Volume 28: Number 128
Wed, 06 Jul 2011
Subjects Discussed In This Issue:
Message: 1
From: Gil Winokur <gilwino...@usa.net>
Date: Wed, 06 Jul 2011 13:23:55 -0400
Subject: [Avodah] THE TALKING DONKEY
Regarding Rb'n Toby's question on Bilaam's not being startled when his
donkey talks, one must look at it from Bilaam's perspective. As a Navi,
he would be accustomed to hearing that which others did not. The
language used is "pi haaton". In contrast, we preface our amidah with
the phrase "H' sfasai tiftach..." which refers to the usage of the lips
for clarity and articulation, which are the sine qua non of speech. A
donkey opens its mouth and brays. The implication of "pi haaton" may be
that the donkey brayed, and Bilaam had so lowered himself that he was
able to understand it. To Bilaam, it may not have seemed so outlandish.
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Message: 2
From: Micha Berger <mi...@aishdas.org>
Date: Wed, 6 Jul 2011 13:54:30 -0400
Subject: Re: [Avodah] Consumer alert:minhog scams on the rise!
On Tue, Jul 05, 2011 at 04:27:43PM +0000, Elazar M. Teitz wrote:
:> Look at the Rambam's words. He says that divrei chakhamim are melitzah,
:> and intepreting them literally is wrong. That part doesn't require
:> disbelieving that they aren't also potentially historical -- just that
:> there is no actual historical claim being made. Chazal do not repeat
:> a story any more because it's history than if it weren't. But then he
:> talks about people who "...vena'asu etzlam kol hanimna'os mechuyevei
:> hamtzei'us." The Rambam rules out such stories that defy nature.
: When the Rambam criticizes those for whom "na'asu etzlam kol hanimna'os
: mechuyavei ham'tzius," he does _not_ rule out all incidents which go
: against nature. He criticizes them for believing "she_kol_ hanimna'os" --
: _all_ "impossible" incidents -- must be true. This is not the same as
: saying all are not true. Certainly he held neis Chanuka to be literal.
Chanukah is an interesting instance which gives me pause. More on it,
below.
However, you repeat what I feel is the wrong half of the Rambam's phrase,
yes it's "sheKOL hanimna'os", but the Rambam continues "mechuyavei
hametzi'us". What are the "necessities of existence" if not the laws of
nature? He doesn't speak of paradoxes and laws of logic...
On Tue, Jul 05, 2011 at 03:28:30PM -0400, Meir Shinnar wrote:
: Therefore, the fact that something is not a greater miracle than nes
: hanukka does NOT mean that it occured - indeed, that criteria is
: irrelevant - the issue is not how far the laws of nature were
: suspended - but the basis for believing that they were suspended at
: all. if at all possible to interprete it allegorically, we are
: obligated to do so.
But the reason why REMT's mentioning Chanukah gave me pause is that the
neis of the pach shemen isn't recorded before Chazal. It itself is an
instance of an aggadic miracle story.
Particulatly since, as R' Dr Shinnar continues:
: WRT the story of Rav Pinchas ben Yair,
: 1) The rambam does not include the use of a story in a halachic
: context as proof of its validity - as the question then is whether
: the story isactually being used as an asmachta rather than real proof
: (and if there is debate about drashot and asmachta, here too)
Last, to return to what I feel is the more essential point because it's
more popular among rishonim than his stance on miracle stories:
: 2) The melitza understanding actually does work - because the melitza
: suggests that we are supposed to assume unless proven otherwise that a
: tzaddik didn't err..
I think the whole focus on which stories were historical and which are
melitzos is a distraction. Chazal didn't care, and our trying to derive
the science of history from quotes made within a worldview that predates
it means focusing on something they didn't consider important.
The "melitzah understanding" has to work because the statement was made
without regard to historiocity. The story is repeated because the lesson
is valid; with no concern for whether or not it really occured. Even
historical stories are only repeated if they have a mussar haskeil or
a nimshal to take away. The understanding has to be the same whether
historical or not.
Tir'u baTov!
-Micha
--
Micha Berger In the days of our sages, man didn't sin unless
mi...@aishdas.org he was overcome with a spirit of foolishness.
http://www.aishdas.org Today, we don't do a mitzvah unless we receive
Fax: (270) 514-1507 a spirit of purity. - Rav Yisrael Salanter
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Message: 3
From: Ben Waxman <ben1...@zahav.net.il>
Date: Wed, 06 Jul 2011 21:00:05 +0300
Subject: Re: [Avodah] THE TALKING DONKEY
I think that the navi sees what we don't (chazon).
Ben
----- Original Message -----
From: "Gil Winokur" <gilwino...@usa.net>
As a Navi,
> he would be accustomed to hearing that which others did not.
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Message: 4
From: "kennethgmil...@juno.com" <kennethgmil...@juno.com>
Date: Wed, 6 Jul 2011 17:40:32 GMT
Subject: Re: [Avodah] soup
R' David Riceman wrote:
> See SA 174:7 "d'hashivei kba'im mahmas haseudah l'fi she'ain
> derech le'echol b'lo shtiyah", which I construe to mean that the
> drinking is an aid for washing down the solids. I don't think
> this applies to the way most people eat soup.
That's true. People don't eat soup as an aid for washing down the solids.
We also don't eat potatoes as an aid to wash down the solids. Both are
eaten simply because it is a normal part of the meal.
It seems to me that RDR is confusing two totally different issues. One is
that wine will cover any mashkeh. As I understand it, this halacha has
nothing to do with the usual rules of ikar and tafel, but is a special
halacha for wine, "because it is Rosh and Rishon of all drinks, and they
are all tafel to it." (Mishneh Berurah 174:2)
> RAZ has informed me offlist, however, that Rabbi Kanievsky is of
> the opinion that someone who eats wine and soup without bread
> should not make a bracha on his soup (see footnote 8 in his
> (RAZ's) essay "What's the Truth About ... Making Berachot After
> Kiddush?".
Given what I cited above, if a posek considers soup to be a mashkeh, then
it would make perfect sense for the wine to cover it. (Personally, I think
this would make a lot more sense for a glass of borscht than for a bowl of
minestrone, and perhaps Rav Kanievsky was indeed thinking only about
chicken soup and similar drinkable soups.)
But in any case, the question of wine covering mashkeh is totally different than the question of what hamotzi covers.
Hamotzi will cover anything which is a legitimate part of the meal,
regardless of whether it is a solid or liquid. This is easily proven by the
example of wine, in the very Mechaber that RDR quoted, in the very words
that follow the words he quoted: During a meal of Hamotzi, "even wine
wouldn't need a bracha rishona, except that because it is chashuv, they
made a bracha for it."
If you want to know whether hamotzi covers soup, then you don't care
whether it is a maachal or a mashkeh -- you want to know if it is a regular
part of the meal or not.
Most of us are familiar with the question of whether or not hamotzi covers
dessert. That is NOT the question here; dessert is something served *after*
the meal, but soup is served *during* the meal.
Still, the question has been raised because of soup's liquidity, and it
deserves an answer. I did not notice anything in the MB which explicitly
talks about soup, but he does mention a very similar food: "daisa", which
is a hot cereal, similar to farina or oatmeal.
MB 177:1 -- "Daisa - Even though it is thick, and one does not eat it
together with the bread (aino m'lafes bahem hapas), and it is eaten on its
own, nevertheless, since it comes for satiety, it *is* the main part of the
meal, and it is tafel to the bread. And the same halacha applies to all
types of tavshilin which are usual to come during a bread-meal."
On the one hand, it is true that the MB does not mention soup by using the
word "marak". But in my experience, "tavshilin" refers specifically to wet
foods which are cooked in a pot. This might be a stew more frequently than
a soup, but I don't see why the halacha would be any different.
> I asked if he (RCK) rules that such a person must make a bracha
> when he eats bread and soup without wine, and he (RAZ) didn't
> know. So I don't know whether this ruling is because of safek
> brachos l'hakel or whether its because he (RCK) holds that,
> me'ikkar hadin, soup is a mashkeh.
Thank you for being so clear and identifying your pronouns as being RCK or
RAZ. But I see no room for any safek here. Above, you referred to "footnote
8", which says:
> Hagafen can also cover soups, even those that require the blessing
> of ha’adamah such as vegetable soups (Rav Chaim Kanievsky, quoted
> in Tzohar, [Rav Elyakim Dvorkes, editor] vol. 5 (5759), pp. 117-118).
That phrasing seems to indicate that he definitely holds soups to be a mashkeh, because Hagafen can and does cover them.
But being a mashkeh is not sufficient reason to say that Hamotzi would not
cover something. To make that case, you'd have to show that the mashkeh is
NOT "devarim haba'im machmas haseudah". One example of that is dessert, but
I'd be amazed if anyone claimed that soup is comparable to dessert in any
way. Another example is whiskey, which MB 174:39 says needs a bracha,
because it is not being drunk for thirst. I suspect that this may be RDR's
whole point, because the soup is not being drunk for thirst either. But my
point is that the soup *is* being consumed for hunger and satiety, which is
exactly why hamotzi *should* cover it.
Akiva Miller
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Message: 5
From: Micha Berger <mi...@aishdas.org>
Date: Wed, 6 Jul 2011 14:19:01 -0400
Subject: Re: [Avodah] The Rambam and Eliyahu haNavi
On Sun, Jul 03, 2011 at 10:12:27AM -0400, David Riceman wrote:
> They're not all coherent outside of the Aristotelian framework. For
> example, I don't know what the ikkar asserting God's simplicity means.
> See, in Hilary Putnam's book "Ethics Without Ontology", the chapter
> entitled "Objectivity Without Objects".
I tried reading that chapter and some background on Google books. I don't
see the relevence. Putnam is discussing the "creaping Platonism" of saying
that sentences on ethics describe reality -- and thus denies that they can
be deemed "true" or "false". For ethics to "exist", they would have to
be in something like Plato's realm of ideals, and from there the attack
continues. Putnam lost me when he distinguished between self-evident
tautologies and ones that one needs to be proven are necessarily true.
I'm with Kant on this one: a priori truths and synthetic ones; ie ones
that are necessarily true by rules of logic and definition vs those that
happen to be true by experiment.
I don't think a priori truths can be divided that way. And if they could,
the line would be subjective, depending on the age and IQ of the person
deciding the truth is too obvious to require an explained proof.
That said.... Theological statements (unlike ethical or mathematical
ones) /are/ ontological. G-d may not be within the realm of empricism,
but the question is whether He exists or not -- or in this case, how many?
Last, the Rambam doesn't understand what the iqar asserting Hashem's
simplicity means either. He has to place it in the realm of the
incomprehensible, since otherwise Yichud Hashem becomes an attribute.
From the Moreh 1:57 (tr Friedlander):
Consequently God exists without possessing the attribute of
existence. Similarly He lives, without possessing the attribute
of life; knows, without possessing the attribute of knowledge; is
omnipotent without possessing the attribute of omnipotence; is wise,
without possessing the attribute of wisdom: all this reduces itself
to one and the same entity; there is no plurality in Him, as will be
shown. It is further necessary to consider that unity and plurality
are accidents supervening to an object according as it consists of
many elements or of one. This is fully explained in the book called
Metaphysics. In the same way as number is not the substance of the
things numbered, so is unity not the substance of the thing which
has the attribute of unity, for unity and plurality are accidents
belonging to the category of discrete quantity, and supervening to
such objects as are capable of receiving them.
That, BTW, is distinctly classical, and the basis for Anselm's Ontological
Argument for God. Today, few logicians would say that the existence
and quantity of an item is a predicate of the item. If anything, it's
a predicate of a set that includes that item. IOW, the uniqueness of
HQBH isn't so much an attribute of G-d as an attribute of the set of
real gods -- the size of that set is 1.
But to quote where the Rambam admits his ignorance, within his description
of the 2nd yesod ("iqar"), "ela Hu yis'aleh Echad, Achdus she'ein achdus
kamoha beshum panim..." G-d is one in a way that nothing else is signular,
unique and indivisible.
And continuing my previous quote from the Moreh:
To that being, however, which has truly simple, absolute existence,
and in which composition is inconceivable, the accident of unity
is as inadmissible as the accident of plurality; that is to say,
God's unity is not an element superadded, but He is One without
possessing the attribute of unity. The investigation of this subject,
which is almost too subtle for our understanding, must not be based
on current expressions employed in describing it, for these are the
great source of error. It would be extremely difficult for us to
find, in any language whatsoever, words adequate to this subject,
and we can only employ inadequate language. In our endeavour to show
that God does not include a plurality, we can only say "He is one,"
although "one" and "many" are both terms which serve to distinguish
quantity. We therefore make the subject clearer, and show to the
understanding the way of truth by saying He is one but does not
possess the attribute of unity.
Although admittedly he calls it "almost too subtle for our undestanding",
only "almost", the Rambam does say that Divine Unity is beyond the reach
of language ("we can only employ inadequate language").
And in conclusion of that pereq in the Moreh:
In short, all similar expressions are borrowed from the language
commonly used among the people. In the same way we use "One" in
reference to God, to express that there is nothing similar to Him,
but we do not mean to say that an attribute of unity is added to
His essence.
"One" is a borrowed term WRT Divine Unity.
Tir'u baTov!
-Micha
--
Micha Berger Our greatest fear is not that we're inadequate,
mi...@aishdas.org Our greatest fear is that we're powerful
http://www.aishdas.org beyond measure
Fax: (270) 514-1507 - Anonymous
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Message: 6
From: Zev Sero <z...@sero.name>
Date: Wed, 06 Jul 2011 14:05:02 -0400
Subject: Re: [Avodah] Consumer alert:minhog scams on the rise!
On 6/07/2011 1:54 PM, Micha Berger wrote:
> I think the whole focus on which stories were historical and which are
> melitzos is a distraction. Chazal didn't care, and our trying to derive
> the science of history from quotes made within a worldview that predates
> it means focusing on something they didn't consider important.
>
> The "melitzah understanding" has to work because the statement was made
> without regard to historiocity. The story is repeated because the lesson
> is valid; with no concern for whether or not it really occured. Even
> historical stories are only repeated if they have a mussar haskeil or
> a nimshal to take away. The understanding has to be the same whether
> historical or not.
If the stories of R Chanina ben Dosa and R Pinchas ben Yair didn't happen
then they *have* no meaning. There is *no* musar haskeil that can be
taken from such a story, if it was made up. How can you prove anything
from a story you just made up for the purpose of proving your point?
The only strength the stories have is that they actually happened, exactly
as described, and that *fact* proves the gemara's point.
--
Zev Sero If they use these guns against us once, at that moment
z...@sero.name the Oslo Accord will be annulled and the IDF will
return to all the places that have been given to them.
- Yitzchak Rabin
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Message: 7
From: David Riceman <drice...@optimum.net>
Date: Wed, 06 Jul 2011 14:08:10 -0400
Subject: Re: [Avodah] soup
RZS:
> When proposing such a radical chidush that nobody has ever heard of,
> you may have to.
> <snip>
>
> We *know* that bread covers all liquids except wine. That's primary.
> Any understanding of the given reason must be secondary.
>
>
I'll summarize what's happened, since you seem to be entering in the middle.
I suggested that we treat soup like food rather than drink, and asked
for a source.
Several people objected: RAZ cited RYK that we don't make a bracha on
soup after wine; implying either that it's a mashkeh or a safeik mashkeh
(I don't know which).
RCB and later RZS objected that after we eat bread we don't make brachos
on drinks. I cited the SA which says that's a machlokes, and for the
opinion that we don't (which the Rama certifies as the normative
Ashkenazi opinion) it's because "ain derech le'echol b'lo shtiyah"
(incidently the SA HaRav citing the Rosh goes further and says that "i
efshar la'achilah b'lo shtiyah").
The problem in metzius is that that doesn't describe how we eat soup.
People who do not serve drinks with the meal do not serve them with
soup, and people who do do. RZS's claim "bread covers all liquids
except wine" assumes that that mashkeh means liquid, which is precisely
the question I'm asking, and ignores that we don't treat soup as the SA
says we treat mashkim.
RAM suggested that the bracha of bread covers soup because soup is
meizan zayyin. This is the opinion of the Mahzor Vitri cited in the
Bach ad. loc., and revived by several aharonim. The problem is that the
rishonim (and the Bach) view the SA's first opinion and the Mahzor
Vitri's opinion as contradictory: they claim that we cannot say both
"meizan zayyin" and "ain derech le'echol b'lo shtiyah" are reasons to
cover drinks under bread, since they are contradictory explanations of a
gemara.
RAM may have a leg to stand on, since one can argue that the two
interpretations are supplementary rather than contradictory, but that
seems unjustified by the historical record.
David Riceman
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Message: 8
From: Zev Sero <z...@sero.name>
Date: Wed, 06 Jul 2011 14:01:45 -0400
Subject: Re: [Avodah] Consumer alert:minhog scams on the rise!
On 6/07/2011 1:54 PM, Micha Berger wrote:
> However, you repeat what I feel is the wrong half of the Rambam's phrase,
> yes it's "sheKOL hanimna'os", but the Rambam continues "mechuyavei
> hametzi'us". What are the "necessities of existence" if not the laws of
> nature? He doesn't speak of paradoxes and laws of logic...
How do you know that's not what he means?
A more reasonable reading of the Rambam is that he means those stories
that even someone who has no problem with miracles can't accept, e.g.
the stories of Rabba bar bar Chana. The problem with those stories is
not that they involve miracles, but precisely that they purport to
describe natural phenomena that can't possibly exist. That, and the
style of the stories themselves, indicate that we're supposed to take
them as tall stories that hide a deeper meaning.
--
Zev Sero If they use these guns against us once, at that moment
z...@sero.name the Oslo Accord will be annulled and the IDF will
return to all the places that have been given to them.
- Yitzchak Rabin
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Message: 9
From: Micha Berger <mi...@aishdas.org>
Date: Wed, 6 Jul 2011 14:49:49 -0400
Subject: Re: [Avodah] Consumer alert:minhog scams on the rise!
On Wed, Jul 06, 2011 at 02:05:02PM -0400, Zev Sero wrote:
> If the stories of R Chanina ben Dosa and R Pinchas ben Yair didn't happen
> then they *have* no meaning. There is *no* musar haskeil that can be
> taken from such a story, if it was made up. How can you prove anything
> from a story you just made up for the purpose of proving your point?
How do you get from "musar haskeil" to "proof"? Sit with the Maharal and
you'll get lessons from R' Chanina ben Dosa's lighting vinegar or his
returning the golden table leg.
TSBP is supposed to be be'al peh. Our need to write down halakhah forced
a shift. However, aggadita doesn't require the same legal precision,
and therefore chazal often put down mnemonic hints of the truths they
wanted to relay rather than commit TSBP to writing.
Thus the heavy use of metaphor in aggadita. Or, as you put it WRT those
stories you agree the Rambam referred to...
On Wed, Jul 06, 2011 at 02:01:45PM -0400, Zev Sero wrote:
> That, and the
> style of the stories themselves, indicate that we're supposed to take
> them as tall stories that hide a deeper meaning.
My point is just that even the historical stories were only repeated
to rely that deeper meaning. Chazal weren't historians; that was neither
their purpose, nor did the concept exist yet.
Jumping back a bit in that second post, RZS asked:
> On 6/07/2011 1:54 PM, Micha Berger wrote:
>> However, you repeat what I feel is the wrong half of the Rambam's phrase,
>> yes it's "sheKOL hanimna'os", but the Rambam continues "mechuyavei
>> hametzi'us". What are the "necessities of existence" if not the laws of
>> nature? He doesn't speak of paradoxes and laws of logic...
> How do you know that's not what he means?
Because "mechuyavei hametzi'us" invokes the empirical. The Rambam literally
says he's talking about those things that defy empirical rules, not logical
ones. The Rambam has many idioms for logical impossibilities, and he was
a philosopher who knew the difference between things that must be false
due to paradox and those that happen to contradict reality. E.g. see
Moreh 3:15, where he argues that Omnipotence does not include doing the
paradoxical, even though other violations of nature are included.
Aside from that, the Rambam discusses it at length in Igeres Teiman,
as R Dr Shinnar already quoted. There the Rambam distinguishes based on
"seder tiv'i".
Tir'u baTov!
-Micha
--
Micha Berger People were created to be loved.
mi...@aishdas.org Things were created to be used.
http://www.aishdas.org The reason why the world is in chaos is that
Fax: (270) 514-1507 things are being loved, people are being used.
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Message: 10
From: Micha Berger <mi...@aishdas.org>
Date: Wed, 6 Jul 2011 14:53:36 -0400
Subject: Re: [Avodah] THE TALKING DONKEY
On Wed, Jul 06, 2011 at 09:00:05PM +0300, Ben Waxman wrote:
> I think that the navi sees what we don't (chazon).
But that "chazon" includes both sound and vision. E.g. "Chazon
Yeshayahu... Ki H' dibeir, 'Banim gidalti veromamti..." (Yeshayah 1:1-2)
And we also have speech WRT nevi'im, "Vayhi devar Hashem eilai leimor:"
(Yirmiyahu 1:4)
Tir'u baTov!
-Micha
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Message: 11
From: garry <g...@garry.us>
Date: Wed, 06 Jul 2011 13:45:57 -0700
Subject: Re: [Avodah] kavanah in tefila - guzma
On 7/6/2011 10:05 AM, mi...@aishdas.org> wrote:
> 1- Lemaaseh, today, kavanah is rare. When R' Matnaya thanked his head
> for knowing when to bow at Modim it was guzma (compared to us, see #2);
> today it's the norm.
This guzma proposition seems similar to the issues we were discussing
about taking aggada as literally true.
Is there any basis to hold that R. Matnaya (and R.Chiya and Shmuel) did
not mean what they said
about their problems with kavana, other than our understanding that
"they were gedolim so they couldn't have meant what they said?"
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Message: 12
From: Micha Berger <mi...@aishdas.org>
Date: Wed, 6 Jul 2011 16:52:01 -0400
Subject: Re: [Avodah] kavanah in tefila - guzma
On Wed, Jul 06, 2011 at 01:45:57PM -0700, garry wrote:
> Is there any basis to hold that R. Matnaya (and R.Chiya and Shmuel) did
> not mean what they said
> about their problems with kavana, other than our understanding that
> "they were gedolim so they couldn't have meant what they said?"
I do think they mean what they said. However...
They couldn't have meant zero, as that would mean they believed no one
ever said a word of prayer thinking about G-d or the meaning of the
words, etc...
So, their notion of "not having kavanah" wasn't literally zero, just
something very close to it.
However, nowadays, nisqatnu hadoros. I mentioned all-day hanachas tefillin
as proof of nisqatnu hadoros WRT our ability to have kavanah. But this
means that what was once considered paltry little kavanah would today be
enough to be noticable; and perhaps even an accomplishment.
Tir'u baTov!
-Micha
--
Micha Berger One doesn't learn mussar to be a tzaddik,
mi...@aishdas.org but to become a tzaddik.
http://www.aishdas.org - Rav Yisrael Salanter
Fax: (270) 514-1507
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Message: 13
From: Zev Sero <z...@sero.name>
Date: Wed, 06 Jul 2011 15:03:09 -0400
Subject: Re: [Avodah] Consumer alert:minhog scams on the rise!
On 6/07/2011 2:49 PM, Micha Berger wrote:
> How do you get from "musar haskeil" to "proof"?
R Pinchas ben Yair's story is constantly brought as proof.
--
Zev Sero If they use these guns against us once, at that moment
z...@sero.name the Oslo Accord will be annulled and the IDF will
return to all the places that have been given to them.
- Yitzchak Rabin
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Message: 14
From: Eli Turkel <elitur...@gmail.com>
Date: Wed, 6 Jul 2011 22:38:27 +0300
Subject: [Avodah] tefillah le-dovid
On 5/07/2011 3:29 PM, Eli Turkel wrote:
> I was asked a question today in shul by an edot mizrach man.
> According to most old nusach sefard (chassidic) siddurim after U-bah LeTzion
> (or returning the sefer Torah) there are prayers
> Tefilah LeDovid, Beit Yaakov and Shir HaMaalot on days that Tachanun is said.
Only Tefilah Ledavid is omitted when there is no tachanun. Bet Yaakov
and Shir Hamaalot are said every day (except when there is musaf, and
therefore the entire order of davening is turned upside down). >>
According to artscroll and also my sefardi friend Tefilah Ledavid is
omitted when there is no tachanun and Bet Yaakov
and Shir Hamaalot are omitted whenever Lamnazeach is not said which
includes numerous days where there is no musaf
> Almost every shul I have gone to in EY does not say this., perhaps due some
> nusach ashkenaz contamination. It seems that in Nusach Sefardi (edot
> Mizrach) it is indeed said.
>
> Does anyone have any experience with this?
I've never seen a NS shul that doesn't say them. >>
Again artscroll uses the language "yesh kehillot"
Obviously Zev and I daven in different shuls - he is welcome to move
to Raanana, EY
--
Eli Turkel
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Message: 15
From: Zev Sero <z...@sero.name>
Date: Wed, 06 Jul 2011 14:52:22 -0400
Subject: Re: [Avodah] soup
On 6/07/2011 1:40 PM, kennethgmil...@juno.com wrote:
> "daisa", which is a hot cereal, similar to farina or oatmeal.
Daisa is just a translation of the Yiddish "kashe", which means any
cooked grain. Rice, barley, buckwheat, quinoa, etc. Even potatoes are
sometimes called "kashe", because they fill the same culinary niche.
--
Zev Sero If they use these guns against us once, at that moment
z...@sero.name the Oslo Accord will be annulled and the IDF will
return to all the places that have been given to them.
- Yitzchak Rabin
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Message: 16
From: Harvey Benton <harvw...@yahoo.com>
Date: Wed, 6 Jul 2011 13:49:00 -0700 (PDT)
Subject: [Avodah] ??how do we understand?
how do we understand the differences between
zonah, kedeisha and challala,
legabei yehuda, who turned aside
to tamar, whom he thought was
a zonah?
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Message: 17
From: Micha Berger <mi...@aishdas.org>
Date: Wed, 6 Jul 2011 17:01:49 -0400
Subject: Re: [Avodah] soup
On Wed, Jul 06, 2011 at 02:52:22PM -0400, Zev Sero wrote:
> On 6/07/2011 1:40 PM, kennethgmil...@juno.com wrote:
>> "daisa", which is a hot cereal, similar to farina or oatmeal.
>
> Daisa is just a translation of the Yiddish "kashe", which means any
> cooked grain. Rice, barley, buckwheat, quinoa, etc. Even potatoes are
> sometimes called "kashe", because they fill the same culinary niche.
Quinoa might be "kashe" in that sense of the word, but I doubt it
or potatos would qualify as daisa (lit: grits).
Last I recall from our annual "is qiunoa qitniyos?" threads of years
back, qinoa are seeds from a plant that is related to beets and spinach,
not grain.
Tir'u baTov!
-Micha
--
Micha Berger "As long as the candle is still burning,
mi...@aishdas.org it is still possible to accomplish and to
http://www.aishdas.org mend."
Fax: (270) 514-1507 - Anonymous shoemaker to R' Yisrael Salanter
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Message: 18
From: Micha Berger <mi...@aishdas.org>
Date: Wed, 6 Jul 2011 17:13:17 -0400
Subject: Re: [Avodah] Consumer alert:minhog scams on the rise!
On Wed, Jul 06, 2011 at 03:03:09PM -0400, Zev Sero wrote:
> On 6/07/2011 2:49 PM, Micha Berger wrote:
>> How do you get from "musar haskeil" to "proof"?
> R Pinchas ben Yair's story is constantly brought as proof.
Yes, such as this recent blog post from R' Chaim Brown (former listmember)
<http://divreichaim.blogspot.com/2011/07/r-pinchas-ben-yairs-donkey.html
>:
Today's [July 3 2011 -mb] daf (Chulin 7) tells the famous story
of the donkey of R' Pinchas ben Yair that would not eat dmai. The
gemara asks: We learned in the Mishna (Dmai 1:3) that animal food is
exempt from dmai -- why would the donkey not eat? The gemara answers
that the food was purchased fo human consumption and was therefore
obligated to be treated as dmai. Only food originally set aside for
use as animal food is exempt.
The Yerushalmi gives a different answer (Dmai 1:3; 4a in the Vilna
edition). According to the Yerushalmi, R' Pinchas ben Yair said,
"What do you want from me -- my donkey is a frummie."
What's that a raayah of? As the mishnah says, the din isn't like the
donkey!
But in any case, any raayah from a story can be from the fact that
tannaim (or amoraim) repeated the story and found it sensible, not from
the historicity of the story.
The same could be said about stories about figures from Tanakh. Since
chazal would never circulate a story that besmirches the name of someone
Tanakh gives us as a positive archetype, we can derive that things as
told in the story are positive. IOW, the raayah something is mutar isn't
that Moshe rabbeinu (eg) did it but that chazal were willing to retell
a story that has MRAH doing it.
Tir'u baTov!
-Micha
--
Micha Berger A wise man is careful during the Purim banquet
mi...@aishdas.org about things most people don't watch even on
http://www.aishdas.org Yom Kippur.
Fax: (270) 514-1507 - Rav Yisrael Salanter
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Message: 19
From: Lisa Liel <l...@starways.net>
Date: Wed, 06 Jul 2011 15:59:41 -0500
Subject: Re: [Avodah] ??how do we understand?
Actually, he thought she was a kedeisha.
Lisa
At 03:49 PM 7/6/2011, Harvey Benton wrote:
>how do we understand the differences between
>zonah, kedeisha and challala,
>legabei yehuda, who turned aside
>to tamar, whom he thought was
>a zonah?
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