Avodah Mailing List

Volume 30: Number 90

Thu, 12 Jul 2012

• 1. Re: treif anatomy [redirected from Areivim] (T6...@aol.com)
• 2. Re: The Main Idea of Judaism (Micha Berger)
• 3. The Main Idea of Judaism (Prof. Levine)
• 4. Re: The Main Idea of Judaism (Chana Luntz)
• 5. Re: The Main Idea of Judaism (Micha Berger)
• 6. Re: The Main Idea of Judaism (Akiva Miller)
• 7. Re: The Main Idea of Judaism (David Riceman)
• 8. Re: treif anatomy [redirected from Areivim] (Micha Berger)
• 9. more on main idea of judaism (Simi Peters)
• 10. Egel Zahav (cantorwolb...@cox.net)
• 11. Re: Egel Zahav (Lisa Liel)
• 12. Re: Egel Zahav (Micha Berger)
• 13. Re: The Main Idea of Judaism (Poppers, Michael)
• 14. LED "tealights" for Shabbos candles (T6...@aol.com)
• 15. Re: Egel Zahav (Liron Kopinsky)

I just found this old post to Areivim (from January) in my old  email -- if 
it has already been extensively discussed, I missed it  or have forgotten 
it.:
 
 
 
In a message dated 1/26/2012, Saul.Z.New...@kp.org writes:
 
 

_http://www.mpaths.com/2012/01/why-is-my-cow-treif.html_ 
(http://www.mpaths.com/2012/01/why-is-my-cow-treif.html)  

nice pics  of treif anatomy



>>>>>>
 

"Some farmers are giving their cows feed combinations that may cause bloat, 
 and cows apparently aren?t good at burping and can explode. A solution to 
this  is a rumen injector or trocar puncture tool. These are tools that 
punch anywhere  from small to fist sized holes into one of the cow?s stomachs ? 
a procedure that  automatically renders the cow not kosher."
 



I am going to ask a childishly simple question. Doesn't treif mean the  
animal has a condition that will soon cause its death? If the farmer does a  
procedure that creates a hole in the cow's stomach -- but he does it to 
PREVENT  the cow's death -- why does it make the cow treif? Does everyone agree 
that this  procedure renders the cow treif, or are there poskim who consider 
the cow  kosher?


--Toby Katz
=============
Romney -- good values,  good family, good  hair


-------------------------------------------------------------------   



-------------- next part --------------
An HTML attachment was scrubbed...
URL: <http://lists.aishdas.org/pipermail/avod
ah-aishdas.org/attachments/20120711/97872407/attachment-0001.htm>

On Tue, Jul 10, 2012 at 07:06:25PM -0400, David Riceman wrote:
> If you think, as I do, that the categories of mitzvah and aveirah are  
> central to Judaism, this is a a troubling attitude.  If a change in  
> perspective can transform a neutral act into a virtuous act, why can't  
> it also change a prohibited act into a virtuous act?

Along the lines of what others posted, here's RSShkop from the haqdamah
to Shaarei Yosher:
    And as understood, all holiness is being set apart for an honorable
    purpose which is that a person straightens his path and strives
    constantly to make his lifestyle dedicated to the community. Then,
    anything he does even for himself, for the health of his body and
    soul he also associates to the mitzvah of being holy, for through
    this he can also do good for the masses. Through the good he does
    for himself he can do good for the many who rely on him. But if he
    derives benefit from some kind of permissible thing that isn't needed
    for the health of his body and soul, that benefit is in opposition
    to holiness. For in this he is benefiting himself (for that moment
    as it seems to him), but to no one else does it have any value.

As for "chang[ing] a prohibited act into a virtuous act", isn't that the
whole thorny topic of aveirah lishmah? Nazir 23b:
    R' Nachman bar Yitzchaq said: An aveirah lishmah is greater than
    a mitzvah shelo lishmah.
    But didn't Rav Yehudah say that Rav said that a person should toil
    in Torah and mitzvos even shelo lishman, because from lo lishman
    one comes to lishman?
    Rather say like a mitzvah shelo lishmah...

Like, rather than greater than.

In any case, the sugya generated reams of conversation, and I don't
claim to have a position. RYGB brought it up often, particularly R'
Tzadoq's shitah, in the early years of Avodah.

Tir'u baTov!
-Micha

-- 
Micha Berger             The greatest discovery of all time is that
mi...@aishdas.org        a person can change their future
http://www.aishdas.org   by merely changing their attitude.
Fax: (270) 514-1507                   - Oprah Winfrey

At 05:39 AM 7/11/2012, David Riceman wrote:

>RAM:
>
><<in my *desires*, I cannot imagine striving to be anything less than a
>*total* oveid Hashem>>
>
>I am less focused than you.  I, for example, would like to develop an
>O(n^2) algorithm for matrix multiplication some day.  That's not assur,
>but it's not a form of avodas hashem, and a "*total* oveid Hashem"
>wouldn't waste his time on such na'arishkeit.

I presume that developing such and algorithm would be part of what 
you do for a living.  Since earning a living and supporting one's 
family is a requirement of Yahadus,  I would consider this as part of 
your avodas HaShem.  YL
-------------- next part --------------
An HTML attachment was scrubbed...
URL: <http://lists.aishdas.org/pipermail/avod
ah-aishdas.org/attachments/20120711/c312902c/attachment-0001.htm>

RDR writes:

>I hate to flog a dead horse, but one more comment on this.

>If you think, as I do, that the categories of mitzvah and aveirah are
central to Judaism, this is a a troubling attitude.  If a change in
perspective >can transform a neutral act into a virtuous act, why can't it
also change a prohibited act into a virtuous act?

Can't it (in extremis)?  How do you deal with the concept of an averah
lishma and the discussion of Horayos 10b?

>David Riceman


Regards

Chana

On Wed, Jul 11, 2012 at 07:20:00AM -0400, Prof. Levine wrote:
>> I am less focused than you.  I, for example, would like to develop an
>> O(n^2) algorithm for matrix multiplication some day...

> I presume that developing such and algorithm would be part of what you do 
> for a living.  Since earning a living and supporting one's family is a 
> requirement of Yahadus,  I would consider this as part of your avodas 
> HaShem...

Probably not. It's more of an intriguing research problem.

(Kind of like my dream of fleshing out my ideas about a programming
language that would make it easier to write software for today's multi-CPU
machines. It's just a fun project, if I ever had the time for it.)

That's why I replied with RSSkop's comment about being able to sanctify
recreation, if the recreation is truly and honestly -- without fooling
oneself -- in order to be more fit at one's tafqid.

(Which RSS defines as hatavah, and even though his haqdamah is how I
aspire to live my own life, in general I've been advocating the "shiv'im
panim" approach to answering the original "Main Point" question.)

Tir'u baTov!
-Micha

-- 
Micha Berger             "I think, therefore I am." - Renne Descartes
mi...@aishdas.org        "I am thought about, therefore I am -
http://www.aishdas.org   my existence depends upon the thought of a
Fax: (270) 514-1507      Supreme Being Who thinks me." - R' SR Hirsch

R"n Simi Peters wrote:

> As far as the second main idea of Judaism (in terms of what
> a Jew is supposed to be and do), it seems to me that
> "Kedoshim tihiyu" is an explicit statement of that.  The
> Meshekh Hokhma's definition of this mitzva encapsulates its
> essential meaning: to dedicate everything to God--our time,
> our energies, our possessions, our relationships, etc. 

R' Jon Baker responded:

> And yet this formulation is entirely God-centered in both
> aspects.  What about  our fellow man?  Hillel and Shimon
> haTzadik would disagree with an entirely God-centered
> formulation, I think.  After all, the Torah is God's will
> for humankind.  If that expression boils down to 'v'ahavta
> lereiacha kamocha' or the negative formulation, that would
> seem to leave God out of the equation.

Good points, but I think you're illustrating a problem that very basic to
this whole thread. Specifically, we're trying to distill everything down to
a short sound bite. Or, to use words which appear in the thread's title,
we're going from the entirety of "Judaism" down to its "main idea".

Of course, this has been done before, as RJB quoted Hillel (Gemara Shabbos
31a). But, notably, it's only a partial quote. The tag line is critical:
"Go and learn." And I suspect that's what led him to conclude, incorrectly,
that it leaves G-d out of the equation.

It is my opinion that when Hillel said, "What you hate, don't do to others
- this is the whole Torah", he did not mean to suggest that Achilas Matza
is an unimportant part of Torah. I can't accept that idea. What he must
have meant by "Go and learn", I think (and if my understanding of Rashi on
that Gemara is correct, he too thinks), that one cannot rely on his own
opinions about what is hated, but rather one must learn Torah through and
through to reach a proper understanding of how to fulfil Hillel's sound
bite. In other words: If one focuses on Bein Adam L'Chaveiro, and leaves
G-d out of the equation, he will fail miserably at reaching Hillel's goal.

But if one fulfils Achilas Matza properly, it will effectively improve him as a person, and the result will be a more complete fulfillment of Hillel's dictum.

Thus, RnSP's cite of "Kedoshim tihiyu" is NOT G-d-centered, depending on
how one understands the idea of being a Kadosh. "Dedicating everything to
G-d"? - sure, but that doesn?t mean ignoring people. Rather, proper
fulfillment of Adam L'Chaveiro is m'akev one's becoming a Kadosh.

I concede that it *seems* like a contradiction: One's ultimate goal may be
totally G-d-centric, yet it is impossible to reach that goal without a
genuine caring for and involvement with one's fellow people. But the
contradiction is an illusion, created by putting too much emphasis on the
sound bite, and a failure to Go And Learn.

Akiva Miller

____________________________________________________________
Woman is 53 But Looks 25
Mom reveals 1 simple wrinkle trick that has angered doctors...
http://thirdpartyoffers.juno.com/TGL3131/4ffda93fb494e293f07d5st54vuc

RLL:
> Because it's prohibited.  Prohibited and required acts are defined. 
> Neutral acts aren't.

Your theoretical construct is a pastiche.  We have a principle (mitzva - 
aveirah) which classifies acts as hiyuvim, issurum, and neutral.  We 
have a second principle (for God's sake) which classifies acts as 
virtuous or not.

But why two principles? Each one by itself fully classifies all acts.  
As far as I can tell your only excuse is that you don't approve of the 
concept of a neutral act, but can't jettison the first principle  (the 
Hovoth HaLevavoth expresses a view similar to yours, but one which does 
not suffer from this particular problem).

RYL:
> Since earning a living and supporting one's family is a requirement of 
> Yahadus,  I would consider this as part of your avodas HaShem.

But I fully expect to continue this sort of behavior if I retire someday.

Your argument, unlike RAM's RMB's and RLL's, is independent of motive.  
So lets try a reductio ad absurdum.  Could one not argue similarly that 
since, according to the Rambam, all non-religious action is fated 
(that's how he construes "hakol biydei shamayim hutz miyiras shamayim"), 
any neutral act I perform counts as a virtuous act?

RMB:
> That's why I replied with RSSkop's comment about being able to 
> sanctify recreation, if the recreation is truly and honestly -- without 
> fooling oneself -- in order to be more fit at one's tafqid.

I think RMB's attitude is closer to the mark, but I'll critique it 
anyway.  The Ba'alei Mussar like to advise people to specialize in one 
particular mitzvah (cf. Avos 4:11), and do that particularly assiduously 
and meticulously.  Of course its impossible for one person to do that 
with all mitzvos, since they compete for resources and attention.  RSS 
himself says that he is describing how to implement the mitzva of 
kedoshim tihyu particularly meticulously. But what of the person who 
chooses to specialize in a different mitzva which takes less time?

I started this subthread because RAM asserted that the only possible 
legitimate aspiration for a Jew is to be a "*total* oveid Hashem".  I 
have always been willing to concede that it is a legitimate aspiration, 
but I strongly disagree that it's the ONLY legitimate aspiration.

David Riceman

On Wed, Jul 11, 2012 at 01:33:51AM -0400, T6...@aol.com wrote:
:                                                 Doesn't treif mean the  
: animal has a condition that will soon cause its death? If the farmer does a  
: procedure that creates a hole in the cow's stomach -- but he does it to 
: PREVENT  the cow's death -- why does it make the cow treif?

You asked a similar question on Sep 13 2009.

I answered then:
> The definition of a tereifah is an animal that that one of a speific
> list of mumim. The CI says it's halakhah leMoshe miSinai, and R' Moshe
> Feinstein agrees.

> OTOH, in the contet of whether someone is guilty of murder, a mum is
> only one the victim couldn't have otherwise recovered from.

That thread also discusses your next question:
:                                                           Does everyone agree 
: that this  procedure renders the cow treif, or are there poskim who consider 
: the cow  kosher?

See
http://www.aishdas.org/avodah/getindex.cgi?section=R#RHS%20AND%20DAIRY
which has a tangent at
http://www.aishdas.org/avodah/getindex.cgi?section=R#RHSDAIRY

as well as the prior threads from v8n60s or so which discuss the
CI's position about science and halakhah, which opens with RGStudent
mentioning tereifos:
http://www.aishdas.org/avodah/getindex.cgi?section=C#CHAZON%20I
SH%20ON%20NATURE
http://www.aishdas.org/avodah/getindex.cgi?section=K#KILLING%20A%20TR
EIFA

RGS notes that tereifos might actually be an exception for the CI, where
in general he would hold nishtanah hateva, nishtanah hadin. But as RDE
replied (later citing CI YD 5:3), here Chazal used G-d-given reshus to
define the limits of a Halakhah leMoshe miSinai. Since it was legislating
(my phrasign), it can only be changed during the 2 millenia of Torah.
Pasq based on Chazal's understanding of metzi'us can be overturned as
our knowledge of the metzi'us improves.

(The example usually given is the permissability to be mechalel Shabbos
to save a baby after 8 months even thugh chazal thought such babies are
not viable. ALTHOUGH, I mentioned a month ago the Y-mi Yevamos 24b which
indicates that this is only true of 9 month babies. 7 month babies could
be born late in the 8th month and are viable. And since you never know
which a baby is, I think this Y-mi is a basis in Chazal for saying you
save the baby because it's safeiq piquach nefesh.)

Tir'u baTov!
-Micha

-- 
Micha Berger             What we do for ourselves dies with us.
mi...@aishdas.org        What we do for others and the world,
http://www.aishdas.org   remains and is immortal.
Fax: (270) 514-1507                        - Albert Pine

R' Jonathan responded to my following statements:

 It seems to me that we can talk about the main idea of Judaism in terms of
 two things:  (1) the message of Judaism to the world (which also includes
 us) and (2) the main idea of Judaism in terms of what a Jew is supposed to
 be and do.
 
> It seems to me that the message of Judaism in the first sense is "ein od milvado".  This isn't a purely theological statement, 

with the following:

I have trouble with that as a fundamental - it's too open to interpretation.
Is it the pshat in the verse, that there is no God but God [and Mussa is his
prophet]?  Or is it the reading of the Tikkunei haZohar (leit atar panui
mineih, etc.) and the Chasidim, that it's an expression of the Upper Unity,
that there is nothing but God as all physical finite reality is nullified
beside the Infinite?
 
I think I didn't make myself clear.  My assumption is that a message
directed to the entire world has to be accessible to all kinds of people,
not a complicated theological proposition that could only be understood by
a philosopher.	The idea of  "ein od milvado" is that there is no God but
God (nothing about "and Mussa is his prophet").  The definition of God is:
the one and only omnipotent, omniscient, non-corporeal, benevolent Power
harmoniously directing the world.  The practical ramifications of that
message (as I pointed out in my earlier post) are that we are enjoined to
be benevolent and peaceful as He is because that is what He wants from us. 
This message can be conveyed in simple language to an intelligent child and
were it to be taken seriously by the world at large, the world would be a
much better place.

The second proposition you quoted was:

As far as the second main idea of Judaism (in terms of what a Jew is
supposed to be and do), it seems to me that "Kedoshim tihiyu" is an
explicit statement of that.  The Meshekh Hokhma's definition of this mitzva
encapsulates its essential meaning: to dedicate everything to God--our
time, our energies, our possessions, our relationships, etc. 

Your response was:

And yet this formulation is entirely God-centered in both aspects.  What about  our fellow man?  Hillel and Shimon haTzadik would disagree with an entirely
God-centered formulation, I think.  After all, the Torah is God's will for
humankind.  If that expression boils down to 'v'ahavta lereiacha kamocha' or
the negative formulation, that would seem to leave God out of the equation.

I understand how you could arrive at this conclusion based on what I wrote,
so let me clarify:  The pasuk from Vayikra (19:18) quoted by Hillel is
actually: Lo tikom velo titor et benei amekha, ve'ahavta le'reakha kamokha,
ani Hashem.  The end of the pasuk is kind of critical here.  Our concern
for fellow human beings is not a matter of how we feel about them at any
given moment, but is a principled extension of our understanding that we
are all created be'tzelem Elokim and that God's will as expressed in His
commandments is that we be good to each other.	A love for humankind that
is grounded in this kind of understanding has a much more solid base than a
love for humankind that flows from a general feeling of benevolence.  It is
much more likely that we will follow through on bein adam lehavero
consistently (no matter how irritating our haver is) if we are acting from
principle.

I'm guessing (and only guessing) that what disturbs you here is that a
God-centered formulation (as you called it) of the main idea of Judaism
could lead to an instrumental approach to human beings, i.e., turning
people into instruments for enhancing the bein adam lamakom relationship. 
Turning a person into an etrog, as they used to say.  Nobody wants to be
someone else's etrog and we all feel instinctively--and quite correctly--
that any approach which treats human beings as a means to an end is
inherently problematic, no matter how exalted the end.	A friend of mine
put it this way:  Do we do mitzvot bein adam lehavero because of the mitzva
of 've'ahavta le'reakha kamoha' or as an act of imitatio Deus (ma hu rahum
af ata heye rahum...)?	My conclusion is that our approach to bein adam
lehavero has to come from both perspectives.  If we don't have the mitzva,
there's nothing to keep us on the straight and narrow when the going gets
tough.	(Don't you just love cliches?)	Bu
 t if we are only acting in conformity to the mitzva, than people become
 our etrog--a means to an end, and that is not how God wants us to relate
 to others because it is ultimately disrespectful and hence defeats the
 purpose of mitzvot bein adam lehavero.  So we need to strive to truly be
 like Hashem--to be truly rahum, hanun, gomel hasadim--to genuinely see and
 care for the other person as Hashem cares for us.

Did I answer your question or did I just go off on a totally pointless tangent?

Kol tuv,
Simi Peters 





-------------- next part --------------
An HTML attachment was scrubbed...
URL: <http://lists.aishdas.org/pipermail/avod
ah-aishdas.org/attachments/20120711/7dda5daa/attachment-0001.htm>

> I pose this very interesting question for which the answer I've seen is far from satisfactory and therefore I won't even give it.
> The question is that since the people thought Moshe Rabbeinu was dead, they were in a panic and needed something to take
> the place of Moshe. They said they needed a leader and hence insisted upon the golden calf. So why didn't they say to Aaron:
> Your brother Moshe is dead. We want YOU to lead us. That would have been the most logical choice. Why then, didn't that 
> occur to them?

On 7/11/2012 5:01 PM, cantorwolb...@cox.net wrote:
> I pose this very interesting question for which the answer I've seen
> is far from satisfactory and therefore I won't even give it.
> The question is that since the people thought Moshe Rabbeinu was dead,
> they were in a panic and needed something to take
> the place of Moshe. They said they needed a leader and hence insisted
> upon the golden calf. So why didn't they say to Aaron:
> Your brother Moshe is dead. We want YOU to lead us. That would have
> been the most logical choice. Why then, didn't that occur to them?

Maybe Aaron didn't come across as the leader type.

On Wed, Jul 11, 2012 at 06:02:38PM -0500, Lisa Liel wrote:
: Maybe Aaron didn't come across as the leader type.

Variant on a them.

Aharon was known to be an oheiv shalom verodeif shalom, oheiv es haberios
umeqarvan laTorah. Even if seen as a leader, he would have been seen as
one of the people, lacking the otherness of Moshe.

Tir'u baTov!
-Micha

In Avodah V30n89, RDR replied to RnLL:
>> It's not a form of avodat Hashem?  I think it can be.  If it isn't, maybe that's something to work on. <<
> <<snip>> If you think, as I do, that the categories of
> mitzvah and aveirah are central to Judaism, this is a a troubling
> attitude.	If a change in 
perspective can transform a neutral act into a virtuous act, why can't 
it also change a prohibited act into a virtuous act? <
A change in intent (via t'shuvah g'murah or, chalilah, the reverse) can
transform one's aveiros into mitzvos or vice versa.  A midah can be (to use
RDR's words) prohibited (e.g. coveting another's property or wife) or
virtuous (e.g. coveting another's knowledge or good deeds).  Seems like the
intent, not the category, is key. 

All the best from 
-- Michael Poppers via BB pager

My husband has a Judaica store in Hollywood (FL not CA) and his suppliers  
send him catalogues of items to order.  In the latest catalogue, one  
supplier is offering an item that looks like a pair of tealights, but instead of  
being candles or even an electric light bulb, these are battery-powered LED  
lights for Shabbos licht.  They have the advantage of giving off no  heat.  
The idea is that they could be used by a patient in a hospital or  anywhere 
that open flames would not be feasible.  
 
My husband wants to know whether you really could use these LED lights as  
Shabbos candles, and could you make a bracha "lehadlik ner shel Shabbos" 
over  them?  An LED light is not a ner -- or is it?  
 
Maybe the same objection can be made to electric lights that have  been 
used in lieu of candles.  Our local Bikur Cholim  lends hospital patients brass 
Shabbos candlesticks with fake electric  "flames."
 
So, is an electric lightbulb a "ner"?  Is an LED light a "ner"?   Can  you 
use them for Shabbos candles, and can you make a bracha over  them?
 

--Toby Katz
=============
Romney -- good  values, good family, good  hair


-------------------------------------------------------------------
-------------- next part --------------
An HTML attachment was scrubbed...
URL: <http://lists.aishdas.org/pipermail/avod
ah-aishdas.org/attachments/20120711/1c5df70f/attachment-0001.htm>

On Thu, Jul 12, 2012 at 1:01 AM, <cantorwolb...@cox.net> wrote:

> > I pose this very interesting question for which the answer I've seen is
> far from satisfactory and therefore I won't even give it.
> > The question is that since the people thought Moshe Rabbeinu was dead,
> they were in a panic and needed something to take
> > the place of Moshe. They said they needed a leader and hence insisted
> upon the golden calf. So why didn't they say to Aaron:
> > Your brother Moshe is dead. We want YOU to lead us. That would have been
> the most logical choice. Why then, didn't that
> > occur to them?


Something interesting that I noticed on this upcoming parsha that might be
relevant: When Ahron dies, Moshe, Ahron and Elazar all go up on the
mountain, and Moshe takes Ahron's bigdei kehuna and dresses Elazar in them.
This is the only real transfer that takes place between Ahron and Elazar.
Then, in this weeks Parsha, Hashem just starts speaking to Moshe and Elazar
in the same way that he used to speak to Moshe and Ahron.

This should be contrasted with the transfer of leadership between Moshe and
Yehoshua, where it was a big deal with lots of symbolic acts, brachot, and
promises from Hashem that He will be with Yehoshua as we was with Moshe.

It seems to me that there are two distinct paradigms of leadership that we
see here. The first, that of the Kehuna, is hereditary leadership. This
leadership represents continuity and a steady purpose. The other type of
leadership, that of Moshe, is a more dynamic, in-the-now type of
leadership. This leadership needs to inspire the people to act in the
present.

As a possible answer to your question, Ahron was already a leader, but he
was the wrong kind of leader. The Jewish people needed both, and could not
move Ahron from one role into the other.

Kol Tuv,

Liron Kopinsky
liron.kopin...@gmail.com
-------------- next part --------------
An HTML attachment was scrubbed...
URL: <http://lists.aishdas.org/pipermail/avodah-ai
shdas.org/attachments/20120712/e88199b6/attachment.htm>

------------------------------


Avodah mailing list
Avo...@lists.aishdas.org
http://lists.aishdas.org/listinfo.cgi/avodah-aishdas.org


End of Avodah Digest, Vol 30, Issue 90
**************************************

Send Avodah mailing list submissions to
	avodah@lists.aishdas.org

To subscribe or unsubscribe via the World Wide Web, visit
	http://lists.aishdas.org/listinfo.cgi/avodah-aishdas.org
or, via email, send a message with subject or body 'help' to
	avodah-request@lists.aishdas.org

You can reach the person managing the list at
	avodah-owner@lists.aishdas.org

When replying, please edit your Subject line so it is more specific
than "Re: Contents of Avodah digest..."