Avodah Mailing List

Volume 28: Number 151

Fri, 05 Aug 2011

• 1. Havdalah On Wine Motza'ei Shabbos Chazon (Prof. Levine)
• 2. Re: $100,000 Check Found in Western Wall - NOT!!! (David Eisen)
• 3. Re: Feedback, causality & G-d (kennethgmil...@juno.com)
• 4. Re: $100,000 Check Found in Western Wall (Micha Berger)
• 5. Re: A God who knows the future (Hankman)
• 6. Re: A God who knows the future (T6...@aol.com)
• 7. Re: "God who knows the future" (Lampel)
• 8. Re: A God who knows the future (Hankman)
• 9. Re: A God who knows the future (T6...@aol.com)
• 10. Re: A God who knows the future (Hankman)
• 11. Re: A God who knows the future (Micha Berger)
• 12. Re: A God who knows the future (garry)
• 13. Re: A God who knows the future (T6...@aol.com)
• 14. Re: A God who knows the future (Micha Berger)
• 15. God who knows the future (garry)

 From http://revach.net/article.php?id=602

Havdalah On Wine Motza'ei Shabbos Chazon - Steipler Gaon, Rav Shlomo 
Zalman Auerbach & ybc"l Rav Elyashiv

The Shulchan Aruch (OC 551:10) says you may drink wine for Havdalah 
during the nine days, while the Rema says we are machmir and give it 
to a child. The child who drinks the wine of Havdalah, says the 
Mishan Brura, must be over the age of Chinuch for the mitzva of 
Havdalah and below the age of Chinuch for aveilus of Yerushalayim. 
This would be between the ages of 6 and 9 according to the Chavos 
Ya'ir in Mekor Chaim or 10 according to the Mei'am Lo'eiz. The 
Steipler Gaon, Rav Yisroel Yaakov Kanievsky used to give wine to a 
Katan until the age of Bar Mitzva.

If there is no boy, points out Rav Elyashiv, do not give it to a 
girl. Most poskim hold if there is no child it is preferable to drink 
the wine yourself rather than make on beer.

Rav Shlomo Zalman Auerbach drank the wine himself even if there was a 
qualifying child available, since halachically it is not really a 
problem and the exact age of chinuch for havdalah and aveilus is not 
very clear.

-------------- next part --------------
An HTML attachment was scrubbed...
URL: <http://lists.aishdas.org/pipermail/avod
ah-aishdas.org/attachments/20110805/241a63e5/attachment-0001.htm>

My apologies for jumping the gun on posting this story yesterday that
admittedly sounded quite bogus to me as well. What lent the story
credibility to me was the identity of the reporter, Kobi Nahshoni, who is a
first-rate reporter on religious affairs with a high degree of
professionalism, IMHO, together with the actual report filed with the police
by the Rav of the Kotel. It turns out that the father of the yeshiva student
indeed contacted the Western Wall Authority after being told by his son of
his "find" in the Wall, and only after the police launched their
investigation and questioned the student did he admit to contriving the
entire story, and no motive was given.
http://www.ynet.co.il/articles/0,7340,L-4104522,00.html (though talkback #3
places on interesting spin on the story)

BTW - R. Yuval Cherlow addressed the question yesterday and said that he
could not render an opinion without knowing the full details, though if the
facts set forth in the article are correct, then the check surely belongs to
the Kotel Authority as it was made out to "the Holy Kotel."
http://www.kipa.co.il/ask/show/249664

Shabbat [Hazon] Shalom u'B'vinyan Yerushalaim Nenuham ,
David
-------------- next part --------------
An HTML attachment was scrubbed...
URL: <http://lists.aishdas.org/pipermail/avod
ah-aishdas.org/attachments/20110805/e8482ae1/attachment-0001.htm>

I wrote:

> The older I get, the more wary I've become of such absolutist
> statements. Does the Ramban consider the possibility of a person
> who is *mostly* perfect? Would he accept that such a person exists
> *slightly* in the framework of nature?
>
> The way RDE phrases it bothers me very much. I could be wrong, but
> I don't even like the idea of an *average* person being thrown out
> of Hashgacha Pratis and consigned to the laws of chance, or, as he
> put it, "totally in the framework of nature."

R' Daniel Eidensohn responded:

> Seforno[1] (Vayikra 13:47): When a person sins because he follows
> his lusts and thus turns away from G-d's will or he simply rebels
> against G-d, he will be punished justly according to G-d's justice.
> When a person sins accidentally, he will typically be punished
> either financial or physically according to G-d's wisdom in order
> to arouse him repent. In contrast those who are as insensitive as
> one asleep and thus have no realization of what is happening and
> are not motivated to know - this includes all the nations as well
> as the majority of Jews except for a few exceptions - they are
> without doubt under the direction of nature or mazel. They do not
> receive hashgocha protis but rather a general form of Providence
> which is for the species rather than the individual. Thus they
> are like the animals and other forms of life which do not have
> individual Providence. They thus fulfill G-d's will only on the
> level of the group not as individuals.

My complaint was against absolutist views. In other words, I object to an
all-or-nothing view such as RDE's explanation of the Ramban, and I prefer a
"Midah K'neged Midah" framework, where Hashem deals with us to the same
degree as we deal with Him. And it seems to me that this is exactly how the
Seforno views it, per his explanation:

The rebel who believes but disobeys is dealt with by Him very personally
and severely. The one who believes but was careless is still punished
personally, but in a teshuva-designed orientation. It is only the totally
unthinking and uncaring one, who G-d chooses to act in an unthinking and
uncaring way, consigning him to "nature".

In conclusion, I have no problem with the Seforno as RDE explained him. But that sounds very different than the absolutist views that he pinned on the Ramban.

Akiva Miller

____________________________________________________________
Penny Stock Jumping 3000%
Sign up to the #1 voted penny stock newsletter for free today!
http://thirdpartyoffers.juno.com/TGL3131/4e3be8b5427d640e91fst02vuc

I would have figured the check isn't necessarily "heqdeish" in quotes,
but could be *actual* heqdeish. The maintanance of the wall around Har
haBayis is part of bedeq habayis.

So, I see three possibilities (if the story were real):

1- He said it's for the kotel, and thus the money is for bedeq habayis
and actual heqdesh.

2- We assume that stam giving money to the kotel means the kotel
authority and thus includes the plaza, not just Har haBayis.

For that matter machatzis hasheqel money can be spent on maintaining
any of Y-m (ignoring the question of what the definition of Y-m would
be bizman hazeh), does anyone if that applies to money being maqdish
lesheim bedeq habayis in general?

The kotel plaza is within Ezra's Y-m.

But it would seem R' Yuval Cherlow would hold that money given to the
Kotel Authority is not heqdeish. The natural assupmtion -- I would just
like to discuss the sevara.

3- The check is an invalid shetar, an asmachta, since the writer
didn't expect anyone to pick it out of the wall.

-Micha

-- 
Micha Berger             Zion will be redeemed through justice,
mi...@aishdas.org        and her returnees, through righteousness.
http://www.aishdas.org
Fax: (270) 514-1507

Rn'TK wrote:
> A finite line can contain an infinite number of points but the traveler
> does not have to touch separately each and every one of those points to
> get to the end of the line.

Just to nit pick a little, I think that statement is wrong in a
strict mathematical sense if you are treating the line (distance) as
a continuum. There is a theorem in calc 101 that a continuous function
must pass through all points to go from a to b. The body does not pass
(exist at) point a and then b and not exist at some of the intermediate
points, but must pass through ALL the points in between.

I think the standard answer given to Zeno's paradox is that the way the
paradox is constructed, it is by design a limit of a sequence that of
course converges to its limit, but that is not to say that the limit may
not be exceeded by some other construct (such as x+1, x+2, x+3 ....). It
is just the problem (construct) as stated that converges to this limit
and no other.

[Email $2. -micha]

I am sorry, I hit the Enter key too quickly. I meant to add to the
previous post that I do not see how your facile answer that since we do
not know the future, there is no problem with how bechira exists and is
not constraned due to HKB'H's fore knowledge. What difference does our
lack of fore knowledge have to do with it. This amounts to saying that
in truth we do not have bechira, just we don't know it at the time we
are making our "choice" because we are not omniscient about what HKB'H
already knows. The question is why is our choice not constrained, not
whether we are ignorant about the constraint.

Kol Tuv
Chaim Manaster

In a message dated 8/5/2011, [R Chaim Manaster] sal...@videotron.ca writes:
> I am sorry, I hit the Enter key too quickly. I meant to add to the
> previous post that I do not see how your facile answer that since we do
> not know the future, there is no problem with how bechira exists and
> is not constraned due to HKB'H's fore knowledge. What difference does
> our lack of fore knowledge have to do with it. This amounts to saying
> that in truth we do not have bechira, just we don't know it at the time
> we are making our "choice" because we are not omniscient about what
> HKB'H already knows. The question is why is our choice not constrained,
> not whether we are ignorant about the constraint.

Chazal were /acknowledging/ that there is a paradox, not attempting to
/explain/ it!

I thought I was as clear as could be that there is no /logical/ way to
reconcile the paradox. It is just that, in our daily lives, the paradox
makes no practical difference.

I was also saying that Pirkei Avos must be understood as it has always
been understood -- to express something that is true albeit paradoxical --
and that the paradox cannot be explained, or explained away, by finding
some new and original way to translate the words so as to somehow make
it come out that it doesn't mean what it says and that Hashem doesn't
have foreknowledge after all, which chas vesholom to say such a thing.

[Email #2. -micha]

In a message dated 8/5/2011, sal...@videotron.ca writes:
>> A finite line can contain an infinite number of points but the   
>> traveler does not have to touch separately each and every one of those  
>> points to get to the end of the line.[--old TK]

> Just to nit pick a little, I think that statement is wrong in a
> strict mathematical sense if you are treating the line (distance) as
> a continuum....

It was to forestall just such a statement that I used the word
"separately" -- I said that the traveler does not have to touch each
point on the line "separately" -- as he would if he were to literally
attempt to get to the half way point, and before that the halfway point,
and before that the halfway point....etc....of line A..............B.

Of course you are correct that a line must be treated as a continuum,
and not as a series of discrete points, if I am ever to get from Miami
to New York.

--Toby Katz

  On Sun, Jul 31, 2011 at 20:09, David Riceman<drice...@optimum.net>  <mailto:drice...@optimum.net>  wrote:

I happened accross a curious Ramban recently (Parshas Shlah...: so that
maybe they would remember and return to God (ulay yizkru v'yashuvu el
hashem)." RMB:...<I'm saying that "ulai" introduces one hypothetical
outcome (from ilu lo, lulei, ulam), and needn't be that we are entertaining
hypotheticals due to doubt. And when the Rambam earlier called HQBH the
"Yodeia' asidos", he was ascribing to HQBH knowledge of the future with no
exceptions.>

I take "ulai" as an expression of "to give them the opportunity" (based
upon my impression--that I'd have to go back and confirm--of the Ramban's
shittos that as you say, by "Yodeia' asidos", he was ascribing to HQBH
knowledge of the future with no exceptions. Ulai we are saying the same
thing?

ZL


-------------- next part --------------
An HTML attachment was scrubbed...
URL: <http://lists.aishdas.org/pipermail/avod
ah-aishdas.org/attachments/20110805/5dd93b2f/attachment-0001.htm>

Rn'TK wrote:

I believe you misunderstood me.  ...  
Chazal were /acknowledging/ that there is a paradox, not attempting to /explain/ it! 

I thought I was as clear as could be that there is no /logical/ way to reconcile the paradox

CM:

OK, we are on the same page here. But I would modify your statement "there
is no /logical/ way to reconcile the paradox" to read "there is no
/logical/ way to reconcile the paradox that I am aware of or can grasp with
my limited human mind."

Rn'TK wrote:

What I said was that there is no /practical/ problem -- we just have to go
on with our lives and make the best choices we can. I freely admitted that
there is a /logical/ problem, 
...
It is just that, in our daily lives, the paradox makes no practical difference.

CM:

Here I beg to differ. The logical problem can make a big difference in our
lives, viz. Zadok & Beitus and an unknown army of others who have been
led astray by this merely "logical" problem that "makes no practical
difference."

Kol Tuv

Chaim Manaster
-------------- next part --------------
An HTML attachment was scrubbed...
URL: <http://lists.aishdas.org/pipermail/avod
ah-aishdas.org/attachments/20110805/f3df83bb/attachment-0001.htm>

In a message dated 8/5/2011, sal...@videotron.ca writes:

 
>I thought I was as clear as could be that there is no /logical/ way  to 
>reconcile the paradox [--old TK]
 
RCM:
 
OK, we are on the same page here. But I would modify  your statement "there 
is no /logical/ way  to reconcile the paradox" to read "there is no 
/logical/ way to reconcile the  paradox that I am aware of or can grasp with my 
limited human  mind."

 
TK:  You are correct, that is what I should have said.

 
 
>What I said was that there is no /practical/ problem -- we  just have to 
go on >with our lives and make the best choices we can. I  freely admitted 
that there >is a /logical/ problem, 
...
>It is just that, in our daily lives, the paradox makes no practical  
difference.[--old TK]
 
RCM:
 
Here I beg to differ. The logical problem can make a  big difference in our 
lives, viz. Zadok & Beitus and an unknown army of  others who have been led 
astray by this merely "logical" problem that  "makes no practical  
difference."

 
TK:  Well, when they used a question of logic as an excuse to do what  they 
wanted and to absolve themselves of responsibility -- they were  exercising 
their bechira!
 
--Toby Katz
 
 
-----------------------


 
-------------- next part --------------
An HTML attachment was scrubbed...
URL: <http://lists.aishdas.org/pipermail/avod
ah-aishdas.org/attachments/20110805/9620dbc9/attachment-0001.htm>

Rn'TK wrote:

It was to forestall just such a statement that I used the word "separately"
-- I said that the traveler does not have to touch each point on the line
"separately" -- as he would if he were to literally attempt to get to the
half way point, and before that the halfway point, and before that the
halfway point....etc....of line A..............B.

Of course you are correct that a line must be treated as a continuum,  and not as a series of discrete points, if I am ever to get from Miami to New York.

CM:

This is now probably more appropriate for a math forum rather than Avodah,
but your response indicates that you were not comprehending the finer
mathematical point. By using the word "separately" you gain nothing.
"touch[ing] each point on the line 'separately'" has nothing to do with it.
 I imagine you now view each step as a discrete point reached (not passing
thru all the interim points not stepped on?). You are still in need of the
continuum to guarantee the existence of the infinitely many dense "landing
points." Whatever functional description of the movement of the body over
the continuous variables representing distance and time travelled from a to
b they will have to take on ALL intermediate values.

Btw, there is no reason you could not get from Miami to NY in a weird world
with only discrete points, so I am not understanding your need for the
continuum to get from Miami to NY.

Kol Tuv

Chaim Manaster
-------------- next part --------------
An HTML attachment was scrubbed...
URL: <http://lists.aishdas.org/pipermail/avod
ah-aishdas.org/attachments/20110805/ef6c0543/attachment-0001.htm>

On Fri, Aug 05, 2011 at 12:19:52PM -0400, Hankman wrote:
: Btw, there is no reason you could not get from Miami to NY in a weird
: world with only discrete points, so I am not understanding your need
: for the continuum to get from Miami to NY.

That weird world may be ours. There are theories of quantum gravity,
the possible unification of Quantum Mechanics and General Relativity,
in which space is quantized. The granularity is very small (Planck
length is 1.6 * 10^-35 meter), but as long as it's not infintesimal,
it avoids Xeno's paradox.

Also, Xeno's paradox uses infinity in the Aristotilian
conception. "Parallel lines meet at infinity" and "Parallel lines don't
meet" are considered equivalent in classical thought, because you could
never have an infinity of anything.

The early versions of the calculus avoided this problem by invoking
limits. IOW, as we get closer to infinity, we get ever closer to this
point. Thus, it doesn't actually discuss sums of an infinite series.

However, since Cantor's transfinite math, the notion of taking a real
sum of an infinite number of infintesimals can be modeled mathematically,
and we don't shy away from it.

Also, the amount of time it takes to make this sum of infinite points
of space is also subject to the same halving and rehalving. So, it
takes a finite time to cover that finite distance.


Pulling things onto topic for Avodah...

Inifinity is the one topic of math that has theological, and thus Torah
implications.

I've argued here a number of times in the past 13 years that this is one
of the things the Rambam is addressing with his Negative Theology. An
Aristotilian can't have a conception of Infinite Power. But the Rambam
doesn't define Omnipotence that way -- he defines it in the negative:
there is nothing Hashem can't do because of a lack of Power.

Similarly, Cantor's algebra distinguishes between kinds of infinity.
Alef-null (written: alef subscript 0) is the number of integers (counting
numbers). C, which may or may not be alef-1, is the number of numbers,
including integers, ratios, and irrational numbers. IOW, an infinitely
long ruler has alef-null 1 cm marks in it, and C infintesimal points
along its length.

Here's from something I wrote on Birkhas Avos
<http://www.aishdas.org/asp/1998/08/avos.shtml>:
    ...
    Rabbi Yochanan (Megilah 31a) said, "Where ever you find G-d's
    greatness, that is where you find His humility". Perhaps we can
    understand this apparent paradox by comparing G-d's properties to
    those of humans. Schools have a problem of overcrowding. There are
    just so many students a teacher can adequately pay attention to. As
    the number of students grows, each one can only get less and less
    attention. Not so Hashem. His infinity is not just that He is a
    "Kel", G-d over all, but also "Gadol", great enough to give personal
    attention to each person.
    ...

And on berakhos in general
<http://www.aishdas.org/asp/2005/12/what-is-berakhah.shtml>:
    ...
    Hashem Elokeinu -- There is a contrast between these two names
    of Hashem and their implication. This topic alone would require
    multiple essays, so I will simply sketch a couple ways of viewing
    this contrast:
    ...
    2- The very remoteness of the name Havayah also implies Divine
    Mercy. This is not intuitive, however, the need to create law comes
    from a person's limited ability to deal with many individual cases. A
    teacher with few students is effective, one with more students,
    less so. To manage a country, we need laws and policies, since we
    do not have infinite time and attention to cover every decision on a
    case-by-case basis. Therefore, it is only because Hashem is Infinite
    that Divine Mercy is possible. Therefore, this expression can be
    seen as a declaration of the unity of G-d, despite the different
    appearances of Mercy and Strict Justice.
    ...

And in <http://www.aishdas.org/asp/2009/02/infinity-and-thought.shtml>:
    ...
    This difference is a good METAPHOR for explaining a common theological
    error.

    Many wonder how G-d, in charge of the entire universe, could possibly
    be interested in an individual person out of billions on a little
    backwater planet out in one galaxy among who knows how many...

    This is viewing G-d like alef-null. It's a huge set. But there are
    gaps between its members.

    G-d's infinity is beyond that. I'm not saying it's C, or anything
    along those lines (which is why I wrote the word "metaphor" in bold
    at the beginning of this digression), just that it's greater than
    alef-null. And just as the real number line as an infinite number
    of points between zero and one (in addition to comprising an infinite
    number of such intervals), G-d has an infinite amount of attention
    to bestow on each of us.
    ...

-Micha

-- 
Micha Berger             Zion will be redeemed through justice,
mi...@aishdas.org        and her returnees, through righteousness.
http://www.aishdas.org
Fax: (270) 514-1507

On 8/4/2011 9:32 PM, T6...@aol.com wrote:
> That's a fair question.  The problem is a problem of logic rather than 
> a practical problem.
> The logic goes like this:  Let's say that G-d knows that on Monday I 
> am going to speak to my mother in an annoyed tone of voice,  thus 
> being oveir on kibud eim.
> Now, what happens on Monday when she says something that I find 
> annoying, and in addition, I am tired and cranky when she says it?
> Two things can happen:  I can just say the first thing that comes to 
> my tongue and commit a sin.  Or, I can think twice and bite my tongue 
> and not commit that sin.
> But how can I bite my tongue and remain quiet?  If I make that choice, 
> then G-d's knowledge of what I was going to do was flawed and 
> incorrect!  So obviously, I /have/ to choose to sin, in order to make 
> it come out that G-d's foreknowledge was correct!
> As you can see, this is a conundrum only in logic and not in practice, 
> because even if He knows what I am going to do, /I/ don't know what I 
> am going to do before I do it, and at the moment it comes to my 
> choosing, I make my choice based strictly on the options before me, 
> completely without regard to what G-d knows.

I'm sorry, I still don't see it.
You seem to be saying that God knows your initial impulse to say 
something annoying, and therefore if you bite your tongue you will make 
God's knowledge incorrect.  But God also knows whether or not you will 
bite your tongue.  The choice is yours - it's just that the _ultimate_ 
outcome is known.

In a message dated 8/5/2011, g...@garry.us writes:

I'm  sorry, I still don't see it.
 
>>>>
The logical contradiction between "Hashem knows what will happen" and  "we 
have free will" is one of those things that some people see immediately  -- 
and are very disturbed by -- and others never see at all.  It's  like that 
famous picture that shows a beautiful young girl if you look at it one  way 
and an old crone another way.  Some people can see both, others can see  only 
the young girl or the old crone and just can't see what people are getting  
all excited about.
 
Have a good Shabbos
 
--Toby Katz
 


-------------- next part --------------
An HTML attachment was scrubbed...
URL: <http://lists.aishdas.org/pipermail/avod
ah-aishdas.org/attachments/20110805/91008d94/attachment-0001.htm>

On Fri, Aug 05, 2011 at 09:36:59AM -0700, garry wrote:
> You seem to be saying that God knows your initial impulse to say  
> something annoying, and therefore if you bite your tongue you will make  
> God's knowledge incorrect.  But God also knows whether or not you will  
> bite your tongue.  The choice is yours - it's just that the _ultimate_  
> outcome is known.

I agree -- but more importantly, so does the Or Sameiach
<http://hebrewbooks.org/pdfpager.aspx?req=19982&;st=&pgnum=28>, near
the beginning of the page. (Which is midparagraph. The section as a whole
begins on pg 25.) In particular, note the second snippet in this quote:
    ... Hateirutz nakhon
    dema shyodeia haBorei be'asid
    hu mitzad she'etzlo yisbarakh
    3 chilqei hazeman -- avar hoveh asid --
    ke'echad heimah

    ... im kein
    Tzofeh uMabit
    ka'asher yabit ha'adam al hahoveh...

I think it's only our instinct that causes precede effects,
which is not true of HQBH (or of people who know the future by using
a time machine) that causes a false instinct.

The (flawed) notion is that if I saw on my time-viewer that you wouldn't
bite your tongue, and the causal chain always flows forward through time,
the causal chain in which you speak up is already "fixed".

Once you realize that Hashem being outside time means causal chains
that involve Him do not have to flow from past to future, the error
becomes clear.

-Micha

-- 
Micha Berger             Zion will be redeemed through justice,
mi...@aishdas.org        and her returnees, through righteousness.
http://www.aishdas.org
Fax: (270) 514-1507

Date: Thu, 4 Aug 2011 19:22:35 GMT
From: REM "kennethgmil...@juno.com"
>>  I am training a newly-adopted dog.  If I leave him in a room with
>>  food on the floor, he will eat it.  He has complete freedom of
>>  choice (a better-trained dog might not), but there isn't the
>>  slightest doubt what his choice will be.
...

> It seems to me that you are confusing two very different kinds of
> knowledge....
> You are merely drawing a conclusion that the dog will eat it, or
> won't eat it. But G-d knows the event, just as surely as if it had
> already happened.

> This is why G-d's foreknowledge of the event is often perceived as His
> control over it. G-d is not merely a perfect psychologist, who knows our
> personalities so well that He can make predictions about our choices
> without ever erring. He is more like tomorrow's newspaper, for which
> all the events reported are a "done deal".

I agree that there are several important distinctions between the 
situation in my analogy and the question at hand, including the 
difference between knowledge by prediction and absolute knowledge.  But 
I still don't see how it makes knowledge the same as control.
Let's say I'm in a comic book world, and Lex Luther or someone puts a 
copy of tomorrow's newspaper on my desk.  (with a note saying "don't 
open until tomorrow")  I don't see how that has any effect on my actions 
or responsibilities today.  What I will do is already printed in the 
newspaper, but how are my choices (that's what we're talking about, 
isn't it? Choices?)  different or less free today because the newspaper 
is lying on my desk?



------------------------------


Avodah mailing list
Avo...@lists.aishdas.org
http://lists.aishdas.org/listinfo.cgi/avodah-aishdas.org


End of Avodah Digest, Vol 28, Issue 151
***************************************

Send Avodah mailing list submissions to
	avodah@lists.aishdas.org

To subscribe or unsubscribe via the World Wide Web, visit
	http://lists.aishdas.org/listinfo.cgi/avodah-aishdas.org
or, via email, send a message with subject or body 'help' to
	avodah-request@lists.aishdas.org

You can reach the person managing the list at
	avodah-owner@lists.aishdas.org

When replying, please edit your Subject line so it is more specific
than "Re: Contents of Avodah digest..."