Avodah Mailing List

Volume 27: Number 155

Wed, 04 Aug 2010

• 1. Re: Reb Shraga Feivel Mendlowitz on RSRH's 19 Letters (Simon Montagu)
• 2. Re: Reb Shraga Feivel Mendlowitz on RSRH's 19 Letters (Allan Engel)
• 3. Mitzvos in Chutz laAretz (Micha Berger)
• 4. Re: Reb Shraga Feivel Mendlowitz on RSRH's 19 Letters (Micha Berger)
• 5. Re: Reb Shraga Feivel Mendlowitz on RSRH's 19 Letters (Moshe Y. Gluck)
• 6. Tzedakah: Giving to an organization vs. giving privately (Micha Berger)
• 7. Re: anti-meat rhetoric "according to Judaism" (kennethgmiller@juno.com)
• 8. Re: anti-meat rhetoric "according to Judaism" (Micha Berger)
• 9. Re: Reb Shraga Feivel Mendlowitz on RSRH's 19 Letters (Arie Folger)
• 10. Re: Copyright and Dina deMalkhuta (Micha Berger)
• 11. Re: toras hachasiddus (Micha Berger)
• 12. Re: Names of God in foreign languages (Micha Berger)
• 13. Achilas Arai and kevias Maasros (Doron Beckerman)
• 14. Re: changing nusach [was: Reb Shraga Feivel Mendlowitz on RSRH's 19 Letters] (T613K@aol.com)
• 15. P'rat U'Klal, Ejusdem Generis and the FBI (Moshe Y. Gluck)

On Mon, Aug 2, 2010 at 6:29 AM, Prof. Levine <Larry.Lev...@stevens.edu>wrote:

> Anyway, we are talking here of studying the writings of RSRH. How can
> anyone be against this or say that this does not "do it for him"?
>
>
Why is this surprising? Do everybody's writings "do it" for you? RSRH
certainly doesn't "do it" for me. I'm not sure if it's the effect of the
translations that I've seen or a feature of the original, but I find his
style so over-elaborate that I am unable to extract any content from it.
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On Mon, Aug 2, 2010 at 4:26 PM, Prof. Levine <Larry.Lev...@stevens.edu>wrote:
>
> Well, here is my opinion, for what it is worth. If one wants to understand
> what Yahadus is really about, then one should study the writings of RSRH. I
> have met people who know a great deal of gemara, halacha, etc. but do not
> have an in depth understanding of Yahadus.
>


I would say exactly the same, but substitute "Moreh Nevuchim" for "the
writings of RSRH".

Others would insert whichever works have resonated most with them.
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There is a Rashi on "veHayah im Shamoa" that it often repeated in some
circles. Rashi on Devarim 11:18 "vesamtem es devarai" is actually a straight
quote of the Sifri. The Sifri states that after "veHayah im Shamoa" describes
our abandonment of HQBH and the resultring galus, Hashem commands us in
tefillin and mezuzos "kedei shelo yihyu lakhem chadashim kishetichzeru".

Interestingly, a similar idea is given in the Yerushalmi, Sheviis 1:1
(vilna: 15b), but with a very different take. According to the gemara,
the pasuq shows that mitzvos she'einum teluyos baaretz are equally
"nohagim bein baaeretz bein bechu"l".

Tir'u baTov!
-Micha

-- 
Micha Berger             A wise man is careful during the Purim banquet
mi...@aishdas.org        about things most people don't watch even on
http://www.aishdas.org   Yom Kippur.
Fax: (270) 514-1507                       - Rav Yisrael Salanter

On Mon, Aug 02, 2010 at 11:15:49AM -0400, Rich, Joel wrote:
:> I believe the Reb Moshe has a teshuva in which he says that one
: can switch from Nusach Sefard (not the oriental Sefard, but the Sefard
: that the Chassidim introduced) to Ashkenaz, because virtually everyone
: in Europe davened Ashkenaz originally until the advent of Chassidus.

: And R'OY has a tshuva that allows a one way switch the other way.

No, he doesn't allow anyone to switch to Chassidish Sfard.

And in any case, ROY's argument is specific to EY, where he feels the
Mechaber was poseiq acharon. RMF neither holds of this supremacy of the
SA in defining pesaq for EY's Ashkenazim, nor happened to be answering
an Ashkenazi in EY.

It's not simply that each is saying their own minhag is superior in
general.

Tir'u baTov!
-Micha

R' YL:
First of all, what does TTBOMK stand for?? Secondly, it appears that his son
and son-in-law did not follow in his derech! The following is from his bio,
pages 37-38:

He was alive to every facet of genuine Torah expression. "Some
souls," he used to say, "drink from Tanya. Others from the Ramchal.
Still others from Rabbi Samson Raphael Hirsch. I drink from all of
them, though at any given time, I might drink from one in particular."
He had the genius to draw from every strand of authentic
Jewish thought, to place those various strands in relation to one another,
and to see each of them as simply another path to knowledge
and service of the Divine. Who else could have used the works of
Rabbi Samson Raphael Hirsch to explain a difficult passage in a
classic chassidic work such as Tanya, or vice versa.
<SNIP>

In a subsequent post, R' Akiva Blum posted: 
Did RSFM teach fully all these approaches? Do his son and SIL need to, or
can?
-------------------


inadvertently I'm sure, misunderstanding R' SFM's Derech. It was that a
person should have a synthesis of the derachim that worked best for _him_,
and not to wholly adhere to one Derech even though it had addressable
faults. R' SFM's personal Derech, IIRC, was based on Nefesh HaChayim, Tanya
(which he learned differently than Chabad did), RSRH, and Ramchal. (I may be
misremembering - I think I have it right, though...) So his talmidim
followed in his path, and ended up differently, Mar K'd'is Lay, u'Mar K'd'is
Lay. If you read again the above passage in that light, I think you'll see a
different meaning than the one you understood. R' SFM would not have, I
guess, made someone learn RSRH who didn't appreciate him.

KT,
MYG

RSW's first vaad in Alei Shur is one for "Hislamdus", the ability to take
lesson / teach oneself / an educational awareness and self-awareness
(a good translation eludes me). This is a thought I had while e-vaad 1
was doing the excercise. I shared it with the vaad, and one of the other
members suggested I repeat it for further discussion here.

The goal of this particular avodah is to say Adon Olam with hislamdus --
not to actively increase one's kavanah, but to become more aware of how
one says it as it is being said. (I think it's normal for an increase
in kavanah to happen on its own given such awareness.)

We stretched on a little long with the one excercise, and so after a
while one day, my mind drifted from how to hislameid from my saying Adon
Olam to what there is lehislameid from Adon Olam itself.

Where should tzedaqah go -- is it better to give to established
institutions, which have more skill at using the money, but you end up
paying for that skill, or to private individuals?

Perhaps it depends on which aspect of our relationship to HQBH we are
trying to emulate.

Emulating the Adon Olam would be working wholesale, and thus push more
toward supporting communal institutions.
Emulating Chai Goali would be having a personal stake in an individual,
and therefore push toward the matan beseiser in the mail-slot kind
of giving.

What do you think? A valid take-home lesson from Adon Olam? No?

Tir'u baTov!
-Micha

-- 
Micha Berger             When faced with a decision ask yourself,
mi...@aishdas.org        "How would I decide if it were Ne'ilah now,
http://www.aishdas.org   at the closing moments of Yom Kippur?"
Fax: (270) 514-1507                            - Rav Yisrael Salanter

R' Micha Berger wrote:
> I used the word suffering for the level 2 experience just to
> have "pain" and "suffering" as distinct terms.

In my experience, most people use these words interchangeably. But if you
want to make this distinction between them, that even if one experiences
pain, he does not experience "suffering" unless he is self-aware, that's
okay with me.

The really important part is this: You seem to feel that the "tzaar" of
"tzaar baalei chayim" refers only to the suffering of self-aware beings,
and not to the pain which other beings might experience. Is this correct?
If so, what is your source? Why do you feel this way?

> For an animal, there is no "I". We can't really picture what it's
> like to think like an animal does. "That hurts, so I should get
> away from it" is a possible thought, but "I am hurting" is not.
> They are somewhere between a sleeping person and one who is
> conscious. Recall that I am saying that a lack of free will
> implies they feel pain, but they are not conscious of feeling
> pain -- that in fact the entire concept of animal consciousness
> isn't what you or I experience.

The phrase "free will" is ambiguous. It can refer to two different things.
In a literal sense, it simply means the ability to choose. But in Torah
thought, it is usually used in a much more specific sense, namely the
ability to choose between right and wrong.

Here's an experiment: In one hand, hold up some kind of food in front of a
dog. At the same time, offer him a different food from your other hand. I
have done this many times, and I watch the dog's face and eyes move back
and forth, from one treat to the other. That is an objective observation.
My subjective interpretation of it is that the dog is trying to decide
which treat to grab. I will not pretend to understand his thought
processes, nor the methods he uses to reach a decision. But I doubt anyone
will ever convince me that he's not engaged in some sort of decision-making
process, that he does indeed have the ability to choose. No, not the
ability to choose between right and wrong. These abstract concepts are
beyond him, as we presume self-awareness to be beyond him.

Let's back up a bit. Torah thought tells us that only humans, with Tzelem
Elokim, are on a high enough level to be able to choose between right and
wrong, even if other animals can choose betwen what they like and don't
like. And scientists, as RMB explains, tell us that only humans are on a
high enough level to be self-aware, and to say, "I am suffering", even if
other animals can say, "That hurts."

But I don't see any relationship between these two ideas. I can easily
imagine a being who is unable to comprehend the concepts of right and
wrong, but is clearly self-aware. (Some criminal psychologists might be
able to point out some specific examples for you.) It is harder for me to
imagine one who does understand right and wrong but is not self-aware, but
that might be because I have difficulty imagining an intelligent being who
is not self-aware.

In any case, I don't see what either of these concepts have to do with
tzaar baalei chayim. You probably explained it in a previo [... We now
pause, while Akiva researches RMB's posts on this topic. ... Okay, he's
back...]

In the current thread, in Avodah Degest 27:141, RMB referred back to a post from 2003, in Avodah Digest 10:91, where he wrote:

> A computer program designed to yelp in response to anyone clicking
> a given button, and to avoid repeating that situation in which it
> occured may seem to feel pain. But as it has no awareness, can
> it?
> Pain is a form of suffering, but only if there is a "someone" to
> suffer.
> This would have no impact on the meaning of dinim of tza'ar ba'alei
> chaim. For reasons similar to Moshe's need to show hakaras hatov to
> inanimate objects. Being cruel to something that seems to suffer
> leads to becoming a callous person.

I think I have found the point which R"n Toby Katz and I are trying to
make: We feel that the pain of a living being is just as real as the
suffering of a self-aware being. RMB feels that an animal is no different
than a computer program in this regard, and the animal only "seems to
suffer" (that's a direct quote), and is not actually suffering.

In contrast, I (and RnTK, I presume) see many differences between a
computer program and an animal, and self-awareness is only one of these
many differences. And while it *might* be true that animals do not "suffer"
the way humans do, the mere lack of self-awareness does not justify
de-legitimizing their pain.

Akiva Miller

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On Tue, Aug 03, 2010 at 04:54:16AM +0000, kennethgmil...@juno.com wrote:
: The really important part is this: You seem to feel that the "tzaar"
: of "tzaar baalei chayim" refers only to the suffering of self-aware
: beings, and not to the pain which other beings might experience. Is this
: correct? If so, what is your source? Why do you feel this way?

Quite the reverse. If I believed that, then there would be no issur of
TBC since I don't believe animals are capable of being aware of their
own suffering. If you think they are incapable of tzaar, then you can't
be prohibited from causing it. (Okay, you can, like ben sorer umoreh,
but you know what I mean -- there couldn't be any lemaaseh issur.)

Rather, I'm saying that tzaar is pain, not self-aware suffering. I am
then explaining why I believe so little utility to man can halachically
justify large amounts of pain to animals. The reason I'm suggesting is
that it's because TBC is "only" about avoiding causing pain.

It is about what it does to the one causing the pain, that doing so makes
the person callous or cruel, rather than what it does to the animal. So as
long as the motive is divorced from wanting to be cruel, it's permitted.

And that last paragraph is the application the Ramban's explanation of
shiluach haqein to this issur in light of the issur of having a chazan
who says "Al qan-tzippor yagiu Rachamekha". It is possible the Ramban
would not have applied the same line of reasoning to TBC, but someone
would have to explain to me why it works in one place and not the other.

: Here's an experiment: In one hand, hold up some kind of food in front
: of a dog. At the same time, offer him a different food from your other
: hand. I have done this many times, and I watch the dog's face and eyes
: move back and forth, from one treat to the other. That is an objective
: observation. My subjective interpretation of it is that the dog is
: trying to decide which treat to grab. I will not pretend to understand
: his thought processes, nor the methods he uses to reach a decision. But
: I doubt anyone will ever convince me that he's not engaged in some sort
: of decision-making process, that he does indeed have the ability to
: choose. No, not the ability to choose between right and wrong. These
: abstract concepts are beyond him, as we presume self-awareness to be
: beyond him.

A chess playing program also takes a long time over each move. And,
a human opponent is likely to anthropomorphize. "It wants to take
my bishop."

Therefore, your argument from appearance doesn't prove anything to me.
I do not believe animals have free will in general, not just WRT good
vs evil. I am not saying the processing they do is the same as a
computer program; just that complex decisionmaking doesn't imply free
will.

(And that's the idea I was going for in the post in v24n141 that RAM
quoted.)

(BTW, as we are seeing on the Bilvavi thread, there are those who teach
that human bechirah is only about how much yir'as Shamayim to have!)

So why don't I accord Roo (who slept by my feet last night) any sort
of free will?

: Let's back up a bit. Torah thought tells us that only humans, with
: Tzelem Elokim, are on a high enough level to be able to choose between
: right and wrong, even if other animals can choose betwen what they
: like and don't like. And scientists, as RMB explains, tell us that
: only humans are on a high enough level to be self-aware, and to say,
: "I am suffering", even if other animals can say, "That hurts."

Not just to say -- to have the experience of their own pain as an input
to their thoughts. We think about thoughts, we think about feelings,
we think about the experience of having sensory inputs -- not just the
inputs themselves.

See the Meshech Chokhmah on "betzalmeinu kidemuseinu". The ability to
be who you choose to be is the core of free will AND what makes humans
uniquely in Hashem's image. Li nir'eh that goes beyond good vs. evil. And,
for that matter, predates Chavah and Adam internalizing good vs. evil.

See also the Kuzari 5:12, which explicitly limits the posession of
chushim penimiyim (Ibn Tibon's term) to man.

So, our first point of departure is that I understand the animals'
lack of bechirah in these terms -- a lack of being a decisionmaker,
not just lacking choices between good and evil. (As per above.)

: But I don't see any relationship between these two ideas. I can easily
: imagine a being who is unable to comprehend the concepts of right and
: wrong, but is clearly self-aware...

However, the reverse is impossible. You can't have control of how you
decide without the decision-making process being itself fed into the
decision-making process.

Thus, self-awareness doesn't necessitate free will, but free will does
require the soul being self-aware. (A second point of departure between
us.)

And that's true in general (as I would take it) but therefore also
in the limited sense of bechirah between tov vara.

Tir'u baTov!
-Micha

-- 
Micha Berger             The waste of time is the most extravagant
mi...@aishdas.org        of all expense.
http://www.aishdas.org                           -Theophrastus
Fax: (270) 514-1507

RJR wrote:
> And R'OY has a tshuva that allows a one way switch the other way.

Indeed, this was implied in the statement you were responding to:
> I believe the Reb Moshe has a teshuva in which he says that one
> can switch from Nusach Sefard (not the oriental Sefard, but the
> Sefard that the Chassidim introduced)

Pay attention to the parenthesis, and you will readily see how ROY's
statement is irrelevant to R'Moshe's. However, it is also true that
ROY believes Ashkenzaim should switch to Nussa'h 'Edot haMzra'h,
something R'Moshe implicitly argues against.

Kol tuv,

-- 
Arie Folger,
Recent blog posts on http://ariefolger.wordpress.com/
* Cows moo-ve over: camel milk coming to Europe
* Scharfe Analyse der Gaza-Flotte auf ARD
* The New Face of Jewish Studitainment
* Should Humanity Call it Quits
* Sollten wir alle Kohanim sein?
* Videovortrag: Wer hat die Psalmen verfasst?

Back in v23n29 (15-Feb-2007
<http://www.aish
das.org/avodah/vol23/v23n020.shtml#14>) RAFolger added to our
perreniel
discussion of dina demalkhusa ("DDD") the following categories:

> DDD means different things to different people. Halakhically, what people mean 
> nowadays under DDD is the conflation of two concepts:
> * the power of taxation by the sovereign, a.k.a. the classical notion of DDD. 
>   This minimally applies to real estate transactinos and poll taxes. Maximally 
>   it can apply to a lot more.
> * the power of a governing body to institute new rules and decrees necessary 
>   for society to function.

> Actually, there is a third category: laws that derive their power from minhag 
> hasokharim. If the government enforces model contracts, we can generally 
> assume these to be minhag hasokharim and automatically binding.

I found an article by RMJBroyde, in "Sh'ma: A Journal of Jewish
Responsibility" <http://www.shmadigital.com/shma/200912?pg=3#pg2> where
he outlines 5 different theories of DDD and what they imply as to the
scope of the rule. I'm going to list them in order of broadest to narrowest
scope.

The relevent gemara is BB 54b "veha'amar Shemu'el 'DDD'."

1- Rashi (Gittin 9b "kesherin", "chutz"): Society's laws are a fulfillment
    of the 7 mitzvos benei Noach, and the 7MBN in general apply to Jews
    as well, with very specific excaptions.

   This would give authority to any law that doesn't contradict halakhah.

2- Maharshal: "If it were not [for secular law], the nation could not
    stand and would be destroyed." Simply, the law has authority because
    we need law.

3- Rashbam: The ruler has power with the consent of the governed, and
    therefore his laws are binding even if you don't agree with the
    particular law.

    (This predates the whole "social contract" view of law that was
    brought to the field of western philosophy by Hobbes, Locke, Rousseau
    etc... in the 17th and 18th cent.)

    Implied in the Rashbam is that DDD wouldn't apply to dictators who
    rule despite the will of the people. It may also exclude laws that
    aren't commonly observed. (Although RMJB says it does, I see the
    Rashbam as explicitly including one-off exceptions. That we're
    talking about the source of the legislator's authority, not the
    particular law's.)

4- Ran (Nedarim 28a): The king is our host, as we can only live where
    we do by their consent. DDD is simply obeying the host in his home.

    Kayadua (from previous iterations here, if nowhere else), many take
    the Ran as implying that DDD wouldn't apply to EY. It just hit me
    that it might be relevent that DDD is a statement by Shemuel, of
    the first generation of amora'im, and who lived in Neharda'a. IOW,
    one of the earliest voices in chu"l among Chazal.

    The Rashbam's and the Ran's sevaros would give no reason to consider
    international law binding.

5- R' Tam: The gov't has power through hefqer BD hefqer.

    Which limits DDD to fiscal law.

The SA appears to be even more limited than R' Tam, saying that DDD only
applies to laws that aid the governments finances. Not all of fiscal law,
mostly taxation and the like.

However, Ashkenazim can't use this heter, because the Rama adds all laws
that aid society. (Which sounds like the Maharshal, to my ear.) The Shakh
agrees with the Rama, only adding that DDD doesn't violate halakhah. (RMJB
suggests the example that if secular law allowed rooftop railings of
only 9 tefachim, we would still be obligated to put up a full maaqah.)

Tir'u baTov!
-Micha

-- 
Micha Berger             When we are no longer able to change a situation
mi...@aishdas.org        -- just think of an incurable disease such as
http://www.aishdas.org   inoperable cancer -- we are challenged to change
Fax: (270) 514-1507      ourselves.      - Victor Frankl (MSfM)

On Sun, Aug 01, 2010 at 06:58:57AM -0500, Ira Tick wrote:
: The notion of success as a measure of the validity of Chassidic
: hashkafa/halacha is something I've heard often in Chabad circles.

: And yes, its quite an interesting method of reasoning.

But has its limits. One would have to explain why it's a valid approach
to determining correctness between certain confines, and doesn't "prove"
the validity of whatever child religion of Judaism is the most popular
right now. (Christianity if we count all the variants together, but who
says that's the right way to count? After all, we started out with a
much finer distinction, between L and other halachic paths.)

: I would disagree that it is the same means by which Sephardim or Ashkenazim
: consider their particular pesika binding on their communities, because I see
: the lack of possible dissention arising from theological fidelity to
: Chassidus as opposed to fidelity to an academic style or tradition of psak,
: or fidelity to a geographical domain.

There are difference in how we view aggadita. Yes, L teaches of a
single line of rebbes from Moshe through the names listed in the Rambam's
haqdamah, through a line of geonim, rishonim, acharonim... the Besh"t, the
Alter Rebbe, etc... (Which makes the current lack of L rebbe a religious
crisis, not "merely" a pragmatic one.) The Moshe bedoro keShemuel bedoro
and the one about whom you could say HQBH medabeir mitokh gerono. The
"Yechidah Kalalis" (the 5th, most supernal, aspect of the national soul).
Which means they can't mean "eilu va'eilu" in any literal sense, if one
of the "eilu"s is the generation's YK.

But in a pragmatic sense, it doesn't impact how they do pesaq. They go
to the same rishonim and acharonim we all do. Chassidim in general,
and L in particular, may not emphasize the same list of sources as a
Yekke or a Sepharadi. But truth be told -- until R' Chaim, what Litvak
gave such emphasis to the Yad over other rishonim?

Is there a difference between the L relationship to SA haRav with the
typical yeshivish person's relationship to the Mishnah Berurah, or my
own dependency on the Arukh haShulchan?

And there was nothing in the presentation of the 1953 sichah,
points 3 and 4 (what RSZN pointed to at the start of the thread)
<http:/
/chabad.org.il/Magazines/Article.asp?ArticleID=6993&;CategoryID=1416
>
that suggests anything more exclusivist than that.

Item gimel is saying that Chassidus proved itself to be a valid shitah
-- not the only shitah. That the objections and fears the misnagdim had
were disproven by the course of history.

Item dalet explicitly argues against the yeitzer hara (the note-taker
uses the term) that Toras haChassidus is an "inyan naaleh vegavoha yoter
midai". That anyone can pursue it -- not that everyone must.

I recommend rereading the notes of the sichah without preconceived
notions about what an L writing "must" be saying.

Tir'u baTov!
-Micha

-- 
Micha Berger             If you won't be better tomorrow
mi...@aishdas.org        than you were today,
http://www.aishdas.org   then what need do you have for tomorrow?
Fax: (270) 514-1507              - Rebbe Nachman of Breslov

On Sun, Aug 01, 2010 at 11:23:13PM +1000, ben Simpleton wrote:
: I was learning Hilkhot Sanhedrin 26:3 where the Rambam writes:
: "Since cursing by any of the attributes entails the penalty of flogging, it
: follows that if one curses by the Names (of God) in any language, he is
: subject to flogging, for the name by which the Gentiles refer to God belong
: to the category of attributes."

I don't know if "kekol hakinuyim" should really be translated as
"category of attributes". I thought a kinui is more like a reference or
descriptive nick-name. Yes, a description will involve attributes, but
the concept of kinui is more in contrast to the sheimos used in Tanakh,
as transmitted in the Torah and via nevu'ah. E.g. "E-lokim" is a
description of G-d as Legislator, but it's a sheim, not a kinui, because
it's used throughout Tanakh -- Hashem picked it, not us. No?

I'm wondering about cognate words, in particular A-llah. A-llah and HaKel
have the same linguistic heritage and translate identically. Unlike the
Kenaani "El", the Deity usually called by the name "A-llah" is the Single
Absolute Creator and Master of all.

I have seen editions of R' Saadia Gaon that do hyphenate A-llah when
written in Judeo-Arabic, which is written using the alef-beis.

: I do not have the Shut Achiezer...

I found it on the Bar Ilan responsa site. I assume it's the one, since
every other occurance of laaz was about "motzi laaz".

Achiezer 4:32. It addresses the question about a copy of the Israelite,
which contained a sheim Hashem belaaz. Rather than try to work
it through for you, I got lazy and put the teshuvah itself up at
<http://www.aishdas.org/avodah/faxes/achiezer3_32.html>.

Tir'u baTov!
-Micha

-- 
Micha Berger             For a mitzvah is a lamp,
mi...@aishdas.org        And the Torah, its light.
http://www.aishdas.org                   - based on Mishlei 6:2
Fax: (270) 514-1507

There is a difference between Achilas Keva, and a Chatzeir being kove'a
Lmaasros:

1) Ben Waxman's chatzer is not kovea lmassros, because it has no surrounding
wall at all, so his daughter is allowed to eat Achilas Ara'i. What
constitutes Achilas Ara'i is a little bit of a mess, but Ikar Hadevarim is
that the Chazon Ish writes (Maasros Simman 4:10) - "Inyan Arai V'keva Aino
Talui Bekamusah Shel HaAchilah Ela B'Aichusah." You can even fill an entire
bowl with fruit and eat Ara'i. b'kitzur it seems that if you decide to eat a
bunch at a time (how much is a bunch? I don't know. If you decide you'll
have them for dessert it seems) that that is Keva.

2) If the chatzer were kove'a Lmassros, then one may not be metzaref two
fruits together in that chatzer and eat them without separating Maasros.
What constitutes tzeruf by grapes is a machlokes R' Akiva and R' Tarfon in
Maasros 3:9, and we pasken like R' Akiva that one must pluck off each grape
from the vine and may not pick off a whole cluster at once, or there is
kevias maasros in the chatzer and one may not even eat Arai.

The confusion sets in because the Rambam in Maaser 3:19 seems to conflate
the two, and seems to say that once you put two fruits together it no longer
constitutes Achilas Arai at all. This is why I thought that once you picked
a cluster off you can't eat Arai anymore, in accordance with R' Akiva.
However, the Mishnah Rishonah to Maasros 4:4 writes that he cannot make
heads or tails of this Rambam (as well as a Rashi in Shabbos 11), because it
is clear from many Mishnayos that one may only not have two fruits together
when there is something which is kovea lmassros as well, but otherwise there
is no concern. It seems that Psak is in accordance with this Mishnah
Rishonah, see Chazon Ish there.

Hope this clarifies matters.
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From: "Prof. Levine" _Larry.Levine@stevens.edu_ 
(mailto:Larry.Lev...@stevens.edu) 

>>  I believe the Reb Moshe has a teshuva in which he says that one can 
switch  from Nusach Sefard ... to Ashkenaz, because virtually 
everyone in  Europe davened Ashkenaz originally until the advent of 
Chassidus.  I am  not sure, but I doubt that he would approve of 
someone who davens Ashkenaz  switching to Sefard.<<




>>>>
 
This comes up at least once a year on Avodah so I will write my annual  
comment:
 
Lithuanian poskim say that you can switch from Nusach Sfard to Nusach  
Ashkenaz (but not vice versa) because Nusach Ashkenaz was the original  nusach 
that Nusach Sfard broke away from, so people can and should go back to  the 
nusach of their great-grandfathers.
 
 
Chassidim say that you can switch from Nusach Ashkenaz to Nusach Sfard (but 
 not vice versa) because Nusach Sfard is a higher, better, holier nusach.
 
So the bottom line is whether you're a Litvak or a chossid, everyone  else 
can change to your nusach but you can't change to theirs.
 
 
 


--Toby Katz
==========



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For those of you who don't keep up with this kind of thing, the FBI recently
demanded that Wikipedia remove its rendition of the FBI insignia from their
website. (http://www.nytimes.com/2010/08/03/us/03fbi.html?_r=2) Wikipedia,
in its response
(http://graphics8.nytimes.com/packages/pdf/us/20100803-wiki-LetterTo
Larson.p
df) to the FBI saying, "Go jump in a lake," wrote the following: The
underlined words are conclusive proof that the canon of statutory
construction ejusdem

generis applies. Under that principle, "where general words follow specific
words in a statutory

enumeration, the general words are construed to embrace only objects similar
in nature to those

objects enumerated by the preceding specific words." Circuit City Stores,
Inc. v. Adams, 532

U.S. 105, 114-15 (2001). Courts use ejusdem generis in conjunction with
common sense and

legislative history to discern the legislature's intent in writing a
statute.

 

I was struck by the similarity between ejusdem generis and "P'rat u'klal,
ein b'klal ela mah she'b'prat."

 

KT,

MYG 

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