Avodah Mailing List

Volume 32: Number 34

Wed, 05 Mar 2014

• 1. Re: Yahrzeit - R' Yitzchak Zirkind zt"l (David Riceman)
• 2. Re: Eitz HaDa'at (was: Why does Moshe use logical arguments when davening to, save) (Arie Folger)
• 3. Re: Time for the Deceased (David Riceman)
• 4. Solar and Lunar Eclipses are bad omens (Marty Bluke)
• 5. Re: Time for the Deceased (Kenneth Miller)
• 6. Re: Philosophers and philosophy (Kenneth Miller)
• 7. Re: Time for the Deceased (David Riceman)
• 8. Vayikra (cantorwolb...@cox.net)
• 9. Tzedakah Con Men (Micha Berger)
• 10. Re: Tzedakah Con Men (Rich, Joel)
• 11. Re: Kivrey Avos (Micha Berger)
• 12. Dating Rabbi Aha's Petirah (Micha Berger)
• 13. Daf HaKashrus 22.5 Pesach Issue (Prof. Levine)
• 14. Re: Nature of the tana'atic machlokus regarding women performing mitzvos aseh shehazman grama (Chana Luntz)

RMB:

<<I received a message from his daughter that his yahrzeit is today and 
it would be greatly appreciated by the family to do something small or 
large L'Iluy Nishmas HaRav Yitzchok A"H ben HaRav Eliezer Tzvi Zev Shlita>>

I was musing nostalgically about RYZ ZL's style of posting.  He would 
have cited sources demonstrating the importance of this, and 
illustrating what "small or large" meant.  Would anyone care to 
contribute footnotes?

David Riceman

RAM wrote:
> Prior to the Chet, Adam was very busy choosing names for all the animals.
> These were not tov/ra choices, but very much in the emes/sheker area,
> analyzing the essence of each creature and assigning a name to that
> essence.

Not wanting to get involved in the main issue of how to define time, I do
want to point out that RAM's above remark about the nature of choice is not
the only way to understand Adam before the cheit. In fact, his dichotomy
distinctly follows Rambam in the Moreh, who assumed that Adam could only
distinguish between tov vera' after the sin.

That position is not necessary, though it is one that, through the Rambam,
obviously enjoys a lot of support. At issue, however, is understanding the
difference between being yod'ei tov vara' through eating from the tree's
fruits, and being, well, something else.

It is somehow inconceivable that Adam could not make these kinds of
distinctions prior to sinning, nor that he would be expected to ever do so,
as the ideal was not to eat from the tree. And all that is inconceivable,
because someone who cannot distinguish between good and evil is, well, a
psychopath, and it is inconceivable that G"d actually wanted us to be
psychopaths (had Adam not eaten from the tree's fruit).

For Rambam, the solution is to recognize that tov vara' are highly
subjective categories, and represent a degradation of Adam's ability to
distinguish between objetive emet and sheqer prior to his sin.

However, the keen reader will have noticed that nowhere in the Chumash is
it stated that Adam only began lehavdil bein tov lara' by eating from the
fruit. Instead, the operative phrase is lada'at, which rather than
conveying the ability to distinguish, conveys intimate knowledge. In fact,
lada'at as a verb conveys such intimate knowledge that it is Tanakh's
choice euphemism for sexual relations.

Thus, it is entirely reasonable to read the parsha differently, as can be
suggested on the basis of a number of midrashim and mefarshim: Adam always
had the inborn ability to distinguish between tov and ra', but as an
analyst, who didn't experience all the choices. G"d, on the other hand,
being the Creator of all, who knows all through and through, knows every
choice as if having experienced it, and that is what Adam was after, to not
only distinguish, but also experience and intimately know ra'.

This read becomes all the more reasonable once one realizes that numerous
midrashei Chazal, several of them cited by Rashi, rather clearly hint that
this ra' was not just any kind of evil, but rather about sexual ra'. That
is subtly hinted in the Chumash, as well, by the way. Partaking from the
fruit was perhaps meant to allow Adam to be overpowered by a taava thus
aroused or rendered uncontrollable. That would explain why according to one
view. the etz hada'at was the grape, which would create a very distinct
linkage between Adam's and Noach's sin.

I explored aspects of the above in a blog post a few years ago, accessible
here:
http://ariefolger.wordpress.com/2008/10/31/the-s
in-of-drunkenness-die-sunde-der-betrunkenheit/

I also explored other aspects in the following podcast, which is,
unfortunately for most Ovedim, in German:
http://ariefolger.wordpress.com/2013/12/04/ein-baum-der-klug-m
acht-audio-schiur/

The topic was also developed, independently, by R' David Fohrman, in The
Beast that Crouches at the Door:
http://www.amazon.com/The-Beast-That-Crouches-Door/dp/0
983269041/ref=sr_1_1?ie=UTF8&;qid=1393876250&sr=8-1&keywords
=the+beast+that+crouches+at+the+door
-- 
Arie Folger,
Recent blog posts on http://ariefolger.wordpress.com/
* Wieviel Feste feiern wir an Sukkot (Audio-Schiur)
* Die ethische Dimension des Schma Jissra?ls (Audio-Schiur)
* Ein Baum, der klug macht?! (Audio-Schiur)
* Podiumsdiskussion ?J?dische Religion zwischen Tradition und Moderne?
* Great Videos from the CER in Berlin
* A Priest Returns to his Faith
* The CER Berlin Conference in Pictures
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RLL:

<<What was Hashem's intent for the world? We can say as a truism that He 
created the world according to His intent. His intent /was/ the 
blueprint for Creation. So when the midrash says that He used the Torah 
as a blueprint for Creation, the meaning seems to be that the Torah 
contains and reflects Hashem's intent for all of Creation.>>

The midrash I mentioned (BR 1:1) is commenting on the Biblical passage 
about primordial Hochmah (Mishlei 8:22ff).  It offers several 
explanations of "Vaehyeh etzlo amon"(Mishlei 8:30)  Here's a loose 
translation of the relevant bit:  "Another explanation - - amon means 
uman (craftsman).  The Torah says: I was the tool of God's craft.  
Generally when a king builds a palace he builds it, based not on his 
plans (da'as - - maybe intentions would be better?) but based on the 
plans of the architect.  The architect builds it, not on his da'as, but 
based on blueprints (diptharot), and he has tablets (pinkasot) to tell 
him how to build the rooms. In the same way God looked at the Torah and 
created the world."

The problem is that, based on your reading, the metaphor is backwards.  
The Bible describes hochmah as prior to the world "Kedem mifalav 
me'az"(8:22).  The midrash is emphasizing that priority: architects 
build buildings from blueprints, they don't draw blueprints from 
preexisting buildings.  And of course it's a lovely metaphor for Philo's 
Logos, the home of the Platonic ideas.  But based on your explanation 
the midrash shouldn't cite that passage in Mishlei, and it shouldn't 
cite the analogy of the architect.  It should say that God modeled the 
Torah on the world, and that the world was prior to the Torah.

So, I repeat: how do you understand the words of the midrash?

David Riceman
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Todays daf (Succah 29a) discusses the various bad omens that a solar/lunar
eclipse portend as well as what Aveiros cause an eclipse.

Given that eclipses are natural events whose time is well known how are we
to understand this Gemara that they are bad omens as well as caused by sins?
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I wrote:

> "V'habit el amal lo suchal" is not a statement of His abilities.
> It is a desperate plea: How can You look at such things?!?!

R' David Riceman responded:

> new JPS "You whose eyes are too pure to look upon evil"
and
> Are you familiar with any clearly subjunctive uses of "yachol"
> in Tanach?
and later,
> I am suggesting that the navi is saying that looking at evil is
> beneath God, and that that is essential to God's role.

I am beginning to suspect that the differences between RDR and myself in
this area might be more semantic than real. I do agree that "V'habit el
amal lo suchal" is a statement that "looking at evil is beneath God". Our
difference seems to be that the way I see it, the description suggests that
God is capable of looking at evil but He chooses not to. If I understand
RDR correctly, it is not even in God's nature to look at evil, and "choice"
is not even a relevant concept.

Many have asked if God can make a rock so big that He can't lift it. We
have translated that into asking if He can draw a rectangle with a
non-integer number of sides in a flat Euclidean plane. I will now take it
yet a step further: Can God do evil?

I think we all might agree that the things God does are good by definition.
If so, then He is definitionally unable to do evil, just as He is
difinitionally unable to make the rock or the rectangle. I think RDR is
saying that God is not only definitionally unable to *do* evil, but even to
*look* at evil. And I might agree, except that I don't really know what
"God looking at evil" *means*.

AFTER writing the above, I asked myself, "Okay, now that you've conceded
this point, what was it that RDR was originally trying to prove?" It was in
Avodah 32:30, in RDR's post of Feb 23:

> "V'habit el amal lo suchal" (Hab. 1:13), "lo hibit aven b'yaakov
> vlo ra'ah amal b'yisrael" (Balak 23:21).  So God doesn't see
> everything.  

If "looking at" something means to look *approvingly* at it, then I can
agree that God is definitionally unable to look approvingly at evil. And
the context of these pesukim is indeed saying that God does not look
approvingly at these things.

BUT we cannot take those lines in isolation! Please look at the entire paragraph! -

> "V'habit el amal lo suchal" (Hab. 1:13), "lo hibit aven b'yaakov
> vlo ra'ah amal b'yisrael" (Balak 23:21).  So God doesn't see
> everything.  How does He see things? The hint is in BR 1:1 (ed.
> Theodor-Albeck p. 2 lines 1-5) "mabit baTorah uborei haolam". This
> is expanded in H. Teshuva 5:4 "God knows, not through extradeical
> knowledge, as people do, but through intradeical knowledge, for He
> and His knowledge are one ..." (compare H. Yesodei HaTorah 2:10).
> Now this seems to contradict God's simplicity, as the Rambam
> points out there in H. Yesodei HaTorah, and quite a lot of
> Lurianic Kabbalah (the first parts of Etz Hayyim) are devoted to
> resolving that problem.

RDR is taking psukim which tell us that God does not *approve* of evil, and he's using them to show that God does not *know* of evil.

How can that be? Can one really think that God is unaware of the evil in this world? I don't even know where to begin to argue against that.

Akiva Miller

ADDENDUM: RDR cited Rambam in Hilchos Teshuva 5:4. I think that's a typo,
intended to be 5:5. There, Rambam first cites the question that if God
knows the decisions we will make, then either we don't really have free
choice, or His knowledge is faulty. Then he states that the answer is
extremely long and complicated, but part of the answer is that His
knowledge is not like our knowledge, and he writes a few words along those
lines, which I do think RDR translated accurately. My problem is that I
believe the Rambam's intention was to show that God's knowledge is greater
than ours, while RDR seems to understand it as some sort of limitation to
God's knowledge. I offer the learned chevrah to see it for themselves.

I also looked at Yesodei Hatorah 2:10, and I can't help but wonder if it might be a source for R"n Gila Atwood's tagline, "We are pixels in G-d's imagination."
____________________________________________________________
How to Stay Asleep All Night
Try this one weird trick to put your sleep troubles to rest.
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I had used the word "guesswork", and R' Micha Berger responded:

> WRT Rambam, like REED, it's not guesswork. The Rambam quite
> clearly credits Aristo. He invokes "qabel es ha'emes mimi
> she'omro" (into to Avos) to justify it.

and

> I think that in the exchange, to much time passed for me to use
> the preposition "it" and you lost track of the "guesswork.
> I'm saying that the attribution of Rambam's idea to Aristo
> is the Rambam's, and the attribution of REED's to secular
> philosophy is REED's, and then R' Aryeh Carmell names which
> philosopher.
> I wasn't guessing that Kant and REED were on the same page,
> or that the Rambam was reading (ibn Rushd's translation of)
> Aristo.

I'm sorry I wasn't clear. When I used the word "guesswork", I was not
referring to the sources of REED's ideas, or the sources of Rambam's ideas.
I was referring to the ideas and conclusions reached by Kant, and by Aristo
-- and to a certain extent, I am referring to the philosophies of REED and
Rambam also.

By "a certain extent", what I mean is this: Certain truths have been
Revealed to us from our mesorah - that is to say, from God. Other truths
are revealed to us by our senses. Still other truths are revealed to us
through logic. These truths are not equally reliable: Sometimes
inaccuracies can creep into what we thought was a reliable mesora. We can
also make errors in our scientific observations. And we are certainly prone
to error when our only tool is our thoughts and philosophies.

Thus, when I spoke of "guesswork", I meant that if we come to some sort of
logical conclusion about something, we should be on guard to the
possibility that we've made an error. "Guesswork" is probably an
unreasonably harsh word for intuitive axioms such as "one and one are two",
but my intended use of the word is directed at the statements made by
philosophers about angels. What facts do they base their conclusions upon?
What experiences can they relate about the supernatural? Is "guesswork"
really too harsh a word?

I said before, and I say again, that I acknowledge philosophy to be a very
rigorous school of thought, and I am probably treating it with too little
respect. But we are talking about subjects which touch on very deep areas
of Torah. Rambam may have thought that Aristo/Aristotle/whoever was almost
a navi, but "almost" means that he was NOT a navi, in which case
*everything* he said about metaphysics is based on nothing more than his
own logic.

In another thread, we are discussing the precise meanings of the words
"God", "god", "El", "Elohim", and others. I humbly suggest that even if
Aristo was totally correct in describing the nature of *angels*, that is
totally irrelevant if I want to understand *mal'achim*. The two might not
be the same thing.

Just to remind everyone where this discussion began, we were wondering if
neshamos of dead people experience the flow of time, because that would
seem to be a prerequisite for getting elevated on their yahrzeit. This led
to an attempt to understand the world in which such neshamos are. Is this
really something that Plato knows about first-hand? (Well, I guess he does
NOW, but I meant back when he could communicate with his students.)

We were willing to reorient ourselves when we turned away from Copernicus
and towards Newton. And again when we turned away from Newton and towards
Einstein. And we are willing to consider that someday, someone may come up
with an even better idea, and we'll turn from Hawking to someone else. Is
it impossible that we might find someone whose logic surpasses Rambam's?
I'm not talking about Rambam's Torah, of course - only his logic and
philosophy.

Lulai di'mistafina: If "qabel es ha'emes mimi she'omro", then dacheh [reject] es ha'sheker mimi she'omro, n'est-ce pas?

Akiva Miller
____________________________________________________________
Never Eat This Carb
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RMB:

<<Although they aren't really conflicting, since they're all instances 
of a single broader geometry, describing differently shaped spaces. Can 
Hashem create a rectangle with 7.4 sides in a flat space? Example, if 
you head north from the equator to the pole, make a 90 deg turn, head 
south back to the equator, and then travel 1/4 a way around the world, 
you traveled a triangle that had 270 deg. If you make a smaller triangle 
on the globe, it will have fewer degrees, but always more than 180. Now 
what about a space shaped like that -- a 3D space that was shaped like 
the surface of a 4D sphere? Can HQBH make a triangle of exactly 180 
degrees in such a curved space -- eg can he make three great cricles on 
a globe intersect in that way? And wouldn't answering my last question 
tend to end up an argument in semantics, in defining whether "triangle" 
has meaning when traveling a globe, or in a curved space, or if one 
really has rectangles in a space where they'd end up with 7.4 sides. So, 
by going meta we can preserve the Rambam's question.>>

I think this is a category error.

When the Rambam says "God can't make a square circle" he's not saying 
"God can't deny a tautology", he's saying "there are synthetic a priori 
propositions which must be true in any world which God could have made."

The example we were discussing is the prophet saying "Looking at evil is 
beneath God."  What you are doing is illustrating that we (following 
Hilbert) construe geometry to be a complex group of tautologies. But the 
Rambam would not have agreed with Hilbert.  He thought geometry 
consisted of synthetic a priori statements.

David Riceman

Leviticus commences with a call:  "Vayikra el Moshe?"

There have been many commentaries addressing the 
miniature aleph but one which is fascinating is that 
due to this smallness vayikra becomes suggestive of vayikar        
used in connection with Balaam: "Vayikar Elokim el Bilaam."

At first sight the comment appears far-fetched, but it 
embodies an important truth. Moses and Balaam were
both prophets: one a prophet to Israel, the other to the
heathens. As such, they represent the highest conceptions
of their respective peoples, l'havdil. To both, God spoke: but
the difference of the mode of address expresses a fundamental
difference in outlook. To Balaam, ?vayikar": the heathen sees life as
merely the product of aimless chance ? we?re born; we die, 
and that?s it: ?Hatched, Matched and Dispatched.? Conversely,
to Moses, ?Vayikra":  Life is not chance but a ?call? to serve the
Almighty. Man has a goal, a life?s calling.

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On Wed, Mar 05, 2014 at 03:56:06AM -0500, RMYG wrote to Areivim:
: One can argue that just as it is meritorious (but not required) to be
: machmir in kashrus, not eating something that is permissible because one
: holds oneself to higher standards, by the same logic one should be machmir
: in tzedakah, to give money to collectors even though some of them might
: possibly not be poor because of one's high standards in helping others.

Rav Moshe Feinstein explained his rather liberal attitude toward issuing
te'udot ishur to collectors with the following derashah:
In the 13 Middot, HQBH is described as (acting according to) "verav chesed
ve'emes". When we emulate the Creator, chesed has to come before emes.

OTOH, erring on the side of not wasting tzedaqah money also has merit. As
the gemara tells us, we need to thank the charlatans, without whom we
would be accountable for each person to him we fail to give.

A talmid of RYBS would simply note that chesed and emes pose a dialectic
(much like shalom and emes in the medrash), and the point of life inheres
in navigating the conflict in values, not in finding some unreachable
resolution.

Tir'u baTov!
-Micha

-- 
Micha Berger             What you get by achieving your goals
mi...@aishdas.org        is not as important as
http://www.aishdas.org   what you become by achieving your goals.
Fax: (270) 514-1507              - Henry David Thoreau

On Wed, Mar 05, 2014 at 03:56:06AM -0500, RMYG wrote to Areivim:
: One can argue that just as it is meritorious (but not required) to be
: machmir in kashrus, not eating something that is permissible because one
: holds oneself to higher standards, by the same logic one should be machmir
: in tzedakah, to give money to collectors even though some of them might
: possibly not be poor because of one's high standards in helping others.
.........

OTOH, erring on the side of not wasting tzedaqah money also has merit. As
the gemara tells us, we need to thank the charlatans, without whom we
would be accountable for each person to him we fail to give.
_______________________________________________
R' Cutler deals with this dialectic here:

http://www.yutorah.org
/lectures/lecture.cfm/809217/Rabbi_Ari_Cutler/Do_I_have_to_give_Tzedaka_to_
the'_Poor'_at_the_Kotel
Rabbi Ari Cutler-Do I have to give Tzedaka to the" Poor" at the Kotel?

KT
Joel Rich
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Thank you.

Back in Jun 2012 we had a discussion by this title which touched on
the topic of whether a meis would be aware of people davening at
their grave.

Zev <http://www.aishdas.org/avodah/vol30/v30n069.shtml#02> cited:
> The machlokes in Brachos 18a-19a is about whether they know what's
> going on *outside* the cemetery. R Yonoson is the only one who thought
> they were completely unaware, and he retracted his opinion...

The Yerushalmi AZ 3:1 18a is even more clearcut... The gemera tells
stories of the days of petirah of a number of amoraim.

When R' Nachum bar Simai was niftar, all the frescos along the funeral
route were covered. It was said, someone who did not look at them in his
life shouldn't hanve to look at them when dead. Later we get the gemara
which says that this is R' Nachum Ish Qodesh, who never even looked at
the images on coins.

The gemara asks if the dead know anything. Would RNIQ even know about
the gesture or the frescoes?

R' Shim'on ben Laqish says:
    Ein beineino veletzadiqim ela dibur peh bilvad.

Apparently dead tzadiqim are very high functioning, even by living
people standards. On the other hand, on our current discusion: does this
"ein bein" imply that Reish Laqish holds that tzadiqim niftarim do not
progress to lemaalah min hazeman?

R' Ze'ira says that a niftar hears his eulogy as from within a dream.

-Micha

-- 
Micha Berger             "'When Adar enters, we increase our joy'
mi...@aishdas.org         'Joy is nothing but Torah.'
http://www.aishdas.org    'And whoever does more, he is praiseworthy.'"
Fax: (270) 514-1507                     - Rav Dovid Lifshitz zt"l

Rabbi Acha, who is found in the Y-mi and medrashim, but rarely in the
Bavli, is another one of the amoraim whose passing is described on Y-mi
AZ 18a. On the day he was niftar, the stars were visible at noon.

Now, not everyh one of these stories is amenable to a natural explanation.
But this one would, if R' Acha was niftar on the day of a solar eclipse.

There were two annular eclipses during the end of the 4th generation of
amoraim that could possibly have been dark enough to qualify.
6 May 337, centered over Ethiopia
3 Apr 349, centered in the Sudan

Tir'u baTov!
-Micha

-- 
Micha Berger                 Life is complex.
mi...@aishdas.org                Decisions are complex.
http://www.aishdas.org               The Torah is complex.
Fax: (270) 514-1507                                - R' Binyamin Hecht

See http://web.stevens.edu/golem/llevine/pesach/daf22-5.pdf

Note the following from this publication.

There are two important developments in OU Passover production for 
2014. The first one is the introduction of Passover Quinoa. Pereg and 
Goldbaum will be selling OU-P quinoa. Quinoa is a plant from South 
America which is not Kitniyot. The OU-P quinoa was packed in South 
America with Mashgiach Temidi. The second development is that this 
year there will be a large number of OU Kitniyot retail items 
available. Manischewitz has introduced the Kitni line which includes 
chick peas, corn, lentil mix, peanut butter and popcorn. There will 
also be Kitni rice cakes and tahina. Ferrero in Italy has produced OU 
Kitniyot Nutella Spread and Kinder chocolate. Osem will also have a 
number of OU Kitnoyot items. All of these products are clearly marked 
Ochlei Kitniyot and are all made with Mashgiach Temidi like all OU-P 
products.

Please see the above URL for more Pesach information.


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>
> I wrote:




> <<But even for those who disagree with Rashi regarding Rabbi Yehuda's
> reason
> for prohibiting - we are not talking about a miut of cases that he
> prohibits, but a miut of cases that he allows, ie the only two that are
> identified as being in this category are lulav and sukkah.  And even lulav
> only if the woman and the lulav happen to be in the same place at the time
> without prior arrangement - clearly according to Rabbi Yehuda the lulav
> cannot be brought through reshus harabbim or even a karmalis for her sake
> (ie a man cannot take the lulav home if the sole purpose of doing so is to
> bring it to his wife). And the Shaagas Areyeh holds (and certainly in this
> regard his logic would seem sound) that if we followed Rabbi Yehuda the
> gezera lest one carry in reshus harabbim would extend to women and lulavim
> on Yom Tov and that therefore women would be prevented by rabbinic gezera
> from performing the mitzvah of lulav in exactly the same way that men are
> so
> prevented on shabbas.  Which leaves sukkah (which is a totally different
> story, as perhaps it might even be necessary for women to be in the sukkah
> for married men to fulfil their obligation of tashvu k'ain taduru properly,
> independent of anything to do with the woman's own mitzvah).>>
>

I had meant to add to this in the course of that posting, but then forgot
at the critical moment, that even with sukkah there are tainas.  After all,
the Rema states with regard to women and tzitzis in Shulchan Aruch Orech
Chaim siman 17 si'if 2:

*And in any event if they want to wrap themselves and bless on it they have
permission like with other positive mitzvos dependent upon time (Tosphos,
and the Rosh and the Ran perek 2 of Rosh Hashana and the first perek in
Kiddushin) but it looks like yehora, and therefore there is not to them to
dress in tzitzis since it is not an obligation of a man (Agor siman 27) the
explanation being that he is not obligated to buy for himself a tallis in
order to be obligated in tzitis.  And below in siman 19 itsays that when he
[happens to] have a tallis with four corners (and he dresses).*

That is, it looks like yehura for a woman to take on a mitzvah that even a
man is not obligated to do (ie has no chiyuv to do), but where the
requirement is only if he happens to have a four cornered garment that he
wants to wear, then and only then does he need to put on tzitzis.

But the same is true after the first night, for men eating in the sukkah.
A man can survive on apples and tuna-fish and eat outside of the sukkah for
the entirety of sukkos.  Using the logic of the Agor (as quoted in the
Rema) therefore, It would seem to be yehura for a woman to eat in the
sukkah any time other than the first night.

Note this is not my chiddush, it is in the Sde Chemed in Marechet hamem
klal 136.

Regards

Chana
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