if you do not permit minors for other
reasons) but also of following positions (b), (c) or(d) all of which have
Maran being wrong at least one fewer time than you need him to be. If given
a choice between ruling that Maran is wrong three times, and ruling he is
wrong twice or once or no times, which option do you think Sephardi poskim
are going to choose?
>Indeed, the analysis in our paper follows the lead of Magen Avraham (O.H.,
sec. 282, no. 6)
Now even the Magen Avraham himself does not fully support your position -
stating only that one cannot call up a minor as ba'al koreh until he brings
two hairs. He does not state that the reason for this is shomea k'oneh. The
Magen Avraham does explicitly rely on the teshuva of the RaM Melamed, but I
have unfortunately not been able to track down a copy of that teshuva (if
somebody could send it to me, I would be very grateful). It may be that RaM
Melamed does cite shomea k'oneh as the reason - but of course in that case
the Magen Avraham should be limiting his prohibition to where the minor is
not reading for himself (as you do), which he does not do. Otherwise it
rather leads one to suspect that he is basing himself on other reasons -
kovod hatzibbur perhaps.
So the fact that various Sephardi communities are choshesh for the Magen
Avraham does not in itself support the idea that the only mechanism that
enables bracha making by an oleh who is not the ba'al koreh is shomea
k'oneh. In contrast however, those communities, and we can have debates
about how extensive they are, but they clearly exist all over the world and
throughout the ages, force you, unless you are prepared to exclude them from
the tent of halacha and are willing to write them out of Orthodoxy, to
understand that the sole halachic mechanism involved cannot be shomea
k'oneh.
And while the situation is more acute for Sephardi poskim, because of the
flat out rejection of Maran in three places, I am not convinced that even
the Ashkenazi poskim, while justifying the minhag of calling up a blind man
and following the Magen Avraham in not calling up pre barmitzvah minors,
would be comfortable with your full rejection of the threefold position of
the Shulchan Aruch, given the existence of options (b), (c) and (d).
For example the Mishna Brura, while citing shomea k'oneh as the mechanism
being used to enable a blind man to have an aliya (OH 139:12) states in the
first Biur Halacha on OH 141 (d"h l'vatala) that "it seems that the Rema
does not rely on the words of the Meharil except for the matter of a blind
man and an am ha'aretz that if they do not call them ever there is much
shame" In contrast however but "when he is baki in reading indeed he is
obligated [to read] with the Shatz since behold he already wrote himself in
the Darchei Moshe that it did not seem to him the words of the Meharil but
the words of the Beis Yosef that he brings in the name of the rishonim that
if he is not able to read with the Shatz he is not able to be called to the
Torah". That is a pretty clear statement as to the adoption of position
(d), ie that shomea k'oneh applies only in limited cases, with the Shulchan
Aruch/Rosh's mechanism being the dominant one in the normative case.
I think if you genuinely try reading these sources without the issue of
partnership minyanim clouding your mind, you will see them for what they
are, halachic justifications for the slightly difficult minhag of calling up
a blind man, not a substantive attack and rejection of the halachically
normative positions of the Shulchan Aruch and the Darchei Moshe.
>In her recent post, the truly erudite Ms. Luntz makes a very novel
suggestion, namely: "Even if the oleh does not actually read along (at least
somewhat) in the Torah, so long as he is able to perform >the ma'aseh
mitzvah, it can be argued that he can still >make the brachos on the basis
of Rav Zera's principle of kol hara'ui l'bila ain bila makeves bo."
I'm afraid I have to apologise for giving what was clearly a misleading
impression, namely that this chiddush was my own. In fact it is that of the
Aruch HaShulchan (Orech Chaim siman 139 si'if 7), who uses it to reject the
Taz's proof (from the story regarding Rabbi Meir in the Tosephta in Megilla
and the Yerushalmi (perek 3 halacha 1)) for shomea k'oneh. All I did was
draw out the logical implication implicit in the Aruch HaShulchan that this
could be used today to deal with those who can read but fail to do so.
>Such a position is problematic for several reason. Firstly, Rav Zera's
priniciple of kol hara'ui l'bila ain bila makeves bo is a mahlokes Rishonim
ve-Aharonim le-halakha whether it applies be-khol
>haTorah kula or only where the Torah is megaleh. Secondly, Ms Luntz is
suggesting is that one can make a birkat ha-mitzva and never actually do the
mitzva - and yet the berakha would not be a >berakha levatala because he
could have done the
>mitsva. So, for example, one could make a le-Shev ba-Sukka and never sit in
it, simply because he could have. Or similarly, one could make le->Hadlik
ner shel Hanukka and never light the candle; yet the berakha would not be
le-vatala since one could
> have made the berakha. Finally, the Rosh says that if the oleh doesn't
read along, his berakha is le-vatala. But why? He could have. The Rosh, nor
any subsequent authority ever entertained the application of kol hara'ui
lebila to keri'at haTorah.My
>brother Dov discussed Ms Luntz's >suggestion with Rav Asher Weiss, who
summarily rejected it. He posited that kol hara'ui l'bila only applies to
Dinim (status) not to mitsvot. He even cited a Ritva to Hullin 106b where
one washes his >hands for bread >and makes al netillat Yadayyim - and then
changes his mind and decides not to eat bread. The Ritva says it is not a
Berakha le-vatala, nor do we require the individual to eat bread, >because
he actually did the mitsva action appropriate for the >berakha. But, says
Rav Asher, had he not done the mitsva action of washing, then obviously the
berakha would have been le-vatala, even >though he could have washed.
In defence of the Aruch HaShulchan, we could perhaps suggest that there are
various hechsher mitzvos (if not part of the mitzvah itself) which do
involve action. After all the oleh rises when his name is called and makes
his way up to the bimah (holacha). He then usually (in the Ashkenazi
tradition) looks in the Torah, kisses the spot pointed to by the ba'al koreh
with his tallis, grasps the handles of the sefer and then makes the bracha,
at the end he then again looks in the Torah, kisses the place pointed to by
the ba'al koreh with his tzitzis. Even if in this whole process he does not
catch sight of a single word that he ends up reading, he has certainly
looked into the actual Torah scroll . And indeed we know (inter alia from
the mitzvah of chanukah candles that you cite) mere seeing (roeh) can be
enough to trigger a bracha, even without all this tzitzis kissing and
marking. I would have thought that therefore the actions involved were more
than enough to justify use of the principle, if the principle can be
utilised at all.
Regarding the machlokus whether or not one can use kol hara'ui l'bila more
generally, I did note that "it can be argued" - but certainly the Aruch
HaShulchan there states explicitly that we can cite this halachic principle
"in general", although of course there are others who hold differently.
What to my mind is even more noteworthy about the Aruch HaShulchan however,
is the fact that he goes to some lengths to suggest alternatives to shomea
k'oneh - citing both this principle and the idea that perhaps the blind man
can recite by heart. That is, one can detect here, just as in the Biur
Halacha, a general discomfort regarding the use of shomea k'oneh even to
support the calling up of the blind (a position he clearly supports). It is
a long way from this to a position that invokes shomea k'oneh as displacing
all other mechanisms as in done in the article.
That, I just don't think is valid. Not only because of the many frum
(Sephardi) Jews over the centuries who have and continue to call up minors
to read as ba'al koreh and whose practices you are attacking (and if they
are not neviim, bnei neviim hem - and the fact that there are other
communities that have an continue to hold differently does not mean you go
out of your way to invalidate the others). But also because of the nature
of the halachic dialogue itself. The blind case is an exceptional case, the
justifications for it are in that context. And to then cite those
justifications to argue for the incorrectness of not just one but three
positions taken by the Shulchan Aruch, when at most one disagreement is
required (and where the Rema himself disagees at most in one place), is
chipping away at the principle that the Shulchan Aruch stands as a dividing
line in the history of psak and potentially operates to weaken the authority
of the Shulchan Aruch vis a vis minority rishonic opinion. And this is not
a situation where we can say that the Shulchan Aruch had not seen all the
evidence we see today (such as lost rishonic opinions) or that his position
here fundamentally contradicts a position he takes elsewhere (which are
potential ways the eg Rav Ovadiah permits to allow disagreement with the
Shulchan Aruch). It is simply a threefold straight out rejection, which I
do not believe is mirrored by the various achronim. I certainly do not
believe this is your intention, but there are risks in undermining the psak
of the Shulchan Aruch is such a straightforward fashion, and I do not
believe you have in any way made the case to do so.
Kol Tuv
Aryeh (from home; For Aryeh and Dov)
--------------------------------
Chana
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Message: 3
From: "Kenneth Miller" <kennethgmil...@juno.com>
Date: Thu, 27 Mar 2014 00:33:10 GMT
Subject: Re: [Avodah] Rav Elya Lopian: tefillin and radio
R' Micha Berger wrote:
> 1- As I cited last time, the Ran, the Ikkarim, the Ramchal, RCV,
> and numerous others explain sekhar va'onesh in terms of the
> mitzvah impacting the soul which then is then more capable of
> receiving Hashem's sekhar. So, let's say someone does everything
> he is obligated to, and never learns his tefillin weren't
> kosher. There is no impact on the person due to the tefillin
> being pasul, and there is no impact caused by his being
> neglectful. So, why shouldn't the guy get the metaphysical
> effects of working tefillin?
One side of me wants to agree,
But the other side wants to cite Rav Chaim Brisker: "Nebach an apikores is
still an apikores." In this case: Granted that he has an iron-clad alibi
for not wearing kosher tefillin; but the bottom line is that he didn't wear
kosher tefillin.
> 3- Similarly "hatTov shimekha". Two people who do the very same
> thing are equally prepared to receive shefa. They are in the
> same state. So how would unknown differences in their tefillin
> change how much shefa they actually do receive?
But the differences *are* there. They are unknown only to us mortals.
What would you say about a person whose bris milah was done by someone who
thought he was Jewish, but really wasn't? Let's say this was discovered
after shechting the Korban Pesach, but before eating it. What next?
> The difference RDR points to is actually what one would expect
> when jumping to from physics to metaphysics. In the physical
> world, things depend on state. But in ruchnius, everything
> depends on process. Two people with the same level of patience
> could be holding in entirely different places is one is simply
> a patient as he was as a toddler, and the other worked hard at
> it. The agra for talmud Torah rests in the tza'ara, not in the
> knowledge gained.
This is an interesting perspective. If it is correct, then it would answer the challenges that I raised above. But are you *sure* that it is correct?
I will agree that in ruchniyus, process is much more important than state.
(Or to phrase it differently: the effort is what counts, not the
accomplishment.) But do you know for sure that state doesn't count *at*
*all*?
Example: A mamzer talmid chacham ranks higher than a kohen gadol am
haaretz. But that still doesn't enable the mamzer talmid chacham to do the
Avodah. And so too, I imagine that one who dons pasul tefilin will not get
as much s'char as if they had been kosher, no matter how good his alibi.
Akiva Miller
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Message: 4
From: Zev Sero <z...@sero.name>
Date: Wed, 26 Mar 2014 20:54:25 -0400
Subject: Re: [Avodah] Aliyyot to the Blind vs Aliyyot for women vs
What is Sefardi practise when someone is called up while he is saying
birchot kriat shema? Does he go up and read, go up and not read, or not go?
Standard Ashkenazi practise is that he goes up and doesn't read; according to
you, though, why is this allowed? It's not a she'at had'chak like the case of
the blind man or the am ha'aretz, where, as you quote, it's terribly shaming
for him *never* to be called. This man is presumably called often enough, so
he won't be ashamed if he has to miss one aliyah, particularly if everyone can
see that he's in the middle of davening. And indeed, if he is standing shmoneh
esreh he *doesn't* go up, and we call someone else, and we're not worried about
embarrassing him, because everyone can see the situation. So if he's in birchot
kriat shema why is it such an emergency that we must rely on the (according to
you) dubious principle of shomea` ke`oneh?
--
Zev Sero A citizen may not be required to offer a 'good and
z...@sero.name substantial reason' why he should be permitted to
exercise his rights. The right's existence is all
the reason he needs.
- Judge Benson E. Legg, Woollard v. Sheridan
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Message: 5
From: "Kenneth Miller" <kennethgmil...@juno.com>
Date: Thu, 27 Mar 2014 01:02:24 GMT
Subject: Re: [Avodah] Rav Elya Lopian: tefillin and radio
I referred to:
> Or the Y'hee Ratzon after Tekios D'Myushav
R' David Riceman responded:
> The instructions in the Koren mahzor read: "There are those who
> have the custom of not saying this, and there are those who
> prohibit saying this." No mention of anyone actually saying it.
> I don't know who composed this prayer, but citing it also seems
> to make your thesis fuzzier rather than clearer.
In the Artscroll, the directions are similar, but they appear only after
Tashrat and after Tashat, but not after Tarat. I have always presumed that
the reason to skip it is because of a hefsek, and once the 30 main blasts
are over, there's no longer any problem.
In the Koren edition edited by Rabbi Jonathan Sacks, the wording is
explicit: "Some congregations say the following prayer (although many
authorities rule that this constitutes an interruption and therefore should
not be said)". I note that Rabbi Sacks puts it after all three (even after
Tarat) and I presume that his logic is that the hefsek problem does not go
away after 30 kolos, but only after all 100.
It seems that you believe that the reason to omit the tefila is because it
smacks of Avodah Zara. You're entitled to your opinion. I know that many
skip Shalom Aleichem for the same reason. But I dare suggest that others
feel that Shalom Aleichem is allowed because we are talking to creations,
not praying to gods. And similarly, it's not avodah zara to think that
spiritual energies are output from the shofar.
ON THE OTHER HAND, I have to admit that the entire rest of that post shook
me a bit. Only a little bit, but it did shake me. On the one hand, my
skills in these topics are so weak that most of what he wrote went far over
my head. But that worries me more than it reassures me.
He quoted various writers and writings, most of which I am unable to look
up. But one very important point did get through my skull: I'm swimming in
water that is way too deep for me.
I really don't see anything problematic in the ideas that I've been writing
about. It sure sounds to me like I am *not* saying anything new; I *have*
given precedents that metaphysical forces are created when we do mitzvos
and aveiros, haven't I?
But that's not good enough - perhaps my inability to see the problems is
the real danger. The suggestion that one's ideas might be heretical should
give anyone pause. My confidence in those ideas is their very danger. I am
not going to back down from them, but I do think that I should keep an eye
out for what greater minds than mine might say.
Akiva Miller
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Message: 6
From: Zev Sero <z...@sero.name>
Date: Thu, 27 Mar 2014 12:30:24 -0400
Subject: Re: [Avodah] Rav Elya Lopian: tefillin and radio
On 26/03/2014 8:33 PM, Kenneth Miller wrote:
> But the other side wants to cite Rav Chaim Brisker: "Nebach an
> apikores is still an apikores." In this case: Granted that he has an
> iron-clad alibi for not wearing kosher tefillin; but the bottom line
> is that he didn't wear kosher tefillin.
One needn't even go that far. Even the Raavad, who holds that "nebach an
apikores is not an apikores", agrees that with a mitzvat asei, "keman deavad
lo amrinan". With all the good will in the world, the mitzvah wasn't done.
> What would you say about a person whose bris milah was done by
> someone who thought he was Jewish, but really wasn't? Let's say this
> was discovered after shechting the Korban Pesach, but before eating
> it. What next?
To the best of my knowledge, it's not actually required that the mohel be
Jewish. Bediavad, if a goy did a circumcision for the purpose of initiating
the baby in the covenant of Avraham Avinu, it's kosher.
>> The agra for talmud Torah rests in the tza'ara, not in the
>> knowledge gained.
How is agra relevant?
> I will agree that in ruchniyus, process is much more important than state.
I don't see any basis for that assertion. RMB seems to be confusing s'char
v'onesh with what is actually achieved.
--
Zev Sero A citizen may not be required to offer a 'good and
z...@sero.name substantial reason' why he should be permitted to
exercise his rights. The right's existence is all
the reason he needs.
- Judge Benson E. Legg, Woollard v. Sheridan
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Message: 7
From: Micha Berger <mi...@aishdas.org>
Date: Thu, 27 Mar 2014 17:25:56 -0400
Subject: Re: [Avodah] Rav Elya Lopian: tefillin and radio
On Thu, Mar 27, 2014 at 12:33:10AM +0000, Kenneth Miller wrote:
: R' Micha Berger wrote:
:> 1- As I cited last time, the Ran, the Ikkarim, the Ramchal, RCV,
:> and numerous others explain sekhar va'onesh in terms of the
:> mitzvah impacting the soul which then is then more capable of
:> receiving Hashem's sekhar. So, let's say someone does everything
:> he is obligated to, and never learns his tefillin weren't
:> kosher. There is no impact on the person due to the tefillin
:> being pasul, and there is no impact caused by his being
:> neglectful. So, why shouldn't the guy get the metaphysical
:> effects of working tefillin?
: One side of me wants to agree,
: But the other side wants to cite Rav Chaim Brisker: "Nebach an apikores
: is still an apikores." In this case: Granted that he has an iron-clad
: alibi for not wearing kosher tefillin; but the bottom line is that he
: didn't wear kosher tefillin.
You'll see below that my conclusion is RSZA's, although my line of
reasoning isn't. I didn't remember that until Zev reminded me about things
said in prior iterations, so I wrote it in my reply to him -- below.
Repeating what I would expect of sekhar va'ones: that it be (1) caused
by the cheit, (2) Divine Justice, and (3) help the soul get to where
it's supposed to be going (for want of a better term: "hatavah"..
Neibich an apiqoreis raises questions of justice. But then, so does
any aveirah beshogeig. Barring criminal negligence [qarov lemeizid]
or avoidable negligence.
OTOH, oneis Rachman patrei raises questions of causality and hatavah.
After all, if someone skins their knee through no fault of their own,
their knee still hurt, and would still benefit from some neosporine.
I'll explain further in reply to Zev, below, but I am assuming
that we need both total unawareness and a lack of culpability to
assume the pesul has no impact on the person's soul.
On Wed, Mar 19, 2014 at 07:05:43PM -0400, Zev Sero wrote:
>> The nimshal for my position is that they work in the same manner. I
>> suggested that mitzvos work by shaping the soul of those who do them.
>> The nimshal for radio waves would be the psycho-spiritual state of the
>> wearer. A pesul in the tefillin that the person didn't know about and
>> has no culpibility for not knowing is like a break in the radio's case --
>> it needn't have any impact on the function of the radio at all.
> You keep ignoring an explicit gemara (Kiddushin 66b) which says otherwise.
I am not, nor neating the entire concept of shogeig. Since we're
revisiting v14, RSZA in Rav Poalim 4:2 invokes "barukh Hashem cheilo"
to explicitly say that in our case H' treats him exactly as though the
tefillin were kosher.
Interestingly, the Y-mi uses this pasuq to say that a chalal who acts
beshogeig is a special case. Not only must RSZA have some source for
conclusing that other amoraim disagree and we hold like them, but for
applying this pasuq to the topic of Hashem's oneshim rather than
our chiyuvei kaparah -- ie when there is no rei'usa tipping the person
off that there may be a yichus or tefillin problem.
My examples
always involve two things, and just to be clear I will use list format:
1- Something the person never knows of (and thus not even a beshogeig),
2- nor can he be held accountable for not knowing.
The first is about the action's impact on the person,
the second is about the state of the person as it impacted the action.
But without either, there is no reason to assume the mitzvah does
reflect the state of the person, what sekhar they are capable of
receivng, what sekhar is fair for them to get, what hatavah is
necesary to get them to the ideal Hashem designed them for.
> We've discussed this before. According to you if a mikveh turned out to be
> passul, everyone who used it innocently should be considered tahor.
Again see also Niddah 3b. As the Rambam concludes (Miqva'os 10:6) it's
not that in total ignorance the miqvah is no longer a miqvah anyway,
but that in total ignorance the tum'ah is still tum'ah. Conflicting
chazaqos.
But obviously the Rambam, or any halachic text, isn't referring to my
case. I'm talking about situations where the person is ignorant that
there is even a problem. The chazaqah de'ika rei'usa means that
the chezkas tum'ah is in play.
Under the hashkafah I'm suggesting, this is because ika rei'usa is
a piece of knowledge. And therefore the person after this situation
is different than the one who actually went to a kosher miqvah.
Our initial case, the pasul tefillin that only HBQH knows is pasul
(maybe also some mal'akhim, neshamos of niftarim, or not... <grin>)
there is no ika rei'usa, there is no knowledge that this isn't the
same case as the kosher tefillin. The person is left at the same
level of development as the one who wore kosher tefillin. So why
should his fate differ?
I'm suggesting that in a case of warring chazaqos where someone learns
there is a question to ask (ika rei'usa), the women are still temei'os.
But if no one ever has reason to raise a question, doubt never enters the
world of their experience, so that their experience is identical to a
kosher miqvah from start to end, they not only think they're tehoros,
I see no reason to assume HQBH wouldn't agree.
Returning to RAM's post of Thu, Mar 27, 2014 at 12:33:10AM GMT, with which
I opened:
:> 3- Similarly "hatTov shimekha". Two people who do the very same
:> thing are equally prepared to receive shefa. They are in the
:> same state. So how would unknown differences in their tefillin
:> change how much shefa they actually do receive?
: But the differences *are* there. They are unknown only to us mortals.
This is an interesting point, one worth teasing out.
Naniach that my causal and hatavah criteria or Nefesh haChaim cheileq
1 requires that the sin that doesn't impact the soul shouldn't have
reprecussions. But perhaps only properly made tefillin impact the
soul in some mystical way that pasul ones don't, in some way we can't
understand. The radio-like quality R' Elya discusses could refer to how
it works on the soul, rather than how it works on creation.
BUT... it would still fail my justice criterion. Metaphysical causality
in general, other than sekhar va'onesh itself, will just give us more
reasons for unfair things to occur.
: What would you say about a person whose bris milah was done by someone who
: thought he was Jewish, but really wasn't? Let's say this was discovered
: after shechting the Korban Pesach, but before eating it. What next?
Well at this point he knows, criterion #1.
:> The difference RDR points to is actually what one would expect
:> when jumping to from physics to metaphysics. In the physical
:> world, things depend on state. But in ruchnius, everything
:> depends on process. Two people with the same level of patience
:> could be holding in entirely different places is one is simply
:> a patient as he was as a toddler, and the other worked hard at
:> it. The agra for talmud Torah rests in the tza'ara, not in the
:> knowledge gained.
: This is an interesting perspective. If it is correct, then it would answer
: the challenges that I raised above. But are you *sure* that it is correct?
I meant to change topics when I quoted RDR's post, and didn't think I
was addressing your question. I just meant that meraphysical engineering
would be "path dependent", unlike radio design. But both are engineering,
and the comparison still holds to validate the concept that a user could
need his "device" to be correct in numerous precise details even if the
user doesn't know why or it won't work.
: I will agree that in ruchniyus, process is much more important than
: state. (Or to phrase it differently: the effort is what counts, not
: the accomplishment.) But do you know for sure that state doesn't count
: *at* *all*?
I think it does matter. The known state. The state that should have been
known doesn't so much matter, but the cause of ignorance does.
But again, here I didn't intend to say anything about state, just that
lefum tzaarah agra drags process/path into the picture. And so the
(known) history of the tefillin could matter in ways the known history
of the radio doesn't.
On Wed, Mar 26, 2014 at 09:29:43AM -0400, David Riceman wrote:
> <<He tried to tell me something about "quality", but I was too young to
> understand.>>
> I think you misunderstand my question. I understand hadar for esrog,
> since the Torah mentions it, and Hazal generalize the concept of hiddur
> mitzva extensively. But why do you think having beautiful tefillin makes
> them work better? ...
Maybe they don't work better qua tefillin. Maybe zeh Keili ve'anveihu is a
second mitzvah, and thus a second means for being able to receive shefa,
unrelated to the mitzvah of tefillin itself. After all, the concept
of shefa is used to model the effects of mitzvos (among other things),
not necesssarily cheftzos.
> Now go read the Rambam's analysis of a
> certain type of AZ in PhM AZ 4:7 (this is one of those places where
> Kafih's translation works better). I'm not sure how close your ideas are
> to those the Rambam describes and condemns.
> I admit that it's hard to find a clear line of distinction between that
> and the phenomenon of nevuah which he discusses in H. YhT 7:1 and MN
> II:36. Nonetheless I wonder if you may be going over the line, and I
> wish you would clarify your conjecture.
Leshitaso:
Nevu'ah is hooking up to the chain of G-d to His Thought, to its thought,
down the chain of mal'akhim and galgalim at a higher point in the chain.
Thus, it's a higher awareness, including that of metaphysical events.
This isn't a mechanistic causality between what we do phsycially to
what's in heaven and back again, like a talisman, or astrology.
To me the line glares, so I must be missing something.
But more on the Rambam and nevu'ah if I ever get to commenting on
the Etz haDa'at thread.
Tir'u baTov!
-Micha
--
Micha Berger Every second is a totally new world,
mi...@aishdas.org and no moment is like any other.
http://www.aishdas.org - Rabbi Chaim Vital
Fax: (270) 514-1507
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