Avodah Mailing List

Volume 28: Number 149

Thu, 04 Aug 2011

• 1. Re: "God who knows the future" (T6...@aol.com)
• 2. Re: Feedback, causality & G-d (T6...@aol.com)
• 3. Re: Feedback, causality & G-d (Joel C. Salomon)
• 4. Re: God who knows the future (garry)
• 5. Re: Feedback, causality & G-d (harchinam)
• 6. Re: "God who knows the future" (harchinam)
• 7. Re: "God who knows the future" (David Riceman)
• 8. Re: "God who knows the future" (Micha Berger)
• 9. Re: Feedback, causality & G-d (David Riceman)
• 10. Re: Feedback, causality & G-d (Daniel Eidensohn)
• 11. Re: "God who knows the future" (Yosef Gavriel Bechhofer)
• 12. Re: Davening for Others (Daniel Eidensohn)
• 13. Re: "God who knows the future" (Micha Berger)
• 14. Re: Feedback, causality & G-d (David Riceman)
• 15. $100,000 Check Found in Western Wall (David Eisen)

From: David Riceman <drice...@optimum.net>
old TK:  
> From our human point of view G-d makes it appear "as if" He  doesn't 
> know what we will do -- He does that by the simple expedient of  keeping 
> US in the dark about the future. But of course He does know and  yet that 
> does not take away our bechira, because WE don't  know.

RDR:  How do you see that in the Ramban?
 
TK:  I don't see that in the Ramban, I see that inside my  head.  I wasn't 
addressing the Ramban, I was only addressing the  question, according to my 
understanding, of how our bechirah does not limit  G-d's ability to see the 
future, or vice versa.



old TK: > To say that if G-d has total foreknowledge,  then we don't have 
free 
> will, or if we have free will, then He  doesn't have foreknowledge, is a 
> plain contradiction to what Chazal  said. It's in Pirkei Avos. "Hakol 
> tzafui vehareshus  nesunah."

RDR: I would say that the naive translation of that is: "You  can do what 
you 
want, but God sees what you do".  "Tzafui" need not  imply prediction.



TK: "Tzafui" absolutely does mean foreknowledge.  And I don't want to  hurt 
anyone's feelings but I really think that the denial that Hashem knows  the 
future is apikorsus. 
 
 
 

--Toby Katz
================




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From: Daniel Eidensohn <yadmo...@gmail.com>
>> I am  working on the issue of feedback. I can not find any Jewish sources
regarding  feedback - to pick a reference and modify behavior or processes 
or
efforts to  maximize the referent. 
>>
 
>>>>>
 
I can think of a few quotations of possible relevance, I don't know  
exactly where they're first mentioned but other people will know:
 
1. Ha'adam nif'al al pi pe'ulosav
 
2. Mitzva gorreres mitzva, aveirah gorreres aveirah 
 
3.and similarly, schar mitzva mitzva, schar aveirah aveirah
 
4. Bederech she'adam rotzeh leilech, molichin oso
 

--Toby  Katz
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On 08/02/2011 01:04 PM, Daniel Eidensohn wrote:
> I am working on the issue of feedback. I can not find any Jewish sources
> regarding feedback - to pick a reference and modify behavior or
> processes or efforts to maximize the referent.

Is R' Aryeh Kaplan's idea about the point of free will, and how it
moves, at all relevant?

--Chesky

I am missing a big chunk of this discussion.  I simply don't see the 
mystery.  Why does knowledge = control?

I am training a newly-adopted dog.  If I leave him in a room with food 
on the floor, he will eat it.  He has complete freedom of choice (a 
better-trained dog might not), but there isn't the slightest doubt what 
his choice will be.

Now a) humans aren't dogs and b) even for a dog there are choices I 
can't predict.  But the fact  remains the same.  The fact that I know 
what choice he will make doesn't have any effect at all on his freedom 
to make it.

>
> It seems that the official Jewish view is that human effort does not cause
> success but only provides merit which justifies G-d making you successful.
> This issue  cuts across a wide range of issues from child abuse, education,
> parnossa etc etc.
>

IIRC, the Rambam [and probably many others] holds that even though Hashem
CAN just do anything in the blink of an eye and without any assistance, He
created a system that we call teva in order that things should generally go
according to the system [and nisim are those things that occur outside of
this system] that would obscure His constant involvement. When we do
hishtadlut of whatever form -- planting a field, sending out a resume, etc.
-- we are merely providing the tzinor for the bracha to flow down through.
So it is not really that we are providing merit, but instead the actual kli
for the bracha to flow through in a figurative manner in order that things
work according to the system of teva that Hashem set up.

So, in Jewish thought, unless you have something really special going for
you, while human effort is not the direct cause of success, that success
would be impossible without it. Effort is a necessary ingredient in success.
What constitutes effort and how much is required and so forth is a matter
for debate but the basic principle has never been debated.

*** Rena
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On Sun, Jul 31, 2011 at 20:09, David Riceman <drice...@optimum.net> wrote:
> I happened accross a curious Ramban recently (Parshas Shlah...
>                                                        so that maybe they
> would remember and return to God (ulay yizkru v'yashuvu el hashem)."

> But doesn't that last clause imply that God didn't know the future here?
> The naive reading of this passage is that the Ramban agrees, if you'll
> pardon the anachronism, with the Ralbag, who says that God can't know all
> the details of the future because that would deny human free will.

The way that I understand this concept is that Hashem gives us free will
to do what we will do, but He, who created us and knows his creations
intimately, knows what we are going to do and how things will turn out.

In the sentence that you quoted, Hashem commanded Moshe to send one nasi
from each tribe to give them the best chance at free will that could be
given, while at the same time knowing how things would turn out.

I assume you either have children or have known children. Is it not a
common parental experience that a parent can leave a child to choose
to do or not do something but can see exactly what is going to happen
without intervention? What if you see that your child, a chair, and a
jar of cookies or treats on a high shelf are in the kitchen at the same
time and you see the child pushing the chair towards the shelves? You
know that without any intervention you will see your child climbing
on the chair to reach the jar, the chair teetering precariously, the
jar of cookies will fall and then so will the child and then you will
hear wailing and you will see a broken cookie jar on the floor. And you
don't even have to be a navi! You just have to be this child's parent
to understand or in other words "to see the future" in this case.

*** Harchinam
     out in harei yehuda

RMB:
> I think he's clear here, as per the reisha of your paraphrase. The 
> Ramban's words: "VeHashem, hayodeia' asidos, tzivehu..." So it's not a 
> question of whether the Ramban believes Hashem can know the future, but 
> how to explain the seifa of the paragraph in that light.

That's not the Ramban's literary style. When he uses a title it's not
a prescription, it's a pointer. Unlike the Rambam, the Ramban puts very
little emphasis on God's simplicity, and he often introduces his comments
by identifying a particular aspect of God about which he's commenting.

In this case he's identifying the command as situational: God, not acting
in His aspect of legislator, but acting in His aspect of tactician.
Next time around the spies need not be gentry, but this time there's a
reason to appoint gentry.



RH:
> In the sentence that you quoted, Hashem commanded Moshe to send one 
> nasi from each tribe to give them the best chance at free will that 
> could be given, while at the same time knowing how things would turn out.

That's not what the Ramban says.  He uses the word "ulay", which implies 
doubt.  If he had meant what you say he could have expressed it very 
clearly.  Is there anything in the Ramban which induces you to read it 
as you do?

David Riceman

On Thu, Aug 04, 2011 at 09:40:44AM -0400, David Riceman wrote:
> RMB:
>> I think he's clear here, as per the reisha of your paraphrase. The  
>> Ramban's words: "VeHashem, hayodeia' asidos, tzivehu..." So it's not a  
>> question of whether the Ramban believes Hashem can know the future, but 
>> how to explain the seifa of the paragraph in that light.
>
> That's not the Ramban's literary style. When he uses a title it's not
> a prescription, it's a pointer...
...
> In this case he's identifying the command as situational: God, not acting
> in His aspect of legislator, but acting in His aspect of tactician.

You lost me, because in talking about how the phrased is used, you do
not address its actual content.

The title is "G-d who knows the future". So how could this NOT indicate
the Rambam believes that Hashem does actually yodeia' asidos? It would
be a weired idiom to use if his later "ilai" referred to HQBH /not/
knowing what their choice would be. Or even if in another comment the
Rambam wrote this -- either Hs is the Yodeia' Asidos, or He doesn't
know. Even if in two comments, that would constitute a setirah.

> That's not what the Ramban says.  He uses the word "ulay", which implies  
> doubt....

Perhaps not. If this were a pasuq I would argue that "ulai" refers to just
leaving both sides open. Ulai appears to be related to "o + lo/lulei"
(c.f. the BDB), and this derivation also better connects ulai to ulam
(meaing: however; as in: ve'ulam "Luz" sheim ha'ir barishonah).

For us, leaving options open is usually the consequence of doubt; but
that needn't mean that the Ramban was referring to Divine Doubt, in the
same paragraph that he calls G-d Knower of the Future. Just that He,
as RHM put it, left both options open. In HQBH's case, this has to do
with allowing for bechirah.


I noticed no one addressed my comment yesterday that the whole dilemma
makes no sense to me. For G-d to know the future we are assuming He is in
the present. Hashem simply Knows, there is no meaning to the question of
when He knows. So I don't even see how the problem gets off the ground,
that we can discuss various resolutions to it.

I also think this is the essence of the Or Samayach's answer in his
multi-page section "HaKol Tzafui vehaReshus Nesunah" in Hil' Teshuvah."
(With a drastically different spin, admittedly.) R' Meir Simchah haKohein
says the reason why G-d's knowledge of the future doesn't imply a prior
cause to my decision, rather than free will, is the same as why His
knowledge of the past doesn't. Since Hashem is lemaalah min hazeman,
both knowledges are the same in kind.

-Micha

-- 
Micha Berger             Zion will be redeemed through justice,
mi...@aishdas.org        and her returnees, through righteousness.
http://www.aishdas.org
Fax: (270) 514-1507

RDE:

<<that is getting closer. But this could be understood that a person 
must appear to act within teva but if he does so that it doesn't really 
matter what weapons he uses and whether he uses good military strategy 
or bad.>>

Did you look at Sheilat's footnote? He refers back to p. 270 ff.  
Especially look at p. 270 lines 8-11 where the Rambam explicitly rejects 
that suggestion in the context of ma'akeh.

David Riceman

I have received a number of replies which indicate I need to clarify my
question. First let me present the following quote from Rav Yaakov
Kaminetsky where he notes the nature of effort is a dispute between the
Ramban and Chovas HaLevavos. This is my translation found in my Daas Torah
page 711

Symbolic act or causes success? -- Chovas HaLevavos versus Ramban Rav
Yaakov Kaminetsky(Emes L'Yaakov Bechukosai): The typical understanding
of the Ramban is that in truth it is prohibited for a person to utilize
doctors and medical treatment but should rely totally on Gd to cure
him... In contrast the typical understanding of the Chovas HaLevavos
(4:4) is that man needs to act as if he is helping Gd provide him with his
sustenance. Thus it is understood that the Ramban takes a more stringent
position that eschews personal effort while the Chovas HaLevavos requires
a person to exert himself and not rely on his spiritual merit. However
a closer look at the Chovas HaLevavos reveals that he is in fact more
stringent in the matter of personal effort. His actual position (4:3) is
that the sole reason for the effort is to be involved in building society
[which Gd requires to keep him busy and away from sin]. Thus the effort
is a mitzva like any other mitzva of the Torah and does not cause him
to reach the goal but is only a perquisite for Gd to give him what one
wants. That is why the Chovas HaLevavos says that one should not change
jobs even if he sees he is not being successful in a particular line of
work. [It is only a formality and thus the lack of success is not because
of the job but because Gd doesn't want to give him what he wants]. The
view of the Ramban is just the opposite. If a person is not completely
perfect than in fact he exists totally in the framework of nature. As such
he of necessity must work in order to achieve his goals. Work and effort
therefore is real and not just a formality. [Consequently according to the
Ramban it could make a difference as to how he is doing his job or what
job he is doing] This can readily be seen in Ramban's comments concerning
medicine. He says that if a person takes a natural approach and utilizes
a doctor he will consequently actually need the doctor to be cured. This
can also be seen from the gemora (Berachos 60a) that if a person prays
after the 40th day of conception that the baby be a boy it is considered
to be a meaningless effort -- even though the gemora indicates that the
matriarchs did in fact succeed in changing the gender of their unborn
children miraculously through pray. They had the ability since according
to their way of existence miracles were a natural thing for them and they
had a different set of rules. [Thus according to the Ramban there are
two totally different modes of functioning and one cannot combine them].

------------------------------


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???????? ????? ????? [?.] ??????? ??? ?' ??? ???? ??? ?"? ???? ???,
????"? ?????? ?????? ???? ???? ?????? ??? ??? ???? ???? ?????? ???? ???"?



On Thu, Aug 4, 2011 at 4:53 AM, harchinam <harchi...@gmail.com> wrote:
>> It seems that the official Jewish view is that human effort does not cause
>> success but only provides merit which justifies G-d making you successful.
>> This issue  cuts across a wide range of issues from child abuse, education,
>> parnossa etc etc.

> IIRC, the Rambam [and probably many others] holds that even though Hashem
> CAN just do anything in the blink of an eye and without any assistance, He
> created a system that we call teva in order that things should generally go
> according to the system [and nisim are those things that occur outside of
> this system] that would obscure His constant involvement. When we do
> hishtadlut of whatever form -- planting a field, sending out a resume, etc.
> -- we are merely providing the tzinor for the bracha to flow down through.
> So it is not really that we are providing merit, but instead the actual kli
> for the bracha to flow through in a figurative manner in order that things
> work according to the system of teva that Hashem set up.

this is not the view of the chovas halevavos and most others. Hishtadlus
merely needs to "appear" natural - such as buying a lottery ticket. You are
in fact paraphrasing the Ramban in regards to medicine. I just posted a
quote from Rav Yaakov Kaminetsky who says that this is a machlokes



On Wed, Aug 3, 2011 at 10:29 PM, Joel C. Salomon <joelcsalo...@gmail.com>wrote:
> On 08/02/2011 01:04 PM, Daniel Eidensohn wrote:
> > I am working on the issue of feedback. I can not find any Jewish sources
> > regarding feedback - to pick a reference and modify behavior or
> > processes or efforts to maximize the referent.

> Is R' Aryeh Kaplan's idea about the point of free will, and how it
> moves, at all relevant?

I assume you mean Rav Dessler's point of free-will. He states that there
are only certain issues that you have genuine free-will. In that issue
he doesn't address the causality of your actions.



On Wed, Aug 3, 2011 at 2:55 PM, David Riceman <drice...@optimum.net> wrote:
> What about the Rambam's letter on astrology (Igros HaRambam, ed. Sheilat,
> pp. 478-490)? In the paragraph on p. 480 he blames hurban habayis on
> neglecting the study of war and instead studying astrology.

that is getting closer. But this could be understood that a person must
appear to act within teva but if he does so that it doesn't really matter
what weapons he uses and whether he uses good military strategy or bad.


On Wed, Aug 3, 2011 at 11:21 AM, Micha Berger <mi...@aishdas.org> wrote:
> As some might recall from earlier debates in which I made bold claims
> about the mental life of animals -- or lack thereof -- I think this
> is Unqelus's point on the creation of man. The "nishmas chayim", the
> soul which turns Adam into a dynamic being, is "translated" to "ruach
> memalela". "Memalela" could be trivially taken to refer to a soul with
> the ability to speak to others. However, given the words being explained,
> I think Unqelus is pointing to the ability to "hear" one's own stream
> of consciousness.

your self-referent awareness is interesting and a topic in its own right.
There is a strange book , "The Origin of Consciousness in the Breakdown of
the Bicameral Mind by Princeton University psychologist Julian JaynesThe
Bicameral mind" directly looks at this and claims that this type of
thinking is relatively recent.

However I am not focusing on consciousness but rather effectiveness
or the natural of causality. When I teach my students - does it matter
how? If they don't learn is it my responsiblity to do something different?

In any act I do - is it necessary to pay attention to the effectiveness
of my action and modify the nature and intensity while monitoring the
consequences for a particular variable? Or is my effort merely a necessary
symbolic act - but not a sufficient condition for success?

On 8/3/2011 10:04 PM, T6...@aol.com wrote:
> "Tzafui" absolutely does mean foreknowledge.  And I don't want to
> hurt anyone's feelings but I really think that the denial that Hashem
> knows the future is apikorsus.

It takes broad shoulders to call the Ralbag an apikores...
According to which one of the Yud Gimmel Ikkarim is that Apikorsus anyway?

KT,
YGB

the issue of the impact of our prayers on others is addressed in the Igros
Moshe (OC 4 40:13)

On Thu, Aug 04, 2011 at 12:14:33PM -0400, Yosef Gavriel Bechhofer wrote:
: According to which one of the Yud Gimmel Ikkarim is that Apikorsus anyway?

Thank you! I never before noticed it, but Omnipotence and Omniscience are
not in the Iqarim.

But the Ralbag can be a bar pelugta of the Rambam anyway. It's not like
we can say nishpasheit hadin already back in the early 14th cent already.

-Micha

-- 
Micha Berger             Zion will be redeemed through justice,
mi...@aishdas.org        and her returnees, through righteousness.
http://www.aishdas.org
Fax: (270) 514-1507

RDE:
> that is getting closer. But this could be understood that a person 
> must appear to act within teva but if he does so that it doesn't 
> really matter what weapons he uses and whether he uses good military 
> strategy or bad.
I wonder whether this option is the denial of causality which the Rambam 
attributes to the Kalam (MN 1:73 in his discussion of the sixth 
proposition).  In that case I find it astounding that you think it was 
widespread - - I don't know of any rishon who explicitly accepts it.  As 
far as I know it penetrated Jewish thought only after Descartes.

David Riceman

It was reported yesterday that a 22 year old yeshiva student from
Yerushalayim found earlier this week a check in the amount of $100,000
pressed in the cracks of the Western Wall that was made out to the ?Holy
Kotel? and was duly signed by a US resident. As the check was not written
?to the account of the payee only,? the check ostensibly may be endorsed and
cashed by the student. As attested by his acquaintances, this student
occasionally rummages through the stones of the Kotel and reads the notes
placed in the Wall, and that is how he found the check this week. They noted
that in addition to the personal notes, he has found cash, amounting in the
aggregate to hundreds of dollars.



The student proceeded to seek legal advice from an attorney in Haifa who
contacted a fellow attorney in the United States who successfully tracked
down the person that wrote the check. The payor confirmed that he indeed
wrote the check and as he quite wealthy, there are sufficient funds in the
bank account from which the check was drawn to cover the $100,000 payment.
The attorney promptly advised the student to turn off his cell phone and go
incognito until he withdrew the funds. As of the date of the article, the
student?s father was unable to contact his son. While the son was consulting
with the attorney who claimed that the check was the property of the finder
under applicable law, the father contacted HaRav Shmuel Rabinowitz, the Rav
of the Western Wall and Holy Sites Authority, who claimed that the check
seemed to have been a donation to Kotel and was the rightful property of the
Western Wall Authority. R. Rabinowitz confirmed the report of the check
found between the stones of the Kotel and submitted the matter to a police
investigation.



See the full story in Hebrew at
http://www.ynet.co.il/articles/0,7340,L-4104158,00.html and an English blurb
athttp://www.israelnationalnews.com/News/Flash.aspx/216802.



Many questions come to mind, including the following:



   1. In addition to seeking legal advice, did the finder seek or obtain a
   psak halacha?
   2. Is the ?finder? entitled to any property rights with respect to the
   check in light of the illicit circumstances in which the check was ?found.?
   I would strongly distinguish between the manner in which he obtained the
   check as opposed to finding it on the floor of the Kotel Plaza.
   3. Did the Western Wall Authority indeed acquire the check, which was
   drawn out to the Holy Kotel?
   4. What were the payor?s intentions? Surely, he could have made the
   donation directly to the Kotel had he desired.
   5. Can one even begin to consider the check as an aveida, when the payor
   seemingly placed the check deliberately into the walls, which may constitute
   an aveida l?da?at (see Sh?A H?M 261:4).
   6. Should the check indeed be deemed ownerless.
   7. Even if the check is to be considered an aveida, shouldn?t the
   halachot and similar Israeli laws of hashavat aveida require the finder to
   deliver the check to the police? With the name of the payor on the check,
   this should be tantamount to a siman muvhak, though, again, it is unclear if
   the payor retained any rights to the check or if he relinquished them either
   to the Kotel or rendered it hefker by the manner in which he chose to place
   the check.

In short, I am interested in your thoughts on what the halacha should be in
this case.


B'virkat HaTorah,

David
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