Avodah Mailing List

Volume 30: Number 84

Thu, 05 Jul 2012

• 1. Re: Who is a Talmid Chacham (Ben Waxman)
• 2. Re: Mechallel Shabbos to destroy a non-kosher phone (Lisa Liel)
• 3. Re: Who is a Talmid Chacham (Ben Waxman)
• 4. Re: single mothers (Ben Waxman)
• 5. Re: Who is a Talmid Chacham (Micha Berger)
• 6. Purchase of Tzitzit by a Messianic (Micha Berger)
• 7. Vigilantism (was: Mechallel Shabbos to destroy a non-kosher phone) (Micha Berger)
• 8. Re: single mothers (T6...@aol.com)
• 9. Re: single mothers (Micha Berger)
• 10. Re: confiscating property (Akiva Miller)
• 11. Re: Who is a Talmid Chacham (Doron Beckerman)
• 12. Re: QUESTION RE: FASTING (Moshe Y. Gluck)
• 13. Re: Mechallel Shabbos to destroy a non-kosher phone (Arie Folger)
• 14. Re: Mechallel Shabbos to destroy a non-kosher phone (Zev Sero)
• 15. The Main Idea of Judaism (Micha Berger)

The statement in the Gemara and in Hoshen Mishpat is that the TC doesn't 
have to pay a tax because he doesn't need the protection. Not that he is 
contributing to the general security of the city through his learning, 
but that he doesn't need the protection. Fine.  But it makes absolutely 
no sense for someone to claim a patur from paying and them demand that 
the police patrol his block just like every other block.

Ben

On 7/3/2012 11:18 PM, Doron Beckerman wrote:
> >> If someone is claiming he has a patur from the way of the world, I
> expect him to act like it. <<
>
> It means that he contributes to security by his full time learning, 
> and does not need to contribute in any other way. They are the literal 
> Neturei Karta.
>

On 7/3/2012 7:41 PM, Zev Sero wrote:
> On 3/07/2012 5:35 PM, Allan Engel wrote:
>> On Tue, Jul 3, 2012 at 10:13 PM, Zev Sero <z...@sero.name 
>> <mailto:z...@sero.name>> wrote:
>
>>> No, I'm being precise.  He has exactly the authority he needs to make
>>> such a takanah.
>
>> Only to people who wish to sublimate their their will to his authority.
>> And almost by definition, anyone who defies that authority  has
>> withdrawn his or her consent.
>
> Hardly.   Or else no melech and no beis din would ever have authority.

Except that both a melech and a beit din have a source for their 
authority.  A rebbe does not have any source for melech status.  It may 
be given to him voluntarily by his followers, but it has no halakhic 
status.  It's just a lifestyle choice.

Lisa

Thank you for the tshuva. It was very pleasant to read an actual psak.

A couple of notes:
1) Even though he quotes Rav Kook as saying that even in war yeshiva 
students should stay in yeshiva, I was told that Rav Zvi Yehuda emptied 
out Mercaz in 48.
2) I find it very strange to have a psak on such a weighty issue based 
mainly on Midrash.
3) I personally wouldn't have much of a problem if his criteria of 
people who learn day and night, who kill themselves over Torah, were the 
ones to get a patur. This is not someone who simply does 2 sedarim a 
day. I work full time and I certainly do not "kill myself or toil day 
and night" at my job. And it is certainly not "the smokers".

Ben
On 7/3/2012 1:38 PM, Doron Beckerman wrote:
>
> and you can add Tzitz Eliezer
> http://www.hebrewbooks.org/pdfpager.aspx?req=20825&;st=&pgnum=81&hilite

So according to RSZA how could we ever (even if just in theory) allow 
Yibum again? A women could have a child with the sperm of the dead 
father, even after she got married to the brother and post facto they 
are living in sin.

Ben

On 7/4/2012 9:58 AM, Eli Turkel wrote:
> He
> bring a disagreement if the donor is consered the father of the baby
> R. Yisraeli - no
> RSZA - yes
> He further brings other poskim that claim that even according to R. 
> Yisraeli there is no prohibition to bring a child into the world who 
> has no halachic father.

On Wed, Jul 04, 2012 at 09:29:00PM +0300, Ben Waxman wrote:
> The statement in the Gemara and in Hoshen Mishpat is that the TC doesn't  
> have to pay a tax because he doesn't need the protection. Not that he is  
> contributing to the general security of the city through his learning,  
> but that he doesn't need the protection...

Which is true for theft, which hits individual homes.

But it does not seem to be true for war, "Mei'achar shenitenah reshus
lamashchis lichbol, eino mavchin bein tzadiq larasha."

Tir'u baTov!
-Micha

R' Ben Hecht posted the following. I thought it would make a solid
conversation piece.

Tir'u baTov!
-Micha

JVO: Purchase of Tzitzit by a Messianic
Tuesday, 3 July, 2012

Jewish Values Online (jewishvaluesonline.org) is a website that asks
the Jewish view on a variety of issues, some specifically Jewish and
some from the world around us -- and then presents answers from each
of the dominations of Judaism. Nishmablog's Blogmaster Rabbi Wolpoe and
Nishma's Founding Director, Rabbi Hecht, both serve as Orthodox members
of their Panel of Scholars.

This post continues the weekly series on the Nishmablog that features
responses on JVO by one of our two Nishma Scholars who are on this
panel. This week's presentation is to one of the questions to which
Rabbi Hecht responded.

* * * * *

Question: My girlfriend runs a business selling hand-spun tzitzit
(fringes for a ritual prayer shawl). Recently, a customer asked her
if he could send her his tallit (prayer shawl) and have her tie the
new tzitzit directly onto it. She agreed, but was surprised to find,
when the tallit arrived, that it was a Messianic (a non-Jewish, fully
Christian group that usurps Jewish ritual and incorrectly incorporates it
into non-Jewish worship) tallit, complete with a New-Testament quote on
the atarah (the neckpiece). Would it still be OK to sell tzitzit to this
customer? On the one hand, we're profiting from an arguably idolatrous
practice, but, on the other, she's helping a (presumably) fellow Jew
(albeit an apostate one) fulfill the mitzvah of wearing tzitzit. What
Jewish values are at work here? And what should we do?

Rabbi Hecht's answer

(A Caveat - While there are actually a variety of halachic issues embodied
within this scenario, I have chosen, in response to this question, to
focus solely on the issue of a Messianic Jew attempting to do a mitzvah
[as I believe that to be the essence and purpose of this question from
which we should not deviate]. I would ask the reader, as such, not to
necessarily form conclusions of my opinion in Jewish Law regarding other
aspects of this question. In the same vein, I have also not considered
the possible repercussions in secular law, if there are any, for refusing
to service or sell to a specific customer in these circumstances. By
extension, I also did not deal with issues related to when there may be,
as such, a conflict between secular law and Torah law.)

There is a fallacy in the minds of many Jews that Halacha is solely
about practice and not thought. As such, many Jews have the incorrect
idea that intent in the performance of a mitzvah is irrelevant; that
the focus of Jewish practice is solely on behaviour and not what one
is thinking. This, however, is not the case. T.B. Rosh Hashanah 28a,b
(amongst other places in the Talmud) discusses the concept of mitzvot
tzrichot kevana, questioning whether, to count as a fulfillment of a
mitzvah, an act must be performed with the proper intent or not. For
example, if someone happens to pick up a shofar on Rosh Hashanah and blows
into without any thought that he would thereby be fulfilling a mitzvah,
would this blowing of the shofar be deemed to have fulfilled the command,
the mitzvah, to blow shofar on Rosh Hashanah? The conclusion of Jewish
Law is actually no. Especially in regard to Biblical commandments, the
dominant view within Halacha is mitzvot tzrichot kevana, to fulfill
a command an act must be done with proper intent that one is thereby
fulfilling the Will of God. As such, given that this person would not be
wearing tzitzit with the proper intent, in approaching this question we
should first recognize that there is no argument that through providing
the tzitzit this woman would be helping a fellow Jew fulfil a mitzvah. She
would not. Should she, though, still, do this? Can she do this?

T.B. Pesachim 50b (again amongst many other places) raises the idea of
lo lishmah bah lishmah, that a deed even if performed without the proper
intent may eventually still lead to a performance with the proper intent
-- and, as such, performance without the proper intent should still be
encouraged. This argument was actually one of those at the root of the
Lubavitch tefillin campaign - that even though it could not be guaranteed
that those putting on tefillin had the proper intent, there was still a
possible educational or behavioural value in promoting this behaviour
although, without the proper intent, it could not truly be defined as
a mitzvah. (An additional argument that Lubavitch presented was that,
in these circumstances, the minority opinions that declared that proper
intent was not necessary in fulfillment of a mitzvah should also be
relied upon.) Perhaps one could maintain that a similar argument of lo
lishmah bah lishmah would be possible in our case and that it would be
appropriate to supply this tzitzit as this behaviour may lead to an
eventual proper fulfillment of this mitzvah with correct intent. The
further problem in this case, however, is that we are discussing what
would be halachically defined as a negative intent.

In regard to the discussion of mitzvot tzrichot kevana, while the debate
focused on proper intent or simply no mitzvah intent, it was generally
accepted that if there was negative intent - intent not to do a mitzvah,
not to fulfil God's Will, intent for some idolatrous purpose - there would
clearly not be a mitzvah. This is the case here. We are not just dealing
with a case of no intent or a secular intent (such as, for example,
blowing a shofar because one simply wants to blow a horn).

In our case, the intent is further problematic for it represents a
contrary theological perspective than that of Halacha. One would not
just be wearing tzitzit for some other reason but with a reason contrary
to Torah thought - one, it could be said, is using the law in a way to
defy the law.

The fact is that Jewish Law looks very negatively on the usurpation of
Jewish religious ideals by foreign religious concepts especially if done
by a Jew. Perhaps the most powerful example of this is the Shulchan Aruch,
Yoreh De'ah 281:1 which states that a Sefer Torah written by a heretic is
to be burnt. Even though, this Sefer Torah contains the name of God and,
in every detail, looks exactly like any other Sefer Torah, the call is
not just to not use it and not just to bury it but to actually destroy
it. Intent matters, even to this extent. A holy object such as a Sefer
Torah created with intent contrary to the recognition of its specific
holiness within the parameters of Torah thought is to be burnt. The
bottom line, as such, would be that there would seem to be no Jewish
value in providing this tzitzit to this individual. In fact, it would
be contrary to Torah values to do so.

So the straightforward answer would seem to be that you should not
affix this tzitzit to this prayer shawl or in any way be involved in
his manipulation of Torah into another religious system. In affixing
this tzitzit to this tallis that reflects the views of another religion,
one would really be called upon to desecrate Torah values and it would
be clearly inappropriate. What if, though, the Messianic simply wished
to buy the tzitzit and would affix them himself (or get someone else
to do so)? My belief is one should still refrain from doing this as
well, especially given the knowledge that the tzitzit would not be used
properly. The issue here is not simply that you would be assisting a
fellow Jew in doing an aveira, a sin, but also that you would be involved
in the desecration of a Jewish religious object.

Simply, Torah standards do not allow for you to be involved in providing
tzitzit in this manner.

I should note in conclusion, though, that within cases such as this,
a further consideration must always be the unique, personal situation.

Perhaps, for example, through this sale you would be making a connection
with this person and as a result perhaps could lead him away from these
views contrary to Torah. The issue is actually a much broader one. How
can anyone who sells Jewish religious items know for certain that all
his/her customers will use the purchased items respectfully? Yet, if
every time someone went to purchase an item of this nature they would
face a third degree interrogation the result could be a strong decrease
in interest in Torah. Every case of this nature has unique policy
considerations and, as such, it is important in such matters to consult
a Rabbi to discuss the particular circumstances and to determine the
best possible alternative. Still, even the desire to do something good
and bring a person back to the fold does not allow for transgression,
especially of such a serious matter as profaning Jewish religious objects.

Posted by Rabbi Ben Hecht at 6:19:00 PM
Labels: JVO

1 comment:

4 July, 2012 10:15 AM
Ben of Ben's Tallit Shop said...

As an online tallit and tzitzit dealer, I have often been in a similar
situation.

I appreciate Rabbi Hecht's thoughtful response, but I was a bit puzzled
by Rabbi Hecht's extended discussion of proper intent when performing a
mitzvah, since the Gemara specifically addresses the case of a non-Jew
who wants to buy a garment with tzitzit, and tells us dealers to refrain
from selling to them - but not for reasons that have anything to do with
their intent in performing the mitzvah.

That said, I cannot understand why, if you assume the customer in question
is in fact Jewish, you would refrain from selling the tzitzit. How can
you keep a Jew - even a terribly wayward Jew - from doing a mitzvah?

Hirhurim - Torah Musings

Vigilantism, Anarchy and Jewish Law
July 3, 2012

I. Preventing Sin

Like all legal systems, Jewish law allows for its enforcement. Courts
are empowered to compel action and forcibly prevent misdeeds. But courts
are not always sufficiently speedy and sometimes individuals need to
act. Perhaps surprisingly, Jewish law affords individuals certain rights
to enforce its rules without prior authorization. In a prior post,
we discussed whether a mugging victim may kill his attackers (link
<http://torahmusings.com/2010/01/vigilantism-in-jewish-law/>). Here we
will discuss an individual proactively coercing another to prevent sin.

The key principle is Afrushei Me-Issura, separating someone from or
preventing sin. Not only is a parent obligated to keep his older child
from sinning, for example eating non-kosher food, all Jews must attempt
to prevent this sin (Rema, Orach Chaim 343:1; Mishnah Berurah, ad loc.
7). We are a community, each responsible for the other (Sanhedrin 27b).
The Minchas Chinukh (239:6) locates the precise source for this obligation
regarding adults in the prohibition to watch idly as a fellow dies
(Lev. 19:16). We must be concerned for another's spiritual welfare in
addition to his physical. How far must we take this?

The Gemara (Bava Kama 28a) states that a former master may forcefully
send forth a freed slave who wishes to remain with his slave wife,
permitted to him in his former slave status but now forbidden to him in
his freed status. With what right does a man hit another free man? The
obligation to prevent another Jew from sinning.

II. Preventing Others

The Terumas Ha-Deshen (1:218) deduces from this Gemara that a person who
witnesses someone under his supervision committing a sin may hit him to
stop him from sinning. He explicitly permits doing this without obtaining
court authorization. The Rema (Choshen Mishpat 421:13) rules like this
Terumas Ha-Deshen. R. Alfred Cohen ("Taking the Law Into One's Own Hands"
in The Journal of Halacha and Contemporary Society XXXV, Spring 1998,
pp. 12-13) includes among those under a person's supervision: children,
students and others in similar situations. Ostensibly, this permits
corporal punishment-spanking-in homes and schools, as well as certain
forms of wife beating and husband beating. However, as we will see,
there are important conditions that must prevail before allowing such
preventive punishment.

The Rosh (ch. 3 no. 13) extends this Gemara's permission further. He
writes that if one Jew is hitting another, a third person may hit the
attacked to prevent him from sinning. The Rosh's choice of language
is important. He does not say that you may resort to violence against
a violent attacker. He says that you-an individual, not a court-may
hit him to prevent him from sinning. Significantly, the Shulchan Arukh
(Choshen Mishpat 521:13) quotes this Rosh with the rationale intact.

Similarly, the Maharshal (Yam Shel Shlomo, Bava Kama 3:9), after quoting
the Terumas Ha-Deshen, deduces from the above Gemara that any Jew may
hit another to separate him from sin: "?? ?? ????? ???? ????? ????? ???
??????? ???????."

III. Debating Coercion

While it would seem from the preceding that the Mechaber, the author of
the Shulchan Arukh, and the Rema disagree on the extent of the permission,
I believe this is incorrect. After the Mechaber quotes the Rosh's broad
permission, the Rema states "and also (ve-khen)" and quotes the Terumas
Ha-Deshen. He seems to me to affirm the Mechaber`s position.

The Ketzos Ha-Choshen (3:1) and the Nesivos Ha-Mishpat (3:1) seem to
disagree whether a court must authorize coercion to refrain from
sinning or an individual may do it without authorization. The
Nesivos infers that the Ketzos opposes individual action and
disagrees. However, in the Ketzos`s response to the Nesivos,
called Meshovev Nesivos, he seems to concede on this point (link
<http://hebrewbooks.org/pdfpager.aspx?req=22262&;st=&pgnum=11>). He
explicitly allows an individual to hit his fellow to prevent him from
violating a prohibition.

R. Hershel Schachter (Eretz Ha-Tzvi 40:4, p. 261) quotes the Shakh`s
explanation of the Bach that a person may act without court authorization
because "it is as if he stood in judgment" (Tekafo Cohen, ch. 24). In
other words, a person serves as a messenger, a representative, of the
court. Therefore, R. Schachter continues, a person can forcefully prevent
his fellow from sinning just like an official court representative may.

IV. Violent Protests

R. Moshe Sternuch (Teshuvos Ve-Hanhagos vol. 1 no. 368 - link
<http://hebrewbooks.org/pdfpager.aspx?req=20025&;st=&pgnum=257>) was
asked whether a child may destroy his parents' television. Assuming
that doing so constitutes preventing committing a prohibition, R.
Sternbuch quotes the Nesivos and Ketzos whether a person requires court
approval to do so. I'm not sure why he states that the Ketzos
disagrees. Perhaps he reads the Ketzos as only allowing action when a
sin is occurring and not in advance, but I find that reading
implausible. Regardless, R. Sternbuch rules like the Ketzos as he
understands it and forbids the destructive behavior.

However, if we accept that a court's prior approval is unnecessary, is
such a child justified in attempting to force his parents to avoid
violating a prohibition? Are the Charedim who throw stones at car
drivers on Shabbos justified in using violence to prevent those
violations? There are three other reasons why this would not be
allowed:

 1. R. Alfred Cohen (ibid., p. 13) emphasizes the Maharshal's (ibid.)
    concluding condition. Only someone who is "undoubtedly known for
    his rectitude, about whom it is known that he is acting strictly
    for the sake of heaven, and that he is a person who is important and
    outstanding [in the community]" may act to forcefully prevent another
    from sinning. This condition only allows for responsible intervention.

 2. R. Hershel Schachter (ibid., n. 5) argues that physical coercion is
    only allowed if it is pedagogically effective. There was a time
    when corporal punishment served as an important educational tool.
    However, as R. Shlomo Wolbe argued, that is no longer the case (link
    <https://www.amazon.com/dp/1881927199/ref=as_li_ss_til?ta
    g=hirhurimmusin-20&;camp=0&creative=0&linkCode=as4&c
    reativeASIN=1881927199&adid=17BBC3FY0CFA0QCZYXD3&).
    Today, someone who breaks a television or diverts a car on Shabbos
    only forces the victim of his violence to buy a new car or drive
    somewhere else. He does not prevent the sin and, therefore, is
    forbidden to use violence.

 3. Additionally, the Maharshal (ibid.) states that violence must be
    the last resort. You must repeatedly attempt to persuade the person
    to refrain from sinning, using all available methods until only
    force is left. Presumably, if a court is available you must also
    submit to its power before resorting to personal force.

Vigilantism is dangerous. It quickly leads to anarchy, a state that is
inhospitable to communal stability and religious growth. However, the
Torah is meant for all times and places. Circumstances can exist in which
courts are impotent, ineffective or non-existent and an individual's
ability to assert the Torah's commands are needed. In those times,
personal initiative is required.

 

In a message dated 7/4/2012, elitur...@gmail.com writes:

>> In the recent issue of Techumum R. D. Senberg has an  article on the 
definition of fatherhood given modern technology.  
Among other issues he discusses the question of freezing sperm and using  
it after the death of the donor. He brings a disagreement if the donor is  
considered the father of the baby
R. Yisraeli - no
RSZA - yes
He further brings other poskim that claim that even according to R.  
Yisraeli there is no prohibition to bring a child into the world who has no  
halachic father.


He then discusses the social (non-halachic) aspect of a single mother. In  
the end he allows it under several conditions
1) the mother is the widow of the deceased
2) they had no children
3) the donor gave permission in his lifetime  <<



-- 

Eli  Turkel



 
 
>>>>>
 
The obvious question would be, would chalitza be required before  this 
widow could remarry?  
 
If the donor is not the father (acc to R' Yisraeli), then that man died  
childless (even though his sperm survived him), and therefore his widow needs  
chalitza before remarrying -- even though she bears a child from her  
deceased husband.  But her husband gets no "credit" for that child, and is  
considered never to have had children.
 
So that's the question:  does she need chalitza?  Let's say some  period of 
time elapsed during which she was not yet pregnant and definitely  needed 
chalitza.  But then she gets pregnant with her dead husband's sperm  and has 
a baby -- now she no longer needs chalitza?  Or she  does?
 
 
--Toby Katz
=============
Romney -- good values, good family, good  hair


------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 
 



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I think RZSA's pesaq would require that a yevamah would require both
chalitzah and the destruction of any remaining sperm or a gett.

(There are numerous cases in the gemara where safeiq forces both
chalitzah and gett.)

Tir'u baTov!
-Micha

I wondered:

> RZS seems to understand that the TAY Rebbe was speaking
> specifically about a situation where the owner of the
> "non-kosher phone" was a member of that kehillah, and had
> been warned that this could result from his "non-kosher phone"
> being found.

RZS answered, and asked:

> Of course.  Didn't you read the original report?  What else
> did you think we were talking about?  Roaming phone-smashing
> gangs?!

No, I did not read the original report. Where would I have read it? Did you or anyone else post a link here on Avodah?

R' Marty Bluke's original post did mention that this discussion began on
Areivim, but I do not subscribe to Areivim (nor do most of the people who
might happen to read the Avodah archives). His post said:

> Continuing the discussion from Areivim. The Toldos Avraham
> Yitzchak Rebbe made a series of statements against non-kosher
> phones. One of the things that he is reported to have said
> was that if they find a non-kosher phone on Shabbos they can
> be mechallel shabbos to destroy it. He also said that the
> destroyers would not have to pay for the destroyed phone.

No, it does not sound like a support for roaming phone-smashing gangs, and
I based that on the phrase "if they find", which I interpret as one
happening upon such a phone without actually searching for it. But it
*does* sound to me like this would apply even in locations outside of their
kehillah, or to phone-owning outsiders who are visiting their kehillah.

And from what I've seen on Avodah, it seems that others interpret it this
way too. If anyone can direct us to "the original report", we'd surely
appreciate it. Thanks.

(By the way, I'm very curious how the situation might arise that someone
might "find a non-kosher phone on Shabbos". Is there a way to determine
whether it is kosher on Shabbos? Doesn't one need to turn it on to
ascertain this information? How is "non-kosher phone" defined? Are only
certain brand names considered "kosher"?)

Akiva Miller

____________________________________________________________
53 Year Old Mom Looks 33
The Stunning Results of Her Wrinkle Trick Has Botox Doctors Worried
http://thirdpartyoffers.juno.com/TGL3131/4ff4b65fbce2a365f3937st51vuc

Let's get some clarity here. There are a few issues at hand:
a) Drafting Talmidei Chachamim to the army when not in active war.
b) Are they miraculously immune to harm in the event of attack.
c) Talmidei Chachamim fighting in active battle.

Issue a) is connected to Bava Basra 8a, (and Bava Metzia 108). There is a
Machlokes whether that relates to theft or also to Nefashos, but the
majority opinion is that it applies to Nefashos as well. Rashi in Bava
Metzia ad loc. says as much - "Tz'va Son'im La'ir." Rabbanan have no need
from protection from *potential* attacks, which are a constant threat. The
comparison is to walls and watchmen which are deterrents, obstacles. People
learning Torah erect such walls around themselves.

But, to relate to issue b), nobody says that their defense is completely
impregnable, any more than a wall or a watchman. They are not miraculously
protected in the event of bullets being shot at them, or Izevels
threatening to kill them.

Regarding Talmidei Chachamim during *active war.* Here, Bava Basra 8 is
inapplicable. But Shevet Levi status is. Makos 10 - "Omdos Hayu Ragleinu"
is. Assa being punished for Angarya BeTalmidei Chachamim is. Is there value
in Talmidei Chachamim *during war* learning to provide merit? Does it
provide protection and help the soldiers? Yes. Are they immune - no. Not
any more than any soldier is.
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From: cantorwolb...@cox.net
Sent: Wednesday, July 04, 2012 8:53 AM
> The following question was posed to me and I gave an educated guess....

> I will be flying back from Poland where I'll be teaching the day of
> Tisha b'Av. Because of the time difference, if I were to go by sunset
> for ending the fast, it would add 6 hours additional than were I to have
> remained in Poland. What does halacha say about this? If I fast for the
> 25 or so hours, then it will be daylight where I land.

See Igros Moshe Orach Chaim III:96. (Courtesy of Artscroll Kitzur, Siman 124
footnote 51.)

KT,
MYG

RZS replied to RAE:
>> Only to people who wish to sublimate their their will to his authority.
>> And almost by definition, anyone who defies that authority  has
>> withdrawn his or her consent.
>
> Hardly.   Or else no melech and no beis din would ever have authority.

Well, that's why a melekh only becomes one after being properly
appointed by a navi and Sanhedrin. Barring that, he is no melekh. Man
malkheio, rabbanon can only work for those who accept that rav's
authority, so indeed, the kind of king you make a rebbe into is one of
rather limited authority.

-- 
Arie Folger,
Recent blog posts on http://ariefolger.wordpress.com/
* Toleranz aber ohne Respekt ? zwei Artikel zur Brit Mil?
* Ein Volk, eine Gemeinde ? R?ckblick auf dem Freitagabend-Anlass
* Die Beschneidung ist im Judentum unentbehrlich
* Joe the Pumber, Guns Control and the Lethal Oppression of the Masses
* Offene Brief an die Redaktion von ?Die Zeit?
* Alle sind gleich vor dem Schabbat, dem hochmodernen Ruhetag
* Thoughts on a Polarizing Society
* Do we Owe Respect to Old Bones?

On 5/07/2012 11:40 AM, Arie Folger wrote:
> RZS replied to RAE:
>>> Only to people who wish to sublimate their their will to his authority.
>>> And almost by definition, anyone who defies that authority  has
>>> withdrawn his or her consent.
>>
>> Hardly.   Or else no melech and no beis din would ever have authority.
>
> Well, that's why a melekh only becomes one after being properly
> appointed by a navi and Sanhedrin. Barring that, he is no melekh. Man
> malkheio, rabbanon can only work for those who accept that rav's
> authority, so indeed, the kind of king you make a rebbe into is one of
> rather limited authority.

It does not, however, exclude anyone who disobeys.


-- 
Zev Sero        "Natural resources are not finite in any meaningful
z...@sero.name    economic sense, mind-boggling though this assertion
                  may be. The stocks of them are not fixed but rather
                 are expanding through human ingenuity."
                                            - Julian Simon

On Thu, Jul 05, 2012 at 12:21:26PM -0400, Prof. Levine quoted Chabad.info
on Areivim:
> From http://fwd4.me/14q6
...
> The main topic of the meeting was how to bring Moshiach, and how to make 
> sure that Lubavitchers don't forget about the main idea of Judaism - 
> Moshiach.
...

Interestingly, the only one of the Rambam's iqarim not in R' Albo's Seifer
haIqarim as an iqar (a required belief that is a first principle) nor
a shoresh (other required beliefs). He classifies belief in mashiach is
an anaf, not something necessary to nourish the "tree". For that matter,
the Rambam spells out the subypes of minim, apiqursim and koferim baTorah
(Hil Teshuvah 3:7-8) before getting on to those who lose olam haba for
non-belief reasons, and those who deny techiyas hameisim or bi'as hago'el
are in their own separate categories. It would seem the Rambam holds that
someone who doesn't believe in mashiach won't make it to olam haba, but
he doesn't include them in his definition of the terms that are reused
when discussing things like stam yeinam. So the Rambam might hold you
could drink his wine, perhaps.

Also, it's not the answer Hillel gives the geirus candidate for kol
haTorah kulah al regal achas, nor R' Aqiva's nor Ben Azzai's kelal
gadol, nor in Mes' Avos's lists of things upon which the world is omeid
or qayam. Not is it one of the beliefs that constitute the Chinukh's
Shishah Mitzvos Temidios.

I'm raising this not to get into a discussion of Lub messianism in
particular, but to open the question of how one decides what is "the
main idea", as variously explained by the numerous derakhim.

This question is sparked also by my reading R' Dr Gidon Rothstein's
"We're Missing the Point: What Wrong with the O Jewish Community and
How to Fix It" (Ktav 2012). R/D GR rules out using aggadita (such as
Hillel and the geirim) because it often uses exageration to make a point,
and tries to derive an incontravertible answer from halakhah, looking
at the mitzvos that apply more often or that have the greater oneshim.

I have problems with the notion that there is one right answer. But in
that part of the book, before getting to the "how to fix it" part, RGR
effectively raises the question of how one would find /any/ right answer.

Tir'u baTov!
-Micha

PS: If anyone has R/D GR's email address, could you please send it to me?

-- 
Micha Berger             It's nice to be smart,
mi...@aishdas.org        but it's smarter to be nice.
http://www.aishdas.org                   - R' Lazer Brody
Fax: (270) 514-1507


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