Avodah Mailing List

Volume 28: Number 159

Sun, 14 Aug 2011

• 1. The Relationship Between the Study of Torah and Other Knowledge (Prof. Levine)
• 2. Re: God who knows the future (kennethgmil...@juno.com)
• 3. simanim and their effects.... (Harvey Benton)
• 4. Re: Ladies not making Havdallah (Chana Luntz)
• 5. Re: Characterizing our era (Lisa Liel)
• 6. havdallah, and other berachos (Harvey Benton)
• 7. hayom yom rishon.... (Harvey Benton)
• 8. Re: "God who knows the future" (David Riceman)
• 9. metziuses in nature.... (Harvey Benton)
• 10. Re: tachlis of creation (Yosef Gavriel Bechhofer)
• 11. Re: havdallah, and other berachos (Zev Sero)
• 12. Re: Kehunat Shem (Ilana Koehler)
• 13. Re: Characterizing our era (Ben Waxman)

The following is from RSRH's commentary on Devarim 6: 7

7 And impress them sharply upon your sons and speak of them when you 
sit in your house and when you walk upon the way, when you lie
down and when you get up.

V'dibarta Bom

The study of the Torah shall be our main intellectual pursuit. We are not
to study the Torah incidentally. We are not to study Torah from the standpoint
of another science or for the sake of that science. So, too, we are to
be careful not to introduce into the sphere of the Torah foreign ideas that
were developed on the basis of other premises. Rather, we should always
be mindful of the superiority of the Torah, which differs from all other
scientific knowledge through its Divine origin. We should not imagine
that it is based on mere human knowledge and accordingly is on the same
level as other human sciences.

We have already explained in our Commentary on Vayikra 18:4-5
that these statements [of our Sages] do not demand of us to completely
ignore all the scientific knowledge that has been gained and cultivated in
other spheres. Rather, these statements assume that a person is familiar
with these other realms of knowledge, but they teach us that one should
occupy himself with this knowledge only from the Torah's perspective,
for only in this way will this knowledge be beneficial to us, and they warn
us that neglecting this perspective will jeopardize our intellectual life.
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R' David Riceman wrote:

> You have left me more confused than before.  I had thought you
> agreed with RMB, who holds that one cannot predicate time of God,
> that all the details of history form a deterministic process, and
> God knows them "outside" of time. ...
>
> You, however, are introducing a distinction between God's
> "knowledge" and God's "foreknowledge".  This is hard to harmonize
> with God's simplicity.  If I understand you correctly God makes
> his decree at some particular point, and it can't be changed by
> any event after that time, even though it won't be known for
> quite some time after that time (remember the gemara is before
> ultrasound or DNA testing).

Yes, exactly. Again, as I wrote before, my source is "Ba'asher hu sham"
(Bereshis 21:17). See Rashi there, and/or any of a gazillion Teshuva
Drashos which quote it.

Hashem knows what we will do in the future. (Or, as someone wrote me
offlist, from His perspective He knows what we DID in the future.) But He
does not take any of that into account when He makes His plans.

For example, He knew at Bereshis all of the tefilos an expectant parent
would say, before during and after the pregnancy. And all their other
mitzvos and aveiros too. Now, there is a certain point, biologically, when
the child's sex is determined, and I say that during Bereishis, Hashem
looked at the parents up to that point, and made his decision about the
child's sex. But anything the parents would do after that point did not
work into the calculation.

Up to this point, my source is those drashos on "Ba'asher hu sham". But my
logic also tells me other svaros: According to RDR's view on this, why
should there be any difference between the tefilos a parent says a minute
before the baby is born, and a minute after? Isn't Hashem equally aware of
both? The answer, I suspect, is that Hashem follows certain rules, for
without them the world would be in chaos.

Just imagine, if a baby would be born and the parent's realization of the
baby's sex would cause his tefilos to be so heartfelt that it would cause a
science-fictiony time-travel change, and the baby was born as the parent
asked. This is exactly the "grandfather paradox" the R' Micha wrote of.
Because now that the tefila worked, it never got said.

(If you'd like, we can go off on a tangent and point out that this is
indeed what happens with Teshuva. It is indeed against logic for Teshuva to
erase the past. It does indeed do that, but because it doesn't affect the
physical world, it's not really relevant to this thread.)

After explaining the grandfather paradox, R' Micha Berger wrote:

> This is why I would remove the concept of Hashem knowing now what
> will happen in the future. It avoids understandings in which HQBH
> is the arrow closing a cycle in causality. The cycle would only
> be closed if HQBH would act today based on that knowledge of the
> future, thus causing an effect that precedes its cause within
> time.

I'd suggest that there is an error in the first sentence which becomes
revealed by the last sentence. You don't need to remove the *concept* og
Hashem knowing the future. It is quite sufficient for Him to not *act* on
that knowledge, as I explained above.

"Baasher hu sham" -- Hafoch bah, v'hafoch bah, d'kulo bah.

Akiva Miller

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simanim and there "real" versus imaginary or "hopeful" placebo effect upon us......
with rosh hashanna approaching, certain members of our tribe, engage in the 

practice of placing, eating and prefacing the eating of certain fruits, vegetables, 

and "l'rosh v'lo l'zanaf" fish heads on our plates. 

my question is, i am sure (though i was not there) that many of these practices were
performed prior to wwii, prior to the spanish inquisition, prior to the chevron massacres, 

etc.,? 

however, on the flip side, we know that a melech has (i believe it is a requirement)
to be "crowned" by a body of water.......from which we learn out, that the koach of
simanim- is real and exists. how do we shtim these two possible outcomes??? 
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> On Wed, Aug 10, 2011 at 05:47:42PM -0400, Aryeh Herzig wrote:
> > Yerushalmi Berachot says we say Havdallah in Chonen Hadaat because :
> >Im Ein Daath Havdallah Minayin".  Since Nashim Daatan Kaloth they can not
> > make havdallah. ( Maariv is reshus so ladies don't daven Maariv anyway
so
> > it is only relevant on Havdallah al HaKos.)

And RMB replied

> Women are mechuyavos in havdallah, the question is only Havdallah al
> haKos. But saying or being yotzeit at least "barukh hamavdil bein
> qodesh lechol" is mandatory (Rama OC 299:10).

Nashim dataan kalot is a complete irrelevancy here, but RMB's statement
above is also not quite right.

First you need to understand the concept of Havdala, and then the
applicability to women.

To my mind, the best summary of the various shitot is the Aruch Hashulchan
in Orech Chaim Siman 296.  First he sets out the references in the gemora,
and then brings the Rambam, the Smag, the Sefer Hachinuch and Pirkei D'Rabbi
Eliezer in support of the position that havdala is d'orisa, and linked to
Kiddush (sanctification of shabbas as it comes in and as it goes out being
equivalent and derived from the Torah).

And then he brings the Magid Mishna on the Rambam that there are those who
disagree and hold that havdala is only d'rabbanan, and their opinion is that
all of these Torah texts are asmachtos b?alama.

And then he states in Si'if 4:

...????? ???? ????? ?????? ????, ??? ???????? - ?? ???? ??????, ???? ????
???? ????. ??? ?????, ???? ???? ???? ?????? ??? ??? ??? ???? ????, ???? ???
???? - ??? ????? ?????? ?? (?"? ??? ???? ?? ??? ?"?). ??? ?????? ?????? ??
??? ????? - ??????, ?????? ?????? ????? (?"? ??).

... And the nafka mina l?dina is in relation to women, because if it is from
the Torah ? also women are obligated, since for all matters of shabbas [the
obligations] are equal.  But if it is from the rabbis, and the matters is
not dependent upon shmiras shabbas rather that it is a matter of its own,
and it is a zman grama ? then women are not obligated in it (Beis Yosef at
the end of this siman).  And there are those who say that even if it is
d?rabbanan, they are obligated, since they [the rabbis] enacted it to be
like Kiddush (Magid Mishna there)

And then in si'if 5:

??? ?? ?? ??? ????? ??"? ????? ?': "???? ?????? ?????? ??? ??????? ??????,
??? ?? ?????" ??"?. ???? ????? ???"?: ??? ?? ?? ?????? ?????, ?? ????? ?????
?? ?????? ??"?.
??? ?? ????? ????, ?????? ?? ?? ?????? - ????? ????, ??? ??????? ?? ??? ????
??? ????? ???? ????? ????? ?????? ??? (?"? ???"? ???"?). ??? ???? ????????
??? ????? ????? ?????? ????? - ?????? ????? ????????, ??? ?? ???? - ??????
(?? ??"?).
??? ?? ?????? ???? ????? ???"? ?????? ????? ?????? ?????? ????????? - ???
????? ????, ??? ??????, ??? ????? ??? ????? ?? ?? ?????? (?"? ??"?).
???????, ??? ???? ?? ??? ??? ?? ????? ??? ??? ??????, ????? ??????. ??? ??
????? ???? ?????? ????? ?????? ?????? ????, ??? ????? ???? ?? ????? ?????
(???? ??"? ??). ??? ?? ????, ???? ?? ?????? ?? ???? ?????? ????, ???? ????
???? ?? ???? ???, ???? ???? ??????? ?????? ???? ???????? ????????? ????
????, ??????? ?????? ?? ??????. ?????? ?? ????? - ?? ?????? ??? ?? ?????,
??????? ??????, ?????? ?????, ??? ????? ???? ?????? ??? - ?? ????? ???????.
???? ??? ???? ?????? ??????? ??????, ??? ??? ??? ?????? ??? ??????, ???? ??
????? ??? ??? ?? ?????? ??? - ??????? ?????. ?????? ?? ????? ???? ??????,
??? ???? ???? ????? ???? ?????. ??????? ?? ??, ???? ???? ???, ????? ?????
???, ??? ???? ?????? ???, ?????? ?????????? ?????? ?????.
?????? ?? ???? ???? ???? ????? - ?? ????? ????? ????, ??? ????? ???? ???? ??
????? ????? ????? ????? ??? ???, ??"? ????? ???"? (?"? ???"?). ??? ???? ????
?? ?????, ?????? ????? ???? ??? ???? ?????, ??? ????? - ???? ??????? ??????.
???? ??? ??????? ?? ???? ??? ??????, ??????? ?? ?????? ?????? ????? ????
???, ??? ?? ??? ?????? - ???? ????? ???? ????? ?????? ?????, ??? ??? ???
??????? (?? ???? ?????? ????).

And on this writes the Shulchan Aruch in si?if 8: ?women are obligated in
havdala just as they are obligated in kiddush and there are those who
disagree? and the Rema writes: and therefore they should not make havdala
for themselves, only they should listen to havdala from the men.

And there are those who comment on this, that even if they are exempt ? they
are permitted to bless, like they bless on many mitzvoth aseh shehazman
grama like sukkah and lulav and similar to these (Bach and the Magen Avraham
si?if Katan 11).    And this that one of the poskim writes that they are not
permitted to make havdala themselves ? the intention is that they are not
obligated, but if they want to, they are permitted (the Bach there).
And there is one who explains the words of the Rema that it is davka in a
place where the men are obligated in a matter from the Torah ? that they [ie
women] are permitted to bless, and not havdala, according to the one who
explains that also for the men this [ie havdala] is only d?rabbanan (Taz
si?if katan 7).  And I wonder at his words, because behold lulav all the
days of chag it is d?rabbanan except for the first day, and women bless.
And there is one who wants to distinguish davka between mitzvoth that are
actions [where] they [women] are permitted to bless, but not a mitzvah which
is only words (see in the Magen Avraham there).  But also this is not so,
since behold in havdala there is the action of drinking the cup.  And
further what sort of reason is there to distinguish like this, and further,
the majority of the poskim hold that it [havdala] is from the Torah, and
they are obligated m?din Torah, and they are able to exempt also men.  And
even if it [havdala] is d?rabbanan, they are able to exempt, as they are
both d?rabbanan, and this position that they are not obligated at all, they
are [only] individual opinions [daot yechidot].

And there are those who want to be concerned for the matter of exempting the
men, and that also it is good for them to hear it from the mouths of men,
and anyway it is straightforward that if there is not [a man] to make
havdala for them, they should make havdala for themselves.  And I saw one
who questioned how can they [the women] make havdala, because behold women
do not drink from the cup of havdala.  And I wonder on this, because this is
din, and this is merely minhag, and not all are concerned for this, and it
is straightforward that when they make havdala they need to drink.

And I saw one who writes that a man who has already made havdala is not able
to make havdala for women, like the man who cannot bless on the shofar on
behalf of the women when he has already fulfilled his obligation, like is
written in siman 589 at the beginning of si?if katan 18.  And it seems to me
that this is not similar, that with shofar it is straightforward that there
is no obligation on them, but havdala, according to most poskim they are
obligated.  And those also of the minority that are concerned that they are
exempt, and indeed if they are able to make havdala for themselves it is
better, but if they are not able, it is permitted and a mitzvah for a man to
make for them havdala, and is the opinion of the majority of the poskim and
so it seems to my limited mind."

So in summary.  If the woman in question is Sephardi and hence follows Maran
over the Rema, then she is considered equally as obligated as a man in
obligation of havdala (and can exempt a man if necessary) (stam v'yesh omrim
halacha k'stam).  If she is Ashkenazi, then the Rema is choshesh for the
opinion that women are not obligated at all in havdala as it is an
independent, not shabbas linked, rabbinical mitzvah, which is dependent on
time, and therefore as per the general rule regarding positive mitzvoth
dependent upon time, she is exempt, and therefore despite the clear majority
opinion would appear to prefer that she heard it from a man.  Not everybody
agrees even with this interpretation of the Rema, however, and some say it
is just that she cannot exempt a man, but can say it for herself or other
women (the Bach).  There are others who say that if a man has fulfilled his
obligation he is not allowed, being choshesh for her non obligation, not
repeat it for her, but rather she should say it for herself, but the Aruch
Hashuchan, while preferring her to say it for herself, allows a man to make
havdala for a women if he has fulfilled his obligation already, given that
the overwhelming majority of the poskim obligate a woman equivalently to a
man.

There is also a minhag that women do not drink from the cup of havdala.  And
while, as the Aruch Hashulchan notes, not everybody follows this minhag, one
can therefore understand Rav Eliashev's position (that started this whole
thread off), that for havdala of Shabbat chazon, one should not give the kos
to a girl to drink.  After all, not drinking the kos for havdala after
Shabbat chazon is a minhag (and one the Sephardim do not follow), and not
giving a woman to drink from the kos of havdala is a minhag, and if it is a
clash of minhagim, it is clearly going to be better to waive the minhag of
not drinking the kos on shabbas chazon, since really, as is clear, the
ma'aseh of drinking is an integral part of havdala, and giving a child is a
bit dubious halachically anyway, so if you are going to have a minhag clash,
better that one gives.

Having now familiarised oneself with the topic and what our texts have said
about it, can one see why nashim datan kalot is a complete irrelevancy here?

> Tir'u baTov!
> -Micha

Shavuah Tov

Chana

On 8/12/2011 4:01 PM, kennethgmil...@juno.com wrote:
> R' Micha Berger wrote:
>
>> In the past I suggested two different lines -- the SA for Seph,
>> and the Mappah for Ashk. The SA (speaking inclusively) recentered
>> halachic discussion around a new book, ...
>>
>> This potential post-acharonic period lacks a similar book. While
>> the MB is rising to that role, it's only one of 4 Turim.
>
> Perhaps the MB is not merely *rising* to that role. Perhaps it is filling that role *precisely*.

The Mishnah Brurah is nothing of the sort.  Even the Shulchan Aruch is 
severely lacking, given that it's only on the Arba Turim.  The Aruch 
Hashulchan at least covers the "fifth Tur" in Aruch HaShulchan HeAtid.

> Consider the comparison **you've** made between the Tur and the MB:
> The Tur (and it's relatives, such as the SA) were the standard-bearers
> for centuries. The a major upheaval occurred, in which a new
> standard-bearer appeared (the MB), which focused only on a particular
> section of the prior one, concentrating on those halachos considered
> most relevant for the times.

The Mishnah Brurah leaves out everything about kashrut and taharat 
hamishpacha.  How is that including everything that's relevant for its 
age?  Not to mention that the material of the "fifth Tur" is extremely 
relevant for us today.

I heard a story, btw, that the Chofetz Chaim was actually planning on 
continuing and doing Yoreh Deah next.  But he was asked by a number of 
Rashei Yeshiva not to, because it would make it too easy to learn the 
laws of kashrut.  It may be apocryphal, but then again, it may not be.

> Is this not exactly what the Tur did to the Rambam?

I don't think so.  There were no korbanot at Rambam's time, either.  And 
no agricultural laws to be kept (with a few exceptions).  But he 
included them just the same, because it's 100% relevant to us.  The Tur 
did not.  Neither did the Shulchan Aruch.  Sometimes I honestly see 
where the Rambamists are coming from.

Lisa

what is the history of the berachos that we have, including the shemone
esre, [the extra] v'malshinim, the shabbas candles bracha, chanukah candles
bracha, matza bracha on pesache, etc, 

do they all have the same validity as the original shemone esre?
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i was told that the reason we are allowed to use the babylonian names of our months (although) they (10 of 12)
were names of babylonian gods, is that we are allowed to use the names of gods/months, that appear in? the
gemmara?? 
1 is this? true; 2. would this reasoning (at all?) apply to our using the names we currently use
for our weekdays (eg, sunday= Sun [god], Monday = [Moon (god)] day. etc, 
.....other names of our weekdays i have read (not verified) are from mercury and other gods that are 
(or were) once worshiped. 
isn't there a biblical commandment to not allow the names of foreign gods on our? lips??
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RMB:

<<In RCC's edition, the sentence that runs across Iyov pp 17-18 and the 
one on Qoheles pg 195 line 5 both explicitly refer to Hashem's knowledge 
of the future as part of His Knowledge of every perat.>>

I found the reference in Iyov (the first word on p. 18 is he'asid) but I 
didn't see the relevance of the passage in Koheles. The subject of the 
passage in Iyov is whether God knows particulars, which need not be 
related to whether God knows the future (it depends both on how you 
construe God "knowing" and on how you construe the future - - see MN 
III:20-21).  I am grateful for the reference, but I wonder if there's a 
place where the Ramban specifically discusses the future, what it is and 
how God knows it.

The Ramban is particularly hard to decipher because he is not a full 
blown adherent of the Kalam - - he does think that nature exists as more 
than a delusion, but he also thinks that God regularly overrules nature 
(in fact, he thinks that the overruling itself follows laws).  That 
makes me unsure how he construes the future.

<<I have no idea what they mean by lemaalah min hazeman>>

A contemporary physicist would translate "time is an emergent phenomenon".

<<In our worldview, time is a context, a dimension, in which processes 
occur.>>

I don't know what you mean by "we", paleface! It's true that physicists 
model physical phenomena that way, but I don't know how that can be 
construed as disposative.  In particular, the question is whether the 
future is uniquely determined by the present, or whether there are 
possible futures only one of which is selected (so future and past are 
asymetric), or whether, a la Everett, there are multiple futures.  Has 
someone come up with an experiment to distinguish these three alternatives?

In the second and third alternatives, space time is not a manifold - - 
you'd need to define something vaguely like a Riemann surface at each 
cusp and knit them all neatly together in a treelike structure.  In 
particular, time cannot be construed to be a dimension in those 
circumstances.

<<Everyone (except the Ralbag and some outliers most of us never heard 
of) holds that G-d knows everything in every detail.>>

This shabbos I came across Ibn Daud in HaEmunah HaRama 2:6:2 cited in 
Wolfson "Repercussions of the Kalam in Jewish Philosophy", p. 217, note 15.

<<A prayer before pregnancy creates a world in which a child of the 
desired gender is more likely to fit Hashem's plan. Cause precedes 
effect. A prayer after 40 days of pregnancy places the effect that 
Hashem inserts into the timeline before the cause, and thus would be 
demanding a causal loop. If Hashem were to do that, free will would be 
curtailed (as I tried to show with the Grandfather Paradox).>>

Now look at Ta'anis 8b, cited l'halacha in H. Berachos 10:22.  "Someone 
who goes to measure his harvest prays "May it be Your will, O God, to 
send a blessing <why not "to bless"?> in the works of my hand". ... if 
he measured and then prayed it is a false prayer." (I translated the 
Rambam, not the gemara)

Why doesn't this prayer request a causal loop? He's already finished 
harvesting - - the amount of grain is determined.  I would say, naively, 
the Mishna holds that the future is not predetermined, and that God will 
listen to prayers until he's determined the gender of the baby, and the 
braysa holds that the future is predetermined, and that God will listen 
to prayers until the person who prays knows the outcome.  The Rambam 
paskens the braysa and not the Mishna based on his philosophical position.

I want to critique RAM's (and possibly also RMB's) position more 
generally.  Naively, when I say "I have free will", I mean that I could 
have written either "say" or "write" in that previous sentence, and that 
it is I who determine which of those happens.  When we say that ten 
years ago someone could predict which of those would happen, we need to 
redefine "free will".

I know of two options.  One is Spinoza's - - my will is free because I 
intended to write "say".  The other is from the Kuzari (5:20): no 
discernible causal chain induced me to write "say" (see Heshek Shlomoh 
al HaKuzari p. 520 s.v. "b'li hechreichi").  The problem with the first 
solution (which I think is RAM's) is that God created my intention.  The 
problem with the second is that it redefines free will beyond 
recognition - - not that either thing can happen, but that I don't 
understand why what happened was inevitable.

I don't find either option at all palatable (see H. Tshuvah 5:3-4), 
which is why I think it's important to retain the opinions of those 
rishonim who preserve the naive understanding of free will.

David Riceman

what metziuzes in nature still exist today, as described by chazal, 

even if they have not made their rulings into shulchan aruch, 

eg, some things described by the arizal, r. yehuda hachasid (
practices we should/should not do) etc., 
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Seeing the question posed here brought me to blog the Rebbe Rashab's 
answer in the name of the Ba'al HaTanya. Since Avodah doesn't do Hebrew 
(or, in this case, Yiddish), please see:

http://rygb.blogspot.com/2011/08/nisaveh-hkbh-dira-batachtonim-no.html

On 8/12/2011 9:32 AM, Micha Berger wrote:
> This question is too rich for the human mind, and so we each have different
> ways of casting shadows of the infinite Truth onto the surface of our
> imaginations. Each of us looks at it from a slightly different angle, and
> therefore gets a different shadow. Communication causes feedback, forming
> groups of people who share very similar such "shadows", and we call those
> derakhim.
>
> The split between Chassidus and Litta could be seen as being about how they
> model the takhlis, see RYGB's "Forks" essay
> <http://www.aishdas.org/rygb/forks.htm>. So I can only answer this question
> by prefacing it with the acknowledgment that this is only true of my own
> derekh, and nowhere near a universal answer.
>

On 14/08/2011 2:49 AM, Harvey Benton wrote:
> what is the history of the berachos that we have, including the shemone
> esre, [the extra] v'malshinim, the shabbas candles bracha, chanukah candles
> bracha, matza bracha on pesache, etc,
> do they all have the same validity as the original shemone esre?

Brachos are one of the seven mitzvos derabanan (whose mnemonic I can never
remember :-) )

Sh"E, and the concept of prescribing a rough nusach hatefilah in general,
is from Anshei Knesset Hagedolah.

-- 
Zev Sero        If they use these guns against us once, at that moment
z...@sero.name   the Oslo Accord will be annulled and the IDF will
                 return to all the places that have been given to them.
                                            - Yitzchak Rabin

                    
                

Date: Mon, 08 Aug 2011 10:13:43 -0400
From: Zev Sero <z...@sero.name>
> On 8/08/2011 6:41 AM, Ilana Koehler wrote:
>> How did Abraham get the Kehuna from Shem?

> He didn't.  Where did you see that Avraham was ever a kohen? 

Answer:  Nedarim 32b; Tehilim 110.

Did Shem sin with the beracha? 
If so, how?
Where?
Why?
When? 

I have a book, the Badei HaShulchan, on kashrut and nidda. It is called the 
MB of Yoreh Deah. However, anyone wanting to learn kashrut shouldn't 
approach these books until he learns the Beit Yosef. Otherwise, he won't get 
very far at all.

Ben
----- Original Message ----- 
From: "Lisa Liel" <l...@starways.net>
> I heard a story, btw, that the Chofetz Chaim was actually planning on 
> continuing and doing Yoreh Deah next.  But he was asked by a number of 
> Rashei Yeshiva not to, because it would make it too easy to learn the laws 
> of kashrut.  It may be apocryphal, but then again, it may not be.
> 



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