Avodah Mailing List

Volume 28: Number 52

Mon, 04 Apr 2011

• 1. Yichud In An Elevator? (Prof. Levine)
• 2. diet coke (Eli Turkel)
• 3. Re: diet coke (Zev Sero)
• 4. Re: diet coke (Akiva Blum)
• 5. Re: diet coke (Zev Sero)
• 6. Re: How do Chazal calculate a king's reign? (kennethgmiller@juno.com)
• 7. Re: diet coke (Ari Z. Zivotofsky)
• 8. Whoever wishes to know what Judaism is (Prof. Levine)
• 9. Textualism and LH (Micha Berger)
• 10. Re: Diet Coke (Jonathan Baker)
• 11. Re: Something's Not Kosher at the Matzah Bakery (Micha Berger)
• 12. Re: diet coke (Micha Berger)
• 13. Re: Chumros (Micha Berger)
• 14. Re: Women and Tallis (Micha Berger)
• 15. Re: Zechor/zachar (Micha Berger)

The following is from http://revach.net/article.php?id=3104

Rav Menashe Klein: Yichud In An Elevator?

Someone asked Rav Menashe Klein (Mishneh Halachos 4:187) a question 
as follows.  Obviously, says the questioner, if a woman comes into an 
elevator that you are in, you must leave because of the issur of 
Yichud.  But what about if there is a closed circuit video system in 
the elevator, is it then permissible to stay?

Rav Menashe Klein says that it is not so obvious that there is yichud 
in an elevator.  In fact he says there is no yichud in a modern 
elevator.  The reason is that there is no yichudin a room or house 
that is opened to a public area because anyone can come in at any 
time, even if a surprise entry in very unlikely to occur as in most 
scenarios.  Certainly in an elevator that can stop at any floor 
without warning, there is no issur of yichud.

Although no one can enter when the elevator is between floors, Rav 
Klein says that there is not enough time for yichud, as the Shiur for 
Yichud is the time it takes to roast an egg.  Furthermore, he says 
that even according to the opinion that Chatzi Shiur (less than the 
shiur) is assur Min HaTorah, in the case of yichud it is 
permissible.  The reason is that Yichud is forbidden because of what 
it can lead to, and in less than the shiur it cannot lead to anything.

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> Since a sweetener is made for taste, it is most certainly not batel in any
quantity.

Why not?  Kitniyos is batel berov, not beshishim, so why should taam
be an issue?>>

I understand that it is a mchloket if it batel in rov or 60.
In general I have trouble understanding the whole issue

1. kitniyot to begin with was controversial in the days of the ashkenazi
rishonim
2. Mei kitniyot is another level of chumra. In fact the Rama never
explicitly outlaws it.
It is an inference since he talks about oils dripping
3. Corn was discovered in the Americas and so was clearly not in the
original gezerah
4. According to some shitot kitniyot is batel in rov and as Zev points out
doesnt
depend on the taste
5. kitniyot he-nishtanu is a machloket poskim

so we have a minhag and several layers of machloket. According to any usual
laws of
safek we should be matir. Yet many places look for more and more chumrot.
Personally we use Canola oil (a rabbi from Bnei Brak already told
me he wouldnt eat in my home for many other reasons so this just adds one
more)


-- 
Eli Turkel
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On 3/04/2011 8:59 AM, Eli Turkel wrote:
>> Since a sweetener is made for taste, it is most certainly not batel in any
> quantity.
>
> Why not?  Kitniyos is batel berov, not beshishim, so why should taam
> be an issue?>>
>
> I understand that it is a mchloket if it batel in rov or 60.

Really?  The Rama holds rov; who holds 60?


> 2. Mei kitniyot is another level of chumra. In fact the Rama never
> explicitly outlaws it. It is an inference since he talks about oils
> dripping

The "inference" is very clear.  It's impossible to read him any other
way, so it's exactly as if he wrote it explicitly.


> 3. Corn was discovered in the Americas and so was clearly not in the
> original gezerah

And yet it's clear that it was considered part of the gezera, and nobody
ever thought otherwise.  Which proves that the original gezera was *not*
on specific species but on the whole category.


> 4. According to some shitot kitniyot is batel in rov and as Zev points
> out doesnt depend on the taste

Some?  Who says not?


> Personally we use Canola oil (a rabbi from Bnei Brak already told me
> he wouldnt eat in my home for many other reasons so this just adds one
> more)

But this shouldn't add a reason; if not for his other reasons, then at
most he should avoid things that actually contain canola oil, since he
would consider you to be "mevatel issur lechatchila".  But your kelim
should be fine, under the heter of the kelim of Bnei Rhenus.

-- 
Zev Sero                      The trouble with socialism is that you
z...@sero.name                 eventually run out of other people?s money
                                                      - Margaret Thatcher

 

> -----Original Message-----
> From: avodah-boun...@lists.aishdas.org 
> [mailto:avodah-boun...@lists.aishdas.org] On Behalf Of Zev Sero
> Sent: Sunday 03 April 2011 5:59 AM
> 
> On 2/04/2011 5:11 PM, Akiva Blum wrote:
> 
> > Since a sweetener is made for taste, it is most certainly 
> not batel in any quantity.
> 
> Why not?  Kitniyos is batel berov, not beshishim, so why should taam
> be an issue?
> 

You're correct. Nevertheless, the Ramo was only mattir where the kitiyos
fell in, but does not allow mixing the oil in. Therefore, the kashrus
agencies, unless they hold that corn syrup is not kintiyos, could not allow
deliberately adding sweetener for pesach.

Akiva

On 3/04/2011 3:42 PM, Akiva Blum wrote:
> [mailto:avodah-boun...@lists.aishdas.org] On Behalf Of Zev Sero
>> On 2/04/2011 5:11 PM, Akiva Blum wrote:

>>> Since a sweetener is made for taste, it is most certainly
>>> not batel in any quantity.

>> Why not?  Kitniyos is batel berov, not beshishim, so why should taam
>> be an issue?

> You're correct. Nevertheless, the Ramo was only mattir where the
> kitiyos fell in, but does not allow mixing the oil in. Therefore,
> the kashrus agencies, unless they hold that corn syrup is not kintiyos,
> could not allow deliberately adding sweetener for pesach.

This goes to the machlokes of the Rashba and the Noda Biyhuda about
how we treat bitul done by a goy.  But the bottom line is that they
can't give a hechsher.  I didn't think anyone was suggesting that they
should.  But that doesn't prevent them from investigating the facts,
and publishing their opinion on whether one can drink the stuff on
Pesach *without* a hechsher.  I.e. the way that kashrus works outside
the USA and EY, where products mostly don't have hechsherim but the
kashrus agencies publish lists of which products are kosher.  In such
a situation one can rely on a goy's bitul.


-- 
Zev Sero                      The trouble with socialism is that you
z...@sero.name                 eventually run out of other people?s money
                                                      - Margaret Thatcher

R' Zev Sero (and another respected listmember who wrote me offline) suggest
that the kings of Bavel and Persia might have used varying methods for
counting their years.

This is a good point, but it is relevant only to the beginning of this
gemara, which explains how Belshatzar (inaccurately) calculated the 70
years, and to the following part, which explains how Achashverosh
(inaccurately) calculated the 70 years.  But then the gemara gives its
*own* explanation of how *we* calculate the 70 years.

As RMB pointed out, Mishnayos RH 1:1 seems to give it as a *halacha* that
we must count the reigns of non-Jewish kings on a Tishrei-to-Elul basis.
Now, I'll grant that this is specifically for the purposes of writing the
date in a shtar, but if a different system were being used here, wouldn't
someone point that out? -- That's why I think that when Rava pointed out
that "Shanim m'kutaos havu!", what he meant was that the final year of one
king and the first year of the next king ALWAYS happens in the same
calendar year (except for the very rare case of one king ending at the very
end of Elul and the next king starting at the very beginning of Tishrei).

From what I can tell, the Gemara does not dispute the prior calculations,
where it was said that Nevuchadnetzar reigned for 45 years, Evil Merodach
for 23, and Belshatzar for 3. The differences lie in which year is the
first of the 70, and the concept of "shanim m'kutaos - cutoff years" (and I
think there were also some differences regarding Daryavesh and Koresh).

But everyone seems to agree that Belshatzar reigned for 3 years. This
provides us with a very simple case for illustration. Belshatzar's
calculation was that his first two years counted as the 69th and 70th years
of our exile, and as soon as he entered his third year (the Gra is quoted
as saying this was only a day or two into that third year), he figured that
our time had come and gone and that it was safe to make use of the keilim
of the Beis Hamikdash. And he was killed that very night.

Now, if Belshatzar died only a few days into his third year, then it is
simply NOT POSSIBLE for his reign for his reign to have lasted more than
two years and a few days, even if we *don't* use the "partial year"
calculation at all! (And if we DO use the "partial year" calculation, then
(regardless of when this "fiscal year" rolls over) it is possible for his
reign to have been as short as 12 months plus a few days at either end!)

So why on earth would anyone think that Belshatzar's reign began in 3386 and lasted all the way into 3389?

Akiva Miller


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the following from this weeks shabbat b'shabbato is very relevant:

   Shabbat B'Shabbato
   A pioneer weekly leaflet in Hebrew and in English, Founded in 1985,
   almost 100,000 copies are distributed weekly.
   Translated by: Moshe Goldberg
...
   A Mixture Containing "Kitniyot" on Pesach
   Rabbi Re'eim Hacohen
   Rosh Yeshiva and Chief Rabbi, Otniel

      Question: Can those people who do not eat "kitniyot" (legumes)
      on Pesach buy products which contain kitniyot in a mixture and
      eat them on the holiday?

      Answer: In the Talmud (Pesachim 30a), Rava prohibits a mixture
      containing even a tiny amount of chametz on Pesach, as opposed to
      other prohibitions during the year, where the prohibition is only
      for a majority of forbidden material (when the two foods are the
      same material) or one-sixtieth of the volume of the permitted food
      or more (if the foods are not the same material). The question
      now is what the ruling is for kitniyot, which is forbidden only
      because of a custom and not a full law. The Terumat Hadeshen (113)
      rules, "If a grain of any kind of kitniyot is found in a pot or in
      cooked food, it is wrong to be stringent and forbid the food, even
      for eating. This is because the decree prohibiting food if even a
      small amount of contamination is present applies only to grains
      of the five species." Darchei Moshe quotes the Terumat Hadeshen
      (453) and rejects the opinion of the Maharil, who prohibited eating
      such a mixture. In his comments on the Shulchan Aruch, the RAMA,
      who follows the Ashkenazi custom, writes: "It is clear that food
      is not to be prohibited after the fact, if something fell into
      it by accident." In Be'er Yitzchak, by Rabbi Yitzchak Elchanan,
      and in the book Marcheshet by Rabbi Chanoch Henich Eigesh (Chapter
      3), a proof is brought from the Tosafot that appears in Chulin
      6a, that no decree was made for a mixture containing "demai"
      (grains bought from an unlearned man). It is not reasonable that
      a mixture containing kitniyot would be treated more stringently
      than a mixture containing demai.

      Chayei Adam (127a), Aruch Hashulchan (6), and the Mishna Berura
      (note 8) all agree that if the grain of kitniyot can be recognized
      in the cooked food it should be removed.

      Three questions may be asked about the opinion of the RAMA:

      (1) When two different species are present, must the kitniyot be
      less than one-sixtieth of the whole mixture, or is it enough that
      the kitniyot are less than half of the total?

      (2) Can kitniyot be mixed into the food intentionally?

      (3) Is one who observes the prohibition of kitniyot allowed to buy
      a product that was made for Sephardim, which contains a mixture
      of kitniyot?

      Each of the above questions can be answered in turn.

      (1) Shulchan Aruch Harav (5), Chok Yaacov (note 6), Chayei Adam, the
      Mishna Berura, and Be'er Yitzchak (11) all feel that if the kitniyot
      is less than half of the total of the mixture it may be ignored.

      (2) It would seem from the fact that the recent rabbis compare
      this to the case of demai that one should not make such a mixture
      intentionally, and this is also what is implied by the RAMA. This
      is against the opinion of the Perach.

      (3) At first glance, it would seem that if a mixture containing
      kitniyot was not part of the original decree forbidding kitniyot,
      no additional decree has been added since then. And even if it was
      decided from the start to prohibit adding enough other components
      to outweigh the kitniyot, a mixture would still be permitted. We
      should also note the opinion of the RAMA in Torat Chatat (quoted by
      the TAZ, Yoreh Dai'ah 108:4) - that the custom is to be lenient in
      buying food that was not directly cooked by a Gentile even if it was
      cooked in vessels whose use is forbidden, unless there is a dire
      need. This is because purchase of a cooked item is not considered
      as an a priori action. It is also worthwhile to note the opinion
      of the "others" quoted in the long version of Torat Habayit (4:3)
      - that in the case of a rabbinical decree that has no direct basis
      in the Torah one is permitted a priori to cancel a prohibition. In
      Be'er Yitzchak, this approach is given as a reason to be lenient
      in such cases.

      Another factor is the approach which allows buying many products
      that were made before Pesach. It is written in Be'er Yaacov with
      respect to kitniyot that were mixed together with other material
      before Pesach, "it can be prepared purposely if it is less
      than half the mixture, since before Pesach it has been given the
      status of a permitted food." Therefore, he writes, mixing kitniyot
      into food before Pesach is not considered purposely cancelling a
      prohibition, "especially since the whole matter is only a decree
      of the Geonim." Rabbi Yehuda Preis in a comprehensive article
      on kitniyot quotes these considerations as reasons to permit
      their use. In addition, a new book was recently published on the
      subject of kashrut by two prominent rabbis, Rabbi Elyashiv Kanohal
      and Rabbi Shmuel Ariel, by the name of "And you will eat and be
      satiated." They also rule that food products that have kitniyot
      in a mixture may be purchased as long as this is not the main
      ingredient and that it is not noticeable in the product.

      In my humble opinion, it seems to me that in this generation of
      ingathering of the exiles, the laws of kitniyot should be kept to
      their original scale, without piling on new stringencies. Those
      who give kashrut approval should instruct the factories to stop
      labeling all the products with kitniyot that are not the major
      ingredient as suitable "only for those who eat kitniyot." Rather,
      the ingredients of the food should be listed, so that every consumer
      will be able to decide if the mixture is forbidden to him or her
      according to his customs.

The following is from the Collected Writings of RSRH /volume I Nissan 
V page 98.

And when now there comes the [Pessach] festival itself, observe that 
it is not our temples and synagogues that are to be decorated for the 
celebration of our national birth. It is in our homes that the 
awakening is to take place. Whoever wishes to know what Judaism is, 
let him come and see our Pessach Week!

All rooms which are used in our family life or for the pursuit of our 
livelihood will carry the imprint of our festival. The spirit of this 
festival penetrates into the humblest corner of our earthly 
surroundings and with its coming, dispels any denial of the Divine 
source of our Redemption. Bread is to be prepared for our table, not 
for the altar. This bread "has so much to tell" about our 
unprecedented Deliverance, which was prolonged until the midnight 
hour when finally the Redemption and Rescue took place. These are the 
Divine acts unparalleled in the history of mankind.

Yitzchok Levine 
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From RJR's recent audio roundup
<http://torahmusings.com/2011/03/audio-roundup-cxxxviii-2/>:

    Dr. Benny Brown's paper
    (<http://cardozo.yu.edu/uploadedFiles/CJL/dine_israel/english/brown
    .pdf>
    -- PDF) concerning the Chofetz Chaim's "halachasizing" approach
    to lashon hara resonated with some of my lay person's musings on
    the subject. My Hirhurim comment prior to reading the paper was
    "llimud v'lo lmaaseh I always go back to the same question -- why
    was there no real compendium on lashon hara rules until the C"C? My
    unsubstantiated theory is that it was taught mimetically and that the
    "here are the rules" approach which basically are taught in a way
    that tells people that just about anything they say about anyone is
    lashon hara needs to be analyzed. I wonder about the impact of the
    cognitive dissonance reinforced by a machsom lfi that says to pick
    2 hours not to speak lashon hara -- it reminds me of the matir of
    "nicht on shabbos geret(my yiddish is poor)". I wonder if people just
    (subconsciously?) say (a la what R'YBS taught about a rabbi not being
    too distant from his congregants) look, no one can really do this
    so let's pay lip service but not differentiate between hard core
    dangerous lashon hara and passing the time of day lashon hara lite?"

    When friends ask me why one is not allowed to discuss their children
    with their spouses, I generally try to change the subject (except
    for my closest friends who I hope won't turn me in).

    That being said, I thought my understanding of some insights from
    R'YBS concerning pirkei avot (from the 1964 notes of R'Avraham Farmer
    as quoted by R'HS in Divrei Harav Page 99ff) might be worth sharing:

    1) The Bartenura explains in his first comment on Pirkei Avot that
    this tractate isn't based on the explanation of a Torah Mitzvah as
    are other tractates but rather it's all mussar and middot. R'YBS
    says there must be more to it, what about vhalachta b'drachav
    (imitato dei) or zeh keili v'anveihur? (me -- or kedoshim tehiyu)

    2) Thus the Bartenura must mean that in certain actions and mussar
    it's more individually subjective (i.e. can say everyone must pick
    up lulav/etrog; can't say that by mussar). Similar to learning
    torah and Tzedaka which are individually based.

    3) By these items (Midot/mussar)

        (i)   we never say the halacha is like Rabbi x;

        (ii)  they aren't taught intellectually but by shimush (observation
              of role models);

        (iii) they are a mesorah of action that sefarim aren't written
              about (except, as is known, in recent generations). That's
              why names are named in Pirkei Avot -- These Rabbis
              represented the statements by living them.

    I can't say whether R'YBS would have extended this analysis to lashon
    hara, but I thought it worth sharing to get your opinion.

Tir'u baTov!
-Micha

-- 
Micha Berger             Every second is a totally new world,
mi...@aishdas.org        and no moment is like any other.
http://www.aishdas.org           - Rabbi Chaim Vital
Fax: (270) 514-1507

RMi:
> On Thu, Mar 31, 2011 at 10:32:49AM -0700, Saul.Z.New...@kp.org wrote:
> : in studying the  various  pesach guides at  
> : http://www.kashrut.com/Passover/   , it is interesting to note  that  many 
> :  mainstream hechshers are not recommending  diet  coke  use  for 
> : ashkenazim.
 
> Sucralose (including the brand name "Splenda"), and aspartame (such as
> "Equal") are generally made from corn syrup.
 
That's not my understanding.  Corn-derived powders are used as bulking 
agents in Splenda and NutraSweet as sold for home use, so that these
chemicals which are hundreds of times as sweet as sugar, can be handled
in usable quantities (teaspoons and reasonable fractions thereof).  I
don't know if commercial forms, such as might be added to soda syrups,
would be mixed with (corn-derived) maltodextrin or dextrose, or might
be sold in pure form.  Sucralose is chlorinated sucrose, so it derives
from cane sugar, rather than from HFCS which is, as its name implies,
fructose.  Aspartame is from L-aspartic acid, which is produced bacterially.
I suppose there might be issues with the growth medium on which the E. coli
live.

http://www.lsbu.ac.uk/biology/enztech/aminoacid.html
http://www.freepatentsonline.com/5498709.html

In fact, looking around, one can buy liquid aspartame or sucralose for
manufacturing - so why would there be an issue of kitniyot for diet 
Coke?  Anyone know more about this?

--
        name: jon baker              web: http://www.panix.com/~jjbaker
     address: jjba...@panix.com     blog: http://thanbook.blogspot.com

On Fri, Apr 01, 2011 at 05:36:38PM -0400, Zev Sero wrote:
> On 1/04/2011 5:07 PM, Micha Berger wrote:
>> As a matter of theory, though, is it an issue of minhag hatagarim? I
>> thought that [was] a way to have qinyanim that are not of one of the
>> halachic forms, and therefore wouldn't be related to  lo solin.

> AIUI "minhag hatagorim" is a consequence of "kol tnai shebemomon kayom".

This begs the question, though... Is lo solin defined by contract law,
or by the employee's expectation of payment date?

By saying that tenai shebemamon applies, you presume what I thought was
the fundamental part of my question question -- that payment time is an
issue of implied contract terms and/or business norm. If so, why would
we need a separate issur of lo solin? And since there is a second issur,
who said it follows the same rules as masa umatan?

Tir'u baTov!
-Micha

-- 
Micha Berger             Every second is a totally new world,
mi...@aishdas.org        and no moment is like any other.
http://www.aishdas.org           - Rabbi Chaim Vital
Fax: (270) 514-1507

On Sun, Apr 03, 2011 at 03:59:06PM +0300, Eli Turkel wrote:
: so we have a minhag and several layers of machloket. According to any usual
: laws of safek we should be matir....

You presume that the poseiq can't come to a real birur, and therefore
most rely on the rules of safeiq.

AISI, rules like rov are at the end of the poseiq's arsenal. He should
try to be mevarer the din. If he can't, he's left with a safeiq so we
apply the rules of pesaq.

The question, to my mind, is whether "we are nohagim to be machmir WRT
Pesach" is a valid such rule, and if so, how do we avoid the problem of
ein ladavar sof?

Tir'u baTov!
-Micha

-- 
Micha Berger             Every second is a totally new world,
mi...@aishdas.org        and no moment is like any other.
http://www.aishdas.org           - Rabbi Chaim Vital
Fax: (270) 514-1507

On Thu, Mar 24, 2011 at 09:56:44PM +0200, Doron Beckerman wrote:
: Rav Wolbe's piece on frumkeit is probably the most well-known Mussar essay
: outside Charedi circles, because it is seen as a frontal attack on the
: excessive Chumros being adopted by people who are not at the level where
: they should, or for the wrong motives. True, and a very necessary message.

: But, I wonder whether some form of "frumkeit" is not a virtually inevitable
: manifestation in one who strives for closeness to Hashem...

I would think that one who stives for such closeness isn't doing so for
the wrong motives (as you put it on the previous paragraph).

AISI, a "right motive", as opposed to frumkeit, are those chumeros that
demonstrably add qedushah. "Qedoshim tihyu - perushim tihyu. Qadesh es
atzmekha bemah shemutar lakh." But if one is relating to the chumerah on
a plane other than perishus and the pursuit of qedushah, then why bother?

By which I mean not only "Keeping up with the Cohens" or yuhara, but
also my reasoning would limit one's adoption of Brisker chumeros.
Stam being chosheish for the Rambam by someone whose own ancestors
followed a different pesaq is an expression of a problematic lack of
belief in the halachic process. LAD, there has to be more to the chumerah
than the cheshash alone.

Unless one finds the sevara compelling, such that is helps create a
relationship, an "ownership" of the mitzvah and thus gives the mitzvah
more impact, I'm not sure of the point.

To case my point into RSWolbe's terms: Rote practice without spirituality
is frumkeit, not the pursuit of qedushah. And perishus from the mutar
is supposed to be all about qedushah.

Tir'u baTov!
-Micha

-- 
Micha Berger             "Fortunate indeed, is the man who takes
mi...@aishdas.org        exactly the right measure of himself,  and
http://www.aishdas.org   holds a just balance between what he can
Fax: (270) 514-1507      acquire and what he can use." - Peter Latham

On Sun, Apr 03, 2011 at 01:42:18AM +0100, Allan Engel wrote:
: This does throw up a separate question that I have wondered about, what
: exactly is the significance of a tallis, especially in an era where men
: routinely wear tzitzis? I appreciate that one can only do 'atifa with a full
: tallis, and that therefore they have different brochos, but surely that is a
: post-facto distinction?

The Mordechai says you're not yotzei the mitzvah at all with a tallis
qatan. The Orchos Chaim says that we cannot say "lehis'ateif" for this
reason, and such a berakhah would be levatallah and sheim H' lashav.
The Rama in Darkhei Moshe follows the OC on this, and says we make
"al mitzvas tzitzis" out of cheshash for those who hold there is no
qiyum. (Possibly "al mitzvas tzitzis" would be an example of the Ashk
practice of making berakhos on minhagim???)

See RSM's post from May 2002 at
<http://www.aishdas.org/avodah/vol09/v09n026.shtml#03>.

Tir'u baTov!
-Micha

-- 
Micha Berger             The fittingness of your matzos [for the seder]
mi...@aishdas.org        isn't complete with being careful in the laws
http://www.aishdas.org   of Passover. One must also be very careful in
Fax: (270) 514-1507      the laws of business.    - Rav Yisrael Salanter

On Thu, Mar 31, 2011 at 09:23:39AM -0400, Hankman wrote:
: RMB wrote:
:> Yes, but under this kavanah, one is definitely making a hefseiq.

: An utterance (not calling it a hefseiq intentionally) letzorech hatfilah
: (eg.) is not a hefseik, so too here as we are in "doubt," it is letzorech
: hakriah and should not be a hefseiq either.

:> I don't think this tenai works, because one is only yotzei with the correct
:> reading, whichever it is, anyway.

: Is this your way of saying that there is no safeik model, only a
: correction model? You will always have a hefseiq problem in your model as
: well, since you are knowingly including one version that does not belong
: there (even though you have no choice due to your doubt) and even more so
: if you really do know the correct version but do not use it exclusively
: out of some of fealty to the "minihag" of the last several hundred
: years. (Even though a clearly "improper" minhag should not be continued).

What I'm thinking is that according to what you're calling the "correction
model" then there is a right answer and a wrong one, and one isn't
creating a hefseiq when correcting oneself.

If one isn't treating one of the variants as "wrong" how is it letzorekh
to say the other?

I answered obliquely because I am not sure I want to buy into your two
models. AISI, the safeiq model is also saying one is a correction (and
thus letzorekh) but we don't know which.

The problem being, the same rules of mesoretic niqud we use for kol
haTorah kulah do tell us which.

It's not a real safeiq, it's a chumrah to be chosheish for an opinion
that the halachic process justifies our rejecting.

And since I now tied things into that thread, a tangent... I could
justify this chumrah by the rules I proposed, though, and perhaps this
illustrates where my head is on chumros.

For someone who doesn't know the difference in semantics between zekher
and zeikher that the Gra's talmidim were arguing about, I fail to see
the point in leining both. However, for someone for whom the repetition
helps drive in the point that we are specifically talking about removing
reminders and mememorials, not all memory of Amaleiq, I do see value.
Because it adds to how he relates to the mitzvah of zekhirah, and thus
increases the mitzvah's qiyum shebaleiv.

Tir'u baTov!
-Micha

-- 
Micha Berger             Nearly all men can stand adversity,
mi...@aishdas.org        but if you want to test a man's character,
http://www.aishdas.org   give him power.
Fax: (270) 514-1507                      -Abraham Lincoln


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