Avodah Mailing List

Volume 30: Number 184

Thu, 27 Dec 2012

• 1. Re: Mesorah (Meir Shinnar)
• 2. Re: Polygamy (Akiva Miller)
• 3. Re: Mesorah (Micha Berger)
• 4. Rambam?s Embrace of Miracles (h Lampel)

One last time

> On Wed, Dec 26, 2012 at 11:08:25PM -0500, Meir Shinnar wrote:
> : 1. In his halachic works - perush hamishnayot and moreh nevuchim -
> : the rambam is clear to uphold the value of chochma and kabel ha'emet
> : Mimi she'omro - that is a clear statement of the independent value of
> : truth, outside of tradition...
> RMB
> No one is questioning that. What we are questioning is whether the Rambam
> would say that Chazal's mesorah on what a pasuq means is any less "ha'emes
> mimi she'amro".
>
> Why are you assuming the Rambam would force the pasuq to bow to philosophy
> rather than say that since this conflict can only be illusory and I don't
> know the way out of the illusion, I yet don't know the answer?
>
> Several separate questions:
1) Yes, chazal's mesorah is of course also  ha'emes mimi she'amro - but the
issue being discussed was the claim that the rambam needed some statement
from hazal that a statement should be understood allegorically - and here
he states that there are other sources of truth..
2) The MTM techiyaht hametim agrees that when chazal are explicit that
something is to be understood as peshat - it is peshat.  What is left
unresolved is the question when the simple understanding (that may be
wrong...)  of hazal would suggest that they viewed it as pshat, and there
may even be specific statements by some that that it is pshat, but there
isn't the specific, explicit consensus ruling out allegory - does that mean
that chazal's mesorah rejects allegory, or does it mean that there is no
mesora about the issue (and we need to understand hazal's statements
differently).
3) This notion of stating I don't yet know the answer, and will leave it
unresolved -is very much part and parcel of modern ideology (clearly part
of RYBS's ideology) - but while the rambam was very aware of the limits of
human knowledge, in the MN and elsewhere,he DOES not apply that approach of
the limits of human knowledge to the tension between torah and philosophy,
and it seems clearly against the whole purpose and tenor of the MN. He
states that he will not explain everything, but it is clear that he thinks
that the the apparent contradictions can all be explained.

> : 2. The whole stated purpose of the moreh nevuchim is to show that
> : philosophic truth is compatible with Torah ( Leo Strauss is right
> : here in arguing that it isn't a book of philosophy per se). The way
> : to harmonize the two is by an allegorical understanding...
>
> This last sentence is your assertion, and the entire topic under debate.
>
> that is his hakdama to the MN....the debate is how far to take that
approach, but that that is his approach is pshat...

> BTW, about Straus's argument... The book is clearly "Scholastic". Its
> division into (1) defining terms, (2) theology, (3) man's mission in his
> world is typical for the Qalam. Except maybe for the length of cheileq
> 1. Whether that is "philosophical" or not depends more on how I define
> the word "philosophy" than what the Moreh actually is.
>
> It seems from the Rambam's promises, the Moreh is what became of his
> intent to describe the essence of Moshe's nevu'ah. I would say that's a
> blatantly religious goal, but I think the Rambam himself would object to
> saying the two topics differ. He holds that a navi is a super-philosopher,
> after all.
>
The rambam in hakdama to helek 2 specifically says that he will not discuss
many topics (in astronomy - which was viewed as part of philosophy)because
he assumes the student can read  the general literature - and much of the
rambam does asume that one has read the general philosophical literature..

> : However, both RZL and RMB argue that the rambam always brings rabbinic
> : proof that a text is to be understood allegorically, and furthermore,
> : this is not merely a rhetorical device, but reflects the rambam's belief
> : that such permission is necessary. I find such a claim extraordinary,
> : not sustainable by any one who actually read the MN...
>
> Except the Rambam himself makes it throughout the Moreh. I already
> listed some places in cheileq 2: peraqim 5, 11, 25 (although we argue
> about how to read it), 26, 27, 28, 41 and 67.
>
Stating that hazal also had the same approach is not the same as requiring
such permission...

> I will address cheileq 1 further down, but a preview: he doesn't consider
> cheileq 1 to be discussing allegory.
>
> I find that very hard to ignore. The Rambam doesn't just happen to quote
> Chazal, he tells you the philosophical theory is acceptable /because/
> it is "what the prophets and our Sages say on this point" (ch 27).
>
Not because....
In chapter 27,he says that haiyun (rational thought) is inconclusive about
whether the world will be destroyed, and all that is left is what  the
prophets and sages say on this point..
how is this prove your point? it seems to support my point..

> Given that it repeatedly comes up in the Moreh, I really don't see how
> one can say the reverse -- that someone who actually read the MN could
> dismiss the claim that the Rambam didn't consider permission from Chazal
> necessary.
>
> Which wasn't actually my claim anyway... I was saying that the Rambam
> wouldn't say a pasuq Chazal took literally was allegorical. I didn't
> actually assert anything about pesuqim Chazal don't address one way
> or the other.
>
>
> ...
> : Introduction Page 6 - one intent is to explain meshalim that seem to the
> : fool as pshat - nowhere is there any mention of requiring rabbinic
> consent
>
> Proof from absence? IOW, how do you know he isn't invoking Chazal to know
> that the fool is being foolish?
>
No, but that one doesn't need hazal to know when one is foolish.  Again, he
is describing his methodology, and precedent from hazal is not part of it.
Yes, there is fundamental belief that hazal agreed with him - but that is a
far cry from your claim..


> As you yourself note, R' Yosef el-Qafih ("Kapach") assumes that he can
> find unstated sources in Chazal for pretty much everything -- if not
> actually everything -- in the Moreh. From the mere fact that he does
> so.
>
> : P 12 - asking that one not explain to another any of the explanations,
> : except those that are already found in his predecessors - therefore
> : explicit many of his explanations are not found in his predecessors...
>
> But not necessarily contrary to those ancestors. Or even that such
> elaborations are taking new things allegorically.
>
sigh.... the issue is not contradiction - but new developments -and as most
of the MN is about such allegorical explanations, what is he talking about??

>
> : Ch 1 - on tselem and demut - and that demut is an allegorical use based
> on man's intellectual comprehension - no statement of hazal brought. ( as
> this is the beginning of mn, and relates to the ikkar emuna of eyn lo guf,
> one would have even expected him to Marshall rabbinic support here - but
> nothing)
>
> One should note that the Rambam tells us that in cheileq 1 he is defining
> terms, not finding allegories. If you prefer, defining idioms -- but rarely
> does he actually say they are so. In pereq 1, he tells you he is setting
> out "al bi'ur inyan tzelem udemus".
>
> I have no reason to believe the Rambam didn't assume Chazal knew that
> tzelem doesn't mean demus. After all, he didn't think they were f

But he does invoke R' Yishma'el's diberah Torah belashon benei adam to
> justify the notion that Hashem wrote in Human idiom, and not in some
> hyper-literal communication mode like a programming language.
>
> Also, in 1:1 the Moreh refers you to his proof of incorporeality at
> the beginning of cheileq 2 -- where he /does/ invoke that it's the
> idea of "our prophets and sages" and not his own.
>
> Either way, I would take cheileq 1 off the table, except if the Rambam
> says he is allegorizing rather than defining leshon benei adam.
>
> he specifically says in all the perakim that at least some of the issues
are meshalim .  His whole understanding of gan eden and etz hada'at tov
vara as an allegory for man's descent to use of imagination over reason is
not an allegory?

> : How much more proof? Every chapter?
>
> I'm not sure what this rhetorical device is about. When I cited a list
> of sources, you didn't seem impressed. Or even address them.
>
> Because none of the sources you listed were relevant... as the purpose of
the moreh is to show that torah is not in disagreement with emet - he will
frequently show that hazal held as he did....none of them are
methodological or ideological - all his methodological and ideological
statements are precisely about the freedom of interpretation given the need.

> : 3) now the rambam realizes there potential incompatibilities between
> : philosophy and torah eg, issue of creation - in rambam's famous
> : statement that if necessary he could reinterprete creation, precisely
> : what he meant may be debated - but the presence or absence of rabbinic
> :  midrashim is not a factor....
>
> Except in 2:26, where he tells you he is being consistent with the
> figurative speech our Sages use in order to hide the true meaning
> of Maaseh Bereishis.
>
> Again, finding support in hazal is not the  same as requiring such support

> : 4) the rambam also complains in several places of those who abandon
> : what has been proven by reason to follow midrashim...
>
> Because he holds that Medrashim en masse were never intended to be
> historical claims. And about that too he cites Chazal as saying so
> themselves. But we're talking about pesuqim.
>
But the statement is about using midrashim to understand psukim in a way
that is against reason - rather than understanding them lfiguratively..

>
> : 5. ma'amar techiyat hametim was written specifically about one potential
> : conflict - physical resurrection - which made no philosophic sense,
> : and the rambam was accused of Kefira and denying it. Therefore, the
> : entire book is, in a sense, about the limits of harmonization...
>
> Which you are denying exist! That anything that doesn't fit should be
> harmonized by declaring the Torah allegorical!
>
> see below..

> You pick out one line that if taken out of context would defeat what you
> say is /the/ -- and I would agree is at least "a" -- purpose of the work,
> and use it to prove your point?
>
> ...
> : RZL ignores the whole context and polemic, and focuses that the rambam
> : does use statements of hazal...
>
> And that the Rambam in MThM too says he must. Which, after all, is
> the point of the work. To show that not every claim of TSBP can bow to
> philosophical argument.
>
> : Again, I find rzl's reading of ma'amar techiyat hametim bizarre.
>
> I am saying the same, in reverse.
>
> : The rambam's model of philosophic truth is not of much interest to us,
> : and the issues he faced are not ours ( eg, few today would equate an
> : eternal world with a mechanistic world) - but the model of resolution
> : remains a problem - and a beacon to those of us with true emunah
>
> True emunah is to admit "I don't know" when facing a problem in
> something you believe in. Not whittling down your beliefs by saying you
> misunderstood an allegory.
>
> A very modern definition of emunah, but not one the rambam would have been
comfortable with...(remember according to R Kafih the rambam does not say
the mitzvah is emunah, but da'at...)

> As the Rambam does with hakol tzafui vehareshus nesunah.
>
> no... there is an intrinsic limitation of human reason to understand....

>
> But I realize I don't understand your thesis. How do you combine:
> : 2. The whole stated purpose of the moreh nevuchim is to show that
> : philosophic truth is compatible with Torah ( Leo Strauss is right
> : here in arguing that it isn't a book of philosophy per se). The way
> : to harmonize the two is by an allegorical understanding...
>
> and:
> : 5. ma'amar techiyat hametim was written specifically about one potential
> : conflict - physical resurrection - which made no philosophic sense,
> : and the rambam was accused of Kefira and denying it. Therefore, the
> : entire book is, in a sense, about the limits of harmonization...
>
> without asserting that there are limits to allegorization. That one can't
> simply take /any/ philosophical proof and allegorize the TSBP into a new
> reinterpretation to fit?
>
As I have stated

I hold that the rambam permitted allegory unless there was a very specific
issur from hazal - which was specific, clearly authoritative ( eg, could
not be held to be a rejected opinion ( da'at yachid)), and explicitly held
for the plain pshat as normative.

and
Some examples can't be reinterpreted - ma'amar techiyat hametim was
composed because the rambam was attacked that he did not believe in
physical techiyat hametim, as it made little sense in his valuatio of the
body - and he responded that this one such example - where clearly hazal
were clearly insistent on physical techiyat hametim, and could not be
reinterpreted.

I am not sure with whom Micha is arguing with, just as I don't see any
relationship between his position and the rambam's.

In one passage, the rambam says that no matter how clear one is, he will be
misunderstood - and brings that the Christians read the shma as proof of
the Trinity.  I think that there is more proof of the Trinity  in the shma
than there isfor  RZL's and RMB's position in the rambam..

Meir Shinnar
-------------- next part --------------
An HTML attachment was scrubbed...
URL: <http://lists.aishdas.org/pipermail/avod
ah-aishdas.org/attachments/20121227/efe227cf/attachment-0001.htm>

R' Zev Sero wrote:
> What do you mean, the Torah doesn't tell us how to define
> marriage?

R"n Toby Katz wrote:
> Although the Torah's definition of marriage is "one man and
> one woman" ...

Can someone please show me where the Torah defines marriage? Or where it even uses such a word?

As I see it, the Torah has no word or reference to any institution similar
to what we know as "marriage". It does (via Torah Sheb'al Peh) refer to
acts which we call Kiddushin and Nisuin, which are one-time acts which
create a set of obligations and prohibitions which we outlined nicely by R'
Micha Berger in this thread. But I don't see "marriage" in here anywhere.
(Even for Benei Noach, there is still a "kicha" which creates these
prohibitions, even if there are little or no ritual acts accompanying it.)

Language shapes our thoughts, and we must be very careful not to be swayed
by the idiom and the rhetoric. I have said this before, but it is
particularly relevant now: I'm not convinced that the Torah even has a word
for "wife".

Our minds are trained to translate "ishto" as "his wife", but I maintain
that his could just as easily mean "his woman". In fact, I would mandate
such a translation for cases where Tanach speaks of a non-legal marriage.
For example, for Ezra to tell the people to send away their wives is
ludicrous - it presupposes that they were indeed "wives"! Rather, he told
them to send away their women, who they were aligned with in a social
sense, but not married to in a halachic sense.

R' Zev Sero wrote:
> I'm saying it's *the* definition of the concept of marriage
> that Hashem created and told Adam and Chava about, and that
> they passed on to their descendants.
and:
> The definition that Adam and Chava knew, and that Noach and
> his family knew, ...

I was going to ask where we see that in the pesukim, but instead I must
thank R' Micha for quoting Hilkhos Melakhim 9:5,7-8. But even so, it seems
to me that everything there concerns the status of the man and the status
of the woman. To speak of an institution called "marriage" introduces
distracting rhetoric and - in my opinion - derails the conversation.


____________________________________________________________
Woman is 57 But Looks 27
Mom publishes simple facelift trick that angered doctors...
http://thirdpartyoffers.juno.com/TGL3131/50dc497c8a857497c5258st04vuc

On Thu, Dec 27, 2012 at 08:57:08AM -0500, Meir Shinnar wrote:
: 1) Yes, chazal's mesorah is of course also  ha'emes mimi she'amro - but the
: issue being discussed was the claim that the rambam needed some statement
: from hazal that a statement should be understood allegorically - and here
: he states that there are other sources of truth..

Again... This is RZL's position. I was arguing that the Rambam would not
contradict Chazal about the literalness of a pasuq. The difference being
cases where Chazal are silent on the topic.

But your argument doesn't mean that those "other sources of truth"
legitimize new understandings of Torah.

: 2) The MTM techiyaht hametim agrees that when chazal are explicit that
: something is to be understood as peshat - it is peshat...

So then how do you say the Rambam is finding new interpretations that
disagree with Chazal's through the use of allegory?

Are we entirely arguing over whether Chazal must be explicit, or whether
the Rambam held his interpretations were always consist with Chazal even
on the implicit level?


: 3) This notion of stating I don't yet know the answer, and will leave it
: unresolved -is very much part and parcel of modern ideology (clearly part
: of RYBS's ideology) - but while the rambam was very aware of the limits of
: human knowledge, in the MN and elsewhere,he DOES not apply that approach of
: the limits of human knowledge to the tension between torah and philosophy,
: and it seems clearly against the whole purpose and tenor of the MN. He
: states that he will not explain everything, but it is clear that he thinks
: that the the apparent contradictions can all be explained.

But not that he can explain them.

RAFolger, in a private email, helped me reach a very different
articulation of my position that may be helpful.

I do not argue with your belief that the Rambam did in fact reinterpret
pesuqim or other ideas in a way that was inconsistent with all prior
understandings of the topic.

I argue with the belief that the Rambam realized he was doing so, and
thought it was okay to do so. This is why in this thread I repeatedly
spoke about what the Rambam thought he was doing -- eg WRT basing his
understanding of parashas Vayeira on a statement from R' Chiya Rubba.

And further, I do not believe that "anyone" we accept as representing
the mesorah thought it was okay to *re*interpret things in a manner
different than established TSBP. In fact, the question of whether the
Rambam did indeed create new interpretations inconsistent with Chazal
is the question of whether we reject the Rambam on matters of aggadita.

Thus, the Gra and RSRH (to take two examples who believed in qabalas
ha'emes mimi she'amro) believed that the Rambam was reintepreting and that
is why they reject the Moreh and the first chapters of Yesodei haTorah!

But in any case, the Rambam himself didn't think his interpretations
were reinterpretations, and repeatedly says so.

:> : 2. The whole stated purpose of the moreh nevuchim is to show that
:> : philosophic truth is compatible with Torah ( Leo Strauss is right
:> : here in arguing that it isn't a book of philosophy per se). The way
:> : to harmonize the two is by an allegorical understanding...

: > This last sentence is your assertion, and the entire topic under debate.

: that is his hakdama to the MN....the debate is how far to take that
: approach, but that that is his approach is pshat...

Where are the words "allegorical understanding"? I don't think the last
sentence it there.

...
:> Except the Rambam himself makes it throughout the Moreh. I already
:> listed some places in cheileq 2: peraqim 5, 11, 25 (although we argue
:> about how to read it), 26, 27, 28, 41 and 67.

: Stating that hazal also had the same approach is not the same as requiring
: such permission...

But when he says that the approach is acceptable because Chazal had the
same approach, it is.

And in some cases, eg the two sides of the eternity of the universe
(Creation and the ultimate future -- 2:25-27) he actually reinterprets
the philosophy by poking holes in it, rather than contradicting Chazal
by turning their words into allegories the Rambam didn't believe they
intended.

Tir'u baTov!
-Micha

-- 
Micha Berger             Strength does not come from winning. Your
mi...@aishdas.org        struggles develop your strength When you go
http://www.aishdas.org   through hardship and decide not to surrender,
Fax: (270) 514-1507      that is strength.        - Arnold Schwarzenegger

1. RMS (Mon, 17 Dec 2012) claims regarding the Rambam's stand on miracles:

...what is quite clear that this priniciple is extended /in dealing with 
any issue of a miracle- one does one's best to explain it away - unless 
there is such a clear and irrevocable tradition that it is literal (not 
merely a lack of a tradition of allegory)./(the case of the mabul would 
clearly be here - with the question of what is meant by specifically 
explained and impossible to explain it otherwise, as the mabul seems to 
violate olam keminhago noheg...).

I will deal with the paragraph RMS repeatedly cites to support this view 
that the Rambam holds that ??in dealing with any issue of a miracle?one 
does one?s best to explain it away...?? and will show it is based on an 
incorrect translation. But we need only look a little further on in the 
Maamar Techias HaMeisim (Sheilat p. 367, lines 9-18) to see very clearly 
that RMS? notion is the exact opposite (not only of Ibn Tibbon?s stand, 
as seen the work RMS has graciously called our attention to, but even 
more openly) of the Rambam?s stand. This is what the Rambam say,s 
speaking about miracles in general and the miracle of techias ha-maiesim 
in particular*:

We have already explained in Moreh Nevuchim, when speaking of the world 
being created [rather than having an eternal past], that the belief in 
Creation necessarily entails the possibility of all miracles. The 
resurrection of the dead will therefore be possible as well. /And 
everything that is possible, when a prophet reports it?we will believe 
it, and we have no need to interpret it, and we do not take it out of 
peshuto./*

Any miracle reported by a prophet.

We will believe it. (And it is not in violation of ''olom k'minhago 
holeich'')

There is no need to allegorize it.

I think this is enough to show that the Rambam held the precise opposite 
of the notion that ??in dealing with any issue of a miracle- one does 
one's best to explain it away.?? But for the sake of savoring the 
Rambam?s words, let?s go on:

True, we need to interpret something whose peshuto is an impossibility, 
such as [pesukim whose literal meaning attributes] physicality to 
Hashem. But that which is possible?stands as it is. ...

This is why the Rambam absolutely does /not/ explain away miracles, and 
accepts, on the basis of the peshat of the pesukim alone (as long as it 
does not contradict fundamental principles), all the miracles written 
about by Moses and all the other prophets, including the miracles that 
proved to Israel and Pharoah that Moses was Hashem?s prophet, the 
Egyptian plagues, the splitting of the sea, and so on.

2. So, what of the paragraph RSM cites to prove that Rambam held that 
??/in dealing with any issue of a miracle- one does one's best to 
explain it away - unless there is such a clear and irrevocable tradition 
that it is literal (not merely a lack of a tradition of allegory)./?? Is 
the Rambam contradicting himself? Well, let?s investigate RSM?s translation:

And our efforts our to gather between the torah and the reasonable,

and will manage all things according to a possible natural order,

except /what is specifically explained that it is a miracle (mofet)/

and it is impossible to explain it otherwise, then we will need to say

that it is a miracle

The translation, ??except what is specifically explained that it is a 
miracle (mofet)?? leads one to one wonder who it is that needs to do the 
specific explaining? Is it Chazal that must specifically insist that 
something was a miracle, and otherwise one is free to allegorize the 
miracle away?

Well, the question is really irrelevant, because the translation is 
wrong. The words RSM translates as ??what is /specifically explained/ 
that it is a miracle (mofet),?? are actually, ellah mah /sheh-hiss-ba-er 
bo/ she-hu mofes. ??/Sheh-hiss-ba-er/ bo?? translates, ??what is itself 
clear.??I.e., the peshat of the posuk indicates it is depicting a 
miracle. Just as Rambam says in the later paragraph I cited above.

And, as the Rambam says there, /that/ is what ??makes it impossible to 
(legitimately) explain it otherwise?? (??v?lo yi-tachen l?faresh 
klall??). The Rambam?s objection is to inventing the occurrence of 
miracles where the pesukim?s peshat, or Chazal (for example regarding , 
do not warrant it.

(This also eliminates objections that one would otherwise raise:

(a) If the impossibility of allegorizing the miracles is based upon some 
statements by Chazal that explicitly point out that particular pesukim 
are really, really talking about miracles?why does the Rambam explicitly 
accept that pesukim that enjoy no such special treatment are describing 
miracles (although that would of course be sufficient grounds, as well.) 
What miracles enjoy less sponsorship by Chazal, that the Rambam 
thereupon discounts versus other miracles that enjoy more 
Chazal-sponsorship?

(b) It is never absolutely impossible to invent an allegorical meaning 
for any posuk. It can and has been done with virtually all pesukim by 
Allegorists for centuries.

So, in response to RSM?s accusation that,

RZL;s position has far more to do with current haredi

sensibilities than with the rambam (one remembers the rambam's parable of

the palace and the role of talmudic scholars)

I will point out that the Rambam?s parable does not license distorting 
his words and reading into them notions that he explicitly disparages. 
The fact that some people interpreted the Rambam to mean the opposite of 
what he held is a phenomenon the Rambam himself experienced and 
complained about in the very Ma?amar Techias HaMeisim under discussion. 
Unfortunately, it haunts us to this day.

Zvi Lampel

*See (Shiat p. 366, lines 9-20):

There is no difference between it saying, ??If a man dies, shall he 
live?!? and ?Shall we bring out water from the rock?!??for this would be 
not natural, but impossible; yet the waters did indeed go out of the 
rock through a miracle! ...And there is no difference between it saying, 
??Shall a Cushite change his skin?!?? and it saying, ??Shall the dead 
perform a wonder?!???yet the hand [of Moses] did indeed turn a [leprous] 
white in color! So if someone would say it is impossible for a lifeless 
object to propel itself in movement, he would be saying the truth 
according to what is in [the realm of] nature; but this statement would 
not be denying the changing of ther staff to a serpent, since that was a 
miracle. It is likewise with all the pesukim you may find in Tanach that 
treat as far-fetched the notion of the dead returning to life. That is 
speaking in the realm of what is in nature. But that does not contradict 
their return to life when Hashem so wills it....You need not interpret 
any of those pesukim with those despicable interpretations, too 
far-fetched to accept, which one who denies the Resurrection uses to 
buttress his stand.

Zvi Lampel


-------------- next part --------------
An HTML attachment was scrubbed...
URL: <http://lists.aishdas.org/pipermail/avodah-ai
shdas.org/attachments/20121227/3dfeef97/attachment.htm>

------------------------------


Avodah mailing list
Avo...@lists.aishdas.org
http://www.aishdas.org/avodah
http://lists.aishdas.org/listinfo.cgi/avodah-aishdas.org


End of Avodah Digest, Vol 30, Issue 184
***************************************

Send Avodah mailing list submissions to
	avodah@lists.aishdas.org

To subscribe or unsubscribe via the World Wide Web, visit
	http://lists.aishdas.org/listinfo.cgi/avodah-aishdas.org
or, via email, send a message with subject or body 'help' to
	avodah-request@lists.aishdas.org

You can reach the person managing the list at
	avodah-owner@lists.aishdas.org

When replying, please edit your Subject line so it is more specific
than "Re: Contents of Avodah digest..."


A list of common acronyms is available at at
        http://www.aishdas.org/avodah/acronyms.cgi
(They are also visible in the web archive copy of each digest.)