Avodah Mailing List

Volume 27: Number 111

Tue, 04 May 2010

• 1. Re: More on what constitutes chilul hashem (Zev Sero)
• 2. Rav Shimon Schwab on how Jewish women should dress (Prof. Levine)
• 3. Re: 2 fridgies (Gershon Dubin)
• 4. Re: Business Halacha - Auto Lease (kennethgmil...@juno.com)
• 5. Re: Taking Responsibility (Ilana Sober Elzufon)
• 6. Re: Rav Shimon Schwab on how Jewish women should dress (Yitzchak Schaffer)
• 7. Baking Matza Until it is Hard (Meir Rabi)
• 8. Re: Taking Responsibility (Liron Kopinsky)
• 9. Re: 2 fridgies (Jonathan Baker)
• 10. Re: Ownership ? (Zev Sero)
• 11. Re: "The Great Miracle of the Volcano Shutdown " (Prof. Levine)
• 12. What if Hashem commanded something I find immoral? (Micha Berger)
• 13. More on a Yissachar/Zevulun Partnership (Yitzchok Levine)

Beth & David Cohen wrote:
> R Zev Sero wrote:
>> "But in most countries the average person breaks the law
>> himself as often as he finds convenient, and certainly doesn't look
>> down on others just for doing things that are illegal.":
 
> There is a distinction. This theoretical average non-Jew acknowledges 
> that he is breaking the law, just that he thinks (hopes) that he will 
> not get caught. And if he does get caught, he acknowledges that in 
> theory the government has the "right" to sanction him.

Nevertheless, he doesn't think he has done anything wrong.  He hopes
to get away with it, and if he is caught he curses his luck.  It follows
that he does not look down on someone else who breaks the law; if the
person gets away with it then he is happy for him, and if he is caught
then he commiserates.



> The theoretical average frum Jew, otoh, thinks that the law itself has 
> no application to him, that he is permitted to disregard it with 
> impunity and any attempt by the State to impose a penalty is per se unjust.
> IMHO, the attitudinal difference is what causes the chilul Hashem.

Assuming this attitudinal difference really exists, how does the non-Jew
know about it?


-- 
Zev Sero                      The trouble with socialism is that you
z...@sero.name                 eventually run out of other people?s money
                                                     - Margaret Thatcher

Verse 24 of the third Perek of Yeshayahu says
And instead of perfume, there will be rot, and instead of the girdle, 
wound; and instead of embossed jewelry, there will be baldness. And 
instead of celebratory
sash, a girdle of sackcloth. For all this will be in place of beauty.
Rav Shimon Schwab, ZT"L, in the sefer Rav Schwab on Yeshayahu writes 
in his commentary on this Pasuk
  In general, from Yeshayahu's rebuke of Jewish women's flaunting of 
their clothing, jewelry, and beauty enhancements, it is quite clear 
that such mode of behavior is highly unbecoming a Jewish woman. A 
Jewish woman should present herself not merely as a "woman," but 
rather, as a human being with a tzelem Elokim, who belongs to the 
Jewish nation, and is possessed of a neshamah that is holy - who 
happens to be a woman. To emphasize the other aspects of the person 
means that one forgets the main idea of what it means to be a tzelem Elokim.

Unfortunately, in our times, showy dressing, and cosmetic and beauty 
enhancement have become normal and acceptable behavior. Even very 
"frum" girls and women dress and beautify themselves in a way that is 
designed to attract attention to themselves as women. This is a 
non-Jewish practice; it is a new phenomenon that was unheard of in 
religious circles in Europe - certainly not in my time there. 
Unfortunately, though, it is very difficult to change this now 
because it has taken root in our culture, and certainly if it is done 
in moderation and in good taste, it is difficult to criticize.

  Once a Jewish woman is aware of her greatness, of her holiness, of 
what she really is, she does not emphasize and flaunt her 
femininity.  Although we have many references to women's beauty in 
the Torah in connection with the Matriarchs, Sara, Rivka, and Rachel, 
such beauty always corresponded to and complemented their inner beauty.

Yitzchok Levine 
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On Fri, 30 Apr 2010 15:56:43 -0400 (EDT) "Jonathan Baker"
<jjba...@panix.com> writes:

<<R' Yosef Wikler of "Kashrus Magazine" advised, when we learned that 
halacha, that one should be stringent and, if putting a pot into the
fridge, that 
one put a paper towel under it, so it's not strictly speaking "on the
same shelf 
as" the kli with the other substance in  it.>>

That's not the reason;  the placemats are only required when eating, not
even when preparing food.  The reason is in case the pot is hot, and
there
happens to be a milk spill right where you put it down, the meat pot will
absorb
the milk.  This was not a stringency;  it's good advice.  Rabbi Yisroel
Reisman
said the same thing when learning basar bechalav.

Gershon
gershon.du...@juno.com
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Cantor Henry Topas brought a case:

> Reuven leases a car from Shimon's leasing company.
> The lease stipulates that upon the end of the lease
> term, the vehicle must have a value of $30,000.

You seem to be interpreting this to mean that when the lease ends, and
Reuven returns that car to Shimon, he will be required to make sure that it
is worth $30,000 at that time.

That's not how I understand auto leases to work. Rather, at the time of
lease origination, a value is stipulated in advance, and when the lease
ends, Reuven has the exclusive option of returning the car or paying the
$30,000, regardless of what anyone thinks the car is actually worth.

Moreover, I don't know if a lease CAN work the way the OP suggests. Reuven
has no control over market forces. There's no way he can promise, years in
advance, how the market will value his car a few years down the line. He
can promise that the car will not have more than a normal amount of
wear-and-tear. But he cannot control whether this car will turn out to have
some sort of defect which causes the value to tumble, such as in many of
today's Toyota. Nor can he control gasoline prices, which caused
gas-guzzlers to tumble a few years back.

So here's the question as I see it: Shimon can agree that when the lease is
up, Reuven will have the option of returning the car or paying $30,000 in
lieu of that car. But does halacha (or civil law) allow Reuven to obligate
himself to $30,000, payable either in full or by returning the car plus an
amount of money to be determined at that date? --- Well, now that I've
phrased it in those terms, I suppose it can indeed work like that. But I
don't think it is actually done in that way, because the leasing company is
much more able to take the gamble than the consumer is.

Akiva Miller

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RLK: I had initially wanted to write about the responsibility that the
nation had to prevent the Mekalel but looking through some sources, I ended
up with the exact opposite conclusion.....This is man who comes from a
broken family, who was pushed around by the people he considered the members
of his Tribe and was provoked further by another individual. Yet ultimately
he alone is responsible for his actions and must take full responsibility
for them.

I'm not sure the two conclusions are mutually exclusive. Yes, the mekallel
is clearly responsible for his own actions, to the point of being chayav
mitah, and cannot claim leniency because he was provoked. But that doesn't
mean that he wasn't provoked!

Rashi, following the midrash, says that he was mitgayer. Not clear what the
halachic significance of this is - possibilities among the mefarshim include
that matrilineal descent did not kick in until after Matan Torah, or that he
chose to identify with his mother's people rather than his father's. It may
also hint that he has in some ways the status of a ger. Like the ger, he has
no tribal affiliation, and when they come into Eretz K'naan, no nachalah.

Having chosen to be part of the Jewish people - he finds himself rejected.
He has, literally, nowhere to pitch his tent. And it's not that the men of
Dan are unreasonably bigoted - their position is upheld in beit din. One can
imagine the despair and disillusionment that would provoke him to blasphemy.

The Torah is not always "fair." For example, as we saw earlier in the
parsha, a kohen with a physical disability, acquired through no fault of his
own, is excluded from service in the Beit Hamikdash. And a mamzer cannot
marry almost anyone - because of a sin committed by his parents before he
was born. (The midrash states that the mekallel's mother, Shlomit, was a
married woman who was raped by an Egyptian overseer. While halachically he
is not a mamzer - because his father was not Jewish - the midrash does say
that he is similar to a mamzer. Perhaps another hint that this is a person
born a severe halachic disadvantage.)

Of course, no matter how great the difficulty, the Torah clearly limits
"free expression." As we see in the book of Job, one can cry and one can
question. As we see in the stories of Bnot Tzlofchad and Pesach Sheni - one
can even approach Moshe Rabbeinu and complain that the Torah isn't fair.
(It's interesting that both in those stories and in this one, a specific
she'elah is asked of HKBH.) But blasphemy, even when amply provoked, carries
the death penalty. As RLK points out, the mekallel is 100% responsible for
his actions.

But does that mean that we shouldn't understand the pain of those who feel
excluded - by the Torah - from the privileges of membership in the Jewish
community? The ger, and his descendents, have no nachalah in Eretz Yisrael.
Yet in many places - including the continuation of this parsha - the Torah
emphasizes that the "ger and the ezrach" are equally part of the Jewish
people. The Torah commands us - clearly, specifically, and repeatedly - not
to cause the ger pain, to include him in our celebrations, and to love him
like ourselves. It seems to me that when b'nei Dan asked the mekallel "what
are you doing here" - knowing full well he had no other place to go - they
were at least coming close to ona'at devarim?

- Ilana
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On 5/2/2010 22:18, Prof. Levine wrote:
> Unfortunately, in our times, showy dressing, and cosmetic and beauty
> enhancement have become normal and acceptable behavior.
...
> Unfortunately,
> though, it is very difficult to change this now because it has taken
> root in our culture, and certainly if it is done in moderation and in
> good taste, it is difficult to criticize.
...

I found this essay frustratingly hard to understand.  Although it 
touches on a worthy concept, it seems to fall short of properly 
delineating it.  It's my understanding that a woman is also meant not to 
look like a frump, but one could come away from this R' Schwab with that 
impression.  What is considered "showy dressing, and cosmetic and beauty 
enhancement" that is wrong, as opposed to that which is right?  Is "in 
moderation" right or wrong?  If it's wrong, how is it "difficult to 
criticize?"  This essay seems to do just that, placing "in moderation" 
under the category of "unfortunately;" "difficult" to criticize, but 
something R' Schwab would like to criticize.

Anybody know from personal experience how R' Schwab would have had women 
present themselves?

-- 
Yitzchak Schaffer
Systems Manager
Touro College Libraries
33 West 23rd Street
New York, NY 10010
Tel (212) 463-0400 x5230
Fax (212) 627-3197
Email yitzchak.schaf...@tourolib.org

Access Problems? Contact systems.libr...@touro.edu

Further to my initiative to produce soft matza:

I believe there is no mention of baking Matza until it is hard in the
Mishneh Berurah, Aruch HaShulchan or the Sh Oruch HaRav.

It is not even mentioned as a custom or as a passing comment.

Am I mistaken?

meir
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On Mon, May 3, 2010 at 5:32 AM, Ilana Sober Elzufon <ilanaso...@gmail.com>wrote:

> Rashi, following the midrash, says that he was mitgayer.
>

Interesting, I hadn't thought through the Ger aspect.

Even though he was a Ger, and we are continually instructed not to mistreat
the Gerim "Ki Gerim Heyitem", he was still fully faulted for what happened.
Doesn't this make my argument even stronger? When I was looking I didn't see
any meforshim who commented that Dan were wrong for provoking him either,
which sort of surprised me.

Taking another approach, do we know if this man was actually enslaved in
Egypt? Maybe, since his father was Egyptian, he was excluded. In this case,
maybe the reasons to be nice to him in particular are minimized.
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I had said:
 
> R' Yosef Wikler of "Kashrus Magazine" advised, when we learned that halacha,
> that one should be stringent and, if putting a pot 
> into the fridge, that one put a paper towel under it, so it's not strictly
> speaking "on the same shelf as" the kli with the other substance in it.
> Like why we use placemats...

RGD corrects me, reminding me that R' Wikler actually advised this because,
as RnTK says, there could be milk on the shelf, and the paper towel
prevents the milk from being absorbed in the (hot) pot, which would be a
real problem.

Personally, we try to avoid putting hot pots into the fridge, so as not 
to overburden the motor trying to cool them.

--
        name: jon baker              web: http://www.panix.com/~jjbaker
     address: jjba...@panix.com     blog: http://thanbook.blogspot.com

Rich, Joel wrote:
> Zev Sero wrote:
>> Rich, Joel wrote:

>>> Reuven lends shimon a glass vase and tells him he can keep it as long 
>>> as he wants and if by some chance he doesn't return it not to worry 
>>> because Reuven is mochel in advance for that possibility.  On his way 
>>> home, shimon stops at the light where levi, busy talking on his self 
>>> phone, knocks shimon over and the vase breaks. To whom, if anyone, 
>>> does levi pay the value of the vase, and why?

>> Um, this seems extremely simple.  Ask yourself another question, and it
>> will become blindingly obvious:  Suppose Shimon heads straight for the
>> market and sells the vase.  Is he a thief?  Of course he is.

> Is it so blindingly obvious?  What if in your case  Reuvain comes to
> Shimon and asks him for it and shimon says - remember you said if I
> didn't return it you are mochel, well I'm not returning it so your
> mechilah kicks in?

Yes, it is obvious that his mechila was never intended to include
deliberate malfeasance.  But even if it had, mechila is not a kinyan;
it's still Reuven's, and it would remain his even if he were bound by
a promise not to sue for its recovery.

This sounds like the old joke about the son-in-law who tells his
father-in-law "I want you to consider our home as if it were your own",
so the old man sells it.

-- 
Zev Sero                      The trouble with socialism is that you
z...@sero.name                 eventually run out of other people?s money
                                                     - Margaret Thatcher

At 06:20 AM 5/3/2010, Yosef Gavriel Bechhofer wrote:
>I have a real problem with these stories in general, and I guess this
>case really underscores why. Just imagine the other stories that are not
>being circulated on the internet. Young mother/child/groom/ whoever on
>waiting list, desperate for transplant, the right liver finally available
>and s/he finally on top of the list - but could not fly to Belgium due
>to the volcano and, r"l, passed away...

>I happen to think we in our generation, and especially from an
>educational standpoint our young people, are more in need of examples
>of tziduk hadin and moving forward in life despite disappointment,
>loss and suffering, than we are in need of further gushes of chicken
>soup for our already entitlement-ridden souls. Because this genre has
>become so ubiquitous, and we are encouraging people to identify (as if
>they could!) `hashgacha pratis' in their lives, I fear we are weakening
>rather than strengthening the kind of emuna needed to make it through the
>real lives most of us lead, the ones in which people die, illness hurts,
>and hopes are dashed, at least sometimes....

>I don't know, I just feel sometimes we in the frum community live
>in a haze of wishful thinking we have allowed and sometimes even
>encouraged. I don't mean to be a downer but to say, let's recognize
>and fix our problems rather than distracting ourselves from them. For
>every heartwarming story circulated I'd like to see at least one story
>that calls us to action, and I mean action to take responsibility for
>our dysfunctionalities...

I could not agree more with this response. These sorts of stories
(which are almost never verified) are not, IMO, a plus for Yahadus.
Is our belief in Hashem and the truth of his Torah so weak that
we need a constant diet of such stories to prop it up. I think
that these stories fall within the general framework of what
the writer of the letter in this week's Hamodia Magazine (See
http://www.stevens.edu/golem/llevine/hamodia/yissachar_zevulun.pdf )
labeled "Push Button Judaism."

YL

On Tue, May 04, 2010 at 09:11:42AM +0100, R Alan Rubin asked the members
of Areivim whether:
: They do whatever they regard as the ratzon Hashem because they are
: avadim of Hashem and they do what ever Hashem asks without
: consideration of whether it is good or evil.

: or
: Whatever Hashem asks must - by definition be good. Hashem chooses it
: and thereby defines it as good

: or
: There is a prior standard of good and evil but we might not understand
: what that is.

: or some other explanantion...

You're restating Euthyphro's Dilemma (from Plato's Euthyphro). Search
Avodah's archive for the word Euthyphro. Also, look for "Divine Command
Theory" a/k/a DCT.

The title of this subject line "what if..." is somewhat understated,
since many of us actually have to grapple with this question WRT mechias
zeikher Amaleiq.

See also <http://www.aishdas.org/asp/2007/05/hashem-and-morality.shtml>
where I conclude:
    So yes, HQBH did choose good vs evil without being subject to
    external constraint, and yet still the choice was not arbitrary.
    Socrates gave Euthyphro a false dichotomy -- there was a third
    choice. Hashem has a reason, but that reason wasn't conforming
    to a preexisting morality.

    G-d created us because He could only bestow good if there is
    someone to receive that good. That is our individual purpose,
    to make ourselves into utensils, receptacles for emanations of
    Divine Good. ... Given that personal purpose, the definition of
    "tov" feeds directly into a "spiritual health" model of reward and
    punishment. Oneshim are the product of not being proper keilim for
    shefa, and therefore one is incapable of receiving the sechar. It's
    not that the sechar is being withheld -- the problem is with the
    reception....

So, Good isn't a "prior standard" nor "whatever Hashem asks" (the
latter being DCT). It's consequential to the question "Why did Hashem
create?"

And in <http://www.aishdas.org/asp/2009/08/divine-command-theory.shtml>
I added observations about how maamarim about taamei hamitzvos relate to
our question. After all, within DCT, what does "taam hamitzvah" even
mean?

    The Rambam (Guide III) uses these two quotes to show that while
    mitzvos in the large have reasons, the details are often arbitrary.
    We needed a rite to elevate how we kill animals, that's more
    significant than what the rite is. If Hashem  said that we should
    shecht from the back of the neck we could ask why not the front? Or
    had he told us to take a pepper on Sukkos, we could ask why not an
    esrog?
    ...
    The Ramban argues that it's a decree on us because shiluach haqen
    is about developing our compassion, not an expression of Hashem's.
    This is reading the Bereishis Rabba, which explicitly says the
    difference in how one slaughters for the sake of our middos, back
    into the gemara in Megillah. I would say the Ramban is also
    leshitaso. His whole concept of "qadeish es atzmekha bema shemutar
    lakh" means that there is a definition of sanctity that goes beyond
    that which was specifically commanded. That there is an underlying
    set of values behind halakhah that we are supposed to be developing
    in ourselves.
    ...
    According to the Maharal, mitzvos are decrees, causeless. Hashem
    then created a universe and people such that "derakheha darkhei
    no'am". It's not that Hashem wishes us to be rachanim that He told
    us to send away the mother bird, but rather because He commanded us
    to send her away, Hashem made it so such behavior would have results
    that are ne'imos (pleasant). Without explicitly invoking the Zohar
    ["hitakei beOraisa ubarei alma"], the Maharal presumes it in his
    answer.

Whereas I first suggested that morality was consequential to Divine
Purpose, in the second post I note the Maharal basically saying DCT but
removing it from the realm of arbitrary because we ourselves are made to
fit the moral law. So given people being people and the universe being
the universe, DCT yeilds derakheha darkhei no'am. What is no'am is a
consequence of halakhah, not the other way around. "Hitakeil beOraisa
ubarei alma."

And the following idea fits either version
<http://www.aishdas.org/asp/2009/05/morality-n-halakhah.shtml>:
    One can accordingly translate Hillel's famous words to the prospective
    ger, "That which you would loathe [if in their shoes] don't do to
    others. Now go and learn" into "All of the Torah is an elaboration of
    natural morality. However, you would never figure out how to reach the
    right conclusions from those principles unless you go study Torah."

    It's like saying that all of biology is inherent in Physics. Even
    that said, you would never be able to derive biology on your own. If
    we were to rely on our ability to build the system ourselves from
    the first principles we would quickly exceed human capacity; errors
    would necessarily be made That's the role of halakhah, to allow us
    to work with notions closer to our question than the basic moral
    principle from which they derive.

In that post I also note that:
    "[B]e holy, for I am Holy" which the Ramban famously tells us is
    an obligation not to be "disgusting with [what would otherwise be]
    the permission of the Torah". By definition, the Ramban assumes
    there is a definition of "disgusting" that isn't defined by halachic
    process. Or "and you shall do hayashar vehatov -- the upright and
    the good". Qedushah, yosher and tov are treated as givens, that a
    person is expected to know what they are before one can even begin
    to explore the halachic mandate.

The Rambam advocates natural morality in the Moreh 1:54, quoting
Friedlander's translation:
    The words "all my goodness" imply that God promised to show [Moshe,
    while in the cleft of the rock, in Ki Sisa -micha] the whole creation,
    concerning which it has been stated, "And God saw everything that
    he had made, and, behold, it was very good" (Gen. i. 31); when I say
    "to show him the whole creation," I mean to imply that God promised to
    make him comprehend the nature of all things, their relation to each
    other, and the way they are governed by God both in reference to the
    universe as a whole and to each creature in particular. This knowledge
    is referred to when we are told of Moses," he is firmly established
    in all mine house" (Num. xii. 7); that is, "his knowledge of all
    the creatures in My universe is correct and firmly established";
    for false opinions are not firmly established. Consequently the
    knowledge of the works of God is the knowledge of His attributes, by
    which He can be known. The fact that God promised Moses to give him a
    knowledge of His works, may be inferred from the circumstance that God
    taught him such attributes as refer exclusively to His works, viz.,
    "merciful and gracious, longsuffering and abundant in goodness," etc.,
    (Exod. xxxiv. 6). It is therefore clear that the ways which Moses
    wished to know, and which God taught him, are the actions emanating
    from God. Our Sages call them middoth (qualities), and speak of the
    thirteen middoth of God (Talm. B. Rosh ha-shanah, p. 17b)...

According to the Rambam, knowing how G-d made things relate to each
other is the basis of understanding His Moral code.

(In all 3 cases, interested parties would make my life easier by checking
the links rather than rely on these excerpts. Otherwise, you're bound
to ask me questions already addressed on-blog.)

Tir'u baTov!
-Micha

-- 
Micha Berger             Today is the 35th day, which is
mi...@aishdas.org        5 weeks in/toward the omer.
http://www.aishdas.org   Malchus sheb'Hod: What is soul-like about
Fax: (270) 514-1507                  submission, and how is it glorious?

Dr. Yehudah (Leo) Levi has a section in  his book Torah Study, A 
Survey of Classic Sources on Timely Issues titled The Partnership of 
Issachar and Zevulun> Most of this section is available on the 
Internet at google books.  I have posted the entire section at

http://www.stevens.edu/golem/llevine/rsrh/levi_yissachar_zev.pdf

Professor Levi points out that "None of the principal early halakhic 
authorities (Rif, Rambam, Rosh) cites such an arrangement as 
permissible; neither was it included in Shulchan Arukh.

He also writes

On the other hand, Shulchan Arukh HaRav rules: "One may not
free himself from his own study obligation by supporting a wiser, more
understanding man, if it is only his working on the man's behalf that is
preventing his own learning." "But if it is his lack of mental capacity that
prevents him from learning [Talmud]-[and his capacity] does not suffice
even for learning the practical applications of the mitzvoth, even though
he makes his Torah study primary--then he is a boor... Let him engage
in business so that he can support those who study Torah day and night...
and he will be treated as if he learns himself, and the others' learning will
be credited to him."  That is, the business role in the Issachar-Zebulun
arrangement is only permitted to a boor.

Please see the above link for the entire piece on this issue. YL 
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