Avodah Mailing List

Volume 32: Number 22

Mon, 10 Feb 2014

• 1. Re: Why does Moshe use logical arguments when davening to save Bnei Yisrael? (Micha Berger)
• 2. "This is the only Sidra from the beginning of Moshe's birth where his name is omitted" (Martin Brody)
• 3. Re: yeshivish vs acadenic (T6...@aol.com)
• 4. Re: Why does Moshe use logical arguments when davening to save Bnei Yisrael? (Marty Bluke)
• 5. Re: A Rasha or Tzadik from the womb? (Marty Bluke)
• 6. Re: Why does Moshe use logical arguments when davening to save Bnei Yi srael? (Kenneth Miller)
• 7. Re: Why does Moshe use logical arguments when davening to save Bnei Yisrael? (Lisa Liel)
• 8. Re: "This is the only Sidra from the beginning of Moshe's birth where his name is omitted" (Zev Sero)
• 9. Re: A Rasha or Tzadik from the womb? (Micha Berger)
• 10. Re: A Rasha or Tzadik from the womb? (Lisa Liel)
• 11. Gender and Tefillin: Assumptions and Consequences (Shoshana L. Boublil)
• 12. Re: "This is the only Sidra from the beginning of Moshe's birth where his name is omitted" (Lisa Liel)
• 13. Re: Why does Moshe use logical arguments when davening to save Bnei Yisrael? (Marty Bluke)
• 14. Re: Why does Moshe use logical arguments when davening to save Bnei Yisrael? (Lisa Liel)

On Sun, Feb 09, 2014 at 02:36:18PM +0200, Liron Kopinsky wrote:
: Rabbi Akiva Tatz says that Tefillah in general isn't about "changing
: Hashem's decision", but rather about changing ourselves into a person who
: would deserve that particular thing we're davening for...

He is preceded in this by both RSRH (who notes the hitpa'el construction,
thus "lehitpalel" = to turn oneself into a request) and RYBS (who focuses
more on the philosophical aspect -- you can't bribe G-d, you always get
what is fitting, etc...)

Tir'u baTov!
-Micha

A common error.
Try  finding it in Nitzavim.

-- 
Martin Brody
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From: Yosef Gavriel Bechhofer _rygb@aishdas.org_ (mailto:r...@aishdas.org) 


On 02/07/2014 04:49 AM, Eli Turkel wrote:
> The gemara is on  Baba Metzia 62a in a famous story of 2 people lost in
> the desert with  enough water for only one to reach new water. Ben
> Peturah says they  should split the water while Rav Akiva says the
> owner of the canteen  gets all the water

I don't know why people don't notice Rashi's critical  comment:


["Ve'im yishteh ha'echad, magia' liyshuv" - and he will find  water.]

Isn't that obvious? What is Rashi  adding?

V'duk.

KT,
YGB




>>>>>
 
 
I think Rashi is adding that if there  is no chance of living  long enough 
to find new water, then they should share what they do  have.  If they are 
both going to die let them share equally the time  remaining to them in this 
world.  But if one of them might possibly survive  longer, then let one of 
them drink all the water. 
 
Mathematically you might think of it this way:  suppose there are  four 
days' drinking water left.  If divided equally they each can live two  days.  
The total of days lived is two plus two i.e., four days.  It  could be zero 
days for the one and four days for the other and that would also  be a total 
of four, but it would be better for them both to share the days,  hence each 
lives two days.
 
But if after four days one of them /can/ reach a well (but after two days  
both will be dead), then let one die now and the other one live four days.   
Then the total of days lived between the two of them will be much more than 
four  days.  It will be zero (for the one guy) plus four days plus  all the 
rest of the second guy's years, which is a lot more life in  total.   A lot 
more time to learn Torah and do mitzvos and bring schar  to the person who 
is still alive, plus he can do a lot of mitzvos le'ilui  nishmas his 
deceased friend.
 
note to R' Micha -- if this is too obvious, or if it is obviously wrong,  
please reject!  thank you
 

--Toby Katz
..
=============


-------------------------------------------------------------------


 



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On Sunday, February 9, 2014, Liron Kopinsky <liron.kopin...@gmail.com> wrote:
>> Do we ever do this in our davening? When people get together and say
>> tehilim for a sick person do they offer justifications...

> "Ase L'maan Shemecha etc."
> "Im Lo L'maaneinu, l'maancha pe'al"

That is not much of a logical argument certainly nothing like the argument
that Moshe made. In fact this is sort of the opposite, we are asking Hashem
to do it for himself for no logical reason related to us.

In any case that is not part of shemone esrei which is the main Tefilla.

R"n Lisa Liel wrote:
> I understand why it's a question. I don't understand why it's a "very
> troubling question". Why should we have to daven out loud at all?
> Tefillah is a reflexive noun. We're clarifying our own position and
> requests when we make them. I mean, your question would apply to just
> about all tefillot; certainly any that contain the word "ki". "Ki Goel
> chazak Ata," for example. Is that supposed to be reminding Hashem that
> He's a strong redeemer? No, it's reminding ourselves, and it's putting
> our request in the context we would like it considered.

You are right, when you really think about it the whole idea of
tefilla makes little sense as many have pointed out. Why should we
need to ask an all knowing omnipotent perfect and unchanging God for
our needs, he already knows them and he has already decided what we
will get. The answers given that tefilla is for us to become better
people, get closer to Hashem, etc. sounds great but seems very hard to
fit in to the actual tefilos that we say and the approach that we
take. But given that answer logical arguments to God make little
sense, how does telling God that the Egyptians will talk if Hashem
kills Bnei Yisroel make Moshe a better person and closer to God.
Logical/emotional arguments seem like tefilla is to persuade God to
change his mind which as pointed above can't be.

R' Zev Sero wrote in response to my question
>> How does this fit in with free will? How can a fetus in the womb be
>> a rasha or a tzadik?

> Why not?  It's learning Torah, why should it not have free will?

Because it has no Yetzer Hara, the Gemara in Sanhedrin (91) states that
one of the things that Rebbe learned from Antoninus is that the the
Yetzer Hara only comes to a person after birth. Without a yetzer hara
how could anyone want to sin?

There is also no yetzer tov in the womb either so where would free
will come into play?

R' Zev Sero wrote:
> Mistranslation. A foetus is an "ubar", not an "ubra". Since its sex
> is unknown, it's always referred to in the masculine. If it smelled
> something it would be "shehiriach". "Ubra" is a pregnant woman, it's
> identical with "me'uberes", and she is the one smelling. It's clear
> throughout the sugya that she, not the ubar, is the subject...

You are right about the translation however, it doesn't change the
point. The Rashi clearly states that after hearing that it was Yom
Kippur "pasak haubar mi'tavaso", and the Gemara calls one ubar a
Tzaddik and one a Rasha

R' Liron Kopinsky wrote:

> Rabbi Akiva Tatz says that Tefillah in general isn't about "changing
> Hashem's decision", but rather about changing ourselves into a
> person who would deserve that particular thing we're davening for. I
> think this means then, that when davening for others, the goal is to
> change ourselves into a person who really, truly wants that thing
> for the other person, so that Hashem grants it to them, so-to-speak
> on our own merits.

I find this logic very appealling, in the case where, for example, I am
praying for a friend or relative who is ill: I share in the pain of that
other person, and I must have deserved that pain. But the tefilla elevates
me to one who does not deserve that pain anymore, and therefore Hashem must
heal him to save ME from that pain.

But this case is different. The question does not concern a person who
cries out, "Please! Please!" This question is very specifically about one
who uses *logical* arguments: "No! YOU cannot do this, because it would be
wrong to do so!" At first glance, I don't see how Rabbi Tatz's explanation
would work in such a case, because the success of the prayer hinges upon
the persuasiveness of the argument, and *not* upon the merits of the one
praying.

Or so it would seem. But perhaps the reality is different. Perhaps, even
when the davener puts forth some sort of logical argument, perhaps even
then, his newfound zechuyos will tip the scales, and it will only *seem*
like Hashem was persuaded.

R' Maty Bluke, in the Original Post to this thread, wrote:

> In next weeks Parsha, after the Chet Haegel Hashem tells Moshe
> that he is going to destroy Bnei Yisrael, and Moshe then davens
> to Hashem to save Bnei Yisrael. One of Moshe's arguments in his
> tefila is what will the Egyptians say if you kill Bnei Yisrael
> in the desert?

And Moshe advanced a second logical argument in the very next pasuk, reminding Hashem of His promise to the Avos.

A simple reading of the story would suggest that one argument, or the
other, or both, persuaded Hashem to change His mind. But I suggest - in
full accord of Rabbi Tatz's explanation - that what really happened is that
Moshe Rabenu's heartfelt plea raised him to a new level, and *that* is what
moved Hashem to (kavyachol) "change His mind."

Akiva Miller
____________________________________________________________
How to Sleep Like a Rock
Obey this one natural trick to fall asleep and stay asleep all night.
http://thirdpartyoffers.juno.com/TGL3131/52f82a292ccdf2a284adast01vuc

On 2/9/2014 2:13 PM, Marty Bluke wrote:
> R"n Lisa Liel wrote:
>> I understand why it's a question. I don't understand why it's a "very
>> troubling question". Why should we have to daven out loud at all?
>> Tefillah is a reflexive noun. We're clarifying our own position and
>> requests when we make them....

>      .... The answers given that tefilla is for us to become better
> people, get closer to Hashem, etc. sounds great but seems very hard to
> fit in to the actual tefilos that we say and the approach that we
> take. But given that answer logical arguments to God make little
> sense, how does telling God that the Egyptians will talk if Hashem
> kills Bnei Yisroel make Moshe a better person and closer to God.
> Logical/emotional arguments seem like tefilla is to persuade God to
> change his mind which as pointed above can't be.

God's response to Moshe making this argument was presumably different
than it would have been had Moshe used a different rationale. Think of
it as a test. Let's say I want to daven for a parnasa. I could say,
"Hashem, I've had a cruddy past few years, and I think I ought to get
something nice for a change." Alternatively, I could say, "Hashem, I
have a family to support, and shul dues and lots of other stuff, and I
do what I can to keep Your mitzvot and make the world a better place."
Both of those are "reasons". Both of them say different things about me.
If I say the first, Hashem will "know" that I'm an immature twit. I say
"know", in quotes, because obviously He'd already know that, but He may
respond to me based on that. More than that, my immature twittiness is
out there, and it's something that I'll remember down the line, when
I've grown up a bit. It will make a difference to me.

If I say the second one, Hashem may see that as an indication that I'm not
just gimme-gimme-gimme, but rather that I'm being reasonable and mature
in trying to support my family. And He may respond to me based on that.
And I'll know that davening that way is different than I would have,
say, back when I was in my 20s.

If Moshe says, "You can't kill Bnei Yisrael! You *promised*!" it would
have been different. It would have demonstrated something about Moshe.
Something not all that nice.

We use logical arguments because that's how we think. That's how the
people Hashem created think. We act, in many ways, as though Hashem is
akin to a king of flesh and blood, kaveyachol, but just greater.

Because it's a way in which we can grasp things. You'd hardly daven to
"all of existence". It'd be weird.

Also, making logical arguments helps us to refine our reasoning.
To understand why it is that we want certain things. We don't try
and persuade Hashem. Not really. In fact, in the ancient world, the
Phoenicians engaged in a kind of sacrifice that scholars call "mulk"
sacrifices, mostly because they don't want to vocalize it as molech
sacrifices, because of the biblical connection. A mulk offering was
explicitly a suasion offering. Something intended to change a deity's
mind. The Torah explicitly forbids these offerings, and even in our
davening, we often use "May it be Your will, Hashem", to indicate that
we're simply hoping that Hashem will decide to do X, rather than trying
to push Him into it, so to speak.

Lisa

On 9/02/2014 3:39 PM, Martin Brody wrote:
> A common error.
> Try  finding it in Nitzavim.

What we call "Nitzavim" is not a whole sedra; the sedra is what we call
"Nitzavim-Vayelech", but it's sometimes read over two Shabbosos.  The
beginning of Nitzavim has to be read before Rosh Hashana, and normally
there's only one Shabbos between RH and Sukkos, so that's when we read
Haazinu.  But when there are two Shabbosim between Rosh Hashana and Sukkos
we have to read something on each, and we can't split Haazinu, so we split
Nitzavim, and read the part beginning "Vayelech Moshe" on the second week.

-- 
Zev Sero               A citizen may not be required to offer a 'good and
z...@sero.name          substantial reason' why he should be permitted to
                        exercise his rights. The right's existence is all
                        the reason he needs.
                            - Judge Benson E. Legg, Woollard v. Sheridan

On Sun, Feb 09, 2014 at 08:56:36PM -0600, Lisa Liel wrote:
: It can't be. It can have more of a potential for one or for the other,
: and that's what I think this aggadeta is trying to say. Note that it's
: an aggadeta. Taking it at face value would be a mistake.

OTOH, the story is highly tailored to convey a message, or else they're
of little value. We can't trivially dismiss whatever we don't like out
of medrash either.

RMBluke asked the same question in 2009, leaving to the thread at
http://www.aishdas.org/avodah/getindex.cgi?sectio
n=W#WAS%20ESAV%20A%20RASHA%20IN%20THE%20WOMB
or http://j.mp/TsIPFn

And then again in Nov 2012
http://www.aishdas.org/avodah/getindex.cgi?section=W
#WAS%20EISAV%20A%20RASHA%20BY%20NATURE
or http://j.mp/1eHI9Ye

In my answers (eg <http://www.aishdas.org/avodah/vol30/v30n162.shtml#10>)
I focused on "vayisrotztzur", and Rashi's comment that it's a language
of ritzah. The whole description is of proclivities, even without simply
neglecting parts of a well-crafted medrash.

Tir'u baTov!
-Micha

-- 
Micha Berger             You will never "find" time for anything.
mi...@aishdas.org        If you want time, you must make it.
http://www.aishdas.org                     - Charles Buxton
Fax: (270) 514-1507

On 2/9/2014 3:16 AM, Marty Bluke wrote:
> At the end of Maseches Yoma the Gemara discusses when a person is allowed
> to eat on Yom Kippur....
>                                       We find a similar medrash quoted
> by Rashi at the beginning of Parshas Toldos on the words Vayisrotztzu
> habanim b'kirba, that Eisav in the womb was a rasha who wanted to go
> out and worship avoda zara.

> How does this fit in with free will? How can a fetus in the womb be a
> rasha or a tzadik?

It can't be. It can have more of a potential for one or for the other,
and that's what I think this aggadeta is trying to say. Note that it's
an aggadeta. Taking it at face value would be a mistake.

Lisa

An excellent rebuttal of the article on women and tefillin by rabbi Ethan
Tucker was recently published.

http://www.torahleadership.org/categories/7aageneral.pdf

By: R' Aryeh Klapper

Gender and Tefillin: Assumptions and Consequences.

I highly recommend it.

Shoshana L. Boublil

On 2/9/2014 8:13 PM, Zev Sero wrote:
> On 9/02/2014 3:39 PM, Martin Brody wrote:
>> A common error.
>> Try  finding it in Nitzavim.

> What we call "Nitzavim" is not a whole sedra; the sedra is what we call
> "Nitzavim-Vayelech", but it's sometimes read over two Shabbosos...

Says who?

Lisa

On Mon, Feb 10, 2014 at 7:11 AM, Lisa Liel <l...@starways.net> wrote:

>
>
> Who said anything about Hashem changing His decision?  I might decide that
> if my daughter does her homework, she can watch TV and if she doesn't, she
> can't.  Her actions will result in one or the other conclusions.  She
> hasn't changed my mind -- in fact -- but to her, the different actions get
> her different results.  Yes, with Hashem, He knows what we're going to
> choose.  But it's still our choice, and He can still have a set of
> responses, each of which is applicable to a different choice we might make.
>
> Lisa
>
> Then why bother even trying logical arguments? We make our choice and his
decision is made, that is fine, but what is the point of logical/emotional
arguments?
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On 2/9/2014 10:14 PM, Marty Bluke wrote:
> On Mon, Feb 10, 2014 at 4:55 AM, Lisa Liel <l...@starways.net 
> <mailto:l...@starways.net>> wrote:
>
>     If I say the second one, Hashem may see that as an indication that
>     I'm not just gimme-gimme-gimme, but rather that I'm being
>     reasonable and mature in trying to support my family.  And He may
>     respond to me based on that.  And I'll know that davening that way
>     is different than I would have, say, back when I was in my 20s.
>
>
> Yes but that just begs the question, Hashem is all-knowing so he knows 
> what my motivation is without me having to say it. What is the point 
> of vocalizing it?

For me.  For anyone else who hears me.

>     If Moshe says, "You can't kill Bnei Yisrael!  You *promised*!" it
>     would have been different.  It would have demonstrated something
>     about Moshe.  Something not all that nice.
>
>     We use logical arguments because that's how we think. That's how
>     the people Hashem created think.  We act, in many ways, as though
>     Hashem is akin to a king of flesh and blood, kaveyachol, but just
>     greater.  Because it's a way in which we can grasp things.  You'd
>     hardly daven to "all of existence".  It'd be weird.
>
>     Also, making logical arguments helps us to refine our reasoning. 
>     To understand why it is that we want certain things.  We don't try
>     and persuade Hashem.  Not really. In fact, in the ancient world,
>     the Phoenicians engaged in a kind of sacrifice that scholars call
>     "mulk" sacrifices, mostly because they don't want to vocalize it
>     as molech sacrifices, because of the biblical connection.  A mulk
>     offering was explicitly a suasion offering.  Something intended to
>     change a deity's mind. The Torah explicitly forbids these
>     offerings, and even in our davening, we often use "May it be Your
>     will, Hashem", to indicate that we're simply hoping that Hashem
>     will decide to do X, rather than trying to push Him into it, so to
>     speak.
>

> Again this begs the question, Hashem is perfect and unchanging so 
> Hashem will not change his decision based on anything I say.

Who said anything about Hashem changing His decision?  I might decide 
that if my daughter does her homework, she can watch TV and if she 
doesn't, she can't.  Her actions will result in one or the other 
conclusions.  She hasn't changed my mind -- in fact -- but to her, the 
different actions get her different results.  Yes, with Hashem, He knows 
what we're going to choose.  But it's still our choice, and He can still 
have a set of responses, each of which is applicable to a different 
choice we might make.

Lisa



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