Avodah Mailing List

Volume 31: Number 192

Sat, 23 Nov 2013

• 1. Skiing HaGomel (Rabbi Meir G. Rabi, its Kosher!)
• 2. Re: The canard of the Rabbinic redefinition of lineal descent (elazar teitz)
• 3. Re: The canard of the Rabbinic redefinition of lineal descent in Judai sm (Kenneth Miller)
• 4. Re: The canard of the Rabbinic redefinition of lineal descent (Zev Sero)
• 5. Re: The canard of the Rabbinic redefinition of lineal descent in Judaism (Micha Berger)
• 6. Re: Skiing HaGomel (Moshe Y. Gluck)
• 7. Re: Skiing HaGomel (Eitan Levy)
• 8. Re: The canard of the Rabbinic redefinition of linealdescent (Eitan Levy)
• 9. The Lion Wakes... (Moshe Y. Gluck)
• 10. Re: The Lion Wakes... (Zev Sero)
• 11. Re: The Lion Wakes... (Lisa Liel)
• 12. Re: The Lion Wakes... (Micha Berger)
• 13. changing nusach tefillah (Lisa Liel)
• 14. Re: Skiing HaGomel (Micha Berger)
• 15. The Gym, the Carpool, and Tzniyus (Chana Luntz)

Since it is not the risk that determines HaGomel, any risk is intolerable
if the activity is beyond the range of what is deemed normal. So the fact
that many people would be scared to climb the upper scaffolding of the
Sydney Harbour Bridge notwithstanding their being tethered, crosses the
Halachic barrier and prompts the Beracha of HaGomel.

Those who live in Peru cross rope bridges as a regular event, it is well
within what is deemed normal and they are not scared.
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     For a source against patrilineal descent, is Nach good enough?  Ezra
10:2 states that "ba'atzas Ad-nai v'hachareidim b'mitzvas Elokeinu," all
the non-Jewish women _and the children born to them_ should be sent away,
"v'chaTora yeiaseh."

EMT
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Rabbi Arie Folger asked about

> the claim that until the time of the Mishna, Judaism was
> transmitted through patrilineal descent ... I wonder who
> first came up with this idea and evidence the supporters
> of this idea marshal.

Is evidence for this really needed? Wouldn't a simple reading of Tanach
suffice? (A simple reading which ignores Torah Sheb'al Peh, that is.) I
would presume that any unbiased person who read Tanach would come to the
conclusion that descent is indeed patrilineal.

I am very unfamiliar with most of Tanach, but certain relationships come to
mind very easily. Gershom and Eliezer seems to have been considered fully
Jewish, just like their father, Moshe Rabenu. This is despite the fact that
we know that their mother - Tzipora - was of Midianite origin. Torah
Sheb'al Peh says she converted, but that's not to be found in any simple
reading of the words.

I suppose one could argue that they were born before Matan Torah, so they
were "in the family" no less than the Yordei Mitzrayim. (This is assuming
one doesn't follow the Midrash that the Shvatim married their sisters, and
they audience we're talking about would probably not be aware of such
midrashim.)

Can someone more knowledgeable than me offer some examples from Tanach?
Please list some couples where it is clear from the written word that a Jew
married a non-Jew, and what the child's status was. For example, we know
that Daryavesh was the child of Achashverosh and Esther, but we know it
only from Chazal. Suppose it had been clearly in Tanach? If that were the
case, it might be significant that although Daryavesh was good to the Jews,
he doesn't seem to identify as one.

The only example I can think of offhand would be Oved, the son of Boaz and
Ruth. In that case, however, the written words ("Elokayich Elokai") do
attest to some sort of conversion to Judaism.

Akiva Miller
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On 19/11/2013 1:34 PM, elazar teitz wrote:
> For a source against patrilineal descent, is Nach good enough?  Ezra
> 10:2 states that "ba'atzas Ad-nai v'hachareidim b'mitzvas Elokeinu,"
> all the non-Jewish women _and the children born to them_ should be
> sent away, "v'chaTora yeiaseh."

That is indeed the most powerful source, and one that I cite whenever the
topic comes up, but the question was about the hava amina.  Where do they
get this bizarre idea in the first place?

BTW I've come across an even more extreme version of the myth; an otherwise
rational and well-read person insisted to me that the matrilineal rule had
been introduced in *medieval* times, and no amount of arguing, including the
citation to Ezra, could convince him otherwise.

-- 
Zev Sero               A citizen may not be required to offer a 'good and
z...@sero.name          substantial reason' why he should be permitted to
                        exercise his rights. The right's existence is all
                        the reason he needs.
                            - Judge Benson E. Legg, Woollard v. Sheridan

On Mon, Nov 18, 2013 at 03:21:10PM +0100, Arie Folger wrote:
: I am sure a great many of us have at one time or another been confronted
: with the claim that until the time of the Mishna, Judaism was transmitted
: through patrilineal descent, and it was "the rabbis" who changed that...

This answers Zev's question, but the version I heard was that it was an
innovation made by Ezra for the purposes of the new community.

Tir'u baTov!
-Micha

R' MGR:

Since it is not the risk that determines HaGomel, any risk is intolerable if
the activity is beyond the range of what is deemed normal. So the fact that
many people would be scared to climb the upper scaffolding of the Sydney
Harbour Bridge notwithstanding their being tethered, crosses the Halachic
barrier and prompts the Beracha of HaGomel.

Those who live in Peru cross rope bridges as a regular event, it is well
within what is deemed normal and they are not scared.

MYG:

One doesn't either make Hagomel when one is scared; one makes it on the
dangerous situations prescribed by Chazal, and those substantially similar
to it. So the Sydney Harbour Bridge, while scary, is not at all dangerous
(as the participants are tethered). Crossing a rope bridge in Peru, whether
or not it is scary, is not dangerous, and one would not recite a HaGomel
either. 

 

KT,

MYG

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Rabbi Meir G. Rabi wrote, ?the fact that many people would be scared to
climb the upper scaffolding of the Sydney Harbour Bridge notwithstanding
their being tethered, crosses the Halachic barrier and prompts the Beracha
of HaGomel.?
Is the issue whether many people would be scared, or if it is, in fact,
dangerous? Many people are scared of flying, but it?s safer than driving
statistically. I imagine crossing a rope bridge while tethered is as close
to 100% safe as many activities we do on a daily basis...
--
B?ahavat Yisrael,
-Eitan Levy
 
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"an otherwise
rational and well-read person insisted to me that the matrilineal rule had
been introduced in *medieval* times, and no amount of arguing, including the
citation to Ezra, could convince him otherwise."

When one builds whole ideologies on quicksand it is hard to extricate 
oneself... 

Shulchan Aruch begins that one should be Misgaber K'ari laamod baboker. I'm
no zoologist, but I looked at a few youtube videos, and if they are any
indication, lions don't wake up too quickly. They roll, they yawn, they
twitch, they look around, they stay where they were for a bit. Does anyone
have an explanation for this comparison?

 

KT,

MYG

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On 20/11/2013 10:34 PM, Moshe Y. Gluck wrote:
> Shulchan Aruch begins that one should be Misgaber K?ari laamod
> baboker. I?m no zoologist, but I looked at a few youtube videos, and
> if they are any indication, lions don?t wake up too quickly. They
> roll, they yawn, they twitch, they look around, they stay where they
> were for a bit. Does anyone have an explanation for this comparison?
>

It's very simple.   Chazal were not zoologists and never saw a lion wake up,
and didn't purport to know how this happens.  What they did know, as did
everyone else, is that lions are strong.   Yehuda ben Teima said that we
should adopt various animals' traits when they are needed; the Mechaber
explains that a lion's strength is needed in order to wake up in the morning,
not like a lion but like a Yid.

When you read on that a leopard's boldness is needed to not be embarrassed
by the mockers, do you imagine that actual leopards ignore mockers, or would
if they were aware of them?  No, a leopard is bold in hunting, taking on prey
much bigger than it, that could easily kill it if they only realised it.
The Mechaber says should adopt this boldness when we need it, which is when
we encounter mockers.

-- 
Zev Sero               A citizen may not be required to offer a 'good and
z...@sero.name          substantial reason' why he should be permitted to
                        exercise his rights. The right's existence is all
                        the reason he needs.
                            - Judge Benson E. Legg, Woollard v. Sheridan

I assume that the metaphor isn't about the getting up.  If I say someone 
is stubborn as a mule about always calling shotgun, it doesn't imply 
that mules call shotgun.  It's just the stubbornness that's being 
compared to a mule, and the idea that the person is that stubborn about 
calling shotgun.  Similarly, phrase is talking about being as mighty as 
a lion, and the idea that the person is that mighty about getting up in 
the morning.

Lisa


On 11/20/2013 9:34 PM, Moshe Y. Gluck wrote:
>
> Shulchan Aruch begins that one should be Misgaber K'ari laamod 
> baboker. I'm no zoologist, but I looked at a few youtube videos, and 
> if they are any indication, lions don't wake up too quickly. They 
> roll, they yawn, they twitch, they look around, they stay where they 
> were for a bit. Does anyone have an explanation for this comparison?
>
>
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On Thu, Nov 21, 2013 at 08:00:26AM -0600, Lisa Liel wrote:
> On 11/20/2013 9:34 PM, Moshe Y. Gluck wrote:
>> Shulchan Aruch begins that one should be Misgaber K'ari laamod  
>> baboker. I'm no zoologist, but I looked at a few youtube videos, and  
>> if they are any indication, lions don't wake up too quickly. They  
>> roll, they yawn, they twitch, they look around, they stay where they  
>> were for a bit. Does anyone have an explanation for this comparison?

> I assume that the metaphor isn't about the getting up.  If I say someone  
> is stubborn as a mule about always calling shotgun, it doesn't imply  
> that mules call shotgun.  It's just the stubbornness that's being  
> compared to a mule, and the idea that the person is that stubborn about  
> calling shotgun.  Similarly, phrase is talking about being as mighty as  
> a lion, and the idea that the person is that mighty about getting up in  
> the morning.

To expand upon Lisa's point:

It doesn't say qam ke'ari, it says gibbor ka'ari -- koveish es yitzrekha
the way a lion does. In both cases, the yeitzer in question might be
lethargy; they are lethargic animal that sprint and attack when needed.
But even that is being more specific than R' Yehudah ben Teima (Avos
5:20) actually said, and his advice can be taken as applying to any
other attraction staying in bed might hold.

If it meant haste to get up, the nesher would be redundant.


R/Prof YL started a similar discussion Aug 2008
http://www.aishdas.org/avodah/vol25/v25n277.shtml#09 . He quoted
http://www.torah.org/learning/tefilah/lion.html

Tir'u baTov!
-Micha

-- 
Micha Berger             We are what we repeatedly do.
mi...@aishdas.org        Thus excellence is not an event,
http://www.aishdas.org   but a habit.
Fax: (270) 514-1507                   - Aristotle

I have a strange situation.  I belong to a group which is planning an 
event, which will be focused on cultural diversity within the Jewish 
People.  The group is approximately 80% or more Ashkenazi, and davening 
is generally Nusach Ashkenaz.  There is a small group who daven Nusach 
Eidot HaMizrach.  The planners of this event are talking about having 
davening for all of us in Nusach Eidot HaMizrach, in order to experience 
this culture.

Is there a halakhic issue in deliberately changing the nusach tefillah 
to one used by a minority of a group for such a purpose?

Lisa
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On Tue, Nov 19, 2013 at 08:12:13AM +1100, Rabbi Meir G. Rabi, its Kosher! wrote:
: Is it not that the danger, as far as Halacha is concerned, is not measured
: by statistics but by whether the activity is deemed to be a normal accepted
: activity pursued by normal average people. Thus flying, although a normal
: activity, is only undertaken by pilots monitored by very strict testing and
: government oversight. This is quite different to driving a car, truck or
: train.

Actually, I think there are two separate cases of when to bentch gomel
being conflated here.

The qorban todah, and therefore today birkhas hagomel, is appropriate
whenever one relived one of the redemptions of yetzi'as Mitzrayim --
somoene who was sick, crossed the sea, was freed from jail or crossed
a desert. More discussion at
http://www.aishdas.org/avodah/vol31/v31n019.shtml#12

Then there is birkhas hagomel to express gratitude at being saved by a
neis nistar (or even nigleh, but how often is that?).

We would bench gomel on an airplain ride because of crossing a sea,
nothing to do with risk.

But do I agree with RMGS that "risky" is based on commonly accepted vs
rare risk, not actuarial tables.

:-)BBii!
-Micha

-- 
Micha Berger             "The worst thing that can happen to a
mi...@aishdas.org        person is to remain asleep and untamed."
http://www.aishdas.org          - Rabbi Simcha Zissel Ziv, Alter of Kelm
Fax: (270) 514-1507

RYL brought a reference to:

From http://tinyurl.com/lwvlaxh

Which is an article by R' Yair Hoffman entitled The Gym, the Carpool,
and Tzniyus in which he laments certain means of dressing amongst mothers
dropping their kids off to yeshiva on the way to the gym, namely leggings
under a pencil spandex skirt. A lot of sources are brought, but as often
with these sorts of articles, these sources can do with being examined
more closely.

> The problem involves dress -- or rather, the lack of appropriate
> dress.... It is a Torah prohibition to go about in improper dress in
> the streets and thoroughfares of the community.

> Actually, there are three prohibitions involved.

This feeds in to another article that RSN posted on Areivim at:
> http://blogs.timesofisrael.com/why-dress-modestly-kakha/ where R' Eliezer
> Melamed brings that when girls ask why they have to dress tzniusly, the
> answer needs to be "Kacha" 

An example paragraph is as follows that latter article is as follows:

> Most children and teenagers love playing on the computer, but on Shabbat -- 
> miraculously -- they don't! Why? Is it because they were lectured on the
> importance of Shabbat, and given profound explanations about how playing
> games on the computer harms the sanctity of Shabbat? No! They don't play
> because halakha forbids it. As time goes on, details about the sanctity of
> Shabbat can also be discussed.

The problem that R' Melamed has though is that while it is very easy to
point to the Torah requirement of keeping shabbas (in the aseres hadibros
and elsewhere), pointing to where the obligation for tznius can be found
in the Torah is much more difficult -- requiring one to focus on the more
pre Sinatic aggadaic references -- such as to Sarah Imenu in her tent,
and Rivka Imenu putting on her veil when she meets Yitzchak.

Because of this, just saying "kacha" to these girls is far more likely
than with keeping shabbas, to give the impression that actually there
are no real sources.

Now certainly there are rabbinic prohibitions, and there are discussions
in the gemora in Brachos daf 24a and in Kesubos 72a -- but if you compare
that to the 157 dafim of meseches shabbas and 105 in eruvin (not to
mention elsewhere) relating to the obligation to keep shabbas, you can
see the difficulties this Rav is facing. And moving on to the Shulchan
Aruch, while there is 175 simanim on hilchos shabbas, the references to
tznius in the Shulchan Aruch are limited to a bit in the siman dealing
with Krias Shema and a couple of others, mostly in the area dealing with
divorce. It is thus very hard to tell girls that really tznius = shabbas.

In that regard R' Hoffman has made a valiant effort to actually identify
the prohibitions involved in tznius. On the other hand, one does have
to examine his sources and see if they really bear out what he asserts
-- which is that he can identify three Torah prohibitions that relate
to tznius.

> First is the general prohibition to appear in immodest attire (see Meiri,
> Kesubos 72a). There are numerous pesukim cited by poskim to this effect.

The Meiri is commenting on the Mishna and gemora in Kesubos 72a. To give
the background, the Mishna states as follows:

"These are those who go out [are divorced] without a ketuba: One who
violates Dat Moshe and Yehudit. And what is "Dat Moshe"? One who causes
him to eat that which is not tithed, has relations when in nida or
does not separate challa; or vows and does not fulfil. What is "Dat
Yehudit"? Going out with her head uncovered, spinning in the market
place, conversing with all men. Abba Shaul said, even cursing his
parents in front of him. Rabbi Tarphon said Also a screamer. And who
is a screamer? One who speaks inside her house and her neighbours hear
her voice."

There are further details in the gemora, much of which the Meiri brings,
but I think the relevant part that R' Hoffman is commenting on is:

??? ?????? ??? ?????? ??? ????? ?????? ?? ?? ??? ??????? ????? ?? ??? ???
?????? ??? ???? ?????? ????? ??? ?? ?????? ?? ?? ??? ??????? ??? ??? ????
?? ???? ??????? ????? ?? ??????? ?? ??? ?????? ??? ???? ?? ?????? ???????
????? ??? ?????? ????? ???? ????? ?????? ???? ?????? ?? ?? ??? ????

The Meiri says: These are those who go out without their ketuba: one who
violates das Moshe and das Yehudis, that is to say, not [just] at the
end of the matter when she commits adultery does she lose her ketuba
but even if she violates das Moshe and das Yehudis; and das Moshe is
said on those mitzvos that are written in the Torah or are hinted at in
it and das Yehudis are those that are said on those customs which the
people are accustomed to from tznius so it should be that the daughters
of Israel are greater in the midah of tznius than the rest of women ...

And then:

???? ?? ???? ????? ???? ?????? ???? ?????? ?? ?????? ?????? ??? ?????
?? ?????? ??????? ??? ????? ??????? ????? ????? ???

And after this it explains the details of das Yehudis and all of them
are matters of tznius, and it teaches [miTorat] that they are things
of pritzus and there goes out from them ways and paths to tznus and it
explicates these: ...

And then:

??? ???? ????? ?????
And in any event [regarding all these things listed] it is a mitzvah to
divorce her.

Now I confess that I would read this Meiri as understanding the
requirements of tznius as being a typical rabbinic fence on the Torah
mitzvah of adultery, and the mitzvah to divorce her if she violates any of
das Moshe and das Yehudis as being a Rabbinic mitzvah so I am not quite
sure how R' Hoffman sees a Torah prohibition in this Meiri. But if there
is a Torah prohibition involving tznius from here, it is clearly part and
parcel of the prohibition on adultery, ie due to an understanding that it
leads to and results in adultery. And if you understand the requirements
of tznius as being Torah mandated based on it likely leading to adultery,
presumably you also understand the mitzvah to divorce on grounds of lack
of tznius as also being a Torah mitzvah (which would be in consonance
with the ervas davar of the pasuk in Devarim 24:1 and Mishna in Gitten
90a that I brought in a previous post). I assume that is Rav Hoffman's
position, but it is hard to see how he makes his case for a Torah,
rather than a Rabbinic, mitzvah.

> Second is a violation of ubechukoseihem lo seilechu, "do not walk in
> their ways." This is discussed by Rabbi Moshe Feinstein, zt'l (Igros Moshe
> YD I #81). It is a violation of walking in the ways of the gentiles if
> one adopts a practice that originated and is practiced by gentiles that
> involves either idol-worship or immodesty.

Rav Moshe in this teshuva is discussing whether or not there is a
prohibition of "do not walk in their ways" for men who came from Eastern
Europe to wear western garb in America. He holds not because (following
the position of the Meharik and the Rema) there is no violation of "do
not walk in their ways" unless the practice is one that (a) is done for
the purpose of pritzus or derech ga'ava (and not for any practical or
sensible reason) and (b) Jews have separated from and do not involve
themselves in this practice.

He is bothered though about new forms of immodest women's clothing which
are invented by the manufacturers both for Jews and non-Jews alike and
where even Jewish women wear them since it would seem from the definition
of the Maharik that one cannot apply "do not walk in their ways" to such
items of clothing and concludes:

???? ??? ?? ?????? ?????? ??? ?????? ?????? ?????? ??? ????? ?????? ???
???? ?? ??? ?????? ???? ????? ??? ??? ???? ?? ?????. ??"? ?????? ??. ???
????? ?? ???? ????? ??? ?? ????? ?? ????? ??? ??? ??????? ?? ?? ????
????? ??? ?????? ???? ?????? ?????. ???????? ????? ??? ???? ??

"it is possible that it is where there is only an element of immodesty
like where the clothes are red and the like [that the issur does not
apply where Jews in fact wear them] but with clothes which are truly
immodest even if [Jews] are still not accustomed to separate from them,
perhaps we say that even without separating there is this prohibition [of
not walking in their ways]. And this prohibition needs investigation. But
in practice behold indeed with these clothes there is a prohibition on
women from the side of the essential immodesty even if we say there is
not in them a prohibition of the dress of non Jews."

So while it is clear that Rav Moshe does hold that there is a prohibition
on Jewish women to wear modern immodest clothes, I would have said
rather that he struggles to find a basis for this in "do not walk in
their ways" -- and seems to derive this prohibition from elsewhere,
although he does not say where -- nor does he say whether it is a Torah
or rabbinic prohibition.

And it would seem from this Rav Moshe that with leggings it is extremely
difficult to argue that they fall within the Torah prohibition of "do
not walk in their ways":

(a) they are a new form of clothing, invented for Jew and non Jew alike
and not something identifiable as historically non Jewish;

(b) they were not adopted for pritzus purpose but to enable free movement
in the gym for exercise purposes. Where there is a sensible (non idol
worship or pritzus) reason to do what is done that does not involve any
of the forbidden purposes, uechukoseihem lo seikechu is generally held
not to apply;

(c) Jewish women are wearing them.

What Rav Moshe does provide support for is that there is some prohibition
(whether Torah or rabbinic one cannot tell) where the clothing are pritzus
mamash, as opposed to merely nidnud pritzus not to wear them. But again
the problem of finding a Torah prohibition remains.

> Third is the prohibition of v'lifnei iver lo sitein michshol -- do not
> place a stumbling block. This is discussed by Rabbi Ovadia Yosef, zt'l
> (Yechaveh Da'as III #67).

The teshuva in question is actually about sellers of sleeveless tops for
women, and whether they are prohibited from selling such tops because of
lifnei iver. And ROY held in conclusion that there is no problem selling
such tops if they were of the kind that one could layer, ie put sleeves
under them, as there was no necessity that any customer was actually
going to go sleeveless.

But as a prologue to that the discussion he deals with the question
of what is the basis for the ultimate prohibition on women not wearing
sleeveless tops. And as R' Hoffman identifies, ROY fundamentally goes for
v'lifnei iver lo sitein michshol. As indeed ROY explains in detail in a
footnote, if you hold that the prohibition of women going out in such
clothing is based solely on the rabbinic prohibition of das Yehudis
"as would seem to be derived from the language of the Rambam" and
"so the language of Maran haShulchan Aruch" then you have a problem
because according to many opinions lifnei iver does not apply to
rabbinic prohibitions (it being based on kol yisrael areivim zeh l'zeh)
see discussion there, thus for v'lifnei iver to apply one needs a Torah
obligation for it to apply to, and hence Rav Ovadiah brings as the key
Torah prohibitions :

(a) "and you will guard from any evil thing" [Devarim 23:10] which is
explained in meseches Avodah Zarah (20b) "that a man should not think
[have hirhurim] in the day and come to tumah in the night" where the
Tosphos says this is a full fledged drasha and not an asmachta like it
is proved in Kesubos (46a);

(b) "and you shall not turn aside after your heart and after your eyes"
[Bamidbar 15:39); and

(c) the Rabbanu Yona in Sharei Teshuva (Shar 1 letter 6 and 8) that the
sin of histalkus bnashim is an issur from the Torah. In the body of the
teshuva, because it itself is dealing with the question of lifnei iver
of the shopkeeper, he does raise various halachic issues relating to
lifnei iver -- two sides of the river versus one side, for example --
but he does not follow this through in his discussion of lifnei iver for
women in dress. However it is interesting to contemplate doing so. The
fundamental situation discussed regarding lifnei iver is based on a person
passing a nazir a cup of wine -- with it only being true lifnei iver If
the cup was on the other side of the river, and the nazir could not access
it without your help. But where it is on the same side of the river, and
the nazir could just go and pick it up, there is no Torah prohibition,
although there may be a rabbinic prohibition of mesaye lei. Applying
this to the case of immodesty in women, it would seem that anywhere where
there were non-Jewish or non frum women dressed inappropriately anyway,
no lifnei iver would seem to apply, and at most it would be the rabbinic
prohibition of mesaye lei (and maybe not even that if the non-Jewish or
non frum immodesty was of a markedly worse scale than that of the woman
in question -- since the histaklus would surely be in that direction). On
the other hand, in the absence of such immodest women, it does not appear
to apply any geder on what can be considered to no longer trigger lifnei
iver. If a man does have hirhurim looking at a woman's little finger,
and the gemora acknowledges on Brachos daf 24b that he can, then the
justification for not wearing full burkas appears difficult. All the
discussions about whether this bit is or is not within the geder of
ervah would seem irrelevant.

This is without getting into tangential but fascinating questions of the
basis of lifnei iver -- many hold as mentioned above that it is based on
the principle of areivus, As mentioned ROY does discuss an aspect of this
in his footnote because if areivus is the basis for lifnei iver, there are
those who hold that it does not apply to rabbinic prohibitions. What ROY
does not discuss, perhaps because he was focussing on the shopkeeper, was
the Rosh's position that areivus does not in general apply to women. But
while that is a fascinating side discussion, the majority position does
apply areivus to women, and so even according to those who hold the basis
of lifnei iver is areivus, then the Torah prohibition of livnei iver
would apply to women here if the obligation on men is a Torah obligation.

But yes indeed, it would seem that here there is at least a prohibition
identified which, at least in some circumstances would be considered to
be a Torah prohibition applying to women.

R' Hoffman then goes on to discuss the "underlying problem" as follows:

> The issue under discussion is a particular type of clothing emanating
> from the gentile world that entered the world of fashion in the 1980s,
> but came back with a vengeance in the year 2005. They are known as
> "leggings" -- a nylon-lycra blend that is used almost universally in
> gyms across the country. The problem is that these leggings are often
> worn under a pencil spandex skirt. Frequently, these skirts do not reach
> the knee or will invariably rise above the knee -- a serious halachic
> problem according to Rav Shlomo Zalman Auerbach, zt'l (Minchas Shlomo
> Vol. III 103:15), Rav Elyashiv, zt'l, and others (cited in Halichos Bas
> Yisroel page 71). The Kuntrus Malbushei Nashim (page 11) cites numerous
> poskim to this effect as well, as does the former chief rabbi of Tel
> Aviv in Assei Lecha Rav (Vol. VII p. 247).

...

> Even though that part of the body is covered by the leggings, a mere
> covering is not sufficient for the portion above the knee, since this
> part is one requiring greater tzniyus -- modesty -- than the lower
> extremities (see Responsa Ohel Yissaschar Siman 10 for a full treatment
> of the issue). The idea is reflected in the derashah found in the Talmud
> (Moed Katan 16a), "Just as the yerech (thigh) is b'seiser, hidden, so
> too regarding Torah." Thus a skirt that entirely conceals the shape
> and form of the thigh is necessary.
I want to get back to this, but first I want to turn to the next portion of
the article, which is headed "A Time-Tested Halachah" which states:

> This is not just the view of modern authorities. The same explanation is
> found in the responsa of the Radbaz and the Shach (YD 340:22) that it is
> forbidden to be able to detect the shape of the limb through the clothing.
> Indeed, the Bach (Yoreh Deah 340:10) goes so far as to write that it is
> equivalent to the bare skin. Other poskim who forbid it entirely are
> the Chochmas Adam (Klal 152:6), the Kitzur Shulchan Aruch (195:3),
> the Be'er Heitev (340:13), and the Maharsham (Daas Torah 75:1).

Now you can make up your own mind, but I thought this rather misleading.
When I read this I thought, as this follows immediately on from the
previous paragraphs, that we were discussing the covering of the knee --
and thought wow, why did I never know that there was a Shach etc who
discuss this.

But actually it is discussing something else, and you can decide for
yourself whether you think this is or is not a comparable case.

The case being discussed in that of tearing kriya for one's father or
mother. And the halacha as brought by the Shulchan Aruch in siman 340
si'if 9 is that for a man, even if he is wearing ten garments, he should
tear each of them so that his heart is exposed. This is then modified in
si'if 10 (at least as per the Rema and a yesh omrim by the Mechaber) that
the minhag is not to tear the [linen] undergarment that is there only to
catch sweat, even though it means that the heart is not in fact exposed.

The Shulchan Aruch then goes on to say in si'if 11 that for a woman should
tear her underneath garment first and then turn it around backwards and
then tear her upper garment.

The Shach and the Bach etc asks the question as to why if in fact the
minhag is that we do not tear the very undermost garment even in men,
is this complicated manoeuvre necessary for women. And answers that
revealing the very undermost garment is also pritzus. And so is brought
by the other authorities cited.

Now in modern parlance, one might say that it is not considered tznius
to tear kriya sufficiently to expose the bra, even if no bare skin is
exposed. Indeed, at least some bras are completely opaque, but it is not
at all clear that this linen garment used solely to mop up sweat was --
it may well have been quite see through, like many thin clothes nowadays.
But I think most people on reading this would agree that to use these
citations as directly applicable to opaque leggings covering the knee
on the basis that a skirt over them might not reach the knee or might
ride up above the knee is something of stretch.

So let us get back to:

> Frequently, these skirts do not reach the knee or will invariably rise
> above the knee -- a serious halachic problem according to Rav Shlomo
> Zalman Auerbach, zt'l (Minchas Shlomo Vol. III 103:15), Rav Elyashiv,
> zt'l, and others (cited in Halichos Bas Yisroel page 71). The Kuntrus
> Malbushei Nashim (page 11) cites numerous poskim to this effect as well,
> as does the former chief rabbi of Tel Aviv in Assei Lecha Rav (Vol. VII
> p. 247).

I have not looked at these various sources, and suspect that many of
them quote poskim who are not looked to by the majority of those here
(the Satmar Rebbe was known for his particular requirements, but that
does not mean that what he held is mainstream). It is not clear to me the
extent to which Rav Elyashev is followed l'halacha in the communities
that Rav Hoffman is speaking to (did the women in question take off,
and perhaps burn, their sheitals during the Indian hair crisis of a
little while ago as per the psak of Rav Eliayashev?) However I did look
up the RZSA reference.

RSZA is there discussing nylon stockings and holds:

(a) transparent nylon is halachically like glass, so just as a covering
of glass doesn't help in the gemora in relation to seeing ervah, so too
nylon falls into this category;

(b) even if the nylon stockings are not transparent, if when the woman
is sitting down it is revealed to the eye of all who see the most hidden
places in the body that is not the way of tzniut, even if they do not
see chas v'shalom the flesh exactly, this also is considered like being
revealed. He then does indeed bring the Shach and the Bach in relation to
women tearing kriyah and states that a woman who reveals her undergarment
even though the flesh remains covered close to the body this is pritzus
and considered to be revealing her naked heart and kol sheken the makom
tzanuah mamash. I confess I didn't get the impression he was talking
about revealing the knee or just above the knee.

(c) RZSA goes on to say that while it is known that there are those who
say that what is required to be covered in relation to the leg [which
goes by the term shok] is just the thigh but that the majority disagree
[and hold it is the whole leg] and therefore he holds that it is required
for a woman to not go out without socks/stockings -- but not rebuke in
places where the many are not particular on this...

 From the last we can see that RZSA was one of those who held to the
requirement that the entire leg must be covered, so of course he would
hold for the prohibition of covering the knee -- but I cannot see from
here a derivation that leggings covering the knee are insufficient.

> Even though that part of the body is covered by the leggings, a mere
> covering is not sufficient for the portion above the knee, since this
> part is one requiring greater tzniyus -- modesty -- than the lower
> extremities (see Responsa Ohel Yissaschar Siman 10 for a full treatment
> of the issue). The idea is reflected in the derashah found in the Talmud
> (Moed Katan 16a), "Just as the yerech (thigh) is b'seiser, hidden, so
> too regarding Torah." Thus a skirt that entirely conceals the shape
> and form ofthe thigh is necessary

Of course, if you hold with those, like the Mishna Brura, that indeed
the only requirement of covering is on the thigh, not the whole leg (ie
the opinion rejected by RSZA), then by definition by covering the thigh
you are granting to it greater tznius than the lower leg. This hardly
provides support for " a skirt that completely conceals the shape or
form of the thigh is necessary".

> Is there any view that permits it? There is one lenient opinion that
> disagrees with the conclusions of all of the above Acharonim and the
> views of Rav Elyashiv and Rav Auerbach. It is cited by Rabbi Shmuel Yaakov
> HaLevi Haber in Et Tznuim Chochmah and holds that if the lower leg above
> the knee is covered completely, it is not a violation. However, this
> is clearly a minority view that has been dismissed by the overwhelming
> majority of halachic authorities. It should also be noted that according
> to some traditions in Yemen, a baggy type of pant cloth made exclusively
> for women would be permitted in Yemen, but not elsewhere.

And this is the point where it really gets astonishing. Because if
there is an inherent issur in showing the form of the leg, then why is
it permitted in Yemen and not elsewhere? And if you argue that we need
to go by the general standards of society, then the general standards
of society in terms of dress in Western Countries are if anything more
lax than in Yemen.

But there is another deeper problem here. The Shalwar Kameez, which
is what I suspect is being described here as the baggy pant of Yemen,
is as Wikipedia says at http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Shalwar_kameez -

    "a traditional dress of South and Central Asia, especially
    of Afghanistan and Pakistan, where it is worn by both men and
    women. In India it is worn mostly by women. It is also worn by
    women in Bangladesh. Shalwar are loose pajama-like trousers. The
    legs are wide at the top, and narrow at the ankle. The kameez is
    a long shirt or tunic, often with a western-style collar... The
    side seams (known as the chaak), left open below the waist-line,
    give the wearer greater freedom of movement"

If you are prepared to see women clothed in what most people would
describe as modest dress, have a look at the historic pictures that
accompany that article, and notice that in general the kameez does not
come down below the knee, and of course the side splits mean that a
portion of the trousered leg can be seen when one walks.

And it was not just Yeminite Jewish women who wore such garb, but Jewish
women from Afghanistan and Parkistan and India and the like. (Indeed I am
seeing a lot of shalwar kameez near our house in Hendon, as a Muslim girls
school has opened up on the road between my house and the train station,
and so I am constantly seeing girls in shalwar kameez and headscarfs).
So it would seem that what R Hoffman is asserting is assur min HaTorah
is the traditional garb of Jewish women across Asia for hundreds of years.

That is why I was extremely surprised to see him state:

> Regarding the issue of a woman?s dress during skiing, there is a
> debate between Dayan Weiss, zt'l, versus Rav Elyashiv, zt'l, and Rav
> Ovadia Yosef, zt'l. Dayan Weiss forbids skiing entirely, since he rules
> that a woman may not wear pants under her skirt at all. Dayan Weiss held
> that all forms of pants are forbidden because they fall under the rubric
> of male clothing. Rav Elyashiv (Yashiv Moshe p. 170) and Rav Ovadia,
> on the other hand, permit it with the caveat that the skirt must be long
> enough to ensure that the knees be obscured at all times. They hold that,
> despite the prohibition of opposite-gender clothing, ski pants may be
> worn as long as a skirt is worn above them.

The hanhagos of the communities that Dayan Weiss and Rav Elyashiv poskened
for may be one thing, but it seems extraordinary that Rav Ovadiah should be
cited as assuring the traditional women's dress of Asia -- and it is
noteworthy that no citation is given here. I am not aware where Rav
Ovadiah discusses the skiing controversy, but his general discussion
regarding trousers and skirts can be found at Yabi'at Omer vol 6 siman 14.
There he has a masterful teshuva in which he demolishes any suggestion that
trousers can be considered male clothing. The teshuva in question asks
whether, if parents are dealing with girls who won't wear long skirts,
should they encourage them to wear mini-skirts or trousers. Rav Ovadiah
answers trousers -- but of course he can only do so if there is no Torah
prohibition based on begged ish. In the course of the discussion he does
come out against skirts above the knee -- even if nylon stockings are worn -- 
on the basis that nylon stockings are the equivalent of the gemora case
which prohibits seeing ervah through a pane of glass. It seems surprising
therefore that he would elsewhere suggest that the knee need be covered at
all times by the skirt even if opaque trousers are worn in the manner of the
shalwar kameez.

In an overly long post, there is really no time to now quote from
Understanding Tzniut by Rav YH Henkin and his derivations from the gemora
and rishonim about the parameters of the tznius requirement on women which
seem rather at odds with a lot of this, but would seem a lot easier to show
to girls in the ulpanot.

But I do think it important to get back to the Meiri and his (as far as I
know undisputed) halacha that divorce is a mitzvah for breaches of tznius.
There is a great line in the gemora on Kesuvos 72b -- Rav Zeira is trying to
understand a statement of Rav Assi in the name of Rabbi Yochanan regarding
head covering -- and the most obvious explanation is that the rabbinic
requirement is to cover her head, at least with a "kalta" [some sort of
minimal covering] even in her own courtyard -- but Rav Zeira responds "if so
you have not allowed a daughter of Avraham Avinu to remain with her
husband!". The point is clear -- if you up the level of even rabbinic
requirements of tznius to beyond what women are able to bear (similar to a
takana that the community is not able to endure) you will end up destroying
marriage -- because of the link, whether rabbinic or Torah law, between
tznius and the mitzvah to divorce. 

It also shows the difficulty that any Rav in an Ulpana has with tznius in
demonstrating clear Torah mandates for it -- and why saying kacha is more
than likely to lead the girls to conclude that there are no real sources on
the subject, given the fuzzy and ever expanding boundaries. 

Regards
Chana



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