Avodah Mailing List

Volume 31: Number 198

Fri, 06 Dec 2013

• 1. The canard of the Rabbinic redefinition of lineal descent in Judaism (Eli Turkel)
• 2. eating out (Eli Turkel)
• 3. Yosef, a despot or a brilliant strategist and educator? (Rabbi Meir G. Rabi)
• 4. Re: suicide by cop (T6...@aol.com)
• 5. Re: suicide by cop (David Riceman)
• 6. Re: suicide by cop (Daniel M. Israel)
• 7. Re: skiing hagomel (Zev Sero)
• 8. skiing Hagomel (Eli Turkel)
• 9. Re: Eating Out (Ben Waxman)
• 10. Re: Eating Out (Daniel M. Israel)
• 11. Re: kasrut change (Ben Waxman)
• 12. Re: The Gym, the Carpool, and Tzniyus (Chana Luntz)

> There is no mention in any of these cases of a conversion occuring first.
> Without TSBP, there is no reason to insert this step, and with repeated
> omission, slight reason to believe it didn't happen. It's not a circular
> argument, it's an attempt at proof from absence. Particularly since the
> omitted bit is important.

I disagree. We don't need TSBP to tell us that people relieved themselves
or ate carrots.>>

Eating carrots is irrelevant to the story. When tanach tells us the sins of
Shlomo's wives it is very relevant whether they converted or not and
perhaps if their conversion was ineffective.
This is especially true for the lineage of Rechovam.
-- 
Eli Turkel
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<<I'd go further, and suggest that it would be presumptuous to criticize or
disrespect people in this manner. I have heard that many who act this way,
do it not for kashrus reasons, but for tznius reasons. In other words,
someone might have total trust in his parents' level of kashrus, but he
still considers it unseemly to "eat out", even at the parents.

I'm not at such a level myself, but others might be, and I'd be a fool to
criticize them for it, provided that they do it as inoffensively as they
can.>>

while I am aware of the minhag of not eating out at strangers personally I
have never heard of not eating my parents or in-laws.
In fact the seforim on Chanuka are filled with the question of lighting
candles when one goes for shabbat to the parents/in-laws

As for being on the level one of the stories of going away for shabbat
chanukah was about R. Chaim Kanevsky going to visit his father-in-law for
shabbat. I personally have very charedi relatives who never eat out but it
is taken for granted that the children come to them.

In addition I have been told that there are rules in some communities
determining which family is visited for the seder.

All in all I find the idea of children never going to parents for a
meal/shabbat quite strange.

-- 
Eli Turkel
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Vayigash
the land was exhausted due to the famine [47:13]

Yosef collected all the money in Egypt and surrounding countries [47:14] as
payment for food [Rashi]

there was no money left and the people were desperate for food [47:15]

so Yosef demanded they pay with their cattle [47:16]

Later they said, ?we have no money, we have no beasts; we have only our
lives and our land? [47:18]

?take possession of us and our land in order that we live? [47:19]

Yosef took ownership of all Egypt?s land in Paroh?s name [47:20]

Yosef [owned the people and he] relocated the entire population from their
homes and suburbs to distant locations [47:21]

Yosef wanted to ensure that in later years, the people would not be able to
make any claims about being the original owners. [Rashi 47:21]

The Torah records this information in order to praise Yosef ? who was
motivated to protect his brothers from being labelled as refugees and
foreigners by the locals who were now themselves landless and unsecured.
[Rashi 47:21]

Was this the action of a despot or the greatest programme in education? For
what better teaches than the experience of poverty and vulnerability?
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From: David Riceman <drice...@optimum.net>

While  recuperating I've been reading a book by Paola Tartakoff about a 
case in mid  fourteenth century Spain of a Jew who had converted to 
Christianity.   It was claimed by the Inquisition...that a group of local 
Jews told him that  
the only way to achieve absolution was to go to the authorities, tell  
them that he had reverted to Judaism, and be burned at the  stake.

Obviously the historical question is did this occur, or is this  
something the inquisitors imagined might have occurred because they  
projected Catholic views of penance and absolution onto Jews.  I  incline 
to the latter because I can't think of any parallels in contemporary  
Jewish thought....
 

David Riceman




>>>>>
 
First of all, whatever you are recuperating from, I wish you a refuah  
sheleimah.
 
Second of all, I quote the ArtScroll Rosh Hashana machzor:
 
--quote--
 
The Bishop of Mainz, Germany [about one thousand years ago] insisted that  
his friend and advisor, R' Amnon, convert to Christianity.  In order to buy  
time, R' Amnon asked for three days of grace to meditate upon the  
question.  Upon returning home, he was distraught at having given the  impression 
that he even considered betraying his G-d.
 
R' Amnon spent the three days in solitude, fasting and praying to be  
forgiven for his sin, and did not return to the bishop.  Finally the bishop  had 
him brought and demanded an answer.  R' Amnon replied that his tongue  
should be cut out for the sin of saying he would consider the matter.
 
Furious, the bishop...ordered that R' Amnon's feet be chopped off, joint by 
 joint.  They did the same to his hands....
 
When Rosh Hashanah arrived a few days later, R' Amnon asked to be carried  
to the Ark.  Before the   congregation recited Kedushah, he asked  to be 
allowed to sanctify G-d's Name in the synagogue.  He recited Unesaneh  Tokef 
and then died.
 
--end quote--
 
PS I will grant that this is not normative -- i.e., one does not have to  
die, or arrange to be killed, in order to atone for the sin of saying "I'll  
think about that."  Also I will grant that the historicity of this story  
has been disputed (not that the ArtScroll machzor mentions that).
 
But what is not in dispute is that this story about R' Amnon has been told  
for generations -- a story that is basically about arranging for his own 
death  at the hands of the authorities, to atone for the sin of even implying  
 that he might consider converting to Christianity. 
 

--Toby  Katz
..
=============


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RTK:
<<First of all, whatever you are recuperating from, I wish you a refuah 
sheleimah.>>

Thanks.  It may take several months for the nerve to recover fully.
<<But what is not in dispute is that this story about R' Amnon has been 
told for generations>>

As far as I know the story first appears in Or Zarua, whose author was a 
prominent member of Hasidei Ashkenaz, a student of both R. Yehudah 
HeHassid and the author of the Rokeah (which contains an extensive list 
of penances, none so extreme as having one's tongue cut out).

Do you know whether it penetrated to fourtennth century Spain?

David Riceman
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On Dec 4, 2013, at 9:07 AM, David Riceman <drice...@optimum.net> wrote:
> While recuperating I've been reading a book by Paola Tartakoff about a
> case in mid fourteenth century Spain of a Jew who had converted to
> Christianity.  It was claimed by the Inquisition (and supported by
> testimony induced by torture) that a group of local Jews told him that
> the only way to achieve absolution was to go to the authorities, tell
> them that he had reverted to Judaism, and be burned at the stake.
> 
> Obviously the historical question is did this occur, or is this
> something the inquisitors imagined might have occurred because they
> projected Catholic views of penance and absolution onto Jews.  I
> incline to the latter because I can't think of any parallels in
> contemporary Jewish thought.

If we presume that the conversion would be public knowledge, it would seem
that it is chillul HaShem in the strictest technical sense, for which one
is chayiv misa and only death is mechaper.  In that context, and certainly
in the absence of a beis din to impose misa, I can see how dying in a
manner that is middah kneged middah and a clear kiddush HaShem would be
seen as the best way to obtain kaparah.

That said, the question is whether such an act would be mutar.	Clearly
this individual would be obligated to revert to Judaism, but if there was a
way to do so and still have a chance to avoid death, is he allowed to
choose to die al kiddush HaShem anyway?

--
Daniel M. Israel
d...@cornell.edu

On 5/12/2013 8:51 AM, Eli Turkel wrote:
>
> One does not make birkhat hagomel because one was almost in an accident.
> In general the bracha is limited to the 4 categories listed in SA.

"Some say that one only says Hagomel for the four things that Chazal listed.
And some say that the same law applies to anyone who was in danger and was
saved, for instance a wall fell on him or he was saved from being trampled
or gored by a bull or a horse, or if a lion attacked him in a settled place,
or if thieves or night-burglars came to him and he was saved, all of them
must say Hagomel, so long as there was a danger to his life, and so is the
custom".   Seder Birchos Hanehenin 13:7

-- 
Zev Sero               A citizen may not be required to offer a 'good and
z...@sero.name          substantial reason' why he should be permitted to
                        exercise his rights. The right's existence is all
                        the reason he needs.
                            - Judge Benson E. Legg, Woollard v. Sheridan

<<Since it is not the risk that determines HaGomel, any risk is intolerable
if the activity is beyond the range of what is deemed normal. So the fact
that many people would be scared to climb the upper scaffolding of the
Sydney Harbour Bridge notwithstanding their being tethered, crosses the
Halachic barrier and prompts the Beracha of HaGomel.

Those who live in Peru cross rope bridges as a regular event, it is well
within what is deemed normal and they are not scared.>>

What is described is the prohibition of "ve nizhartem mi-nafshotechem"
not necessarily the same as Hagomel

-- 
Eli Turkel
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I agree 100% that no one should criticize someone who doesn't eat 
outside of his own home.  On the other hand, I also don't believe that 
this particular mode of behavior is one that people should be taught is 
a "goal", a "higher level", "something to emulate".

Ben

On 12/4/2013 3:53 PM, Kenneth Miller wrote:
> Cantor Wolberg wrote:
>
>> I see nothing to criticize. That is an individual's personal
>> choice and it is a lo p'lug principle which should be respected.
> I'd go further, and suggest that it would be presumptuous to criticize or disrespect people in this manner.

On Dec 3, 2013, at 7:34 AM, cantorwolb...@cox.net wrote:
>> we shouldn't state with pride how many Orthodox houses we don't eat in.
> 
> I personally knew a very m'dakdek, machmir Rabbi whose son (also a
> musmach) never ate anywhere outside of his own home. People would
> criticize saying: R' Ploni doesn't even eat in his parents' home.
> 
> I see nothing to criticize. That is an individual's personal choice and
> it is a lo p'lug principle which should be respected.


When it comes to a specific individual, we should certainly be dan l'chaf
zechus, but as a principle, I think that the idea that refusing to eat in
the homes of people who are known to be shomer mitzvos should be subject to
close scrutiny.  There are specific circumstances in which it might be
warranted, but it seems to me that in most cases it is hard to justify not
relying on someone's chezkas kashrus.

--
Daniel M. Israel
d...@cornell.edu

Ironically, B'Sheva published a tshuva today (from R Yitzhaq ben Yosef) 
about the issue of bishul akum, bringing different reason why Sefardim 
can be meiqil and eat in hotels who employ non-Jews:

  * Shema the halacha is like the Rema
  * Shema the issur of bishul akum only applies when the non-Jew is
    cooking in a home, but not when he cooks in a hotel owned by a Jew.
  * Shema a hired hand doesn't have the din of bishul akum
  * Shema the issur doesn't apply when cooking for the public

Ben


On 12/4/2013 7:03 PM, saul newman wrote:
> http://lifeinisrael.blogspot.com/2013/12/rabban
> ut-changing-policy-about-non-jews.html
> while they emphasize  , no arabs in the kitchen,

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> Rabbi Meir Rabi wrote:
> > Is it not correct to explain that Tznius is the Hashkafa of
> > not shouting to the world - Look At ME?
>
> Dr Isaac Balbin responded:
> > I do not think that one can draw that conclusion in general.
> > It cannot, for example be argued that someone who wears a
> > tefach above their elbow is shouting "look at me!" for example
> > ... however I use this example as I assume RMR contends in
> > should extend at least to the end of the elbow. He can correct
> > me if I am wrong in that assumption. Reasons for Halachos are
> > something that can almost always be shown to be incomplete.
>
> And RAM further responded:


> I think that RMR and DIB are talking about two different things, and thus
> might not really be disagreeing. RMR is talking about the general hashkafa
> of tznius, also known as "the spirit of the law". DIB is focusing on one
> particular detail of the halacha, also known as "the letter of the law"
>

And RMYG gave yet another example:

>That may not be incorrect but it's certainly not complete, as tznius is an
>obligation "afilu b'chadrei chadorim."

I agree with RAM that RMR and DIB are talking about two different things
(and I would add that RMYG is talking about a third thing), but I would go
further than RAM.  I think that a lot of the problem we have with the
concept of tznius is that we have at least three (and possibly four)
different halachos that are grouped under the general heading of tznius -
and they are actually not the same thing at all.  It is not just a matter
of letter and spirit of the law, they are really quite different concepts.

I believe they are as follows:

1. The concept derived from the pasuk of tzanua l'leches im haElokim (Micha
6:5).  This is a midah (it may be an all encompassing mida as per the
Gemora in Makos 24a, which understands Micha as having come and reduced the
entire Torah to three basic principles, of which this is one),  but it is a
matter of all encompassing principle.  As the gemora there in Makos and in
Sukkah 49b learns out of this pasuk:

 What is it written "and he will tell to you man what is good and what
HaShem desires of you: that you do justice and love chesed and walk
modestly with your G-d."  To do justice:  -this is the din, to love chesed:
- this is gimlut chasidim, and to go modestly with your G-d this is to go
out with the dead and to cause the bride to enter the chuppah .  And behold
these things are a kal v?chomer:  just as things that it is the way to do
publically, the Torah says to go modestly, things that it is the way to do
privately how much more so.
This applies equally to men and women, and it very much about not shouting
"Look at me" as per RMR.  And just consider the examples used - ie the
classic examples of doing chessed - and the caution is, even when you are
doing chessed, don't do chessed in a "look at me" way, even the most public
forms of chessed, and all the more so the more private forms.

 2. The halacha of not exposing ervah, afilu b'chadrei chadarim.  At least
one of the sources for this obligation can be found from Shemos 28:42 and
the obligation to give the kohanim trousers and the obligation to build a
ramp, not steps, to the mizbeach Shemot 20:21.  It applies to both men and
women, but less so to women than men, as women can make a bracha when naked
(so long as sitting down) (Rema Orech Chaim 74:4) and a man cannot. It is
the basis for the dinnim at the beginning of Shulchan Aruch Orech Chaim
relating to the appropriate behaviour in the bathroom.  It is very hard to
characterise this as having anything to do with "look at me", nor would it
seem to be related very easily to the pasuk in Micha - the one place one is
not "going with Hashem you G-d" is in the bathroom, and while there might
be disturbed people who go naked as a means of shouting "look at me", it
would seem to miss the point to apply that as the rationale here.

3. The covering of ervah (Torah or rabbinic) in the presence of others who
might respond in a sexually inappropriate manner to such exposure.  This
applies more to women than to men, because it would seem that the rabbis
extended the areas deemed ervah in women in a way they did not in men.  The
reason I am stating that these extensions are rabbinic, is that (a) the
basis for these extensions tend to be drashos from Shir HaShirim (see
Brachos 24a) - so they cannot be of Torah origin, and (b) the concept of
das Yehudis, as found in Kesubos 72a seems from the subsequent gemora
discussion to be understood by the gemora to be at most rabbinic (and that
seems to be the view of the Rambam and the Shulchan Aruch when discussing
das yehudis).

There is (as previously mentioned on this list) a view that such covering
is actually a torah matter of lifnei iver, but the problem with applying
lifnei iver, as I articulated in my previous post is:
- it would not apply if it is a same side of the river case.  If a man is
going to walk down the street and have his eyes assulted anyway, it would
seem that the obligation on any particular woman would fall away;
- it would apply far wider than the accepted limits if this was the only
woman around, given that it is known that men can and do respond
inappropriately to even the little finger of a woman.  ie burkas would seem
to be mandatory a priori.

Note in addition that if this was a Torah obligation of lifnei iver, you
would expect similar obligations on men given the existence of men who find
other men attractive - again possibly without limit (ie anything that a
homosexual might find attractive).

An alternative view is that these are rabbinic fences to distance people
from the Torah prohibitions of arayos.  Hilchos yichud is generally
understood to be a case of this (and the extent to which it applies men to
men depends on the machlokus between the Shulchan Aruch and the Bach) and
one can (as the Meiri articulates) understand these obligations in this
manner.  In which case the rabbinic fences are what they are, and whether
or not the rabbis might have considered placing similar restrictions on men
is irrelevant, the gezeros were in fact only placed on women.

This can in certain circumstances be linked to "look at me", if the "look
at me" is of a sexual nature, but, as DIB pointed out, there is very often
no such intention by the person looked at all, only a
(potential) inappropriate response by the onlooker.  And the fact that most
people will differentiate between the kinds of clothing worn by women when
they can be seen by men, and when they can only be seen by other women
(such as when at all women swimming) illustrates the point that it is
fundamentally about sexual response.  Not about loudness and showiness,
which can be done equally well in front of only women.

The fourth category (but which mayreally be part of the third) is that of
not following the ways of the non Jews when they involve pritzus.  The
cases discussed make it clear that the pritzus they are referring is
related to sexual matters - and in fact this might be where two of the
definitions above actually clash.  Because if the overwhelming dress code
is one that is oversexualised (violation of tznius definition 3), one is is
probably making a "look at me" statement (violation of tznius definition 1)
by dressing in what would loosely be called a "tzniusdik manner".  An
Orthodox Jewish woman or man can stand out like a sore thumb in certain
environments because of the way they dress, and indeed what they are then
engaged in is clearly an exercise in walking in a "look at me" way with
HaShem your G-d.  Proudly and "in your face" in advertising the rejection
of the mores underlying the generally worn clothing.  As always when there
are competing halachos, a decision needs to be made which one to
prioritise, but it is easier and more straightforward to understand these
as genuinely conflicting halachos, rather than as elements of the same
halacha that somehow seems to double back on itself.

So I don't agree with RAM that it is about a conflict between the spirit
and the letter of the law.  Rather to my mind it is about three completely
different concepts that get grouped under the same (and hence misleading)
heading.  I suspect that at least some of the grouping is a deliberate
attempt to make the whole idea of tznius no 3 more palatable (or even
explainable) to schoolgirls, by blurring it with concept no 1.  But in
reality they are not the same type of animal at all, even if we use the
same word  and that is why there is confusion.  RY Hoffman's article that
started this whole discussion is clearly one about the halachic bases of
tznius concept 3, and I responded in like vein.  And because of
the fundamental differences in their theoretical underpinnings and
underlying sources I do not think that bringing in tznius concept 2 or
tznius concept 1 actually assists in understanding the nature of tznius
concept no 3 in any way.


>Akiva Miller

Regards

Chana
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