Avodah Mailing List

Volume 31: Number 144

Sun, 11 Aug 2013

• 1. Re: Must we agree with the Torah? (Zev Sero)
• 2. Re: Must we agree with the Torah? (Micha Berger)
• 3. Re: Must we agree with the Torah? (Kenneth Miller)
• 4. Re: Must we agree with the Torah? (Kenneth Miller)
• 5. Re: Must we agree with the Torah? (Meir Shinnar)
• 6. Re: Must we agree with the Torah? (Zev Sero)
• 7. Re: Must we agree with the Torah? (Micha Berger)
• 8. Essay by R' Aaron Lichtenstein re: Must We Agree with the Torah (Nachum Binyamin Klafter, MD)

On 9/08/2013 1:43 PM, Micha Berger wrote:
> So it could be a position somewhere between "because He said so" and
> "because it makes sense" -- "because I trust that whatever He says
> does make sense."

This.  Except not *because* I trust that.  I do trust that it makes sense,
but the "naaseh" doesn't depend on that; we would do it even if we somehow
knew that it didn't make sense.  At least, that's how I understand "ilu
nitztavinu lachtov eitzim".  (How could we possibly know that a mitzvah
made no sense, even to Hashem?  Perhaps only if He told us.)

-- 
Zev Sero               A citizen may not be required to offer a 'good and
z...@sero.name          substantial reason' why he should be permitted to
                        exercise his rights. The right's existence is all
                        the reason he needs.
                            - Judge Benson E. Legg, Woollard v. Sheridan

On Fri, Aug 09, 2013 at 01:53:58PM -0400, Zev Sero wrote:
> On 9/08/2013 1:43 PM, Micha Berger wrote:
>> So it could be a position somewhere between "because He said so" and
>> "because it makes sense" -- "because I trust that whatever He says
>> does make sense."

> This. Except not *because* I trust that. I do trust that it makes sense,
> but the "naaseh" doesn't depend on that; we would do it even if we somehow
> knew that it didn't make sense...

Personally, I wouldn't follow a god who insisted on things that don't
make sense even to Him.

I could, in theory, accept the Rambam's idea that the mitzvah has a
purpose but some details are simply to the tune of: If Hashem told
you to take a pepper rather than an esrog we would instead be asking,
"Why a pepper?" But since Hashem created esrogim and peppers along with
the mitzvah, I don't personally believe that. He didn't have to choose
among the existing fruit, Hashem more likely designed just the perfect
one for His purposes for the mitzvah.

Back to the point: while I would feel just as compellingly about following
a mitzvah in all its details even if I thought that some details were
arbitrary, just because He had to specify /something/. But I don't think
I could respect or obey a god I thought capable of ordering meaningless
actions. It would boil down to yir'as ha'onesh -- avoiding G-d's whip,
rather than obeying Him Himself.

:-)BBii!
-Micha

-- 
Micha Berger             Despair is the worst of ailments. No worries
mi...@aishdas.org        are justified except: "Why am I so worried?"
http://www.aishdas.org                         - Rav Yisrael Salanter
Fax: (270) 514-1507

R' Zev Sero wrote:

> ... perhaps, now that you know Hashem says they're bad, it
> would be proper, a midas chassidus, not to *pretend* not
> to like them, but to develop a genuine distaste for them.
> Perhaps now that you know He doesn't like them you ought
> to try to become like Him by not liking them either.

How can one possibly accomplish this, without knowing *why* Hashem doesn't like them? How can one "develop a genuine distaste"?

Perhaps this is a reason to learn Taamei Hamitzvos. If a person *does* like
(for example) pork ribs, the only way I can imagine that one might "try to
become like Him by not liking them either" would b by learning what it is
about pork ribs that Hashem doesn't like.

Personally, I dislike dry wine. But I understand that it might be
worthwhile to learn to like it. I'd imagine that a good way to "learn to
like it" is by sitting with a person who understands such wine, tasting it
with him, and have him point out the various aspects that I had not noticed
before. The exact same procedure might work for someone who wants to learn
to appreciate fine art.

And so too for mitzvos. To appreciate the importance of staying away from
pork, I must allow myself to be taught those nuances, from people who
already understand and appreciate such things.

But this will not work 100%. Eventually, we will have to confront the idea
that this mitzvah -- or ANY mitzvah -- is ultimately a chok, and not
subject to our understanding or appreciation.

And perhaps this is another reason why Rav Elazar Ben Azarya said, "I *do*
want to." The highest level is to simply subjugate one's desires to
Hashem's command, and this is the person who sees the mitzvos as chukim.
The person whose mindset includes an understanding and appreciation of why
pork is bad - has he really subjugated himself? Where is the Kabalas Ol
Malchus Shamayim?

R' Micha Berger wrote:

> But it's unclear to me that malkhus Shamayim necessarily
> means a blind "ana avda deQBH" or if it also includes
> agreeing with what we understand of His Reasons for making
> that gezeira.

For a long time I was bothered by the idea that a Metzuveh V'Oseh gets more
sechar than an Aino Metzuveh. It seemed to me that the volunteer is more
praiseworthy than the employee or the slave. The answer I've liked best is
that the Aino Metzuveh is doing it for reasons that appeal to him. Whatever
those reasons might be, he would most likely not be doing the mitzvah if he
didn't see some value in it. As such, there is less of a Kiddush Hashem in
his actions, as compared to when a Metzuveh does the mitzvah, whether he
wants to or not.

Similarly here: If someone does not want to eat pork -- even if that lack
of desire results from learning taamei hamitzvos -- then his refraining
does not demonstrate any subservience. The one who does want it but
refrains anyway - he is doing a Kiddush Hashem.

Akiva Miller

> rather he should say, "I want to, but my father in heaven
> decreed upon me that I can not!"

I once conjectured that the baal teshuva can say this with a much greater
sincerity than the FFB, and that this what entitles the baal tshuva to
stand at a higher level,

Akiva Miller

> The Rambam is usually explained as making a chiluq between mitzvos sichlios
> and shim'iyos. IOW, the Sifrei bedavqa applies to shaatnez or maachalos
> asuros, but not to something people have a native understanding of, like
> arayos.

Much of the Rambam's Shmona Perakim is devoted to this (BTW, I don't
think using the categories of sichliyos and shimiyos is correct - that
is far more R Saadiah's distinction - the category is more mefursamot
vesus shimiyot..). However, in the shmona perakim, arayot seem to be
in the same category as shaatnez, and his examples are precisely from
the gmara that amoraim had the yetzer for arayot - as distinct from
mefursamot such as gezel and murder - a moral human being can still have
yetzer for arayot, but should not have yetzer for gezel...

Meir Shinnar

On 9/08/2013 4:42 PM, Micha Berger wrote:
>> >This. Except not*because*  I trust that. I do trust that it makes sense,
>> >but the "naaseh" doesn't depend on that; we would do it even if we somehow
>> >knew that it didn't make sense...
> Personally, I wouldn't follow a god who insisted on things that don't
> make sense even to Him.

So "ilu nitztavinu lachtov eitzim" means we would decide that there must
be a reason why He needs us to do that?

-- 
Zev Sero               A citizen may not be required to offer a 'good and
z...@sero.name          substantial reason' why he should be permitted to
                        exercise his rights. The right's existence is all
                        the reason he needs.
                            - Judge Benson E. Legg, Woollard v. Sheridan

On Fri, Aug 09, 2013 at 04:51:42PM -0400, Zev Sero wrote:
>> Personally, I wouldn't follow a god who insisted on things that don't
>> make sense even to Him.

> So "ilu nitztavinu lachtov eitzim" means we would decide that there must
> be a reason why He needs us to do that?

You shifted topic, because I said how I felt, not what Chazal hold or
any other definition of what the ideal should be.

But you also shifted topic a second way.... I am talking theology, not
mitzvos. IOW, I have to believe that HQBH doesn't tell a person to do
something arbitrarily because otherwise He wouldn't be Him.

And, to unwind the conversation a step, given that everything He demands
of us has some point, I asked whether REBA's definition of ol malkhus
Shamayim refers necessarily to following HQBH out of respect for the
Commander or if it also includes trust that the King has reasons that
I would agree to if I could be sufficiently wise.

Either could be in contradistinction to "ee ifshi".

I am inclined toward the latter, but I have no proof with which to close
that question.

:-)BBii!
-Micha

-- 
Micha Berger             Friendship is like stone. A stone has no value,
mi...@aishdas.org        but by rubbing one stone against another,
http://www.aishdas.org   sparks of fire emerge. 
Fax: (270) 514-1507                  - Rav Mordechai of Lechovitz

I think that everyone is indeed focusing on the correct passage:  "A person
should not say 'I have no desire for pork, or to wear shatnez'..."  The
Rambam in the Shemona Perakim Chapter 6 clarifies that this only applies to
the chukim, but not to the rational commandments.  (Actually, he states
that this commandments should not be referred to as 'sichliyos', but that
is not relevant to our topic.)

However, I think that it is easy to take the Rambam's words too concretely
here.  I was inspired by the words of Rabbi Aaron Lichtenstein's words on
this topic:  ("By His Light, pp. 57-59")
  Does this mean that we should all be burning with a lust for bacon and
  ham, but simply be restrained because it says in the Shulchan Aruch that
  you shouldn't eat it? Is it really an ideal that we should always pit
  ourselves against G-d and then let G-d win, or pit, if you will, the
  biological part of ourselves against our moral and spiritual selves?
  Should we encourage this sort of constant conflict? I find it
  inconceivable that this is the way we are supposed to live.

  Ultimately, the ideal for a person should be that, if the Shulchan Aruch
  says don't eat ham, then I should feel revulsion for ham. But the
  question is: What is the basis of that revulsion? If a person feels
  revulsion towards shrimp or lobster because of some aesthetic
  consideration therefore he doesn't eat it, then his not eating it is
  simply a part of the aesthete in him. However, if a person feels that on
  aesthetic grounds he could eat it, but now he has reached a point where
  his revulsion is due to the fact that G-d has forbidden it ? how can I
  want something that G-d forbids? - then he has reached a level for which
  a person should strive.

  If one keeps mitzvot because they happen to coincide with his instincts
  and intuitions, then it is all part of self-fulfillment and not part of
  avodat Hashem. Avodat Hashem means to serve G-d for His sake. But once
  you identify with what G-d wants, you can then bring your own
  self-fulfillment to be part of your avodat Hashem. Kant believed that a
  person must always act against his inclination, but we do not subscribe
  to this position. Judaism does not want a person to feel like a
  shmatte(rag) all his life, constantly fighting himself, as if the whole
  of spiritual existence is to be realized through inner tension and
  struggle.

  Certainly, it is both psychologically and religiously beneficial for a
  person to find happiness and self-fulfillment in what he does. But we
  grant this on one condition: that the content and direction of that which
  makes you feel fulfilled did not start with you. It started with G-d, and
  through a process which admittedly is difficult, you have gradually been
  able to shape your own inner spiritual being in such a way that now there
  is consonance between what G-d wants and what you want...
--
Nachum Klafter, MD 
???? ?????? ???????
doctorklaf...@cinci.rr.com

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