Avodah Mailing List

Volume 30: Number 165

Thu, 06 Dec 2012

• 1. Re: Is there a Reshus Harabim D'oraysa nowadays? (Zev Sero)
• 2. Re: Is there a Reshus Harabim D'oraysa nowadays? (Akiva Miller)
• 3. On the origins of Eruvin (YG)
• 4. Re: Is there a Reshus Harabim D'oraysa nowadays? (Micha Berger)
• 5. Re: re Goebekli Tepe (Micha Berger)
• 6. Re: Is there a Reshus Harabim D'oraysa nowadays? (Zev Sero)
• 7. Re: Goebekli Tepe (martin brody)
• 8. Re: Goebekli Tepe (T6...@aishdas.com)
• 9. Beit Hillel - Rules to be followed when eating at secular person's home (Prof. Levine)
• 10. Re: Beit Hillel - Rules to be followed when eating at secular person's home (Ben Waxman)
• 11. Re: re Goebekli Tepe (Meir Shinnar)
• 12. Re: re Goebekli Tepe (Zev Sero)
• 13. Re: re Goebekli Tepe (Micha Berger)

On 5/12/2012 1:26 PM, Micha Berger wrote:
> Shelomo haMelekh (and his court) enacted eiruvin and netilas
> yadayim. (Eiruvin 21b) This is usually understood not as the creation
> of a new loophole in a pre-existing gezeira of karmelis, although it is
> arguable that Shelomo's court was gadol bechokhmah uveminyan than any
> earlier one. Rather, the usual explanation is that the original gezeira
> was against carrying in a karmelis that doesn't have an eruv or shituf
> mevo'os, and was enacted in the days of Shelomo haMelekh.

No, Shlomo's gezera was against carrying in a *shared Reshus Hayachid*
without an eruv.  It had nothing to do with karmelis.

-- 
Zev Sero        "Natural resources are not finite in any meaningful
z...@sero.name    economic sense, mind-boggling though this assertion
                  may be. The stocks of them are not fixed but rather
                 are expanding through human ingenuity."
                                            - Julian Simon

R' Zev Sero wrote:

> You're trying to have your cake and eat it.  The view that
> 600K is a requirement for RHR is based on a girsa in which
> Ulla explicitly says that there is no such thing as a RHR in
> Bavel (whether this means the city or the country is another
> question).  And it's expressed by most of its exponents as a
> statement that there is no such thing as a RHR "nowadays". 

There are many poskim who say, "There is no RHR nowadays." Are you
suggesting that they are NOT referring to population patterns or road
construction styles, but rather they're referring to "nowadays when we hold
that 600K is a requirement"?

I've always wondered this, but I've never seen anyone suggest it. In my
experience, I've never seen an explanation of *WHY* there's no RHR
nowadays; they all seem to take it as axiomatic.

Akiva Miller
____________________________________________________________
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>
> I noticed a lot of research on this topic on Prof. Schiffmans' blog.


 http://lawrenceschiffman.com/blog/
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On Wed, Dec 05, 2012 at 07:22:28PM +0000, Akiva Miller wrote:
:> You're trying to have your cake and eat it.  The view that
:> 600K is a requirement for RHR is based on a girsa in which
:> Ulla explicitly says that there is no such thing as a RHR in
:> Bavel (whether this means the city or the country is another
:> question).  And it's expressed by most of its exponents as a
:> statement that there is no such thing as a RHR "nowadays". 

: There are many poskim who say, "There is no RHR nowadays." Are you
: suggesting that they are NOT referring to population patterns or road
: construction styles, but rather they're referring to "nowadays when we
: hold that 600K is a requirement"?

I think Zev is saying -- and if not I want to say it -- that either you
believe we hold like the lost quote from Ulla and (1) RHR requires 600k,
and (2) it's rare enough to have no examples in Bavel during Ulla's
lifetime (when most Jews were in Bavel).

Or do not believe the authenticity of the quote or that we hold like
Ulla. In which case RHR doesn't require 600k people and it's not
necessarily rare.

But you can't use current rarity as proof against 600k, since no one
claims the deOraisa requires 600k and that RHR is common.

Now you can ask why, according to Ulla, these gezeiros were made to
protect hotza'ah deOraisa. But that's different than questioning whether
the rishonim got it right.

Tir'u baTov!
-Micha

-- 
Micha Berger             You want to know how to paint a perfect
mi...@aishdas.org        painting?  It's easy.
http://www.aishdas.org   Make yourself perfect and then just paint
Fax: (270) 514-1507      naturally.              -Robert Pirsig

Yesterday, at 2:12pm EST, I wrote:
: In my own life, I am an absolutist on mesorah. Not on literalism or
: maximalism, but on not questioning historical claims made in the
: mesorah on the basis of anything but questions raised by studying
: the mesorah. Do chazal or rishonim question the idea or raise
: alternatives? Do they reach conclusions in their study of other statements
: that compellingly force me to say that not everything could be as it
: seems with the historical claim in question?

: But if there is "just" a scientific problem I would prefer to live with
: the question, confident that an answer exists even if I don't know what
: it is...

A couple of replies to questions asked off-list that I think I need to
clear up in order to for that post to make sence.

1- Aggadic narratives in general were not made to be historical claims.
There are enough sources to this; in fact, we as a group got together
and gathered citations.

So, the above rule would not include accepting as historical any story
in the gemara or the medrash that contradicts science -- because no such
story must be accepted as history.

Here we're talking about peshat in a pasuq and a hashkafic matter, either
of which I would distringuish from the (mashal side of) a medrashic story.

2- You might notice a crossover between what I said here and what I said
I am comfortable with on issues like the evolution of the kezayis or the
definitions of sheqiah and tzeis hakokhavim. There too I expect halakhah
to ignore historical research that contradicts the results of halachic
process.

3- I was asked for my source. My understanding of the Moreh 2:25 gets
debated here every year or two over the past decade and change. (I CC-ed
some of the interested parties from over the years.)

The Rambam contrasts the case of the eternity of matter, which is part of
orthodox Aristotilianism and implies that the universe had no beginning,
with anthropomorphications of G-d, where he uses the theological argument
to concluded that none of them are meant literally -- neither in Tanakh
nor when these idioms are used by Chazal. Why does philosophy bow to
Torah in one case, but the interpretation of Torah compelled by the
philosphy in the other?

He actually gives two distinctions, and for some reason people looking
for liberal interpretations tend to only discuss the first one.

From the Moreh 2:25 (from Friedlander's translation
<http://www.sacred-texts.com/jud/gfp/gfp112.htm>):

    WE do not reject the Eternity of the Universe, because certain
    passages in Scripture confirm the Creation; for such passages are not
    more numerous than those in which God is represented as a corporeal
    being; nor is it impossible or difficult to find for them a suitable
    interpretation. We might have explained them in the same manner as
    we did in respect to the Incorporeality of God. We should perhaps
    have had an easier task in showing that the Scriptural passages
    referred to are in harmony with the theory of the Eternity of the
    Universe if we accepted the latter, than we had in explaining the
    anthropomorphisms in the Bible when we rejected the idea that God is
    corporeal. For two reasons, however, we have not done so, and have
    not accepted the Eternity of the Universe.

    First, the Incorporeality of God has been demonstrated by proof:
    those passages in the Bible, which in their literal sense contain
    statements that can be refuted by proof, must and can be interpreted
    otherwise. But the Eternity of the Universe has not been proved; a
    mere argument in favour of a certain theory is not sufficient reason
    for rejecting the literal meaning of a Biblical text, and explaining
    it figuratively, when the opposite theory can be supported by an
    equally good argument.

    Secondly, our belief in the Incorporeality of God is not contrary
    to any of the fundamental principles of our religion: it is not
    contrary to the words of any prophet. Only ignorant people believe
    that it is contrary to the teaching of Scripture: but we have shown
    that this is not the case: on the contrary, Scripture teaches the
    Incorporeality of God. If we were to accept the Eternity of the
    Universe as taught by Aristotle, that everything in the Universe is
    the result of fixed laws, that Nature does not change, and that there
    is nothing supernatural, we should necessarily be in opposition to
    the foundation of our religion, we should disbelieve all miracles
    and signs, and certainly reject all hopes and fears derived from
    Scripture, unless the miracles are also explained figuratively.


IOW:
1- Eternity wasn't proven conclusively, and
2- it contradicts the Torah.

The Rambam did not believe that it was possible to have a situation
where some idea is (1) proven conclusively and yet still (2) it
contradicts the Torah. Asking what the Rambam would tell us to do
if it did occur is like "But if you did have a brother, would he like
noodles?"

The question arose whether I was summarizing the Rambam's "secondly"
correctly. What does he mean to exclude?

a- "... is not contrary to any of the fundamental principles of our
    religion" -- reinterpretation is possible whenever it is is consistent
    with the iqarei emunah.

b- "it is not contrary to the words of any prophet" -- reinterpretation
   is only possible when it doesn't contradict prophecy.

c- "Only ignorant people believe that it is contrary to the teaching
   of Scripture" -- reinterpretation is okay whenever it is consistent
   with the Torah as understood by the non-ignorant. IOW, consistent
   with TSBP.

If we understand (b) to refer to prophecy as explained through the mesorah
of TSBP, then (b) and (c) agree. And in fact that is the position I took
for granted when I summarized the "secondly" as "it contradicts the Torah."

And if not, the Rambam is only requiring internal consistency within
TSBP and [philosophical] reason. Qaraism -- reason trumps TSBP.

But is my assumption justified? Or is the essence of the Rambam's taking
"Yad H'" idiomatically is okay is because it is consistent with the
iqarim of our faith, rather than TSBP as a whole?

Well, here are some quoted from other parts of Moreh cheileq 2. You'll
notice that the Rambam repeatedly requires consistency with "our sages".
I.e. "not contrary to the words of any prophet" as see through the
eyes of baalei mesorah in particular.

Pereq 5:
    The opinion of Aristotle, that the spheres are capable of
    comprehension and conception, is in accordance with the words of
    our prophets and our theologians or Sages.

Pereq 11 on metaphysics and ontology:
    In the same manner the creative act of the Almighty in giving
    existence to pure Intelligences endows the first of them with
    the power of giving existence to another, and so on, down to the
    Active Intellect...

    We have already mentioned that these theories are not opposed to
    anything taught by our Prophets or by our Sages....

(This is the bit I call Maimonidian Qabbalah on my blog
<http://www.aishdas.org/asp/category/qabbalah>, based heavily on
the Gra's shitah in Qabbalah as explained in Nefesh haChaim the Leshem's
Kelalim.)

When it comes to the other end of eternity, ch 27:
    There remains only the question as to what the prophets and our
    Sages say on this point; whether they affirm that the world will
    certainly come to an end, or not.

But in terms of this particular instance of philosophy vs peshat, see
the very next chapter (#26):
    ... But let us premise two general observations.

    First, the account given in Scripture of the Creation is not, as is
    generally believed, intended to be in all its parts literal. For if
    this were the case, wise men would not have kept its explanation
    secret, and our Sages would not have employed figurative speech
    [in treating of the Creation] in order to hide its true meaning,
    nor would they have objected to discuss it in the presence of the
    common people. The literal meaning of the words might lead us to
    conceive corrupt ideas and to form false opinions about God, or even
    entirely to abandon and reject the principles of our Faith. ...

Allegorization of maaseh bereishis is fine because Chazal did so, and
being literal would lead to kefirah.

    Secondly, the prophets employ homonymous terms and use words which
    are not meant to be understood in their ordinary signification, but
    are only used because of some other meaning which they admit, e.g.,
    "a rod of an almond-tree (shaked)," because of the words which follow,
    "for I will hasten (shaked)" (Jer. i. 11, 12), as will be shown in
    the chapter on Prophecy....

Ch. 28:
    MANY of our coreligionists thought that King Solomon believed in
    the Eternity of the Universe. This is very strange. How can we
    suppose that any one that adheres to the Law of Moses, our Teacher,
    should accept that theory? if we were to assume that Solomon has on
    this point, God forbid, deviated from the Law of Moses, the question
    would be asked, Why did most of the Prophets and of the Sages accept
    it of him?

Ch 41-42 is where the Rambam argues that every story involving mal'akhim
is prophetic. He cites R' Chiya Rabba in Bereishis Rabba and other
maamarei chazal as justification /against/ the literal reading of most
of the persuqim (written by nevi'im).

Last, in ch. 67 he similarly points out that one shouldn't take hyperbole
in Tanakh too literally. Again, citing chazal.


Tangent, but since I got this far, I want to be complete:

As for the Rambam's first criterion, it's unclear when he would consider
scientific theory as solid as he did indeed consider a proven Natural
Philosophical conclusion, and when it would not. Natural Philosophy proof
(when valid) is closer to logical proof than experiment. And science is
built on the notion of progressively getting closer to the truth. The
Rambam dealt with a set of knowledge that was accepted as authoritative
for over 1500 years.

R' Aryeh Kaplan, from whom I got much of my instinctive "what feels
right to me" hashkafah comes from, writes in his Handbook:

    7:75 There are times when the Torah speaks in allegory and
    metaphor. [180]

    There are four conditions under which there is a tradition that the
    Torah is not to be taken according to its literal meaning: [181]
    1. Where the plain meaning is rejected by common experience.
    2. Where it is repudiated by obvious logic. [182]
    3. Where it is contradicted by obvious scripture.
    4. Where it is opposed by clear Talmudic tradition. [183]

    180. Moreh Nevukhim, Introduction, from Hosea 12:11.
    181. Emunoth VeDeyoth 7:2 (83a).
    182. As in the cases of anthropomorphisms; Moreh Nevukhim 2:25. See
         above, 2:23.
    183. Cf. Minchath Chinukh 232:4; and Zohar 3:85a; Minchath Pittim,
         Orach Chaim 156; Makor Chesed on Sefer Chasidim 673:1.

This question I asked about how we can't know what the Rambam would
say once Natural Philosophy got replaced by science can be rephrased as
asking when is science is strong enough to fall under RAK's [1]; IOW,
how common does "common experience" have to be? And whether Natural
Philosophy, when the proof is conclusive, is [1] or [2].

RAK's list only sites R' Saadia Gaon for "repudiated by obvious logic"
(By "obvious" I presume he means logic so clear we know we couldn't
possibly have erred.) However, R' Saadia (EvD 7:2) lists chush, seikhel,
pasuq acheir and mesorah. The same four.

Back on topic, now that I used the detour to introduce EvD:

Notice 7:2 does not discuss mesorah in the sense of 1-3 are only valid
reasons to take a pasuq is literally when consistent with mesorah, but
mesorah as a reason to say the pasuq isn't literal. He does actually
posit the Rambam's "secondly", but in the prior pereq -- 7:1:
    Similarly anything we are told by mesorah that has a condition,
    we will give an explanation which is appropriate to the true mesorah.

Which is my thesis, exactly.

Summary:

If we can't fit both what is "demonstrated by proof" and what is "in
accordance with the words of our prophets and our theologians or Sages",
the Rambam (and RSG, but those quotes are from the Moreh) tells us we
made an error somewhere and until we discover whether our demonstration
or our understanding of what the mesorah says are wrong, we simply have
no answer. Yet.

Tir'u baTov!
-Micha

-- 
Micha Berger             "The worst thing that can happen to a
mi...@aishdas.org        person is to remain asleep and untamed."
http://www.aishdas.org          - Rabbi Simcha Zissel Ziv, Alter of Kelm
Fax: (270) 514-1507

On 5/12/2012 2:22 PM, Akiva Miller wrote:
> R' Zev Sero wrote:
>
>> You're trying to have your cake and eat it.  The view that
>> 600K is a requirement for RHR is based on a girsa in which
>> Ulla explicitly says that there is no such thing as a RHR in
>> Bavel (whether this means the city or the country is another
>> question).  And it's expressed by most of its exponents as a
>> statement that there is no such thing as a RHR "nowadays".
>
> There are many poskim who say, "There is no RHR nowadays." Are you
> suggesting that they are NOT referring to population patterns or road
> construction styles, but rather they're referring to "nowadays when we
> hold that 600K is a requirement"?

No, of course not.  Either 600K is a requirement or it isn't.
Those who hold that it is hold that it was always one.  They *have*
to; we have no authority to change the definition of a RHR.  I don't
understand how you could read such a suggestion into the words you
quote above.


> I've always wondered this, but I've never seen anyone suggest it. In
> my experience, I've never seen an explanation of *WHY* there's no RHR
> nowadays; they all seem to take it as axiomatic.

It's a statement about the metzius of their day, just as Ulla's
supposed statement -- found in their girsa but not ours -- was about
the metzius of Bavel (but presumably not elsewhere) in his day.  That's
why it can change, and we can say that there weren't any in the rishonim's
day, at least in the places known to them, but there are today.

-- 
Zev Sero        "Natural resources are not finite in any meaningful
z...@sero.name    economic sense, mind-boggling though this assertion
                  may be. The stocks of them are not fixed but rather
                 are expanding through human ingenuity."
                                            - Julian Simon

On Wed, Dec 5, 2012 at 12:51 PM, <T6...@aol.com> wrote:
> Are you saying or implying that science /has/ disproven the existence of
> Adam and Eve?  Actually *proven* that they never existed?

Please read what I said carefully.. In part I said" Because the Adam story
is just that, a story. Part of out sacred narrative, but not part of our
sacred history, because it never happened"

Science has nothing to say whether there was a man named Adam or a woman
named Eve that lived approximately 5773 years ago. What I said, and I'll
clarify it and expand  it, was the Torah story about Adam and Eve has been
proven false by science. That is, humans, roughly in the form that we are
now, inhabited the Earth, in their millions, many thousands of years before
this story. They were not created whole, there is a dispute in the Torah
how Eve came about, as adults, 6 days after God created the universe from
nothing. And nor did they live for nearly 10 centuries.

And for many thousands of years before this "first" there were religions.
Indeed, that was the birth of philosophy, and religions 3 main questions,
where did I come from, why am I here and how do I live. Around campfires
ancient humans pondered these questions and came up with fantastic answers,
such as the Adam and Eve myth.

The ancient religions were pagan, nature worshippers. The Torah, is a
polemic against that.

My post was an answer to Micha's question, and I'm sure he knew he would
get a response like mine, so I posted it.

Those that take the Creation , Adam and Eve etc. narratives literally, in
the name of Orthodoxy, make Orthodoxy look foolish.

Regards,
Martin Brody

From: martin brody <martinlbr...@gmail.com>
>> Tell  me, was there such a person as Lotan, and did he have a sister
>> called  Timna? [--R Zev Sero]

> That is a non sequitur, meaning it has nothing to do with the discussion.
> Science has not disproven their existence as stated in Torah.

Are you saying or implying that science /has/ disproven  the existence of 
Adam and Eve? Actually *proven* that they never existed? 

--Toby  Katz
=============

At 04:05 PM 12/4/2012,  R. Ben Waxman wrote:
>http://www.beithillel.org.il/show.asp?id=56061
>Beit Hillel, a rabbinic organization, has come out with guidelines as to
>what can be eaten at the home of a secular person's home...
...
>   *   heating up food (use a microwave or wrap it in aluminum foil),

There are a number of conditions involved in using a microwave that has
been used to heat non-kosher food, and there are different types of
microwaves. See the article at
http://www.star-k.org/kashrus/kk-cooking-microwave.htm for details.
To simply say "use a microwave" is misleading.

Also, using a regular oven and wrapping the food in aluminum foil
(double wrapping, I believe is required) is also not so simple. See

http://www.oukosher.org/index.php/common
/article/is_your_oven_kosher_what_every_kosher_cook_must_know/

>   * serving plates & utensils (use disposable or eat stuff that isn't
>     too hot),

What constitutes too hot. Above Yad so Ledas bo? From
http://tinyurl.com/b4bzo3m

If so, the real issue seems to be whether the kettle cooked products
are hotter than yad soledes bo (120? F) ...

>   * bugs (you don't have to investigate how the lettuce was checked),

This assumes that the lettuce was checked. I do not think that
non-religious Jews normally check lettuce.

>   * fruit and vegis (this is a no brainer - as long as it came from a
>     regular with a heksher, no problem; if not, get permission to take
>     terumah),
>   * shimittah (don't eat stuff from their garden),
>   * wine (no problem if it is Jew pouring it),

Even if the wine is not MeVuShal and the person serving it is not
Shomer Shabbos?

>   *   dairy (no worries here),
>   * meat (if you are really maqpid on glatt, than try not eat it)

Sadly not all meat that is sold as kosher is actually kosher. Their are
unscrupulous people who sell non-kosher meat as kosher. Surely one has
to know if the meat, even if it is not glatt, has a reliable hechsher.

>   * home cooked stuff (don't eat it unless  you can verify that the food
>     and pots are OK).

It is more than the pots being OK. What about the ingredients that go
into the food when it is cooked? What if the person is not aware that
margarine can be milchig for example and uses this in the cooking of meat?


>Truth be told, these don't see like such amazing qulot. IMO the big
>chiddush is the very idea that, yes you can eat in a secular person's
>home. The details aren't that startling.

I disagree. These suggestions from Beit Hillel are, IMO, most
misleading. I do hope that Beit Shammai will come out with their
guidelines! >:-}



At 01:26 PM 12/5/2012, Ilana Elzufon wrote:
>RBW:
>> Truth be told, these don't see like such amazing qulot. IMO the big
>> chiddush is the very idea that, yes you can eat in a secular person's home.
>> The details aren't that startling.

>No amazing chidushim here - nor should there be. I think many frum people
>have been keeping some version of this for a long time when eating by
>secular relatives, at office functions, etc. This is basically a statement
>of their position that one may (and should!) forgo chumrot and hakpadot
>that one keeps at home in situations where eating by others will create
>achdut and shalom. Obviously the actual rules are somewhat different in EY
>and chu"l, due to both mitzvot hateluyot ba'aretz and differences in
>metziut.

I disagree, as I indicated in my response to Ben Waxman. There are
real problems with eating in the home of someone who is not observant,
and I think that this Beit Hillel, whoever they are, are not doing the
public a service with this approach. (I would like to know the names
of the rabbis who are behind this suggestion.)

IMO, a better idea would be for the non-observant people and the observant
people to go out to a kosher restaurant to break bread together.

YL

Did you read the article or only my very very short summary which did 
not do it justice?

Ben

On 12/5/2012 10:58 PM, Prof. Levine wrote:
> . . . . ..
> I disagree.  These suggestions from Beit Hillel are, IMO,  most 
> misleading.  I do hope that Beit Shammai will come out with their 
> guidelines! >:-}
>
> YL

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On Dec 5, 2012, at 7:17 PM, Micha Berger wrote:
> 2- You might notice a crossover between what I said here and what I said
> I am comfortable with on issues like the evolution of the kezayis or the
> definitions of sheqiah and tzeis hakokhavim. There too I expect halakhah
> to ignore historical research that contradicts the results of halachic
> process.

The assumption is that halachic process ignores historical research - and
I would argue that while the halachic process has the RIGHT to override
historical research - that right is one that needs to be taken expliciyly
in knowledge of the historical reality. tWe actually do care (and most
rishonim and achronim did care) about what actually was the historical
reality - the true commitment is to mesorah and torah misinai. One of
the reasons that halacha kevatrai is precisely because we hold that the
batrai were aware of the opinions of the kadmai and were able to weigh
them - and good historical research here is one that shows what the kadmai
truly held - which may be different that what later authorities believed.

Indeed, RMB's position is a radical one - that may be difficult to find
prior to the rise of Wissenschaft and Reform - and reflects a reaction
to them, rather than traditional mainstream mesorah..it also reflects a
penetration of the dual truth philosophical position into yahadut - one
that may insulate us from the vagaries of research - but is a radical
transformation of traditional understandings of mesorah as reflecting
the truth. It actually undermines the legitimacy and power of true
mesorah, reflecting in the end a lack of emunah in the truth of mesorah
and its ability to withstand challenge.

WRT RMB understanding of the limitations of the rambam on the power of
reinterpretation, the rambam clearly has some limitations (eg, in ma'a'mar
techiyat hametim) - but they do not seem to be what RMB suggests.

let me offer one coutnerexample. THe rambam famously understands that
every time a malach is mentioned in a story, that story did not occur
literally, but within a prophetic vision. This of course implies
that the whole beginning of vayera and also sedom occur not literally
- as the ramban is quick to point out and criticicze It also implies
(as some classic commentaries did) that the akeda was also in a vision.

How would RMB fit this within his model ?

Meir Shinnar

On 5/12/2012 8:23 PM, Meir Shinnar wrote:
> let me offer one coutnerexample. THe rambam famously understands that
> every time a malach is mentioned in a story, that story did not occur
> literally, but within a prophetic vision.

No.  AIU the Rambam, he holds that these incidents *are* literal, the
malach really manifests itself and does what the pasuk says it does;
but since has no physical body, there's nothing for the person's eyes
to see, so the visual experience is happening entirely within the brain,
with the images supplied by the person's own imagination as his brain
tries to make sense of the signal it's receiving.  Someone watching the
akeda through a telescope would have seen Avraham do everything the pasuk
says, but would not have known why he suddenly changed his mind.

-- 
Zev Sero        "Natural resources are not finite in any meaningful
z...@sero.name    economic sense, mind-boggling though this assertion
                  may be. The stocks of them are not fixed but rather
                 are expanding through human ingenuity."
                                            - Julian Simon

On Wed, Dec 05, 2012 at 08:23:05PM -0500, Meir Shinnar wrote:
:                                         We actually do care (and most
: rishonim and achronim did care) about what actually was the historical
: reality - the true commitment is to mesorah and torah misinai. One of
: the reasons that halacha kevatrai is precisely because we hold that the
: batrai were aware of the opinions of the kadmai...

Which is different than saying that since we can dig up an olive pit or
in another way deduce the size of chazal's olives, we should overturn
the well-accepted but historically counter-factual opinions of what a
kezayis means.

You're referring to how well basrai know mesorah, not how well we know
external historial fact. My use of the word "historical" was ill advised,
as you're taking it more broadly than intended. OTOH, it was in a post
about my own approach to resolving questions of mesorah vs *external*
data.

FWIW, though, even WRT knowing the historical mesorah, we do let things
evolve. We care more about how the gemara understood the mishnah than
W-t theories about what the tanna must have been referring to. And how
rishonim understood that gemara, etc... And then there is the question of
whether the (unquoted parts of the) Me'iri has the same halachic gravitas
as rishonim whose texts were not lost, and thus had more impact on the
development of the din.

...
: WRT RMB understanding of the limitations of the rambam on the power of
: reinterpretation, the rambam clearly has some limitations (eg, in ma'a'mar
: techiyat hametim) - but they do not seem to be what RMB suggests.

: Let me offer one counterexample. THe rambam famously understands that
: every time a malach is mentioned in a story, that story did not occur
: literally, but within a prophetic vision. This of course implies
: that the whole beginning of vayera and also sedom occur not literally
: - as the ramban is quick to point out and criticicze It also implies
: (as some classic commentaries did) that the akeda was also in a vision.

The Abarbanel understands the Rambam as saying that the story did occur
literally, thus answering the Ramban's complaint in the beginning of
Vayeira. However, it literally happened involving prophetic vision rather
than physical vision. This is consistent with their machloqes about who
or Who was in the throne at the end of parashas Mishpatim (discussed at
length at <http://www.aishdas.org/mesukim/5764/mishpatim.pdf>) which is
leshitasam with who defines "aspaqlaria" to which nevuah and chokhmah
are compared to be a lens, and who says it's a mirror.

To the Rambam, nevu'ah is a vision of things really going on but
metaphysically, among sikhliim nivdalim.

To the Ramban, a nevu'ah is a communication from G-d wrapped in symbols.

But noting that the Rambam didn't consider this to be allegorical
is off-topic. I'm not discussing when it's okay to decide a story is
non-literal, but when it's okay to invent new shitos that contradict
the old ones. What I am saying would be just as true about insisting
something literally happened when chazal say it's a pure allegory.

So the question is whether the Rambam considered this idea that mal'akhim
can't be physically seen or heard to be new. I addressed this example
in my prior post, to which you were responding, within my survey of Moreh
cheleq 2 and places where the Rambam requires consistency with chazal:
> Ch 41-42 is where the Rambam argues that every story involving mal'akhim
> is prophetic. He cites R' Chiya Rubba in Bereishis Rabba and other
> ma'amarei chazal as justification /against/ the literal reading of most
> of the persuqim (written by nevi'im).

The Rambam felt obligated to show that his opinion was not a chiddush
supported only by philosophy, but was rooted in mesorah. Whether or
not we find the Rambam's understanding of R' Chiya compelling, clearly
the Rambam himself would disagree that his understanding of angels
and nevu'ah demonstrated a willingness to contradict mesorah when it
conflicts with philosophy.

The Rambam felt conflicts of the sort you're positing -- where a sound
philosophical conclusion contradicts the mesorah -- are impossible.
Rather than advocating reinterpreting the mesorah to fit reason,
I would think he would tell us to wait until we can figure out which
we misunderstood. We will find that we made an error in the data, the
logic or understanding the existing TSBP. Not that the impossible
happened and now we have to question the Torah we received.

The bottom line is that I'm uncomfortable with an epistomology that
puts mesorah as less of a justification of knowledge than science.

Tir'u baTov!
-Micha

-- 
Micha Berger             The greatest discovery of all time is that
mi...@aishdas.org        a person can change their future
http://www.aishdas.org   by merely changing their attitude.
Fax: (270) 514-1507                   - Oprah Winfrey


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