Avodah Mailing List

Volume 31: Number 38

Thu, 07 Mar 2013

• 1. Fwd (JID): "Who Says There Are No Coincidences?" (Kenneth Miller)
• 2. Re: Fwd (JID): "Who Says There Are No Coincidences?" by R' D. Glasner (Lisa Liel)
• 3. Re: partnership minyanim (Meir Shinnar)
• 4. Re: Fwd (JID): "Who Says There Are No Coincidences?" (Kenneth Miller)
• 5. Does "kitniyos" include all grain-like products? (Micha Berger)
• 6. Re: Fwd (JID): "Who Says There Are No Coincidences?" (Simon Montagu)
• 7. CHAZAK CHAZAK, V'NITCHAZEK (cantorwolb...@cox.net)
• 8. Re: Does "kitniyos" include all grain-like products? (Zev Sero)
• 9. Re: CHAZAK CHAZAK, V'NITCHAZEK (Micha Berger)
• 10. Re: Lecture by Rav Moshe Tendler about Brain Stem Death (Micha Berger)
• 11. Re: carrying an ID card on shabbat (Micha Berger)
• 12. Re: Fwd (JID): "Who Says There Are No Coincidences?" (Micha Berger)
• 13. Re: carrying an ID card on shabbat (Zev Sero)
• 14. Re: ein mazal l'Yisrael (Lisa Liel)

Like R' Micha Berger seems to be saying, I would say that "There are no coincidences" is pretty much identical to "Universal Hashgachah Peratis".

Under UHP, I cannot stub my toe without it having been divinely decreed. To
me, that sounds identical to discovering that I share the same birthday
with someone -- I would not have found out the fact unless there was a
reason for me to have found it out. It was not happenstance; it was not a
coincidence.

"Tzuri v'lo avlasa bO." If Reuven does an aveira, and HaShem decides on a
certain consequence, He will also consider the ripple effects to Reuven's
family, his friends, and anyone else who might be affected. My suffering
from his aveira will not be just my bad luck - a coincidence - but it will
be something that I deserve.

Granted that UHP is not unanimously subscribed to, as R' Micha reminded us.
To those who disagree, and say that Hashgacha Pratis is true but only
applies to "the big stuff" and not every detail of every person's life,
there are indeed coincidences. In this view, stuff happens, and for the
most part, it happens randomly, and I would think randomness to be
equivalent to coincidence.

Akiva Miller
____________________________________________________________
Woman is 55, But Looks 27
2013's No. 1 Cream. Mom is Wrinkle Free Thanks to Doctor's Secret!
http://thirdpartyoffers.juno.com/TGL3131/5137b8953ed9b38954ed6st03vuc

I always understood the idea as being related to "ein mazal l'Yisrael".  
That is to say, for Jews, possibly excepting those who are porek ol, 
hashgacha pratit operates on a very tight level.  That the ordinary laws 
of history and nature don't apply to us.  The example I always heard was 
lottery tickets, the idea being that when a non-Jew buys a lottery 
ticket, he wins or loses based on probability.  But when a Jew buys one, 
at least a frum Jew, he wins or loses based on whether God determines he 
should win or lose.  And that therefore (this was the correlary), one 
shouldn't buy more than a single lottery ticket for a given drawing 
(other than for charitable reasons), because it demonstrates a lack of 
emunah, since if God wants you to win, one ticket is enough.

Lisa


On 3/6/2013 12:32 PM, MPoppers wrote:
> An article like this (by a descendant of the Dor R'vi'i
> <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Moshe_Shmuel_Glasner>) may provoke more
> questions than it answers, but hey, hQbH granted us some grey cells
> so that we should utilize them every once in a while (and that is no
> coincidence :)) ...
>
> http://www.jewishideasdaily.com/6078
>
>    
-------------- next part --------------
An HTML attachment was scrubbed...
URL: <http://lists.aishdas.org/pipermail/avod
ah-aishdas.org/attachments/20130306/f598caab/attachment-0001.htm>

> On 3/4/2013 9:18 AM, Chana Luntz wrote:
>> What I objected to in the piece was that, while the article's target was
>> partnership minyanim, the arguments being raised worked equally well to rule
>> out a very common Sephardi minhag, that of katanim saying psukei d'zimra.
>> And in fact that reality was acknowledged, ie there were various portions of
>> the piece which suggested that the author knew that the arguments that were
>> being raised to rule out partnership minyanim also ruled out katanim leading
>> psukei d'zimra - and in fact discomfort was indicated about davening in
>> minyanim where katanim did psukei d'zimra.

> And I think this was one of the major problems with your piece.  Just
> because a particular argument, bereft of context, could be used for
> something else does not mean it ever has, or should, or can be once
> context is included.  Your assumption that if the argument is applicable
> to women, it *must* be equally applicable to ketanim is invalid for the
> reason that you haven't established it.  You've merely asserted it.

> The fact that the same poskim who permit certain roles for ketanim do
> *not* permit those same roles for women is evidence that they see a
> distinction, and R' Freundel's suggestion that chinuch is the logical one.

> To reject that leaves 3 possibilities: (1) That the poskim who permit
> those roles for ketanim *would* permit them as well for women, (2) That
> the poskim who permit those roles for ketanim and do not permit them for
> women make this distinction for extra-halakhic reasons, and (3) That the
> poskim who permit those roles for ketanim and do not permit them for
> women make this distinction for halakhic reasons other than chinuch.

> You have agreed that possibility (1) is not the case.  Possibility (3)
> is equivalent in every way that I can see to R' Freundel's chinuch
> explanation.  Which leaves possibility (2).  It seems to me that the
> only logical possibility left to explain your position is that you see
> poskim who make a distinction between the permissibility of these roles
> for ketanim and women as operating outside of the halakha.  And I have
> to object to you accusing those rabbis of making their decisions for
> extra-halakhic reasons.

> Now... I don't actually think you are making that accusation.  I'm using
> that to illustrate what you've done.  As you did, I derived a logical
> implication that you were saying X, even though you've never actually
> said X.  And then I attributed that position to you.  Which is unfair,
> and less than honest of me.  But as God is my witness, I can't see how
> it's any different than you saying that R' Freundel is objecting to
> Sephardi minhag.  He has never said any such thing, to the best of my
> knowledge.  You are attributing that position to him based on your
> logical implication.  And that's wrong.  It's the very definition of a
> strawman argument.

RCL does not need my support. However, RLL completely misunderstands
the nature of her critique of RBF and of halachic reasoning.
The issue is not whether or not one can derive women from ketanim -
which is something that can be debated - and is litte addressed by RBF
except for raising hinuch.

The issue is that the specific halachic arguments that RBF brings in lead
to the inescapable conclusion that ketanim are forbidden from being a
hazzan in psuke d/zimra and kabbalat shabbat. RBF expresses his discomfort
with the fact that communities do allow that, and then tries to find a way
around that. However, his success is limited. There is no clear rationale
of why ketanim can do some things that require a hazzan and not others.

WRT chinuch - the problem is how chinuch works `- it can't work if there
is a real hiyyuv involved for the community.

The answer seems to be somewhat different
1)the problem with minors leading is NOT because one requires a real
leader or hazan - in such cases, ketanim can't lead. Rather, there is
a general problem with having anything done publicly by minors when it
could be done by adults (one thinks of the gmara of tavo me'ara on
someone who needs a katan to lead him in hallel, even though no such
me'ara on someone who needs an adult to lead him), as it suggests that
the adults of the community are unable to perform.
Here, as there is no requriement for a hazan, we allow a katan to get
up in front of the community as it is hinuch.
The question how this applies to women - and that reflects both halachic
and nonhalachic issues. (see related note)

[Email #2. -micha

Rav Freundel's piece (and RCL responses) require a more detailed analysis.

As someone with a day (and night..) job, I haven't had time for a full
response. I have started the following, and appreciate comments.

As someone who has known Rabbi Freundel for many years, and is
appreciative of his contributions to the community, I am troubled by
his analysis. While there are legitimate halachic issues to be raised,
I think most of his sources are actually irrelevant to the argument --
and would not be taken seriously in other contexts. Rav Freundel is too
good of a scholar for this.

This is a quick analysis by someone who is not a professional scholar
-- Rabbi Freundel's piece deserves a far more detailed analysis of the
individual components than is appropriate here (or that I have time for),
and was partially given by Chana Luntz..

To start, for what I know of the partnership minyanim, they are not
radically egalitarian -- they recognize that certain parts of the
tefilla may not be led by women, but argue that others -- essentially
those which we allow a minor to lead -- which implies that the leader
has a different halachic status than the leader of other parts of the
tefilla which may not be led by a katan.

That argument may well be flawed -- and an explicit analysis of why
one can or can not extrapolate is in order. However, the argument
therefore has to focus on understanding what that halachic status is,
and formulating the difference between women and ketanim.

The problem with Rav Freundel's arguments is, as Chana Luntz pointed out,
that his arguments ultimately imply that those parts of the service can
not be led by ketanim.

I would also argue that he misunderstands many of the sources, that are
actually irrelevant to the argument.

For example, the Meiri who talks about a katan not being able to pores
al shma or yored lifne hateva -- and the tosefta with similar language --
is irrelevant to the discussion -- as no one disagrees. The Meiri does
not say (as rav Freundel says

For at least the 7th or 8th time in my article and in these posts the
Meiri says a) that a male child may get an aliyah b) but may not lead
services AT ALL.

The problem is the term yored lifne hateva has a specific meaning in the
tosefta and the Meiri -- about leading a particular part of services --
(hazarat hashatz) -- and is not equivalent to the hazan (which is why
text is both about pores al shma (birkhot kriat shma) AND yored lifne
hateva -- an unnecessary duplication if yored lifne hateva is generic
for hazan).
There is no argument that ketanim and women may not do those parts (I
haven't had time to look it up, but think that this is standard pshat
in the understanding of that tosefta -- will try to look in tosefta
kipeshuta)

If the Meiri and tosefta is understood in the broad sense that Rav
Freundel understands -- then one is left with the problem of how we
allow ketanim to lead any part....

Rav Freundel then has a long discussion about whether communal practice
and norms can transform a part of the tefilla to tefillat harabim --
and then arguing that kabbalat Shabbat has been so transformed. I
think the details of the analysis are flawed, but regardless of how one
views the details, the conclusion is problematic (reduction ad absurdum
refutation).(
 One quick example of flawed analysis -- he brings a tshuva of Rav Moshe
Feinstein that if one davens with a minyan where only 6 people have not
yet davened, one may say hazarat hashatz -- but does not fulfill tefillat
harabim -- and argues that therefore

"It is not the content of the prayer, but the presence of ten men praying
that makes a service into a tefillat hatzibbur"

- that is not to be found or even implied in rav moshe's tshuva --
whose import is that for tefillat betzibbur one needs ten men who are
actually praying -- while for hazarat hashatz one needs only ten men
(even if only six are actually praying). There is nothing to suggest
that this applies to any tefilla other than shmone esre ( or similar
tefillot) -- or that the content of the prayer is not important). )

--


assume that merely because the community has decided to say them they now
become part of tefillat hatzibbur -- rather, there are reasons related
to the nature of selichot that so transform them (eg, rav soloveichik's
analysis is that they are a form of ze'aka) that people delve into.
Rav Freundel's reasoning would eliminate the need for all that discussion.
One may argue that perhaps a community may deliberately institute a prayer
as tefillat harabim requiring a hazan -- but one needs far more proof
that the mere act of saying them as a community so transforms them....

However, the problem that one is facing is that if one assumes the
analysis is correct, the following dichotomy is problematic

1) Some parts of the prayer require an adult male as a leader
(pores al shma, yored lifne hateva, selichot, magen avot..)and we do
not allow a minor to lead.

2) Some parts of the prayer (that Rav Freundel views as requiring
a hazan), we tolerate a kattan as leader

What halachic criteria do we use to distinguish them? If selichot,
magen avot, kabbalat Shabbat, and psuke d/zimra all require a hazan just
because the community says them regularly -- what is the difference?

Rav farber suggested a difference between the two types of prayer --
Rav Freundel criticized him for lack of sources -- what is the source
for his distinction??

Hinuch.

Rav Freundel suggests that the solution is hinuch. Indeed, some sources
do discuss hinuch as why we allow kids to lead sometimes. However,
there is no suggestion that hinuch will actually allow a kattan to lead
when there is a real obligation for a leader -- and the question remains
the difference between the two categories -- for which there is no source.

I think a far more plausible understanding of why hinuch is brought
in is on issues related to kavod hatzibbur (not in the formal sense
used for kriat hatorah) -- that it is embarrassing for a community
to be led by minors, as there should be men available who can lead
(and preferably leaders who can bring honor to the community) -- and
the answer is we allow minors to get up before the community as part of
hinuch -- but therefore implying that no real leadership is involved in
their actions....

This perhaps reflects the issues with women leading (see below).

The real halachic issues that I think are raised by kabbalat shabbat
being led by women are different.

1) Women leading anything. A different paradigm is women saying
Kiddush for others -- there is no question of the level of obligation
and intrinsic permissibility. -- but the Mishna Berura says that it
shouldn't be done as an inappropriate role. If one follows the Mishna
Berura and his logic, which many do, clearly one would not allow women
to lead any prayer for others as inappropriate.

However, as is known, Rav Soloveichik gave a psak allowing women to say
Kiddush to say for others -- even to say for a large group on a college
campus. If one follows the rav's psak, however, it isn't an intrinsic
problem (not that I think the rav would have allowed this -- because of
point 2 below..). Rav Freundel questions whether any sefardi posek (the
ones who allow ketanim to lead) would allow women -- but it seems clear
that most such as ROY would probably follow the mishna berura on this....

2) Minhag bet haknesset. This is far more problematic -- and Rav
Soloveichik was known to be strict on this. However, Rav Freundel, as a
scholar of the history of tefilla, is aware of the multiple changes that
have occurred in that minhag. One of the issues in his article is the
lack of halachic writings addressing the topic of women leading qabbalat
shabbat -- and the implication is that such change require some level
of formal halachic inquiry and authorization, and underlying that is the
question of who has the power to make such changes. Those are serious,
legitimate issues -- but the critique should be on that basis. Raising
new issues that are problematic undercuts the validity and force of
any legitimate critique.

Meir Shinnar

Coincidentally enough, a few minutes ago, I happened to chance upon an
article by Rav Yissocher Frand of Ner Yisrael in Baltimore, about Parshas
Vayikra. Regarding the small Aleph in the first word, he wrote: "With the
Jewish people, there is no such thing as 'Vayiker' (happenstance). ...
there are no coincidences."

The full article can be read at htt
p://www.torah.org/learning/ravfrand/5772/vayikra.html?print=1

Akiva Miller
____________________________________________________________
Woman is 53 But Looks 25
Mom reveals 1 simple wrinkle trick that has angered doctors...
http://thirdpartyoffers.juno.com/TGL3131/51388ec7b3145ec65c0bst01vuc

On a thread about quinoa, and whether the minhag of qitnios would
automatically include it, Zev posted to Areivim (2:14pm EST):
> What is a more traditional view?  My *guess*, and it is only that, is
> that you mean the view that only specific species were included in the
> takanah, and this list should be seen as fixed; that seems to be RMF's
> view, but in what way is it traditional?  Who else held it?  Is it not
> his chidush?

IM IC 3:63 opens with "hinei bedavar ha-peanut, shekasavti shebeharbeih
meqomos akhlu osam bePesach..." He also cites R' Yeshchiel ushe'ar
gedolim, "chakhmei doros ha'achronim", etc... RMF is reporting what was
his norm, clearly not a chiddush.

I got the impression from RMF's teshuvah that back in pre-war Eastern
Europe, some areas followed a minhag that was being limited to the initial
list of species, and some followed a minhag of avoiding a general concept.

Miqroei Qodesh reports that R' Chaim Brisker permitted.

Tir'u baTov!
-Micha

-- 
Micha Berger             Life is a stage and we are the actors,
mi...@aishdas.org        but only some of us have the script.
http://www.aishdas.org               - Rav Menachem Nissel
Fax: (270) 514-1507

n Thu, Mar 7, 2013 at 2:56 PM, Kenneth Miller <kennethgmil...@juno.com>wrote:

> Coincidentally enough, a few minutes ago, I happened to chance upon an
> article by Rav Yissocher Frand of Ner Yisrael in Baltimore, about Parshas
> Vayikra. Regarding the small Aleph in the first word, he wrote: "With the
> Jewish people, there is no such thing as 'Vayiker' (happenstance). ...
> there are no coincidences."
>

I wonder how he understands Ruth 2:3
-------------- next part --------------
An HTML attachment was scrubbed...
URL: <http://lists.aishdas.org/pipermail/avod
ah-aishdas.org/attachments/20130307/06ef78b9/attachment-0001.htm>

We finish the Book of Shmos this Shabbos and the very last verse  
contains the words "...l'einay chol beis Yisroel..." (before the eyes of 
all of the HOUSE of Israel).  The very last three words of the entire 
Torah are  "...l'einay kol Yisroel" (before the eyes of all Israel). Why
is the word "beis" [HOUSE of ] missing at the end of the Torah but not
the end of Shmos?  
I don't know if that question was ever raised but my pure guess is that 
the HOUSE (beis) is missing at the end because it refers to the
Beis Hamikdash which tragically will be destroyed in the future. 
-------------- next part --------------
An HTML attachment was scrubbed...
URL: <http://lists.aishdas.org/pipermail/avod
ah-aishdas.org/attachments/20130307/8d84b7b2/attachment-0001.htm>

On 7/03/2013 2:54 PM, Micha Berger wrote:
> On a thread about quinoa, and whether the minhag of qitnios would
> automatically include it, Zev posted to Areivim (2:14pm EST):
>> What is a more traditional view?  My *guess*, and it is only that, is
>> that you mean the view that only specific species were included in the
>> takanah, and this list should be seen as fixed; that seems to be RMF's
>> view, but in what way is it traditional?  Who else held it?  Is it not
>> his chidush?
>
> IM IC 3:63 opens with "hinei bedavar ha-peanut, shekasavti shebeharbeih
> meqomos akhlu osam bePesach..."

What does that show?  The fact that in many places they ate peanuts
doesn't tell us anything about why, and it certainly doesn't tell us that
they held of a shita that there was a fixed list of species.


> He also cites R' Yeshchiel ushe'ar gedolim

Who didn't hold of kitniyos at all.  What have they got to do with the
question before us?  They certainly didn't hold that there was a fixed
list of forbidden species!


> "chakhmei doros ha'achronim", etc...

This is his speculation.  He doesn't quote any chachamim who were
reluctant to add species to the issur; he supposes that all the later
chachamim *were* reluctant to do so.  That AFAIK is his chidush, not
a traditional view.


> RMF is reporting what was his norm, clearly not a chiddush.

Where do you see this?  The only norm he is reporting is the metzius that
in many places they ate peanuts.  The rest is his explanation for that
metzius.  Other explanations could also be proposed.

Incidentally, I have a problem with one of the proofs he gives that the
issur is list-based rather than description-based, from the fact that
mustard is forbidden even though it doesn't seem to fit the criteria.
But the Taz explains exactly why mustard is forbidden -- because it
grows in pods.  And that would apply equally to peanuts.


> I got the impression from RMF's teshuvah that back in pre-war Eastern
> Europe, some areas followed a minhag that was being limited to the initial
> list of species, and some followed a minhag of avoiding a general concept.

As I read the teshuvah, he is *positing* that the issur was list-based and
nothing was added to it.  I speculate that he was unaware that corn was
unknown at the time of the original issur.


-- 
Zev Sero               A citizen may not be required to offer a 'good and
z...@sero.name          substantial reason' why he should be permitted to
                        exercise his rights. The right's existence is all
                        the reason he needs.
                            - Judge Benson E. Legg, Woollard v. Sheridan

On Thu, Mar 07, 2013 at 12:13:43PM -0500, cantorwolb...@cox.net wrote:
:                                                                      Why
: is the word "beis" [HOUSE of ] missing at the end of the Torah but not
: the end of Shmos?  
: I don't know if that question was ever raised but my pure guess is that 
: the HOUSE (beis) is missing at the end because it refers to the
: Beis Hamikdash which tragically will be destroyed in the future. 

Maybe it's that the version in Shemos has an "extra" bayis because it
closes the 13% of the Torah that discusses building the Mishqan.

The cloud was over the Mishqan, "le'einei kol beis Yisrael", to reiterate
the opening of this segment of Shemos, "ve'asu Li miqdash, veshakhanti
besokham" -- not in the house, in them. So now it parallels the Mishqan
to *Beis* Yisrael.

Also a "pure guess".

-Micha

-- 
Micha Berger             "'When Adar enters, we increase our joy'
mi...@aishdas.org         'Joy is nothing but Torah.'
http://www.aishdas.org    'And whoever does more, he is praiseworthy.'"
Fax: (270) 514-1507                     - Rav Dovid Lifshitz zt"l

On Thu, Feb 28, 2013 at 02:57:22PM -0600, noam stadlan wrote:
: Rav Micha has listed the position of many gedolim on brainstem death.
: However, it is important to know and think about exactly what they held.
: Many held that life is present as long as circulation is present.  In the
: era of modern technology this means that a body without any functioning
: cells is still considered alive as long as some machine is pumping blood in
: the vessels.  So when you think about it a bit, this position makes little
: sense...

Only if you think that "life" is an empirical term.

If one deduces from "vayipach be'apav nishmas chayim" that life is
defined by some metaphysical relationship between body and soul that
occurs with breathing, how can we know what makes sense?

A body can be dead by any empirical measure, but still chayim in the
sense halakhah uses the term, and one still commits retzichah by stopping
its breath.

Much the way mequbalim speak of chibut haqever, which is enabled by some
weaker connection between body and soul after death. It too is a purely
spiritual claim and thus has no empirical measure or definition.

Now I'm not saying I /do/ define chayim and misah that way; I find the
topic too complex for me to take a position. But it /could/ be. There
is no way for me to assess what makes sense, and what doesn't.

Tir'u baTov!
-Micha

-- 
Micha Berger             Education is not the filling of a bucket,
mi...@aishdas.org        but the lighting of a fire.
http://www.aishdas.org                - W.B. Yeats
Fax: (270) 514-1507

On Thu, Feb 28, 2013 at 06:43:18PM -0500, Zev Sero wrote:
> I don't believe that would change anything; it adds nothing to the
> clothing so the fact that it's sewn on doesn't stop it from being
> a burden. Just as one can't just pin a key to ones clothing and
> call it a button, but must either make it genuinely decorative (and
> gender-appropriate) or an integral part of a garment, one would have
> to do the same with the ID card...

So you remove the manufacturer's and shaatnez inspector's labels before
the first time you wear a garment on Shabbos? Unlike a key pin, this
is permanently attached to the garment and thus batul to it.
According to SSK pg 215 RSZA says this is why extra buttons sown
onto a garment can be worn as well. (I am told RMF and RSYE hold
similarly.)

> A key belt might work, but then there's another problem: we have a
> whole chapter of mishna dealing with actual garments that may not
> be worn because the wearer might remove them in the street...

This was discussed widely WRT gloves. The gezeirah was about jewelry,
and few say it includes anything but. (This ties to the discussion of
whether qitniyos includes more than the original list of legumes.)

...
> I just want to point out that heterim that were given in the past, in
> other countries and times, were usually given because of sh'as had'chak.

I knew there was a she'as hadechaq element, which is why I reiterated
both "Refuseniks" and "under the Soviets" to underline the context.

Tir'u baTov!
-Micha

-- 
Micha Berger             "And you shall love H' your G-d with your whole
mi...@aishdas.org        heart, your entire soul, and all you own."
http://www.aishdas.org   Love is not two who look at each other,
Fax: (270) 514-1507      It is two who look in the same direction.

On Thu, Mar 07, 2013 at 06:22:55PM +0200, Simon Montagu wrote:
: On Thu, Mar 7, 2013 at 2:56 PM, Kenneth Miller <kennethgmil...@juno.com>wrote:
:> Coincidentally enough, a few minutes ago, I happened to chance upon an
:> article by Rav Yissocher Frand of Ner Yisrael in Baltimore, about Parshas
:> Vayikra. Regarding the small Aleph in the first word, he wrote: "With the
:> Jewish people, there is no such thing as 'Vayiker' (happenstance). ...
:> there are no coincidences."

: I wonder how he understands Ruth 2:3

That, like every other use of the word "miqreh", means that it seemed
coincidental, but it was part of Hashem's plan for her to end up in
Boaz's field. Since it obviously was, this seems to be the meaning even
if coincidences do exist in general.

Personally, I don't believe in them because of Chaos Theory, as often
illustrated by "The Butterfly Effect". If there were anything whose
final outcome wasn't influenced by HQBH, how could there be anything
whose final outcome was? All events interact and interplay.

Which is also how I can believe that people have free will in terms of
what they do, but can have bitachon that everything that occurs to them
is hashgachah. A person has the choice to interject one vector into the
mix; weaving them into a total package is Hashem's orchestration.

(And yes, even before the modern period, most rishonim did believe that
all events that impact people were guided by hashgachah peratis.)

That's not a "survey" answer, trying to fit this rishon or that. It's
what from the chulent of Jewish Thought strikes me personally as true.


On Wed, Mar 06, 2013 at 03:22:52PM -0600, Lisa Liel wrote:
> I always understood the idea as being related to "ein mazal l'Yisrael".
> That is to say, for Jews, possibly excepting those who are porek ol,
> hashgacha pratit operates on a very tight level.  That the ordinary laws
> of history and nature don't apply to us.  The example I always heard was
> lottery tickets, the idea being that when a non-Jew buys a lottery
> ticket, he wins or loses based on probability.....

Ein mazal leYisrael doesn't mean that necessarily a nakhri's life is
dictated by luck. That's the converse, not the contrapositive, of
the aphorism.

(Definitions:
    Given: Every X is Y
then the contrapositive would be
    Whenever not-Y, it can't be an X.
and the contrapositive is always as true as the given. The converse
would be
    Every not-X is not-Y
which could be true or not.)

And if you're willing to except the Jew who is poreiq ol, what about
the chasid umos ha'olam?

In any case, given that stars and constellations move in known calculable
patterns (and the amoraim knew them as attached to a solid dark raqia,
even if Rashbi did not -- Bereishis Rabba 6), I don't think "mazal"
means luck. More like destiny.

I would take "ein mazalos leYisrael" to mean that Jews (or maybe just
those who didn't lose their guarantee on olam haba) make their own lives,
and are not subject to predestination.

Tir'u baTov!
-Micha

-- 
Micha Berger             If you won't be better tomorrow
mi...@aishdas.org        than you were today,
http://www.aishdas.org   then what need do you have for tomorrow?
Fax: (270) 514-1507              - Rebbe Nachman of Breslov

On 7/03/2013 5:13 PM, Micha Berger wrote:
> So you remove the manufacturer's and shaatnez inspector's labels before
> the first time you wear a garment on Shabbos? Unlike a key pin, this
> is permanently attached to the garment and thus batul to it.
> According to SSK pg 215 RSZA says this is why extra buttons sown
> onto a garment can be worn as well. (I am told RMF and RSYE hold
> similarly.)

Those are batel to the garment.  The permanent attachment is irrelevant;
they'd be just as batel if they weren't permanently attached.  They have
no independent metzius, they're just part of the garment.



>> A key belt might work, but then there's another problem: we have a
>> whole chapter of mishna dealing with actual garments that may not
>> be worn because the wearer might remove them in the street...

> This was discussed widely WRT gloves. The gezeirah was about jewelry,
> and few say it includes anything but. (This ties to the discussion of
> whether qitniyos includes more than the original list of legumes.)

Where are you getting this from?  The discussion about gloves is over
the metzius: is it likely that you will remove them, or not?  There's no
doubt that if you are likely to remove them you can't wear them.

>  The gezeirah was about jewelry

No, it wasn't.  It includes shoes, which are certainly not jewellery!
One may not go out wearing a single shoe, for fear that one will start
to feel embarrassed and remove it.  One may not go out with a shoe that's
too big, for fear that it will fall off and one will carry it.


-- 
Zev Sero               A citizen may not be required to offer a 'good and
z...@sero.name          substantial reason' why he should be permitted to
                        exercise his rights. The right's existence is all
                        the reason he needs.
                            - Judge Benson E. Legg, Woollard v. Sheridan

On 3/7/2013 4:51 PM, Micha Berger wrote:
>
> Ein mazal leYisrael doesn't mean that necessarily a nakhri's life is
> dictated by luck. That's the converse, not the contrapositive, of
> the aphorism.
>
> (Definitions:
>      Given: Every X is Y
> then the contrapositive would be
>      Whenever not-Y, it can't be an X.
> and the contrapositive is always as true as the given. The converse
> would be
>      Every not-X is not-Y
> which could be true or not.)
>
> And if you're willing to except the Jew who is poreiq ol, what about
> the chasid umos ha'olam?
>    
But ein mazal l'Yisrael comes from Avraham and the stars that Hashem 
showed him.  So it wouldn't apply to the chasid umot ha'olam.  Nor, 
necessarily, would it apply to a Yisrael mumar.

Lisa


------------------------------


Avodah mailing list
Avo...@lists.aishdas.org
http://www.aishdas.org/avodah
http://lists.aishdas.org/listinfo.cgi/avodah-aishdas.org


End of Avodah Digest, Vol 31, Issue 38
**************************************

Send Avodah mailing list submissions to
	avodah@lists.aishdas.org

To subscribe or unsubscribe via the World Wide Web, visit
	http://lists.aishdas.org/listinfo.cgi/avodah-aishdas.org
or, via email, send a message with subject or body 'help' to
	avodah-request@lists.aishdas.org

You can reach the person managing the list at
	avodah-owner@lists.aishdas.org

When replying, please edit your Subject line so it is more specific
than "Re: Contents of Avodah digest..."


A list of common acronyms is available at at
        http://www.aishdas.org/avodah/acronyms.cgi
(They are also visible in the web archive copy of each digest.)