Avodah Mailing List

Volume 28: Number 150

Fri, 05 Aug 2011

• 1. GOD WHO KNOWS THE FUTURE (Richard Wolberg)
• 2. Re: God who knows the future (kennethgmil...@juno.com)
• 3. Re: $100,000 Check Found in Western Wall (Arie Folger)
• 4. Re: "God who knows the future" (T6...@aol.com)
• 5. Re: "God who knows the future" (T6...@aol.com)
• 6. Re: Feedback, causality & G-d (kennethgmil...@juno.com)
• 7. Re: "God who knows the future" (Micha Berger)
• 8. Re: Feedback, causality & G-d (Daniel Eidensohn)
• 9. Re: "God who knows the future" (Micha Berger)
• 10. "God who knows the future" (David Riceman)
• 11. Feedback, causality & G-d (David Riceman)
• 12. Re: "God who knows the future" (T6...@aol.com)
• 13. Re: Feedback, causality & G-d (Daniel Eidensohn)
• 14. Re: "God who knows the future" (Yosef Gavriel Bechhofer)
• 15. Re: A God who knows the future (T6...@aol.com)

The analogy I like to give is that if you had an unedited video of someone's
whole life, would that affect the choices that person made? Of course, not.
The only difference here is that God already has the video of your life, but
since God is not bound by time, He knows the choices you will make. From
our point of understanding, we see the choices someone made after the fact.
God sees it before. The real question would be how can God see something
that hasn't taken place yet? The answer I would give is this is obviously way
beyond our comprehension and it would be like a tree asking how we can live
without being attached to the earth. Just as the tree can't understand, neither
can we. 

R' Garry wrote:

> I am missing a big chunk of this discussion.  I simply don't see
> the mystery.  Why does knowledge = control?
>
> I am training a newly-adopted dog.  If I leave him in a room with
> food on the floor, he will eat it.  He has complete freedom of
> choice (a better-trained dog might not), but there isn't the
> slightest doubt what his choice will be.
>
> Now a) humans aren't dogs and b) even for a dog there are choices
> I can't predict.  But the fact  remains the same.  The fact that
> I know what choice he will make doesn't have any effect at all on
> his freedom to make it.

It seems to me that you are confusing two very different kinds of
knowledge. Your knowledge of your dog is knowledge of his thinking
patterns, and this leads you to certain conclusions about the dog and the
food. But G-d's knowledge is a knowledge of the event itself.

You are merely drawing a conclusion that the dog will eat it, or won't eat it. But G-d knows the event, just as surely as if it had already happened.

This is why G-d's foreknowledge of the event is often perceived as His
control over it. G-d is not merely a perfect psychologist, who knows our
personalities so well that He can make predictions about our choices
without ever erring. He is more like tomorrow's newspaper, for which all
the events reported are a "done deal".

If G-d would merely predict our actions, He'd be little more than a stage
illusionist. But these are not mere predictions. Our future is as clear to
Him as our past is, and this is what strikes fear into our hearts, and
makes (some of) us feel like we have no free choice.

Akiva Miller

____________________________________________________________
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Two important possibilities are missing from your list:
8. Should the cheque be considered as having been made out to
"heqdesh,"i.e. for a G"dly purpose, for instance, a recipient fund
designated by the Kotel Plaza?
9. Should it be considered tsedaqa, that the payor was intending it to
go to a needy individual or institution, and is the finder entitled to
tsedaqa support (until he cashes the cheque, after which he'll be a
great deal wealthier)?

-- 
Arie Folger,
Recent blog posts on http://ariefolger.wordpress.com/
* Rabbi, wie stehen Sie zur Ein?scherung?
* Biblical Advice for the Internet Age iii
* Speaking To Your Kids About Personal Safety
* Chance Favors the Concentration of Wealth, Study Shows - What's
Torah's Alternative?
* Biblical Advice for the Internet Age ii
* The Ecologically Correct Funeral
* The Goodly Tents of Jacob
* Biblical Advice for the Internet Age

 
From: Yosef Gavriel Bechhofer <r...@aishdas.org>
old TK:  > "Tzafui" absolutely does mean foreknowledge.  And I don't want  
to
> hurt anyone's feelings but I really think that the denial that  Hashem
> knows the future is apikorsus.

RYGB:It takes broad  shoulders to call the Ralbag an apikores...

 
TK: Please show me where the Ralbag denies that Hashem knows the  future.

RYGB: According to which one of the Yud Gimmel Ikkarim is that  Apikorsus 
anyway?


TK: The sixth one, "all the words of the Nevi'im  are true."  How can the 
Nevi'im know the future if Hashem Himself doesn't  know the future?
 
 
PS. RMB's post about how Hashem is outside of time and therefore terms like 
 "past" and "future" are irrelevant to Him -- all very well, but in our 
human  perspective, Hashem knows our past and our future, so down here on Earth 
the  question about His foreknowledge and our bechira remains, except that 
I think it  is adequately answered by saying that since /we/ don't know the 
future, our  choices are not constrained.
 
--Toby Katz
 
 
 
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From: Micha Berger <mi...@aishdas.org>
>>I never  before noticed it, but Omnipotence and Omniscience are
not in the  Iqarim.<<



>>>>>
WHAT are you talking about?  Omnipotence and omniscience are the  bedrock 
and foundation of the entire set of Ani Ma'amins!
 
from the Koren translation:
1. Hashem creates and rules all creatures, and He alone made, makes,  and 
will make, all things.
 
5.  He is the only one to whom it is proper to pray
 
6.  All the words of the prophets are true.
 
10.  He knows all the deeds of human beings, and all of their  thoughts.
 
11.  He rewards those who keep His commandments and punishes those who  
transgress them.
 
13.  The dead will live again, at a time of the Creator's  choosing.
 
 
It would take such a highly eccentric reading that I can't even fathom it,  
to say that He knows all our deeds and thoughts, but is not necessarily  
omniscient; or that He created everything, answers prayers, rewards and  
punishes, and will bring the dead to life -- but is not necessarily  omnipotent.
 
--Toby Katz
 
------------------------------
 
 

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R' Daniel Eidensohn wrote:

> However I am not focusing on consciousness but rather effectiveness
> or the natural of causality. When I teach my students - does it
> matter how? If they don't learn is it my responsiblity to do
> something different?
>
> In any act I do - is it necessary to pay attention to the
> effectiveness of my action and modify the nature and intensity
> while monitoring the consequences for a particular variable? Or is
> my effort merely a necessary symbolic act - but not a sufficient
> condition for success?

At first, I was going to say that the answer will depend on the machlokes
as you've explained it. According to the Chovos Halevavos ("one should not
change jobs even if he sees he is not being successful in a particular line
of work"), I suppose he should just keep on teaching in his usual way, but
if he does more mitzvos and has more zechusim, then Hashem will give him
more success.

But then I wanted to distinguish between teaching and other jobs. It seems
cruel and inconceivable to imagine that the Chovos Halevavos would tell a
teacher not to change jobs even if he sees that his students are not
learning from him. Is it possible that students will learn or not learn
depending on whether or not Hashem wants that teacher to be a successful or
unsuccessful teacher?

And then I realized that this is exactly what happened with Paro and Yosef.
Paro did a very poor job of explaining his dream, and left out some
critical details. But Hashem wanted Yosef Hatzadik to be successful, and he
understood even the things that Paro left out.

(Lest anyone think this example fits only the Chovos Halevavos, I would
point out that it seems to fit RDE's explanation of Ramban too: Because
Yosef was a tzadik, nature didn't apply, and no histadlus was necessary, so
the omission of details was irrelevant.)

At this point, I'd like to move back from Yosef Hatzadik, and closer to our selves. RDE wrote:

> The view of the Ramban is just the opposite. If a person is not
> completely perfect then in fact he exists totally in the framework
> of nature. As such he of necessity must work in order to achieve
> his goals. Work and effort therefore is real and not just a
> formality.

The older I get, the more wary I've become of such absolutist statements.
Does the Ramban consider the possibility of a person who is *mostly*
perfect? Would he accept that such a person exists *slightly* in the
framework of nature?

The way RDE phrases it bothers me very much. I could be wrong, but I don't
even like the idea of an *average* person being thrown out of Hashgacha
Pratis and consigned to the laws of chance, or, as he put it, "totally in
the framework of nature."

Even moreso am I bothered by the idea that only a "completely perfect"
person would escape such a fate. Even Moshe Rabenu wasn't "completely
perfect." Would the Ramban say that Moshe was "totally in the framework of
nature", or would he concede that he was *slightly* in the framework of
nature?

If RDE's use of the word "completely" was an error, or mere rhetoric, then
I think this whole issue becomes moot on a practical level, because we are
all somewhere in the middle, needing both work and zechusim.

Akiva Miller

____________________________________________________________
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On Thu, Aug 04, 2011 at 03:46:32PM -0400, T6...@aol.com wrote:
: Please show me where the Ralbag denies that Hashem knows the future.

Already done. To repeat: Milkhamos Hashem 3:3.

According to the Ralbag, Hashem's knowledge is complete knowledge of
the consequence of every combination of decisions people are capable
of making.

: The sixth one, "all the words of the Nevi'im are true." How can the 
: Nevi'im know the future if Hashem Himself doesn't know the future?

Knowledge of the sort the Ralbag describes is sufficient. Particularly
since we have cases like "veNinveh nehepekhes" where the nevu'ah could
go different ways depending on the listener's consequent decisions.

For that matter, a person's knowledge is quite limited, but it's
hypothetically possible that there is someone who simply never announces
anything he is in the dark about.

Similarly, being the Creator doesn't necessitate Omniscience or
Omnipotence, nor are they necessary for it to be worth worshipping Him.

Try looking at the Ralbag with a clean slate, rather than from a position
of shock at how alien it all seems. At least one Tosafist believed that
G-d had a body. And his argument, actually, is more solid than you'd
think. We can't just ignore rishonim or retrofit them. Even those who
believed things that we today pasqen would make one's wine non-kosher.

: PS. RMB's post about how Hashem is outside of time and therefore terms like 
: "past" and "future" are irrelevant to Him -- all very well, but in our 
: human perspective, Hashem knows our past and our future, so down here on Earth 
: the question about His foreknowledge and our bechira remains...

But our perspective is false, only an approximation of His Reality (for
want of a better word), and not even the best approximation we are
capable of.


The question is that between knowledge and control, as R' Garry put it.
The only reason why this is a question is because we presume that causes
precede effects in time. IOW, if it is already known now what I will
decide tomorrow, then I can't decide otherwise -- or the "knowledge"
is in error. And thus, no free will.

But G-d's knowledge is outside of time and outside the causal chain,
and therefore His knowledge of the future compells my decision as little
as my knowledge of your post from yesterday compells your decision to
write it, as the Or Samayach put it. Or, by placing G-d out of time we
break the causal link that identifies knowledge with outcome and thus
"knowledge =/= control".

-Micha

-- 
Micha Berger             Zion will be redeemed through justice,
mi...@aishdas.org        and her returnees, through righteousness.
http://www.aishdas.org
Fax: (270) 514-1507

> The older I get, the more wary I've become of such absolutist statements.
> Does the Ramban consider the possibility of a person who is *mostly*
> perfect? Would he accept that such a person exists *slightly* in the
> framework of nature?

> The way RDE phrases it bothers me very much. I could be wrong, but I don't
> even like the idea of an *average* person being thrown out of Hashgacha
> Pratis and consigned to the laws of chance, or, as he put it, "totally in
> the framework of nature."

> Even moreso am I bothered by the idea that only a "completely perfect"
> person would escape such a fate. Even Moshe Rabenu wasn't "completely
> perfect."...

Seforno[1] (Vayikra 13:47): When a person sins because he follows his
lusts and thus turns away from G-d's will or he simply rebels against G-d,
he will be punished justly according to G-d's justice. When a person
sins accidentally, he will typically be punished either financial or
physically according to G-d's wisdom in order to arouse him repent. In
contrast those who are as insensitive as one asleep and thus have no
realization of what is happening and are not motivated to know - this
includes all the nations as well as the majority of Jews except for a
few exceptions - they are without doubt under the direction of nature
or mazel. They do not receive hashgocha protis but rather a general form
of Providence which is for the species rather than the individual. Thus
they are like the animals and other forms of life which do not have
individual Providence. They thus fulfill G-d's will only on the level
of the group not as individuals.

On Sun, Jul 31, 2011 at 20:09, David Riceman <drice...@optimum.net> wrote:
: I happened accross a curious Ramban recently (Parshas Shlah...
:                                                        so that maybe they
: would remember and return to God (ulay yizkru v'yashuvu el hashem)."

I emailed RDR the following summation of how he and I read the Ramban
differently, and he agreed to its accuracy. I therefore want to share
the two possibilities with the chevrah.

I'm saying that "ulai" introduces one hypothetical outcome (from ilu lo,
lulei, ulam), and needn't be that we are entertaining hypotheticals due
to doubt. And when the Rambam earlier called HQBH the "Yodeia' asidos",
he was ascribing to HQBH knowledge of the future with no exceptions.

RDR us saying that "Yodeia' asidos" describes HQBH as knowing some of
the future, and needn't mean He knows how we will decide. Whereas ulai
(as quoted above) does mean Divine uncertainty.

We each find the other's read improbable.

-Micha

-- 
Micha Berger             Zion will be redeemed through justice,
mi...@aishdas.org        and her returnees, through righteousness.
http://www.aishdas.org
Fax: (270) 514-1507

[R]<<TK: "Tzafui" absolutely does mean foreknowledge.>>

So you're saying Rashi and the Bartenura are wrong?

David Riceman

RDE citing RYK:

<<the typical understanding of the Chovas HaLevavos (4:4) is that man 
needs to act as if he is helping Gd provide him with his sustenance.
<snip>

His actual position (4:3) is
that the sole reason for the effort is to be involved in building society
[which Gd requires to keep him busy and away from sin].>>

I find it provocative that you cite "the typical understanding" of both ChL and the Ramban.

I am perturbed, however, that what you cite as "his actual position" seems
incorrect.  First of all, what you cite as "the sole reason" is described
by ChL as "the second reason" (tr. Hyamson p. 312).  Second, he is
describing, not why people have to work in spite of nature being "only a
formality", but why God created nature which is not "only a formality".

As I said in a previous post, even though the Rambam attributes to the
Kalam a position similar to the one you describe, I know of no rishon who
adopts such a position.  I think you are trying to read a modern position
back into earlier sources.

David Riceman

In a message dated 8/4/2011 6:07:59 P.M. Eastern Daylight Time,  
drice...@optimum.net writes:

[R]<<TK: "Tzafui" absolutely does mean  foreknowledge.>>

So you're saying Rashi and the Bartenura are  wrong?

David Riceman
>>>>>
 
 
I don't know, how do they translate "Hakol tzafui vehareshus  nesunah"? 
 
In my whole life I have never heard it or seen it translated any other  way 
than "Hashem knows what will happen and nevertheless we have free will." 
 
I can't think of any other translation that would make sense.
 
I just checked some translations of Pirkei Avos 3:19:
 
ArtScroll:  Everything is foreseen, yet the freedom of choice is  given.
 
Birnbaum:  Everything is foreseen [by God], yet freewill is granted  [to 
man]. (Their brackets)
 
Koren: All is foreseen, yet freedom of choice is given.
 
 
 
--Toby Katz






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I am not sure why you are "perturbed" at what you claim my
misrepresentating of the views - I am simply translating Reb Yaakov
Kaminetsky - the Hebrew is there if you think I am mistranslating the
section.

On Thu, Aug 4, 2011 at 6:22 PM, David Riceman <drice...@optimum.net> wrote:

> RDE citing RYK:
>
> <<the typical understanding of the Chovas HaLevavos (4:4) is that man needs
> to act as if he is helping Gd provide him with his sustenance.
> <snip>
>
> His actual position (4:3) is
> that the sole reason for the effort is to be involved in building society
> [which Gd requires to keep him busy and away from sin].>>
>
> I find it provocative that you cite "the typical understanding" of both ChL
> and the Ramban.
>
> I am perturbed, however, that what you cite as "his actual position" seems
> incorrect.  First of all, what you cite as "the sole reason" is described by
> ChL as "the second reason" (tr. Hyamson p. 312).  Second, he is describing,
> not why people have to work in spite of nature being "only a formality", but
> why God created nature which is not "only a formality".
>
>
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On 8/4/2011 3:46 PM, T6...@aol.com wrote:
> The sixth one, "all the words of the Nevi'im are true."  How can
> the Nevi'im know the future if Hashem Himself doesn't know the future?

Hashem is very powerful. He can make things happen.

KT,
YGB

 
From: garry <g...@garry.us>
>> I am missing a big chunk  of this discussion.  I simply don't see the 
mystery.  Why does  knowledge = control? <<



>>>>>
 
That's a fair question.  The problem is a problem of logic rather than  a 
practical problem.  
 
The logic goes like this:  Let's say that G-d knows that on  Monday I am 
going to speak to my mother in an annoyed tone of  voice,  thus being oveir on 
kibud eim.  
 
Now, what happens on Monday when she says something that I find annoying,  
and in addition, I am tired and cranky when she says it?  
 
Two things can happen:  I can just say the first thing that comes to  my 
tongue and commit a sin.  Or, I can think twice and bite my tongue and  not 
commit that sin.  
 
But how can I bite my tongue and remain quiet?  If I make that choice,  
then G-d's knowledge of what I was going to do was flawed and incorrect!   So 
obviously, I /have/ to choose to sin, in order to make it come out that G-d's 
 foreknowledge was correct!
 
As you can see, this is a conundrum only in logic and not in practice,  
because even if He knows what I am going to do, /I/ don't know what I am going  
to do before I do it, and at the moment it comes to my choosing, I make my  
choice based strictly on the options before me, completely without regard 
to  what G-d knows. 
 
 
(If I knew what He knows, of course, it would be a completely different  
problem.  If, for example, a prophet had forewarned me that I was going to  
sin on Monday, then I would be constrained in practice, and not only in logic, 
 to do what G-d knows I am going to do.)
 
 
The practical part of the problem comes /after/ the sin:  If G-d knew  what 
I was going to do, doesn't that mean that I /had/ to sin, whether I knew it 
 or not?  Because had I not sinned, His foreknowledge would have been  
inaccurate, but since his foreknowledge is always accurate, doesn't it mean that 
 I was in some sense programmed to sin at that moment?  Wasn't my sin in a  
sense forced on me?  And doesn't that mean that no one is really culpable  
for any sin they commit?
 
When it says in Pirkei Avos, "Hakol tzafui vehareshus nesunah" it is  
answering that argument, and Chazal are saying, "No, even though it might seem  
to you that logically you had no choice but to sin, since Hashem knew you 
were  going to sin, nevertheless, you really did have a choice, and you cannot 
evade  responsibility for your sin."
 
I would compare this to Zeno's Paradox, in a certain way.  Zeno's  Paradox, 
to summarize it, goes something like this:  If you want to get  from point 
A to point B (from Miami to New York, say), you must first get to a  point, 
X, which is halfway between point A and point B.  But before you can  get to 
point X, you must first get to a point which is halfway between point A  
and point X.  But before you can get to that point, you must first get to a  
point which is halfway to that point.  But before you can get to that  
point....and so on ad infinitum.  Thus, it is impossible for anyone ever to  get 
from point A to point B.  So, I can never get to New York.  I can  never even 
get out of Florida!
 
This is a mental puzzle, a logical paradox.  It is not a problem in  
reality, in practice, because people get from point A to point B every day,  
without worrying their heads about how they covered the intervening space by  
halves.  
 
Similarly, the paradox of G-d's foreknowledge and human free will is not a  
problem in practice, because every day we choose our actions.  And even if  
it were true that G-d's foreknowledge had really constrained our choices, 
we  still must act /as if/ we have free will, we still have to make choices 
every  day, because no prophetic voice comes from Heaven telling us what to 
do.   In practice we either have free will, or we act as if we had free will, 
but the  third choice -- wait for a heavenly order, and then obey it -- is 
not  there.
 
Chazal in Pirkei Avos are telling us that we are not just acting "as if" we 
 have free will, but that we really do have free will.
 
BTW I have seen an answer to Zeno's Paradox, a mathematical answer, namely, 
 that the fact that Line AB contains an infinite number of points -- half 
of X  and half of that, etc -- in no way implies that Line AB is an infinite  
line.  A finite line can contain an infinite number of points but the  
traveler does not have to touch separately each and every one of those points to 
 get to the end of the line.
 
I have not seen a mathematical answer to the Pirkei Avos Paradox but am  
content to accept on faith the fact that I have free will.
 
The actual range within which free will operates, I should add, is  
limited, as Chazal say:  "Hakol beyedei Shomayim chutz miyir'as  Shomayim."  That 
is, our genuine choices, the range within which we  can exercise free will, 
are only the moral choices.  Those choices that do  not have to do with 
choosing good or evil are really illusionary choices.  
 
For example, choosing to wear modest clothes is within my area of free  
will, but choosing to wear a blue rather than a pink sweater is not really in 
my  power.  The pink sweater is dirty, it is lost, it doesn't even exist --  
they don't make pink sweaters anymore -- or simply, G-d pushed my hand  
towards my blue sweater when I went to my closet, without my conscious  
awareness.  
 
Many daily choices, thus, /seem/ to be free-willed choices, but really are  
not.  Even the big ones, like what job to take or what city to live in, are 
 a product of a confluence of factors orchestrated by Divine Providence and 
not  truly in our hands.  But the moral choices are in our hands -- to do 
good,  or otherwise -- just as surely as Zeno can get from here to there.
 
 

--Toby  Katz
================




_____________________  





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