Avodah Mailing List

Volume 31: Number 62

Wed, 10 Apr 2013

• 1. Re: Chazakah vs Plausibility (hankman)
• 2. Re: Chazakah vs Plausibility (Lisa Liel)
• 3. ROSH CHODESH (cantorwolb...@cox.net)
• 4. Re: Chazakah vs Plausibility (Kenneth Miller)
• 5. Re: Chazakah vs Plausibility (Zev Sero)
• 6. proper attire for shabbat (Eli Turkel)
• 7. kitniyot (Eli Turkel)
• 8. Re: Proper Attire for Shabbos (Kenneth Miller)
• 9. Re: Proper Attire for Shabbos (Marty Bluke)
• 10. Re: (Areivim) Short Shabbat Hagadol Drasha (Micha Berger)
• 11. Re: YT Sheni in Eretz Yisrael (was Minhagim for Baalei Teshuva) (Micha Berger)
• 12. Re: kitniyot errors (Micha Berger)
• 13. Re: Chazakah vs Plausibility (Micha Berger)
• 14. Re: Chazakah vs Plausibility (Zev Sero)
• 15. Re: kitniyot (Zev Sero)

R?nLL wrote:
The laws of chazaka are not dependent on likelihood. Once a chazaka is 
established, it stands until something specific comes to break it.

CM notes:
...like a rov?
The klal of ruba vechazaka, ruba adif seems to run counter to the above
statement. Rov is essentially another way of saying likelihood. So it
seems, chazaka is very dependant on likelihood. Why do we not look to
actuarial tables (ruba d?leisa lekaman) when the shaila comes to b?d,
establish a rov based on them and his age and say the rov governs ? not the
chazaka? (In a sense this is a weaker form of RMB?s issue with BQ and the
?immpossible? 200 year old man.)

Kol tuv
Chaim Manaster
-------------- next part --------------
An HTML attachment was scrubbed...
URL: <http://lists.aishdas.org/pipermail/avod
ah-aishdas.org/attachments/20130409/f7d5cad8/attachment-0001.htm>

On 4/9/2013 4:56 PM, hankman wrote:
> R?nLL wrote:
> The laws of chazaka are not dependent on likelihood. Once a chazaka is
> established, it stands until something specific comes to break it.
> CM notes:
> ...like a rov?
> The klal of ruba vechazaka, ruba adif seems to run counter to the 
> above statement. Rov is essentially another way of saying likelihood. 
> So it seems, chazaka is very dependant on likelihood. Why do we not 
> look to actuarial tables (ruba d?leisa lekaman) when the shaila comes 
> to b?d, establish a rov based on them and his age and say the rov 
> governs ? not the chazaka? (In a sense this is a weaker form of RMB?s 
> issue with BQ and the ?immpossible? 200 year old man.)

Well, I was mistaken in that I didn't mean no connection at all.  I 
meant no connection after the fact.  Once the chazaka is established, 
arguments about probability (like the "impossible" 200 year old man) are 
irrelevant.

But you seem to be agreeing with me, that reality is what we're 
interested in.

Lisa

-------------- next part --------------
An HTML attachment was scrubbed...
URL: <http://lists.aishdas.org/pipermail/avod
ah-aishdas.org/attachments/20130409/84d2eb65/attachment-0001.htm>

Our Rabbis taught: On the 6th day of the month of Sivan were the 10 Commandments given to Israel.
R. Jose maintained: On the seventh thereof. Said Raba: All agree that they arrived in the Midbar on the
first of the month. [For] here it is written, on this day they came into the wilderness of Sinai; whilst elsewhere
it is written, This month shall be unto you the beginning of months: just as there the first of the month, so here
too, the first of the month is meant. Again, all agree that the Torah was given on Shabbos?where they differ
is on the fixing of Rosh Chodesh. R. Jose holds that Rosh Chodesh was fixed on the first day of the week [Sunday],
and on that day Moses said nothing to them on account of their exhaustion from the Journey. On Monday he said
to them, and ye shall be unto me a kingdom of priests; on Tuesday, he informed them of the order to set boundaries,
and on Wednesday they separated from their wives. But the Rabbis hold: Rosh Chodesh was fixed on Monday, and
on that day Moses said nothing to them on account of their exhaustion from the Journey.  Talmud Shabbos: 86b-87a

The question is also raised that when any festival falls out on Shabbos, it is mentioned in the b'rachot after the haftorah
except Rosh Chodesh. Why is it that even though Rosh Chodesh is d'oraita, no mention of it is made at the conclusion
of the m'kadesh haShabbos? The answer given is that since but for the Shabbos, no haftorah is recited on Rosh Chodesh
any other day of the week.
On the shalosh regalim, there is a haftorah, irrespective of what day it falls on.  Shabbos: 24a

-------------- next part --------------
An HTML attachment was scrubbed...
URL: <http://lists.aishdas.org/pipermail/avod
ah-aishdas.org/attachments/20130409/ac7b6121/attachment-0001.htm>

R' Micha Berger wrote:

> Even though in BQ's case we're using a chazaqah to assert a
> physical impossibility -- a 200 yr old man?!
>
> Li nir'eh the kashrus of a get, or the permissability of an
> eishes kohein eating terumah, rests not on the actual life
> of the husband, but on the chazaqah of life.

In actual history, not many people since Moshe Rabenu have lived past 120 years. But I don't think that's enough to make it a physical impossibility.

Regarding your "li nir'eh" -- Are you saying that only in the absence of other evidence, or even after other evidence has presented itself?

For example: Suppose an Eishes Kohen received a get from a shaliach in
5790. She had been eating trumah all along, and legitimately so, on the
presumption that her husband was still alive, but she stops upon receiving
the get. Later, in 5792, clear evidence appears - accepted by Beis Din if
you like - that the husband had already died in 5788.

If you want, you can discuss whether or not she'll get punished for the
last two years of eating trumah. But what I want to know is this: In 5793,
is she considered a grushah or an almanah?

Akiva Miller
____________________________________________________________
OVERSTOCK ipads: $29.15
Get an Apple ipad for $29.15. Limite One Per Day. Grab Yours Now.
http://thirdpartyoffers.juno.com/TGL3131/51649f3c2c5271f3b347est03vuc

On 9/04/2013 7:06 PM, Kenneth Miller wrote:
> For example: Suppose an Eishes Kohen received a get from a shaliach in
> 5790. She had been eating trumah all along, and legitimately so, on
> the presumption that her husband was still alive, but she stops upon
> receiving the get. Later, in 5792, clear evidence appears - accepted
> by Beis Din if you like - that the husband had already died in 5788.
>
> If you want, you can discuss whether or not she'll get punished for
> the last two years of eating trumah. But what I want to know is this:
> In 5793, is she considered a grushah or an almanah?

Make your question better: assume she has a living descendant.   The question
becomes, once it's established that her husband died before the get was
delivered, can she resume eating terumah?  I'm fairly sure that she can.

-- 
Zev Sero               A citizen may not be required to offer a 'good and
z...@sero.name          substantial reason' why he should be permitted to
                        exercise his rights. The right's existence is all
                        the reason he needs.
                            - Judge Benson E. Legg, Woollard v. Sheridan

<<As I see it, the important thing is that the Shabbos clothes be nicer
than the weekday clothes. If the main difference is that the weekday
clothes are colored and wrinkly, while the Shabbos clothes are white and
pressed -- and that this is the norm for that society -- I can't imagine
what the objection might be>>

What does someone, eg a lawyer, do when he wears a fancy suit all week long

-- 
Eli Turkel
-------------- next part --------------
An HTML attachment was scrubbed...
URL: <http://lists.aishdas.org/pipermail/avod
ah-aishdas.org/attachments/20130410/2f0b73c4/attachment-0001.htm>

<<My objection started with an argument based on realia against qitniyos
and an argument based on historical olive sizes against current shitos
defining the kezayis. The argument could be more or less valid, and I
think it takes someone who did shimush and whose rebbe found him ready
for "yoreh yoreh" to decide.>>

I am confused. The argument for doubling the size of olives began with
measurements
of the Nodah BeYehuda that he claimed showed a contradiction between the
tefach and beizah sizes. He rejected the possibility that men grew and the
olive remained the same because we cant be larger (greater?) than chazal.
Hence, he whole premise is based on logic and measurements and not mesorah.
The claim is that we cant disagree with this because of the Mesorah???

Over the years many gedolim including RMF did their own measurements of the
amah and beitzah.
I once read a story that they had discovered an ancient mikvah and the
Steipler Rav went to measure its size.

As to kitniyot the claim of RMF is that only certain items were included in
the gezerah and that is determined by minhag. So want cant add new items
based on realia

BTW the shiur of CI as is is a physical impossibility since 500x500 Amah
does not fit
into the current Har Habayit (doesnt miss by much). I saw a psak in Piskei
Teshuvot that we need to add some 2% to CI's shiur since there are various
smaller and larger tefachim and we dont know which one these refer to (the
difference between the large and small tefach is about 2% according to most
rishonim). Of course this makes the shiur more impossible to fit into har
habayit.
Does that mean we ignore all realia and blindly accept every chumra to even
the CI shiur?

BTW I am currently reading an interesting book on RSZA. He claims that RSZA
relied on living mesorah rather than book knowledge as distinct from the
theories of Haym Soloveitchik and others about the movement to book
knowledge. One example is making eggs and onions on shabbat. RSZA starts
off by stating that his mother and grandmother did it and it is impossible
that they were mechallei shabbat and so he has to defend the permissibility

-- 
Eli Turkel
-------------- next part --------------
An HTML attachment was scrubbed...
URL: <http://lists.aishdas.org/pipermail/avod
ah-aishdas.org/attachments/20130410/a83990e4/attachment-0001.htm>

Prof. Levine asked:

> I know that "his clothes would be acceptable in many places"
> in Israel.  I have never understood how or why this mode of
> dress on Shabbos became acceptable in EY in any place.

Not about Shabbos specifically, but regarding tefilah in general, please see Mishne Brurah 91:13, "B'artzos hachamin"

Akiva Miller

____________________________________________________________
Woman is 60 But Looks 25
Mom publishes simple facelift trick that angered doctors...
http://thirdpartyoffers.juno.com/TGL3131/51655fc5784db5fc57173st03vuc

Nowadays, I would venture to say that the Israeli who wears a white shirt
on Shabbos is fulfilling the mitzva of kavod shabbos better then many
people who wear a suit for the following reason.

Many people (especially non Chasidic Charedim) wear a suit, white shirt and
a tie every day of the week. It is very difficult if not impossible to
distinguish between their weekday dress (white shirt, suit, tie) and their
shabbos dress (white shirt, suit, tie). I understand that these people
generally designate specific suits, shirts, and ties for shabbos
but the fact is that to the outside observer they look no different on
Shabbos then they do during the week. Just by looking at them I would have
no idea if it is Shabbos or a weekday. They don't look anymore dressed up
on Shabbos then they do during the week which is a lack of Kavod Shabbos.
On the other hand, for the Israeli who dresses casually during the week
with colored shirts (maybe not even  button down) the white shirt on
Shabbos is very clearly visible and a distinct indication of kavod shabbos.
His dress on shabbos is clearly different and nicer then his dress during
the week. You can immediately tell that he is dressed up for shabbos.
-------------- next part --------------
An HTML attachment was scrubbed...
URL: <http://lists.aishdas.org/pipermail/avod
ah-aishdas.org/attachments/20130410/33b55e20/attachment-0001.htm>

In a two-income family where husband and wife keep their money in joint
accounts, which of the two models of nechasim applies?

Tir'u baTov!
-Micha

On Tue, Apr 09, 2013 at 01:40:12PM +0100, Chana Luntz wrote:
: I am hoping some time in the future to discuss the more general question of
: minhag and minhag hama'akom - but I don't think whether a tourist in Eretz
: Yisrael observing YT sheini shel goliyos is a good example of the question.

: If anything, that question illustrates beautifully the tension between
: halachic logic, which would seem to point one way, and minhag, which points
: the other.  It is very hard to read the Chacham Zvi and conclude anything
: other than it is forbidden for a tourist to keep two days Yom Tov when in
: Eretz Yisrael....

I did not understood this as a question of minhag avos vs minhag hamaqom.
After all, despite the use of the phrase "minhag avoseihem biydeihem",
we do not argue that the grandchildren of benei EY still keep one day
in their 2nd generation in chu"l!

Rather, I had assumed it's a question of whether minhag hamaqom is based
on where you are at the moment or where you live, defining "where you
live", and in this case, whether making an error is belittling qedushas
EY ch"v.

Although I must confess that I so took it for granted, I never thought
to check whether that understanding is compelled by the sources.

Tir'u baTov!
-Micha

-- 
Micha Berger             Today is the 15th day, which is
mi...@aishdas.org        2 weeks and 1 day in/toward the omer.
http://www.aishdas.org   Chesed sheb'Tifferes: What is the Chesed in
Fax: (270) 514-1507                            harmony?

On Mon, Apr 08, 2013 at 07:36:05AM +0300, Eli Turkel wrote:
: Again, I stress that as far as I know CI is a daas yachid before and after
: his time.
...
: Finally as to achronim not disagreeing with rishonim I would think everyone
: agrees that it is kavod and not halacha. The Gra (and Shaagas Aryeh among
: others) disagreed with rishonim.

Yes, the CI is unique WRT giving significance to the appx year 4000. But
(to cut-n-paste the rest of this sentence) "the Shakh (s"q 22) ... citing
the Alshikh (teshuvah 39) and Maharam el-Shaqar (teshuvah #54), that
halakhah kebasrai does NOT cross the rishon-acharon barrier." Never mind
the tanna-amora one.

So I do not think your "nearly everyone" is accurate.

Tir'u baTov!
-Micha

-- 
Micha Berger             Today is the 15th day, which is
mi...@aishdas.org        2 weeks and 1 day in/toward the omer.
http://www.aishdas.org   Chesed sheb'Tifferes: What is the Chesed in
Fax: (270) 514-1507                            harmony?

Lisa replied to me on Tue Apr 9 10:48am EDT:
:>> Any legal system can have situations that appear absurd from the
:>> outside.  That doesn't mean they're entirely divorced from reality.

:> But I never claimed they were "entirely divorced", and tried repeatedly
:> to remove this absolutist form of my opinion from the discussion because
:> it stands as a strawman.

: And yet you're treating them that way.  Chazaka is a special case.  It's 
: recognized as such throughout the halakhic literature.  You can't use it 
: as a support for your theory that reality needn't override psak.

(To disambiguate, we're discussing chazaqah demei'iqara, where the
halakhah established by the last time the metzi'us is observed is
considered in place until the next observation.

(A chazaqa disvara, if there were one, would have been the reverse: be
to presume that things proceeed as they normally do, and we can presume
that a 200 yr old man is dead.)

Well, if pesaq did need to conform to reality, then even as a special
case, chazaqah would require that the presumption is possible. How can
you be told to presume the impossible, if the presumption were really
about empirical state?

Not that I know of any such recognition that chazaqah actually
is a special case. Nor am I clear even what "special case" would
mean. Chazaqah is a kelal in kol haTorah kulah. A "special case" that
says that halachic state persists from last observed state in any of
the 613 (and 7 derabbanan) mitzvos?

:> Such as when I wrote:
:>: I believe there are times evidence will overturn pesaq. But because pesaq
:>: is law, there are times it won't.

: That's a vague statement that lacks content.  But I'll buy it if you 
: recognize that the times evidence will overturn psak include times when 
: it's demonstrable that the original psak was given as a "best we can do" 
: in absence of actual knowledge.  Which is the case for most of the 
: outrageously oversized shiurim.

The lack of content is because I'm showing why pesaq isn't necessarily
a slam dunk given the metzi'us. I am not asserting what the pesaq should
be. Just that the topic is more muddled.

In short, a Bar Ilan CD doesn't replace shimush and getting a feel for
how to pasqen. And for similar reasons, the decision of whether an article
about historical kezeisim should or shouldn't impact halakhah lemaaseh
isn't for someone who wasn't told "yoreh yoreh" to decide on their own.

As I wrote:
>> My objection started with an argument based on realia against qitniyos
>> and an argument based on historical olive sizes against current shitos
>> defining the kezayis. The argument could be more or less valid, and I
>> think it takes someone who did shimush and whose rebbe found him ready
>> for "yoreh yoreh" to decide.

To which you replied:
> Good.  Rabbi David Bar Hayim suffices for me.  And since he did shimush 
> and his rebbe found him ready for yoreh yoreh, you can't merely dismiss 
> his position.

But our entire topic on the "kiniyot" thread was whether RDBH's
methodology of producing rulings and whether or not it actually conforms
to what other poseqim would consider pesaq. Having a rebbe saying you're
capable doesn't mean he's right, or even that that's what you think you
ought to be doing.

He clearly does not believe that acceptance lends a pesaq
authority. Neither pragmatic (mimetic) acceptance by the masses nor peer
review (textual acceptance) by later posqim.

Assuming for the minute we were to accept that RDBH's decisionmaking
process is normative...

Unless RDBH actually is your poseiq about everything, I don't see
how this is any less DIY Judaism. It's still picking among pesaqim on
the basis of our underdeveloped skills.

>: Which I am using to buttress the idea that halakhah must be reasonable
>: in its application of the legislative and interpretive rules, but may
>: not be logical a priori.

> No.  And logic isn't the issue here.  Fact is the issue here.

Neither. LAW is the issue here. Which includes deciding which facts
are relevant -- and how relevant (rather than a boolean yes-or-no)
in comparison to other factors.

Including how compelling a finding of fact must be to overturn precedent.

>> (If my theory about halakhah and experience is valid [further generalizing
>> from R' Dovid Lifshitz's generalization from bugs to beitzei qinim], it
>> would mean that for halakhah to track reality we would need two criteria:
>> (1) the reality is being invoked prescriptively, not descriptively; and
>> (2) the reality must be on the scale of human senses, and not something
>> we can only know via tools and/or reason. But my point doesn't really
>> rest on this theory; they just dovetail well.)

> K'zayit is prescriptive, and it's on the scale of human senses.  I don't 
> see the problem.

How do you know kezayis is prescriptive? What is it about olives that
make consuming a piece of meat this size akhilah, but a smaller one not?
Perhaps it's something based on average siza of the human mouth, throat,
taste bud sensitivity, psychology, middle eastern eating styles, or
something else and just happens to yield a result that is the same
as an olive. In which case, getting the olive wrong would mean not
matching chazal's shiur, but does it mean that the new shiur is wrong,
or simply different?

In fact, RCVolozhiner is a daas yachid in saying the size tracks the
size of a contemporary olive. It could be because he knew or guessed
correctly that olive breeding didn't change the size much. Or it could be
because he alone holds it's prescriptive and tied to something conceptual
involving olives.

Again, just showing ways in which pesaq /could/ drift from scientific
findings in this case. Not actually asserting anything WRT whether or
not it actually does.

And, given the authority that acceptance does lend a pesaq, are you
really sure enough of the relevance of the historical kezayis to say
it's open and shut that you ought to be following the evidence? And
that you can cherry-pick the poseiq who gives you the conclusion you
want on each issue?

Tir'u baTov!
-Micha

-- 
Micha Berger             Today is the 14th day, which is
mi...@aishdas.org        2 weeks in/toward the omer.
http://www.aishdas.org   Malchus sheb'Gevurah: How does judgment reveal
Fax: (270) 514-1507                            G-d?

On 10/04/2013 12:59 PM, Micha Berger wrote:
> (To disambiguate, we're discussing chazaqah demei'iqara, where the
> halakhah established by the last time the metzi'us is observed is
> considered in place until the next observation.
>
> (A chazaqa disvara, if there were one, would have been the reverse: be
> to presume that things proceeed as they normally do, and we can presume
> that a 200 yr old man is dead.)
>
> Well, if pesaq did need to conform to reality, then even as a special
> case, chazaqah would require that the presumption is possible. How can
> you be told to presume the impossible, if the presumption were really
> about empirical state?

Halacha does not recognise that a 200-year-old man is impossible.  On the
contrary, it takes for granted that there have actually been such rare people,
so we can't be sure it won't happen to any given person.  If it really were
impossible, then the chazakah would indeed be overridden.

-- 
Zev Sero               A citizen may not be required to offer a 'good and
z...@sero.name          substantial reason' why he should be permitted to
                        exercise his rights. The right's existence is all
                        the reason he needs.
                            - Judge Benson E. Legg, Woollard v. Sheridan

On 10/04/2013 4:58 AM, Eli Turkel wrote:
>> <<My objection started with an argument based on realia against qitniyos
>> and an argument based on historical olive sizes against current shitos
>> defining the kezayis. The argument could be more or less valid, and I
>> think it takes someone who did shimush and whose rebbe found him ready
>> for "yoreh yoreh" to decide.>>

> I am confused. The argument for doubling the size of olives began
> with measurements of the Nodah BeYehuda that he claimed showed a
> contradiction between the tefach and beizah sizes. He rejected the
> possibility that men grew and the olive remained the same because we
> cant be larger (greater?) than chazal. Hence, he whole premise is
> based on logic and measurements and not mesorah. The claim is that we
> cant disagree with this because of the Mesorah???

Yes, you are indeed confused.  We are not discussing the Noda Biyhuda's
enormous shiurim.  We are discussing a recent challenge to the *traditional*
shiurim, for which we have a long mesorah, and which is based on the correct
sizes of eggs, but the claim is that the kezayis, taken as either 1/3 or 1/2
of an egg, is too big, because we observe that olives are much smaller than
that.  The claim is that these numbers of 1/3 or 1/2 are based on Rashi and
Tosfos, who never saw an olive; a big problem with that claim is that we
are not just relying on Rashi and Tosfos but on many Rishonim and Acharonim
and a long-standing mesorah in many communities, many of whom *did* have
olives.

  
> As to kitniyot the claim of RMF is that only certain items were
> included in the gezerah and that is determined by minhag. So want
> cant add new items based on realia

Yes, that is RMF's shitah, but it seems to me to be a da'as yachid and a
big chiddush.  I haven't yet seen another source that says this, and I've
seen a few that explicitly say the opposite, and some more that are most
easily read by assuming the opposite.


-- 
Zev Sero               A citizen may not be required to offer a 'good and
z...@sero.name          substantial reason' why he should be permitted to
                        exercise his rights. The right's existence is all
                        the reason he needs.
                            - Judge Benson E. Legg, Woollard v. Sheridan


------------------------------


Avodah mailing list
Avo...@lists.aishdas.org
http://www.aishdas.org/avodah
http://lists.aishdas.org/listinfo.cgi/avodah-aishdas.org


End of Avodah Digest, Vol 31, Issue 62
**************************************

Send Avodah mailing list submissions to
	avodah@lists.aishdas.org

To subscribe or unsubscribe via the World Wide Web, visit
	http://lists.aishdas.org/listinfo.cgi/avodah-aishdas.org
or, via email, send a message with subject or body 'help' to
	avodah-request@lists.aishdas.org

You can reach the person managing the list at
	avodah-owner@lists.aishdas.org

When replying, please edit your Subject line so it is more specific
than "Re: Contents of Avodah digest..."


A list of common acronyms is available at at
        http://www.aishdas.org/avodah/acronyms.cgi
(They are also visible in the web archive copy of each digest.)