Avodah Mailing List

Volume 27: Number 195

Tue, 16 Nov 2010

• 1. Re: The Rosh ruled that a rav was a zaken mamre (Hankman)
• 2. "Re: Contents of Avodah digest on atifat tallit (Joel Schnur)
• 3. R Michael J Broyde on Electricity (Micha Berger)
• 4. Re: The Rosh ruled that a rav was a zaken mamre (kennethgmiller@juno.com)
• 5. RSRH on Establishing a Household (Prof. Levine)
• 6. False Piety and Superstition (Prof. Levine)
• 7. Re: atifat tallit (Danny Schoemann)
• 8. Godel's incompleteness theorems -- Proof of G-d's existence (Micha Berger)
• 9. The Forces That Have Shaped World History (Prof. Levine)
• 10. Re: "Re: Contents of Avodah digest on atifat tallit (Micha Berger)
• 11. Re: The Rosh ruled that a rav was a zaken mamre (Micha Berger)
• 12. Murder? (Harry Maryles)
• 13. Re: Murder? (Zev Sero)

:> In other words: According to my understanding, there are only two
:> circumstances under which the Torah allows a Jew to kill another: (a)
:> In the case where a duly-constituted beis din has sentenced someone to
:> death, and (b) To prevent a murderer or potential murderer from murdering,
:> and this includes lots of cases such as self-defense, getting rid of a
:> moser, and the like.

: 3. The beit din or some other authority (therein lies another rub)
: takes the power originally allocated to the Jewish king to maintain
: civil society.

RMB responded:

Isn't that the same as (b)? Or is there a distinction I'm missing?

CM speculates:

The distinction could be quite simple (if my thoughts are true to the
halacha). The cases under b) all prevent some form of murder. The cases
under c) may be much broader in that they will include cases to maintain
civil order when the king deems necessary even if loss of life is not
expected, such as say a curfew on pain of death imposed to prevent mass
looting etc., or other such examples. (I know you can qvetch in a risk to
life  here if you push it beyond my meaning).

Kol Tuv

Chaim Manaster
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The Vilna Gaon states that it is not necessary bizman hazeh, to do atifas
yishmealim. Just hold the tallis over your head and make the bracha of
l'hisataf BAtzitis. Nothing is said before or after, either.

___________________________

Joel Schnur

Senior VP

Government Affairs/Public Relations

Schnur Associates, Inc.

1350 Avenue of the Americas

Suite 1200

New York, NY 10019

 

Tel. 212-489-0600 x204

Fax. 212-489-0203 

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RMJB submitted scans of four of his articles related to electriticy for
inclusion in the articles section of aishdas.org . (I wonder if that's
related to his position being discussed on mail-jewish over the past
few days...) They are:
The Use of Electricity on Shabbat and Yom Tov
    http://www.aishdas.org/articles/rmjb_electricity1.pdf
    RMJB and R' Howard Jachter

Modern Technology and the Sabbath: Some General Observations
    http://www.aishdas.org/articles/rmjb_electricity2.pdf
    by RMJB

Electrically Produced Fire or Light in Positive Commantments
    http://www.aishdas.org/articles/rmjb_electricity3.pdf
    by RMJB

Use of Elevators and Escalators on Shabbat and Yom Tov
    RMJB and R' Howard Jachter
    http://www.aishdas.org/articles/rmjb_electricity4.pdf

-micha

R' Joel Rich wrote:
: 3. The beit din or some other authority (therein lies another rub)
: takes the power originally allocated to the Jewish king to maintain
: civil society.

Yeah, I keep forgeting this point. It is very difficult for me -- in our
day when the rabbonim have no real authority and merely tell their opinions
-- to imagine when it was otherwise.

I'd like to ask where they get this authority, given the reality that the
melech has these powers and the Rosh was not a melech. But that might be
getting it backwards, because I don't really know the definition of a
melech.

It is simple to know who a kohen is: it is a man whose father is a kohen.
It is simple to know who a rabbi is: it is a man who was given that
authority by someone who already has it (and perhaps other conditions, for
Real Semicha TM).

But I have no idea what the definition of the melech is, and the haftara
for Chayei Sarah (1 Melachim chap 1) does nothing to clarify it for me. How
did Adoniyah become the melech? *Did* he become the melech? Was he a
legitimate melech? Is there such a thing as a *pasul* melech? The pshat of
the story gives me the impression that anyone who is accepted as melech by
his constituency (not necessarily all of Klal Yisrael) is a melech, and of
so, that would also apply to the Rosh.

Am I making any sense? Or am I simply illustrating the dangers of have too little knowledge of a subject?

Akiva Miller

____________________________________________________________
Mortgage Rates Hit 3.25%
If you owe under $729k you probably qualify for Obama's Refi Program
http://thirdpartyoffers.juno.com/TGL3131/4cdda265dd3e926e49ast02vuc

Below is part of RSRH's commentary on Bereishis 28

20 Ya?akov made a vow as follows: If God will be 
with me and keep me on this path on which I am 
going, and will give me bread to eat and
clothes to wear;

21 And I return in peace to my father?s house ? then God will be God to me.

Ever since the gates of Paradise were closed, the establishment of
an independent household involves so many difficulties, hinges on circumstances
and situations so complex, that a person needs special help
from God so as not to forfeit the whole of his better self in gaining that
piece of bread. Who can count the people who were morally pure before
they set out on ?the path to bread and clothing,? but who subsequently,
for the sake of making a living and attaining social status, denied God,
spurned morality, were inconsiderate of their neighbor and of his human
dignity, and so on. Not for naught do our Sages say that ?this
path? alludes to Avodah Zara, gilui  aroyas, 
shefichas damim and loshon harah(see Bereshis
Rabbah 70:4).

Thus far, Ya?akov has been a yoshav ohalyim but now he is setting out
to seek a wife and sustenance for his wife and children. The dangers
involved seem to him so grave that first he prays for the preservation
of his character, that he not forfeit his spiritual and moral integrity.

Integrity is the first thing that the ancestral Jew wishes for himself
as he sets out to establish his home. Only then does he request:
v'nasan li ? ?to me? ? i.e., an independent livelihood, food and clothing, so
as to live respectably in society; in short: sustenance and social position.
The third wish, which lives, and should live, in the heart of every Jew,
is for sholom, peace, and finally bais av, family ties that remain intact.
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The following is from RSRH's commentary on Bereishis 30: 27 - 30.

27 Lavan said to him: Would that I found favor in your eyes, for I 
have a presentiment that God has blessed me for your sake.

28 Then he said: Set your wage from me and I will gladly give it.

29 [Ya'akov] said to him: You know very well how I have served you 
and what your property has become with me.

30 For the little that you had before I came increased tremendously 
because God blessed you according
to my endeavor. And now, when will I, as well, provide for my household?

Lavan would very much like to retain Ya'akov's services, preferably for
no other payment except his keep, as heretofore. Hence, he begins to
speak in the manner that is typical of self-righteous hypocrites, who
affect piety. He does not admit that he would like to keep Ya'akov because
of the diligent services he has rendered. He knows that such actual
things have to be paid for, and that he who praises them will pay a
high price. For this reason he affects extreme piety (just as, today, those
who have cast off all genuine piety turn to superstition, imagining that
Nechush, superstitious belief in omens, is tantamount to piety). Lavan says
to Ya'akov: I don't like to let you go. There is no real reason for it, but
I have a Nechush (presentiment): It seems to me that "Hashem," Whom you serve,
has blessed me for your sake, because you are such a pious man. I
would not like to see such a pious man leave me.




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I wrote:

> (For that matter the Tos' HaRosh IIRC mentions that the Baytusim and
> Tzadukim had 2 conflicting approaches how to misinterpret the
> Written/Oral Law, and much later the Minim had a 3rd approach. But
> "Laws that the Tzadukim agree to" are common to all 3 break-away
> groups.)

It's actually a Tiferes Yisroel  on Maseches Yodayim 4:6

- Danny

On Mon, Nov 15, 2010 at 10:40:06AM -0500, Hankman wrote to Areivim:
: I suspect (speculate, I am no expert here) that Godel's incompleteness
: theorems could be at the bottom of the reason why absolute proofs of
: G-d's existence are hard (impossible by the theorm) to come by. It
: asserts that not all things that are true can be proven to be true (no
: consistent system can prove its own consistency - thus as proof of an
: all powerful deity would show the consistency of a deity based theology
: [logical construct] no such proof is possible). Am I off base here? See
: his theorems below:

: Kol Tuv
: Chaim Manaster

: Goedel's incompleteness theorems

: It is not strictly science, but rather a very interesting set
: of mathematical theorems about logic and the philosophy that is
: definitely relevant to science as a whole. Proven in 1931 by Kurt
: Goedel, these theories say that with any given set of logical rules,
: except for the most simple, there will always be statements that are
: undecidable, meaning that they cannot be proven or disproven due to the
: inevitable self-referential nature of any logical systems that is even
: remotely complicated. This is thought to indicate that there is no grand
: mathematical system capable of proving or disproving all statements. An
: undecidable statement can be thought of as a mathematical form of a
: statement like "I always lie." Because the statement makes reference to
: the language being used to describe it, it cannot be known whether the
: statement is true or not. However, an undecidable statement does not need
: to be explicitly self-referential to be undecidable. The main conclusion
: of Goedel's incompleteness theorems is that all logical systems will have
: statements that cannot be proven or disproven; therefore, all logical
: systems must be "incomplete."

: The philosophical implications of these theorems are widespread. The
: set suggests that in physics, a "theory of everything" may be impossible,
: as no set of rules can explain every possible event or outcome. It also
: indicates that logically, "proof" is a weaker concept than "true"; such a
: concept is unsettling for scientists because it means there will always be
: things that, despite being true, cannot be proven to be true. Since this
: set of theorems also applies to computers, it also means that our own
: minds are incomplete and that there are some ideas we can never know,
: including whether our own minds are consistent (i.e. our reasoning
: contains no incorrect contradictions). This is because the second of
: Goedel's incompleteness theorems states that no consistent system can
: prove its own consistency, meaning that no sane mind can prove its own
: sanity. Also, since that same law states that any system able to prove
: its consistency to itself must be inconsistent, any mind that believes
: it can prove its own sanity is, therefore, insane.

Goedel's proof involves self-referential statements. The only particular
statement that he shows can't be proven within system X is "This
statement can't be proven from system X", I statement I'll call GX
(the Goedel statement for X) or one that maps 1:1 to that statement --
a GY in system Y that maps 1:1 with a "I can't be proven" GX in system X.
(Where Y is to GY as X is to GX.)

If GX is true, then it's true that it can't be proven, so X must be
incomplete -- we know of something true that can be expressed in X's
language that can't be proven within X.

If GX is false, then we are saying it CAN be proven -- and yet it's
false. That would make X inconsistent -- it can prove a falsehood.

So while "an undecidable statement does not need to be explicitly
self-referential to be undecidable" it must be implicitly self-referential
-- ie map 1:1 to a self-referential statement to be provable to be
undecidable.

Second, I would not assume without proof that our minds are formal
systems. Consciousness, unlike math formulae and algorithms, might well
be exempt from Goedel's analysis.

However, I think Goedel offers a good mashal for halakhah...

Eilu va'eilu divrei E-lokim Chaim (DEC) -- the halachic process is
inconsistent, it allows proof of both Beis Hillel's position and Beis
Shammai's

vehalakhah keBH -- the halakhah pesuqah is not a closed finite system.
The intial is incomplete, and we grow the halakhah based not only on
the halachic system itself, but also on matters like the middos of BH,
their numbers, and other new information.

So, the DEC level is intentionally inconsistent. At any one moment, the
halakhah pesuqah level is incomplete -- there are always new situations
not yet encountered and not yet pasqen-ed upon. And that incompletion
is closed using a broader process that isn't a closed finite system. In
no sense of the word "halakhah" do Goedellian limitations set in.

Tir'u baTov!
-Micha

-- 
Micha Berger             A cheerful disposition is an inestimable treasure.
mi...@aishdas.org        It preserves health, promotes convalescence,
http://www.aishdas.org   and helps us cope with adversity.
Fax: (270) 514-1507         - R' SR Hirsch, "From the Wisdom of Mishlei"

The following is from RSRH's commentary on Bereishis 32

8 Ya'akov was very much afraid and distressed, so he divided the 
people who were with him, as well as the flocks, cattle and camels, into
two camps.

Just as Ya'akov and Esav oppose each other here, so they continue
to stand opposed to one another unto this very day. Ya'akov is the family
man blessed with children; hard-working, serving, weighed down by
cares. Esav is the "finished and accomplished" man (cf. Commentary
above, 25:25).

Ya'akov now returns as the independent head of a family. Even now,
having overcome all the obstacles, this privilege is, to him, the highest
prize, the greatest achievement. But to attain it, he had to toil and
struggle for twenty years, despite the fact that he had already received
the blessing and the birthright.

Others, however, take this privilege for granted; it is given to them
from birth. Esav, the "finished and accomplished" man, already possessed
it in full measure when Ya'akov first left home. While Ya'akov,
through hard work, succeeded in establishing a family, Esav became a
political force, the leader of an army, an aluf at the head of his troops.
Thus the external contrast between Ya'akov, who held on to his brother's
heel when they were born, and Esav, the "accomplished" man.
In Ya'akov and Esav, two opposing principles confront each other.
The struggle between them, and the outcome of this struggle, are the
forces that have shaped world history. Ya'akov represents family life,
happiness and making others happy. Esav represents the glitter of political
power and might. This conflict has raged for thousands of years:
Is it sufficient just to be a human being, and are political power and social
creativity of no significance unless they lead to the loftiest of all human
aspirations, or, on the contrary, does everything that is human in man,
in home, and in family life exist only to serve the purposes of political
triumph?

How different from his attitude toward Lavan is Ya'akov's attitude
toward Esav. We know how steadfast is the power of one who is sure
of his own integrity, and how oppressive is the feeling of guilt, even if
only imagined. It is easier to suffer wrong and injustice for twenty years
than to face for one minute a person whom we know was offended by
us and who cannot understand our motives, which do not justify our
actions but at least excuse them.
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On Fri, Nov 12, 2010 at 10:28:36AM -0500, Joel Schnur wrote:
: The Vilna Gaon states that it is not necessary bizman hazeh, to do atifas
: yishmealim. Just hold the tallis over your head and make the bracha of
: l'hisataf BAtzitis. Nothing is said before or after, either.

What grounds does the Gra have for the din changing?
Does it have something to do with whether atifah is the norm in general society?
Or perhaps it's a din in tekheiles?
Or was it something else I couldn't guess at?

The first possibility might require a tallis that is buttoned or otherwise
worn in a modern style.

Those of us who wear murex dyed tekheiles might still need to do atifah
if we want to gain by doing so. (I would say Radziner tekheiles too, but
following the Radziner rebbe and worrying about minhag haGra at the
same time would require a unique individual.)

Tir'u baTov!
-Micha

-- 
Micha Berger             Between stimulus & response, there is a space.
mi...@aishdas.org        In that space is our power to choose our
http://www.aishdas.org   response. In our response lies our growth
Fax: (270) 514-1507      and our freedom. - Victor Frankl, (MSfM)

On Fri, Nov 12, 2010 at 09:31:46AM -0500, Hankman wrote:
:>: 3. The beit din or some other authority (therein lies another rub)
:>: takes the power originally allocated to the Jewish king to maintain
:>: civil society.

: RMB responded:
:> Isn't that the same as (b)? Or is there a distinction I'm missing?

: The distinction could be quite simple (if my thoughts are true to the
: halacha). The cases under b) all prevent some form of murder. The cases
: under c) may be much broader in that they will include cases to maintain
: civil order when the king deems necessary even if loss of life is not
: expected, such as say a curfew on pain of death imposed to prevent mass
: looting etc., or other such examples. (I know you can qvetch in a risk
: to life here if you push it beyond my meaning).

But does a king himself have the right to execute if he can't "kvetch in"
a risk to life?

Even a milkhemes reshus... Is it mutar to declare one before things get to
the point where poverty threatens lives? See the Ritva on Berakhos 3b,
"She'tzrichin parnassah, keshehayu aniyim dechuqim hayu omerim kach v'lo
b'chol sha'ah". (Which RMYG pointed us to during the thread
http://www.aishdas.org/avodah/getindex.cgi?section
=W#WHY%20IS%20MILCHEMES%20RESHUS%20ALLOWED
or <http://bit.ly/9vEtgg>.)

On Fri, Nov 12, 2010 at 08:22:41PM +0000, kennethgmil...@juno.com wrote:
: I'd like to ask where they get this authority, given the reality that
: the melech has these powers and the Rosh was not a melech. But that might
: be getting it backwards, because I don't really know the definition of
: a melech.

R' Akiva reminded me of R' David Cohen's take on what he calls "daas
Torah", which is much narrower than the concept usually disputed here.
(Aside from not asserting any greater probability of being correct,
RDC's formulation doesn't justify seeking rabbinic advice on personal
matters that revolve on secular questions.)

RDC holds that the power of the melekh fell to the Sanhedrin with the
end of melukhah, and to the rabbinate when the Sanhedrin disbanded. We
therefore are obligated to listen to gedolim not because of any claim
that they are more likely to be correct, but as a derivative of the
obligation to listen to the melekh.

See RDC's Maaseh Avos, Siman Labanim cheileq I, English translation
published by Artscroll in "Templates for Ages" at page 33: "The Crown
of Torah and the Crown of Kingship; the Hasmoneans and the Concept of
Daas Torah".

The gemara Gittin 62a calls rabbanim "melakhim".

And in Hareri Qedem pg 265, RYBS is quotes as comparing a mara de'asra
to a melekh.

(Sources from when we discussed daas Torah, and in particular
<http://www.jlaw.com/Articles/observ-on-daat.html>.)

If a rav has a din melekh WRT obedience, it would be no major chiddush
if it were true WRT enforcing the stability of society.

The SA CM 2:1 says that it falls to any beis din, even non-musmachim,
to punish as needed to order society (even without eidus, hara'ah,
or the din being a chiyuv misah), but the job of doing so falls to the
gadol hador or the 7 tuv'ei ha'ir. The Rama emphasizes the role of the
7 tuv'ei ha'ir. And the SA allows using secular authorities as the means
of execution in such cases, if that is all those authorities allow the BD.

Getting back to the opening case... The Rosh declared someone a zaqein
mamrei. He can't have the person killed midin zaqein mamrei -- there is
a lack of a Sanhedrin on har habayis. He could have the person killed
midin malkhus / 7 tuvei ha'ir, but only if he could argue that letting
this case go would somehow cost lives. But again, that's not do to the
technicalities of zaqein mamrei, and therefore wouldn't mean that the Rosh
giving someone this title was tantamount to saying he should be killed.

Tir'u baTov!
-Micha

-- 
Micha Berger             When we are no longer able to change a situation
mi...@aishdas.org        -- just think of an incurable disease such as
http://www.aishdas.org   inoperable cancer -- we are challenged to change
Fax: (270) 514-1507      ourselves.      - Victor Frankl (MSfM)

The following exchange between RZS and RMF took place on Areivim in an
ongoing debate about various ethical aspects of of organ transplants:

On 15/11/2010 2:33 PM, Michael Feldstein wrote:
>> By agreeing to receive a person's heart or lungs, I believe you are
>> directly authorizing the murder of an individual (assuming you do not
>> belive that brain stem death is halachic death). Those organs would NOT
>> be harvested unless a donor is directly identified and agrees to be the
>> recipient. It's the fact that a good match is identified and the recipient
>> wants the organ that directly triggers the harvesting of the organ to
>> occur. It's much more direct than you are implying. In fact, there have
>> been cases where a brain stem dead person wants to donate organs but
>> because no match is identified, the organs are not harvested. Therefore,
>> you cannot use the argument that the person will be murdered anyway.

On Mon, 11/15/10, Zev Sero <z...@sero.name> wrote:
> How do you *know* in any specific case that there are no other suitable
> recipients, and therefore that if you refuse the organ the murder won't
> happen?

> Furthermore, suppose your friendly neighbourhood mafioso offers outright
> to go out and kill someone in order to procure you a life-saving organ;
> is it really the case that you must give up your life by refusing? He
> is a moral agent, and ein shliach lidvar aveira. It's his decision to
> be a murderer, not yours. You're not committing the murder, you're not
> even asking him to do it, you're merely not telling him not to do it;
> at what point do you say "al titzdak harbeh"? And if you want to be
> a chassid at the expense of your own life, that's one thing; but what
> entitles you to insist that someone else make such a sacrifice, when
> the Torah does not demand it of him?

That generated the following thought -- which I was aksed to post
on Avodah:

Let me pose some other ethical -- and even Halachic questions. Let us
say that someone needs a kidney. Let us further assume that his prognosis
is death without a transplant.

Let us then say that he knows of someone who is a compapitable donor
that can donate one of his kidneys and save his life.

But the potential donor refuses to put himself under the knife since
there is a minimal risk of death. What would you say if the person who
needed the kidney kidnapped the potential donor and forcibly removed a
kidney and had it transplanted into himself. Now both people will live
a long healthy life. What are the ethics of such a scenario?

What recipient were your child?

What about buying a Kidney even though it is against the policy of UNOS
(United Network for Organ Sharing). They believe that money should never
be a factor when deciding who is the recipient of a donated organ. They
say it is unethical and recipients should be prioritized based on
medical need.

HM

...
> But the potential donor refuses to put himself under the knife since
> there is a minimal risk of death. What would you say if the person who
> needed the kidney kidnapped the potential donor and forcibly removed a
> kidney and had it transplanted into himself. Now both people will live
> a long healthy life. What are the ethics of such a scenario?

Lechatchila, he surely has no right to do this. Even stealing property
for your own pikuach nefesh is only allowed if you have the intention of
repaying him; if you steal an organ how can you repay him? And as for
laying hands on someone, let alone subjecting him to even a minimal risk
of death, but one of which he is afraid, one would need a very strong
source to permit this even for pikuach nefesh.

But bediavad, it seems 100% clear to me that he need not give the organ
back, and must merely compensate his victim financially.

> What recipient were your child?

I don't see how that changes the moral or legal analysis. Your duty
to provide for your child doesn't even override your own life, let
alone someone else's. Of course the emotional analysis is completely
different, but that is only relevant in assigning moral blame bediavad,
not in deciding what to do lechatchila.

> What about buying a Kidney even though it is against the policy of UNOS
> (United Network for Organ Sharing). They believe that money should never
> be a factor when deciding who is the recipient of a donated organ. They
> say it is unethical and recipients should be prioritized based on
> medical need.

In my opinion their opinions and laws are completely immoral and
unethical, and it is a mitzvah to ignore and subvert them. Not only
may one buy an organ for oneself or ones relative, but it's a mitzvah
to do so for a stranger, and even a broker who procures such organs for
huge amounts of money is still doing a mitzvah and gets sechar for it.
I also think it a mitzvah to vote and campaign against such laws whenever
one has a chance, and to vote or campaign for candidates who are against
such laws (all else being equal).

-- 
Zev Sero
z...@sero.name



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