Avodah Mailing List

Volume 31: Number 37

Wed, 06 Mar 2013

• 1. Re: Lecture by Rav Moshe Tendler about Brain Stem (Meir Shinnar)
• 2. Ahava Rabbah (Rich, Joel)
• 3. Re: partnership minyanim (Chana Luntz)
• 4. PARSHAS HACHODESH DISCUSSES THE PROCLAMATION OF THE NEW MOON AND NEW MONTH (cantorwolberg@cox.net)
• 5. Re: partnership minyanim (Lisa Liel)
• 6. lo tikom parameters (saul newman)
• 7. Re: lo tikom parameters (Micha Berger)
• 8. Re: lo tikom parameters (Rich, Joel)
• 9. Fwd (JID): "Who Says There Are No Coincidences?" by R' D. Glasner (MPoppers)
• 10. Re: Fwd (JID): "Who Says There Are No Coincidences?" by R' D. Glasner (Micha Berger)

> : Contrary to popular belief, organ transplant is not only allowed al pi
> : din, but it is meritorious...
> RMB
> According to RMT. It is unclear RMF actually did change his mind from
> what was published earlier in IM. I don't think his sons remember his
> final position the way his son-in-law does.
>
>
>
> R Binyamin Walfish went to RYBS in 1983 or '84 to ask RYBS his opinion.
> RBW reported that RYBS accepted brain death as a criterion, but RAS, R'
> Isador Twersky (a son in law), and R/D Haym Soloveitchik said he did not,
> and grandsons R' Mayer Twersky and R' Yichok Lichtenstein reported several
> conversations in which RYBS said that he didn't and didn't understand
> how anyone can accept it.
>
>

RN Stadlan has commented on much of RMB's post.
However, two points:

1) RMF.
While many poskim don't accept brain death, it is quite clear that RMF did.
There is, however, a concerted effort by many (given RMF's stature,
especially for the American community) to deny and reinterprete it.  There
are two tshuvot of his which specifically address the issue of brain death,
including one in the latest volume of Igrot Moshe, addressed Dr Bondi,
where he specifically accepts the Harvard criteria.

This has led to some convoluted interpretations, and even claims that RMF
did not write the tshuvot, and that the sons deny that RMF wrote them (the
sons have an introduction to both the new volumes accepting the
authenticity of all the tshuvot...), and essentially slander RMT.

There is a good summary in a recent book by rav halperin Qeviat rega
hamavet, where he brings all opinions. In the chapter devoted to Rav Moshe
(published before the last volume of IM), there is a letter by Rav David
Feinstein about the tshuva in the next to last igrot moshe, saying
essentially enough already, my father wrote the tshuva....

He also brings that some rav wrote that he spoke to rav david feinstein,
who denied that his father wrote the tshvua - and then he spoke to rav
david feinstein, who said that he never said any such thing.  (showing how
far some went in trying to deny that RMF supported the Harvard criteria)

Therefore, while there are many poskim who deny brain death - it is crystal
clear that Rav Moshe Feinstein accepted the harvard criteria - in spite of
the very intense efforts by those opposed to deny it and put the onus on RMT

Whether RMF accepted them because he accepted neurological death per se,
 or whether he accepted them merely as irrefutable, halachically acceptable
evidence of the irreversible cessation of capacity for spontaneous
respiration (as RMB suggested that Rav David Feinstein seems to suggest -
but note that unlike RMB, RDF is talking  about spontaneous respiration -
not respiration - a corpse can be put on a ventilator...) may not be
completely clear from the tshuvot - but is not a practical difference (if
anything, this positiion is far more lenient than RMT's understanding -  as
there are several conditions (eg, neuromuscular diseases such as ALS) which
can lead to irreversible capacity  for spontaneous respiration while
maintaining cortical and intellectual function when on a ventilator..).

2) RYBS.  RYBS was one who was constantly mechadesh, and did change his
mind.  I have no doubt that the family had the conversations that they
report at different times in his life.

However, the one actual tshvua (rather than theoretical discussion) to a
practical halacha lema'ase question that he ever gave on the subject was
one that he gave in his capacity as posek of the RCA to the executive
director of the RCA about a public policy issue that needed an immediate
answer - where the executive director had no axe to grind - and he told him
that he accepted Rav Moshe Tendler;s position and understanding. This was
not a secret conversation - it became the public policy of the RCA.  There
is no evidence that anyone of the family spoke with him either close to or
after he gave that particular psak.
This has led to essential slandering of Rav Walfish. I don't think that
there is any credible reason to doubt rav walfish - even if his final
practical psak contradicted some of his earlier theoretical discussions.

In the end, the two leading poskim of the last generation for both the MO
and yeshivish community in America clearly paskened that brain death was
halachically death - a position at odds with other (Not all) other major
poskim, and one that much of the current halachic leadership in America is
uncomfortable with.  However, that discomfort does not and should not
translate to a license to distort.


Meir Shinnar
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Any ideas on why we break into bakashot in the middle of the bracha of Ahava Rabbah when it seems out of place compared to the whole flow from Barchu on?
KT
Joel Rich
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RBJF writes:

>Let me begin by again stating the purpose of my article because much of
what she claims that I didn't cite simply is beyond the scope of what my
goal >was in my article.

>I wrote an article about Partnership Minyanim (a new phenomenon in the
Ashkenazi community where women lead things like Kabbalat Shabbat, Pesukei
>Dezimra etc. but not Maariv), and about why I believe that these services
are halakhically unsustainable within our community. I first challenged
those >few halakhic defenses of Partnership minyanim that I have read or
heard and then provided many additional sources to challenge the practice.
>Inter alia I did discuss the custom of some communities that allow male
children to lead Pesukei Dezimra and Kabbalat Shabbat because that practice
>does potentially challenge my conclusion and I then provided answers to
that challenge. That is the totality of what this article required for its
>purposes on this last subject, and as such I did not write the definitive
discussion of children leading any and all parts of davening as found in
>halakhic literature.

>This introduction alone responds to 90% of what she says in a general sense
(I will be more specific below) but I would add one other general point that
>takes care of most, if not all of the rest before I get to specifics.

>Ms. Luntz cites Sefardi poskim such as R. Ovadiah Yosef and R Untermann in
her presentation. Is she seriously suggesting that if they were asked
whether >women could lead Kabbalat Shabbat or Pesukei Dezimra they would say
"yes"? 

Of course not, nor was that what I objected to.

What I objected to in the piece was that, while the article's target was
partnership minyanim, the arguments being raised worked equally well to rule
out a very common Sephardi minhag, that of katanim saying psukei d'zimra.
And in fact that reality was acknowledged, ie there were various portions of
the piece which suggested that the author knew that the arguments that were
being raised to rule out partnership minyanim also ruled out katanim leading
psukei d'zimra - and in fact discomfort was indicated about davening in
minyanim where katanim did psukei d'zimra.

>Is the track record of Sephardi poskim on issues such as this one that
>suggests they would respond in the affirmative?

>I think not and that alone raises some serious questions about the things
that she is claiming in her post.

Why?  I am not objecting to concerns regarding partnership minyanim being
raised that do not, at the same time, argue for the invalidity of a common
Sephardi minhag of katanim saying psukei d'zimra.  It is the objection to
the Sephardi minhag that I find problematic, and I continue to stand by
that.   As I wrote in my original piece - "the real problem with Rabbi
Freudel's analysis is, as I have mentioned, that in his zeal to write
partnership minyanim out of Orthodoxy, appears to be doing a good job to
write the Sephardi Community wholesale out of Orthodoxy."  I suspect from
what follows that RBJF has perhaps misunderstood.  He may have jumped to the
conclusion that because I am a woman, I am therefore defending partnership
minyanim, which have to do with women's issues.  The bit about my background
he may have missed is that my husband is Sephardi, and therefore I have (a)
son in the parsha of katanim saying psukei d'zimra (not that he is
interested, he would rather hang round my Ashkenazi shul, but that is
another story).  Thus my focus therefore throughout my piece was on katanim
saying psukei d'zimra.

> In her very first paragraph there are two serious misstatements

>1) She says " He (meaning me) then cites as (sic) Meiri, which he (me)
quotes as " often cited as a critically important source supporting the
arguments >of those who see aliyot for women as acceptable", but which, as
he (me) correctly points out, does not discus (sic) prayer services in any
great >detail,".

>That is not what I said and more importantly, that is not what the Meiri
says.

>For at least the 7th or 8th time in my article and in these posts the Meiri
says a) that a male child may get an aliyah b) but may not lead services AT
>ALL. Those who support Partnership minyanim have used part a of this
sentence to support aliyot for women but then have ignored part b and in
fact have >extrapolated to women leading parts of davening. This is a
serious challenge to those who have defended Partnership Minyanim based on
the articles that >defend women getting aliyot, and that is why I discuss it
as I do.

As I said, I am not coming to defend partnership minyanim, and I don't know
why those who defend partnership minyanim would want to quote the Meiri.  To
me the Meiri seems a straw man, because he doesn't add anything to the
argument one way or another.  I do have a problem with RBJF's bringing of
the Meiri *if* this Meiri is then being used to rule out katanim saying
psukei d'zimra - I don't think the Meiri says this - and I don't think any
of the Sephardi poskim think he says this.  I got the impression (and indeed
still get the impression) from RBJF's piece that he was, by saying a male
child may not lead services AT ALL concluding from this that a male child
may not lead psukei d'zimra.  If he does not conclude this from the Meiri,
then the Meiri is irrelevant (both to partnership minyanim and any
discussion about katanim).  If he does conclude this from the Meiri, as I
thought he did, then arguably we have a problem and a challenge to the
Sephardi minhag - although I think that even if there was a challenge a
Meiri would not be enough to unsettle such a custom, the poskim would merely
conclude that there were enough rishonim who held differently for us to
ignore the Meiri.

>2) She then continues: "although it (Meiri) does deal make reference to
what is the critical halachic question, which is what is the situation for
>minors [katanim].(sic)"

>With all respect, the status of MINORS is not the critical question, the
status of WOMEN is the critical question.

To me, and my piece, the status of MINORS is indeed the critical question.
As indicated, I am perfectly happy for RBJF to make a halachic case against
partnership minyanim, and/or against women leading psukei d'zimra.  What I
personally am not happy about is him making a case against minors leading
psukei d'zimra.  The problem that I see at the moment is that the halachic
case he tries to build against women saying psukei d'zimra at the same time
possels the practice of katanim saying psukei d'zimra.

>One can accept any and all participation by male children and still not
allow women to lead. I have already suggested that the Sephardic poskim Ms.
>Luntz cites who allow children to lead in some places in the davening all
follow that view.

I don't think it would ever have crossed their mind that women would lead
the davening.  That is not the question.  Indeed, Rav Ovadiah, who agreed is
somewhat extreme on this even amongst Sephardi poskim, forbids women from
saying psukei d'zimra with Shem and Malchut so of course he would not have
them leading, they don't even say the full brochos. 

> This is true because the permissive argument for children is based on
Chinukh 

Now, this gets more to the heart of it.  It is indeed true that a logical
rationale to push for katanim to say psukei d'zimra is because of chinuch.
But indeed nobody says this.  It would be extremely interesting to see a
source which says - there is an issur on katanim doing psukei zimra (or
ma'ariv for that matter), but that is pushed aside because of chinuch.  Rav
Uzziel in the Mishpachat Uziel I quoted discusses other parts of the service
- namely birchas krias shema, tephila and musaf and concludes that a katan
cannot do them.  He then says that what is left for a katan who has reached
the age of chinuch to do is psukei d'zimra.  But nowhere does he say that
there is also an issur on a katan doing psukei d'zimra, that is then pushed
aside by the obligation of chinuch.

>which as I have shown repeatedly does not apply to women. I will have more
to say about this as we go but even at this point the post >has already
shown >a lack of credible argumentation.

No, chinuch doesn't apply to women - so if you can indeed show that the
practice of katanim saying psukei d'zimra is indeed assur but pushed aside
because of chinuch, then you would have a strong argument why there would be
a problem for women doing so.  But since my interest was not in women, it
was in katanim, I don't think this affects my argument one way or the other.

>Chana Luntz then goes on: "However it is somewhat astounding, to my mind,
that Rabbi Freundel brings this Meiri, Tosepheta and other sources, but does
>(sic) bring what I would consider the more authoritative halachic
literature on the subject. In my view, the key halachic source is rather
this Beis >Yosef Orech Chaim Siman 53 (letter 2): (sic)

>Once again this is simply egregious. First the source is letter 10 not
letter 2.

The lettering in the Beis Yosef is not exactly fixed in stone.  I was trying
to help people find it.

 >Second the literature she refers to including this source from Bet Yosef
is about children leading services not about women leading services and is
not >"the more authoritative halachic literature on the subject" unless one
changes the subject from women to children which seems to be her intent
here. 

Indeed it is, as I stated very clearly.  The Meiri, as all can agree, was
being brought regarding katanim leading services, and if you are going to
have a discussion about katanim leading services, the Meiri is not the place
to go, it is this Beis Yosef.  RJFB writes:

>Third I didn't bring the Meiri, R. Mendel Schapiro did on p. 7 of his
article and I am responding to that fact.

I can't explain why R' Mendel Schapiro on p 7 of his article brought the
Meiri and didn't bring the Beis Yosef.  This wasn't specifically a criticism
of RBJF, it was a criticism of anybody having a discussion about katanim and
davening (and the Meiri is only dealing with katanim, so any reference to
the Meiri is perforce dealing with katanim) only citing the Meiri, and not
the Beis Yosef.  Once you start discussing katanim, the thing to do is to
make reference to the major sources on the subject.  It is just bizarre to
have a back and forth on a Meiri, when you have a Beis Yosef quoting a
Rashba and a Ra'avid

> Fourth, the Tosefta which she consistently denigrates is discussed
repeatedly in the sources she cites and specifically in this text from the
Bet Yosef >where what the Tosefta says is cited from Tractate Chullin in the
paragraphs just above the one she cites.

I am not denigrating the Tosefta. The point is that there is a huge
(including rishonic) literature on this tosephta.  The halachic derech that
I am certainly familiar with does not encourage people to go and look at a
gemora, and certainly not a tosephta, and learn directly out of that gemora
or tosphta without reference to the later halachic literature.  Once Tosphos
and the Rambam and numbers of other rishonim have dealt with a gemora or
tosphta, that is what is key to any proper discussion as to its meaning, not
some derivation learnt out directly from it.  I thus found it very odd to
have a discussion about a tosephta without any even reference to such
rishonim, and that conclusions were learnt out of such tosephta without such
references.

>Therefore, since the Tosefta rejects women from any possibility of being
Chazzanim and R. Yosef Caro both here and in Shulkhan Arukh accepts the
>Tosefta's conclusion (that only beard growing individuals, or potential
beard growing individuals, can be chazzanim) and starts the discussion in
both >places from that point -- these sources can't possibly be justifying
women leading services.

The issue in question that I was dealing with is katanim.  Given the
tosephta, the gemora in Chullin and the Mishna in Megila the Beis Yosef,
Rashba and Shulchan Aruch deal with the question about katanim being
chazanim for ma'ariv (other than Shabbat) and appear to (grudgingly) allow
this - while generally ruling them out of being regular chazanim.  None of
them raise the question about katanim leading psukei d'zimra, but, as
mentioned, this is an extremely common Sephardi minhag, and the Sephardi
poskim appear clearly to allow katanim to lead psukei d'zimra, even without
having a beard filled out or indeed having reached majority.  Chinuch is
never mentioned as a reason even for doing ma'ariv on motzei Shabbat, and
certainly not for doing psukei d'zimra. 

As far as I can see, the next parts of the analysis are all objections to
the fact that we are dealing with katanim, not women.  There seems very
little point in responding piece by piece, because that indeed was what I
was discussing.  As I said the point of my piece was to argue against a
halachic analysis that while at the same time as arguing against what is
indeed a new innovation, that of partnership minyanim, argued for the
invalidity of common Sephardi custom.

>My article spends a great deal of time showing that Kabbalat Shabbat is a
chova (derived from minhag) and the fact that it is recited every week
>(essentially). Pesukei dezimrah is, from Talmudic times, a requirement. We
today treat Maariv as a chova in that we do not see Maariv as optional on
any >given night

This is where the analysis again starts to touch on katanim.  Because if
indeed kaballat Shabbat and psukei d'zimra are a chova, then there is a
problem with katanim doing them.  RBJF now says that there is an obligation
of chinuch on a katan which allows us to waive this chova.  But the problem
with this is that this only works according to the Rashba and those like him
who hold that a katan has his own personal chova due to chinuch which allows
him to exempt others.  According to the majority opinion that the obligation
of chinnuch falls on the father, then there is no allowance for a katan to
exempt somebody else's chova.  Therefore this analysis for allowing katanim
to say psukei d'zimra does not work (which is precisely what it seemed to me
that the piece said originally).  But that means that either you have to say
that the Sephardim are holding like the Rashba (but that is difficult to
say) or that there is in fact, according to Sephardi psak, no chova, or you
have to rule out the minhag.  I think very clearly the analysis that comes
through is that of no chova - the discomfort with ma'ariv being that it is
understood to be pretty close to chova, and the ruling out of Shachris and
musaf is precisely because it is chova (contrary to the Rashba, who would
seem to allow even this were it not for kovod hatzibbur).  

That it seems to me is the problem.  That the analysis was fundamentally to
show that psukei d'zimra is a chova (I agree because the target was women in
partnership minyanim) but in doing so, it was ruling common Sephardi
practice out of Orthodoxy.  That was my objection.

Now I gather, in an attempt to somehow allow the Sephardim back in a Rashba
like obligation of chinuch has materialised in order to push aside the chova
that is being postulated by this analysis.  But that just isn't how we hold.
There is extensive discussion on the extent to which chinuch impacts in
various ways, and the debates amongst the rishonim as to what sort of
obligation chinuch creates is well known.  It just doesn't work very well,
which seems to mean we are back with the Sephardim being out again.

This is getting over long already - and I have tried to keep it focused on
what I think is the key point (at least for me) denigration of common
Sephardi custom.  I did in my other piece make a couple of side references
to the women's issue, but I think it is probably better not to even mention
that here, because to me they were very much a side piece.  I have a
discussion on the nature of kovod hatzibbur in another piece which is
somewhere in the ether to Avodah - because it is also a fascinating topic,
but I want to keep this focused on this particular question.

>Barry Freundel

Regards

Chana

In thinking of one of the Hebrew words for moon LEVANAH
something occurred to me in looking at the spelling.
The first two letters (lamed, beis) spell heart.
the last two letters (nun, hay) can spell "noha" which can mean
lamentation or strong yearning.

We are a lunar oriented religion (calendar, rosh chodesh, very first mitzvah to the Jews "observance of the New Moon", etc.).
Therefore the connection I see is that just as the moon waxes and wanes, so, too, our hearts also wax and wane. 

Translation results for: NO'HA

(literary, rare) strong yearning, longing; following

(flowery) lamentation, bemoaning, wailing
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On 3/4/2013 9:18 AM, Chana Luntz wrote:
> What I objected to in the piece was that, while the article's target was
> partnership minyanim, the arguments being raised worked equally well to rule
> out a very common Sephardi minhag, that of katanim saying psukei d'zimra.
> And in fact that reality was acknowledged, ie there were various portions of
> the piece which suggested that the author knew that the arguments that were
> being raised to rule out partnership minyanim also ruled out katanim leading
> psukei d'zimra - and in fact discomfort was indicated about davening in
> minyanim where katanim did psukei d'zimra.
>    

And I think this was one of the major problems with your piece.  Just 
because a particular argument, bereft of context, could be used for 
something else does not mean it ever has, or should, or can be once 
context is included.  Your assumption that if the argument is applicable 
to women, it *must* be equally applicable to ketanim is invalid for the 
reason that you haven't established it.  You've merely asserted it.

The fact that the same poskim who permit certain roles for ketanim do 
*not* permit those same roles for women is evidence that they see a 
distinction, and R' Freundel's suggestion that chinuch is the logical one.

To reject that leaves 3 possibilities: (1) That the poskim who permit 
those roles for ketanim *would* permit them as well for women, (2) That 
the poskim who permit those roles for ketanim and do not permit them for 
women make this distinction for extra-halakhic reasons, and (3) That the 
poskim who permit those roles for ketanim and do not permit them for 
women make this distinction for halakhic reasons other than chinuch.

You have agreed that possibility (1) is not the case.  Possibility (3) 
is equivalent in every way that I can see to R' Freundel's chinuch 
explanation.  Which leaves possibility (2).  It seems to me that the 
only logical possibility left to explain your position is that you see 
poskim who make a distinction between the permissibility of these roles 
for ketanim and women as operating outside of the halakha.  And I have 
to object to you accusing those rabbis of making their decisions for 
extra-halakhic reasons.

Now... I don't actually think you are making that accusation.  I'm using 
that to illustrate what you've done.  As you did, I derived a logical 
implication that you were saying X, even though you've never actually 
said X.  And then I attributed that position to you.  Which is unfair, 
and less than honest of me.  But as God is my witness, I can't see how 
it's any different than you saying that R' Freundel is objecting to 
Sephardi minhag.  He has never said any such thing, to the best of my 
knowledge.  You are attributing that position to him based on your 
logical implication.  And that's wrong.  It's the very definition of a 
strawman argument.

Lisa

in light  of this  post ,
http://jewishworker.blogspot.co.il/2013/03/the-charedi-part
ies-are-threatening.html
 ,

is   lo tikom an issur on individuals only  or  also     corporate
entities,  political parties , religious mosdos  etc ?
can a threat of nekama  be used for financial/political/religious leverage?
  [ eg give tzedaka to this mossad or we won't do business with you /will
spread info about you]
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On Tue, Mar 05, 2013 at 07:38:28AM -0800, saul newman wrote:
: is   lo tikom an issur on individuals only  or  also     corporate
: entities,  political parties , religious mosdos  etc ?

As is my wont, the first thing I'll do in response to a question about
details in a mitzvah bein adam lachaveiro is to recommend the list of
mar'eh meqomos collected by Linas haTzedeq (Center for Jewish Values).
Not that it answers your question, just because I know of no comparable
way to get a handle on these mitzvos, and like to spread the word.

This time, at <http://www.jewishvalues.us/uploads/114_Nekama_UNetira.pdf>.

I'm not sure there is a nafqa mina to whether or not it does apply to
groups taking revenge on individuals, because every corporate entity
does things through the actions of individuals. Neqamah is unlike ribis
in a critical way. The issur of ribis can be defined as not applying
to a corporate entity collecting from an individual because ribis has a
recipient. The people doing the billing don't become the sole owners of
the interest. But WRT neqamah, the victim isn't giving the corporation
anything. I see no difference between a corporation taking revenge,
and an individual using his coporate position to mete out revenge. Thus,
I don't see how someone can initiate corporate revenge either way.

Similarly, the people who belong to a victim organization are themselves
individuals who are victims. Even if the revenge is taken monetarily,
it's their headache to budget the money.

: can a threat of nekama  be used for financial/political/religious leverage?
: [eg give tzedaka to this mossad or we won't do business with you /will
: spread info about you]

I'm not sure how this question begins, if neqamah applies to corporate
entities. Why would someone think that blackmail is a cause which
overrides neqamah? I obviously don't understand what you're saying.

-Micha

-- 
Micha Berger             "'When Adar enters, we increase our joy'
mi...@aishdas.org         'Joy is nothing but Torah.'
http://www.aishdas.org    'And whoever does more, he is praiseworthy.'"
Fax: (270) 514-1507                     - Rav Dovid Lifshitz zt"l

I'm not sure there is a nafqa mina to whether or not it does apply to
groups taking revenge on individuals, because every corporate entity
does things through the actions of individuals. .............
. I see no difference between a corporation taking revenge,
and an individual using his coporate position to mete out revenge.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Perhaps the question is do the corporate owners also bear the "liability? 
Take a simple case which may be parallel- 2 partners own the only butcher
shop in town and the one who mans the retail operation refuses to sell the
partnership's products to a particular individual. Would the silent
partner's  not insisting on selling to this individual	cause him to be
guilty of lo tikom because of his ownership interest?
KT
Joel Rich
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An article like this (by a descendant of the Dor R'vi'i
<http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Moshe_Shmuel_Glasner>) may provoke more
questions than it answers, but hey, hQbH granted us some grey cells
so that we should utilize them every once in a while (and that is no
coincidence :)) ...

http://www.jewishideasdaily.com/6078

(BCc: RDG)

On Wed, Mar 06, 2013 at 01:32:56PM -0500, MPoppers wrote:
: An article like this (by a descendant of the Dor R'vi'i
: <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Moshe_Shmuel_Glasner>) may provoke more
: questions than it answers, but hey, hQbH granted us some grey cells
: so that we should utilize them every once in a while (and that is no
: coincidence :)) ...

:> Not long ago in a casual conversation, I heard an Orthodox
:> acquaintance of mine say matter-of-factly that we all know there
:> are no coincidences. Although it was not the first time I had heard
:> this assertion, I was surprised to hear it stated with such dogmatic
:> assurance...

Well, this is the notion which R' Chaim Friedlander calls a chiddush
of the Gra's, and the LR attributes to the Besht, which we here tend
to refer to as Universal HP (Hashgachah Peratis). And even though that
pretty much rules out the chance of ever finding a rishon who believes
in universal HP, there is something nearly the same on a pragmatic level
which many rishonim did agree to -- HP universally across all events
that happen to people.

The Rambam says this is the position of Chazal (3:17) but then goes on to
redefine the idea in a way he doesn't attribute to them (3:18) by noting
that not all biological homosapiens are equally "people" in the sense of
beings with da'as. So I think this idea -- HP universal to humans --
is well established, if not the only shitah among rishonim.

...
: Just why a more or less innocuous saying has evolved into a principle
: of faith is surely an appropriate topic for sociological, perhaps social
: psychological, research, and is likely related, somehow or other, to
: the general rightward drift, both toward and within Orthodoxy...

I actually think it shares a lot with the drift in Western Philosophy
since Kant to Existentialism and beyond. There is now little focus on
trying to figure out the world as it is, and we instead talk about the
world as it is experienced.

So, when the rishonim talk about hashgachah they're having a metaphysical
discussion about how G-d relates to the universe. A statement of
emunah. Moderns have given up, since such a relationship is inherently
unknowable. Instead, it becomes a statement of bitachon; everything that
happens in my life it the result of my partnership with the Eibishter.
It's not even that we've shifted position, we've changed topic.

: Let me try to explain the point with an example from mathematics. I
: once heard a lecture on mathematics in in which the instructor,
: after pointing out an interesting relationship between two classes of
: numbers, asked his audience whether they thought the relationship was
: a coincidence. He then explained that mathematicians don't believe in
: coincidences, because, whenever they discover a relationship, they try
: to prove that the relationship they have found is logically necessary. A
: necessary relationship cannot be coincidental. Things simply could not
: have been otherwise.

Math is a poor example, because it only studies analytic truths --
things that are true because of their meaning. You need a discipline
that also studies analytic truths -- things that are true because they
correspond to evidence.

(Eg: "Black houses are dark" is an analytic truth; for things to be
otherwise would require a different definition of "black" or of "dark".
"Tom's house is dark" would be a synthetic truth.)

...
: So to believe that there are no coincidences, that nothing ever
: happens by chance, means that whatever happens had to happen exactly as it
: happened; if two events share a common characteristic, that characteristic
: is shared by necessity...

Or, that free will sits in the space between determinism and random. It
is possible to say that the only thing non-deterministic is intellect,
thereby allowing for Free Will and Providence and yet still have no room
for coincidence.

: In the religious context of this discussion, to say that there are no
: coincidences implies that everything that happens had to happen because
: God willed it to happen. But if this is so, then there is no event,
: including the actions of human beings, that was not willed by God...

Why does "there are no coincidences" exclude the actions of humans? We
too are non-random causes of synthetic truths.

: Now one might say that this problem, the conflict between the necessity
: that God's will be realized and human free will, exists regardless of
: whether or not one believes that coincidences are possible. There is,
: after all, an old and well-known conflict between God's knowledge of
: the future and the possibility of human free will, a conflict that
: has occupied the attention of Jewish as well as Gentile philosophers
: and theologians.

I don't understand the problem. G-d doesn't know the future. By which I
do not mean to assert that there is something G-d does not know. Rather,
that G-d has no "now" for there to be a "fore" in "foreknowledge". G-d
doesn't know *now* what I will do *tomorrow* even though He is Omniscient
because He has no "now".

Of course, this makes the concept of Divine Will incomprehensible. Human
Will precedes action, and we just eliminated any chance of using the
word "precedes". But this is far from the only incomprehensible thing
about G-d.

Tir'u baTov!
-Micha

-- 
Micha Berger             The trick is learning to be passionate in one's
mi...@aishdas.org        ideals, but compassionate to one's peers.
http://www.aishdas.org
Fax: (270) 514-1507


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