Avodah Mailing List

Volume 27: Number 45

Wed, 10 Feb 2010

• 1. Geirut for marriage (Rich, Joel)
• 2. Re: Microwave Ovens on Shabbos (Saul Guberman)
• 3. Re: Rights in halakhah (Zev Sero)
• 4. Re: Rights in halakhah (Micha Berger)
• 5. Re: Rights in halakhah (Zev Sero)
• 6. Re: Rights in halakhah (Chanoch (Ken) Bloom)
• 7. Re: Rights in halakhah (Micha Berger)
• 8. Seeing Policies Everywhere (rabbirichwol...@gmail.com)
• 9. Shulchan Aruch VS Our Own understanding (rabbirichwolpoe@gmail.com)
• 10. Re: Habituation (Michael Makovi)
• 11. krumkeit (Eli Turkel)
• 12. Re: krumkeit (Samuel Svarc)
• 13. Re: krumkeit (Eli Turkel)

IIUC the rule is we don't lchatchila  accept a ger who wishes to convert to marry, but bdieved "kulam geirim heim"
1. I assume this prohibition is on a rabbinic level-is it?
2. If a beit din converts the individual, what issur, if any are they over?
are there practical implications for the beit din or its members (e.g.
tenant in future?)?
3.Has the ger been over an issur?  is it punishable bydei adam or shamayim?
4. What about the Jewish partner-is he culpable (e.g. msayeah?)
5. What if either of the partners has charata - what kapparah, if any, would be recommended?
KT
Joel Rich



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>
>   Being that the microwave is not considered utilizing fire (I believe),
> an=
> d that the issur of cooking on shabbos applies to cooking with fire exclus=
> ively-  is there a tshuva that would allow me to use a microwave on shabbo=
> s with the provision that it run on a timer and the light will not turn on=
>  when I open the door? If so, where can I find it?
>
> =20
> -Josh Schulman=20
>

See this shiur by R M Willig
http://www.yuto
rah.org/lectures/lecture.cfm/740216/Rabbi_Mordechai_I._Willig/Halacha_Engag
es_Modernity_-_Part_6_-_The_Microwave

Saul
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Micha Berger wrote:

> My belief is that duty-to-another based law can too easily decay into
> totalitarianism
> and that rights-based law too readily decays into a culture of
> entitlement. (Because a culture of getting guaranteed rights naturally
> leads to wanting more and more things guaranteed.)

Except that in rights-based philosophies, at least those in the category
of "natural law", recognise only negative rights; i.e. each person has
the right *not* to have anyone else do certain things to him, which is
the same as imposing a prohibition on all others from doing those things
to anybody without their consent.  This has limited potential for getting
out of hand.  To get to your scenario one would have to introduce the
idea of positive rights, i.e. an obligation on all others to do something
for a person, or to give him something, which essentially turns all others
into his slaves.


-- 
Zev Sero                      The trouble with socialism is that you
z...@sero.name                 eventually run out of other people?s money
                                                     - Margaret Thatcher

On Wed, Feb 10, 2010 at 11:08:26AM -0500, Zev Sero wrote:
: >My belief is that duty-to-another based law can too easily decay into totalitarianism
: >and that rights-based law too readily decays into a culture of
: >entitlement. (Because a culture of getting guaranteed rights naturally
: >leads to wanting more and more things guaranteed.)
: 
: Except that in rights-based philosophies, at least those in the category
: of "natural law", recognise only negative rights; i.e. each person has
: the right *not* to have anyone else do certain things to him...

Locke wrote about the (positive) rights to Life, Liberty and Property, it
is his philosophy which shapted the US, and I'm saying that that's a major
piece to the prevelance of the culture of entitlement in these parts.

(Similarly, a monarchy needn't decay into a totalitarian dictatorship.
But it often did, and there is a reason why.)

I could be wrong, but the concept of shared responsibilities toward a
common beris does avoid the pitfall -- whether or not it uniquely does.

the U
: the same as imposing a prohibition on all others from doing those things
: to anybody without their consent.  This has limited potential for getting
: out of hand.  To get to your scenario one would have to introduce the
: idea of positive rights, i.e. an obligation on all others to do something
: for a person, or to give him something, which essentially turns all others
: into his slaves.
: 
: 
: -- 
: Zev Sero                      The trouble with socialism is that you
: z...@sero.name                 eventually run out of other people?s money
:                                                     - Margaret Thatcher
: _______________________________________________
: Avodah mailing list
: Avo...@lists.aishdas.org
: http://lists.aishdas.org/listinfo.cgi/avodah-aishdas.org
: 

Tir'u baTov!
-Micha

-- 
Micha Berger             A pious Jew is not one who worries about his fellow
mi...@aishdas.org        man's soul and his own stomach; a pious Jew worries
http://www.aishdas.org   about his own soul and his fellow man's stomach.
Fax: (270) 514-1507                       - Rav Yisrael Salanter

Micha Berger wrote:
> On Wed, Feb 10, 2010 at 11:08:26AM -0500, Zev Sero wrote:

> : Except that in rights-based philosophies, at least those in the category
> : of "natural law", recognise only negative rights; i.e. each person has
> : the right *not* to have anyone else do certain things to him...
> 
> Locke wrote about the (positive) rights to Life, Liberty and Property, it
> is his philosophy which shapted the US, and I'm saying that that's a major
> piece to the prevelance of the culture of entitlement in these parts.

On the contrary, those are negative rights.  I can't imagine how you
understand them to be positive rights.

-- 
Zev Sero                      The trouble with socialism is that you
z...@sero.name                 eventually run out of other people?s money
                                                     - Margaret Thatcher

On Tue, 2010-02-09 at 09:47 -0500, Micha Berger wrote:
> A few times on my blog I discuss the difference between rights and
> duties, and later between
>     - rights
>     - duties to another (perhaps contractual, perhaps by fiat)
>     - membership in a beris (forming a new whole and having
>       responsibilities with it)
> as a basis for a legal system. In short, barring a covenant, rights-based
> legal systems appear to have the most success preventing people from
> eating each other alive. However, halakhah has a different goal, and is
> based on a beris. We discussed it here too, so I don't see reason to
> give a longer version.
> 
> I dont believe that halakhah is based on a philosophy of rights.
> However, there are specitic halakhos which clearly imply the existence
> of a right.
> 
> Phrasing the issur of waking someone else up as "gezel shinah" implies
> that a person owns an intangible right to sleep. Not just that I have a
> duty to let you sleep if you wish to, but chazal articulate it in terms
> usually used for property.
> 
> Similarly geneivas da'as.
> 
> The only other example I could think of is this right to select a kohein
> to whom to give your terumah.
> 
> Can anyone else think of others?

If you're listing "gezel sheinah" and "geneivas da'as", then stam gezel
should also be on the list. Tangible property rights are so obvious that
I think we frequently forget that they're rights.

--Ken

On Wed, Feb 10, 2010 at 01:00:13PM -0500, Zev Sero wrote:
:> Locke wrote about the (positive) rights to Life, Liberty and Property, it
:> is his philosophy which shapted the US, and I'm saying that that's a major
:> piece to the prevelance of the culture of entitlement in these parts.

: On the contrary, those are negative rights.  I can't imagine how you
: understand them to be positive rights.

"Right to life" not "Right not to get killed".

On Wed, Feb 10, 2010 at 12:09:35PM -0600, Chanoch (Ken) Bloom wrote:
: If you're listing "gezel sheinah" and "geneivas da'as", then stam gezel
: should also be on the list. Tangible property rights are so obvious that
: I think we frequently forget that they're rights.

Once you frame your legal system in terms of rights, then ownership
becomes a right. I am not sure that one needs to see property in those
terms.

Related is an issue I raised here a few times, the difference between
baalus and the western concept of ownership. (WHich in turn, was an idea
I developed while we were playing VIDC [Vos Iz Der Chiluk] years ago.
See the discussions at
http://www.aishdas.org/avodah/getindex.cgi?section=M#MC%20VOL%202%20
P%2065
http://www.aishdas.org/avodah/getind
ex.cgi?section=V#VOSS%20IZ%20DER%20CHILLUK%205%20MC%20VOL%202%20P%2065
(the latter is also available as http://bit.ly/9uvBe4 )
and some of the followups went to
http://www.aishdas.org/avodah/getindex.cgi?section=V#VIDC

Once my theory grew, I ended up blogging
http://www.aishdas.org/asp/2007/03/qinyan-and-baalus.shtml

In short, I generalize from the case of making a qinyan to accept
shelichus to argue that qinyan acquires responsibility, and the
priviledges of baalus derives from responsibility.

Not that ownership is a right on property, but it's a duty. However,
one can't have a responsibility without the authority to execute it --
so duty implies the privilege to use.

IOW, in American Law, if my property causes damages, I am responsible
because I own it. In halakhah, I own something because I accepted
responsibility for it.

Of couse, all this is my own sevara, not worht much. I'm just showing
that ownership need not be a rights-centered concept by giving a
counterexample.

Snippets:
    Qinyan

    Although a wedding is called qinyan, and the laws are derived from
    Avraham's acquisition of a field from Efron, there are a number of
    ways it differs from the halakhos of a property transfer....

    Thus, qinyan refers to the work and to the responsibility of repair.
    This would explain why many of us, in less than a month, will be
    performing a qinyan sudar, a kind of qinyan involving handing over a
    small object, usually cloth, to delegate the job of selling our
    chameitz. The rabbi isn't acquiring our chameitz, he can't own it
    any more than the rest of us can. He is assuming the responsibility
    for its sale, to serve as our shaliach, our proxy....

    Ba'alus

    R' Dovid Lifshitz was once approached before shiur by somone who had
    recently bought a co-op. The problem was that the co-op board didn't
    allow him to change the appearance of the outside of his domicile
    from the co-op's standard by hanging a mezuzah.

    Rav Dovid suggested (warning: I can't recall if this was his
    conclusion or a hava amina, a possibility raised to be rejected) that
    perhaps someone who doesn't have the authority to hang a mezuzah lacks
    ba'alus, and therefore wouldn't be obligated to. (In either case, he
    suggested moving to a friendlier venue.) Note the implication: even
    if this lack of ba'alus is not sufficient to remove his obligation,
    it remains that a renter who can hang a mezuzah has more ba'alus
    than an owner who may not. And in any case, a renter doesn't own,
    but is a ba'al with respect to hilkhos mezuzah. Ba'alus is not the
    same concept as that denoted by the English word "ownership".

    ... The ba'al must have the liberty necessary to execute his
    responsibilities that he was qoneh, and thereby has the permission
    to use it for himself. Authority without responsibility is immoral,
    responsibility without the authority to execute it is impossible. A
    person would accept the responsibility in exchange for the right to
    be able to use an object.

    Pragmatics:

    What is the nafqa minah lehalakhah, the pragmatic difference,
    between halachic ba'alus and western ownership?

    We already saw two: ... [Then I add the aforementioned VIDC about
    there is no yerushah of chameitz on Pesach.]

Ownership in the context of a beris might have an entirely different
meaning. From my translation of the intro to Shaarei Yosher
<http://www.aishdas.org/asp/ShaareiYosher.pdf>i (for the Hebrew, see pg
9 of the PDF, 10 lines before the paragraph that begins with the large
"VeKhein", last word, which is also "vekhein"):
    Therefore it is appropriate to think about all the gifts of heaven
    "from the dew of the heavens and the fat of the land" that they
    are given to the Jewish people as a whole. Their allotment to
    individuals is only in their role as caretakers until they divide it
    to those who need it, to each according to what is worthy for him,
    and to take for himself what is worthy for himself. With this idea
    one can understand how charity has the effect of enriching the one
    who performs it, as the sages say on the verse "'aseir ta'aseir --
    you shall surely tithe' -- tithe, so that you shall become rich --
    shetis'asheir". Someone who is appointed over a small part of the
    national treasury who does a good job guarding at his appointment
    as appropriate will be next appointed to oversee a sum greater than
    that, if he is not promoted in some other way. If they find a flaw in
    his guard duty, no fine qualities to be found in him will help, and
    they will demote him to a smaller task. Similarly in the treasuries
    of heaven which are given to man. If he tithes appropriately,
    he satisfies his job of disbursement as he is supposed to conduct
    himself according to the Torah, giving to each as is appropriate
    according to the teachings of the Torah, then he will become wealthy
    and be appointed to disburse a greater treasure. And so on, upward
    and upward so that he can fulfill his lofty desire to do good for
    the masses through his stewardship of the treasury. In this way a
    man of reliable spirit does the will of his Maker.

It would seem that to own something is really to be the part of the
whole charged with making sure it's properly distributed and used.

Tir'u baTov!
-Micha

-- 
Micha Berger             I slept and dreamt that life was joy.
mi...@aishdas.org        I awoke and found that life was duty.
http://www.aishdas.org   I worked and, behold -- duty is joy.
Fax: (270) 514-1507                        - Rabindranath Tagore

OK I have a Brisker Hilluq re: what has become a third rail term
viz. "g'zeira". I think this may help see it from a new perspective.

I owe this hiddush to the Ba'er Hetev Hilchos M'gillah 690:15 which has a
dissertation on Minhaggim and I made a simple diyyuq leading to a hilluq.

Let me quote
"V'davar shenigzar B'MINYAN - afilu yadua mei'ezeh ta'am uvateil hata'am -
tzarich MINYAN acheir l'hatiro - gmara pereq qama d'veitza"

[NB: Emphasis added on MINYAN]

Translation: 
"An edict issued by count [vote], even if the underlying reason is known
and that reason has disappeared, nevertheless requires another count to
permit it [repeal it]."

Here is my diyyuq

The Brisker "two dinnim" are taluy whether the g'zeira was b'minyan or
not b'minyan!


G'zeiros Taluy b'minyan:
Thus those g'zeiros - both Talmudic -AND perhaps post-Talmudic - that
have been voted upon are not subject to repeal w/o another vote.

[For post Talmudic g'zeiros with a "Minyan" consider EG: 
    + Polygamy
    + The 3-day period for salting
    + Qitniyyos]

OTOH, if Rambam or SA or Rema or Magen Avraham pasqen a g'zeira, it is as
binding as any other p'saq - except that it may be couched as or temr as a
"g'zeira".

Illustration:
Trumas hadeshen quoted by Rema in YD 69:12
Don't leave meat unsalted for more than 3 days lest it be cooked [iow
even after it's been broiled]

This is AISI a g'zeira lacking a Minyan, but ratified by Rema and thus
behaves like p'saq or Minhag.

Hypothetically:
RMF could have himself been gozeir "no smoking" [just like a p'saq]

Or he could have assmbled all the rabbis in North America and had a
"Minyan" ratify such a g'zeira.

Now go back to Igros Moshe and see how RMF treated Agudas haRabbanim as
a "MINYAN" legabei certain cases - EG microphone on Shabbos. Which is
perhaps why he was not willing to allow for relying upon a more meiqeldick
t'shuva

KT
RRW
Sent via BlackBerry from T-Mobile

The Shulkhan Arukh
http://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/jsource/Judaism/shulkhan_arukh.html

> The legal code known as the Shulkhan Arukh, compiled by the great
> Sephardic rabbi Joseph Caro in the mid?1500s, is still the standard
> legal code of Judaism. When rabbis, particularly if they are Orthodox,
> are asked to rule on a question of Jewish law, the first volume they
> consult generally is the Shulkhan Arukh.

> A major reason for its universal acceptance is that it was the first code
> to list the differing customs and laws of both Sephardic and Ashkenazic
> Jewry. (Maimonides's earlier Mishneh Torah, for example, contained only
> the legal rulings of Sephardic Jewry, which differed in certain areas
> from European Jewry's practices.) This unique feature was not intended
> by Joseph Caro, but came about through a happy coincidence. At the very
> time that Caro was compiling his code, a similar undertaking was being
> planned by Rabbi Moses Isserles of Poland. Isserles, known in Jewish life
> as the Rama, was thrown into some despair when he first heard about Caro's
> work, for he knew Caro to be a greater scholar than himself. Nonetheless,
> he soon realized that both Caro's legal code and his own would not by
> themselves meet the needs of all Jews. Thus, the Shulkhan Arukh was
> published with Caro's rulings listed first, and Isserles's dissents and
> addenda included in italics.

Also see Rema's haqdama
    "Mi sheyeish lo chaich lit'om..."
Vs.
    "Umi shelo higi'a l'madreiga zo..."

Of course a Gadol, a Gaon is not limitted by SA-Rema, if he's already
a baqi in shas and posqim

I saw an article quoting Ri miGash as recommending to rabbis to follow
Gaonic rulings and NOT to pasqen directlly from Shas

The article interpreted Ri miGash as referring to "medium level
rabbis". But Great Rabbis were never intended to be so restricted.
I believe that there have been upwards of 300 commentaries published
on SA. There is a reason for books like Mishna Brura etc.

KT
RRW
Sent via BlackBerry from T-Mobile

Rn' Toby Katz was confused by my heter for a blind man to look at
photographs in Playboy. What I was trying to do was made an extreme
example: this man has 0% hirhur, and so he has 100% heter. He can look
at Playboy all day, because he'll get no hirhur whatsoever. The case
of a blind man looking at photographs sounds ridiculous, and it is -
that was precisely my intention. I was trying to find a case where
there is absolutely positively no hashah of hirhur whatsoever. The
hashash is so non-existent, that it doesn't even make sense to discuss
the case. To prohibit a blind man to look at photographs in Playboy
would just be the most outrageous pesaq ever. (Unless the fear was
that he'd look at them in public, and cause a hilul hashem. The fear
wouldn't be hirhur / hana'ah, however.)

R' Isaac Balbin asked for some clarifications on my intent in the following:

> I tend to prefer the positions that reconcile as much as possible.
> ...
> Furthermore, I prefer a few kelalim to many peratim - Occam's Razor.
> myself

What I meant was, that I prefer the explanation of the Talmud, Rambam,
Shulhan Arukh, etc., that is the simplest, that explains the most
number of laws and principles with the least amount of explanation or
peratim. The more kelalim that can explain the greatest number of
authoritative sources in the simplest way, this I will prefer.

Also, for me, real-life experience is also a valid datum. I will
prefer the explanation of halakhah that squares best with what I see
with my own eyes.

Obviously, this does NOT mean I am rejecting halakhah, or placing my
own real-life experience above the halakhah - halila!

I often prefer non-Ashkenazi rulings, for all these reasons. I
remember studying one sugya, I forget about what, in which another
sugya in the Gemara seemed to explicitly contradict it, saying the
exact opposite. Tosafot offered several very elaborate oqimtot, but
the Rif simply pasqened by one of the two sugyot and ignored the
other. The Ra'avad, commenting on the Rif, made a very tiny change in
girsa to the second sugya, making it agree with the first sugya that
the Rif pasqened as halakhah. I very very very much preferred the
Rif/Ra'avad solution to the Tosafot one; the Rif's solution resulted
in one single very simple straightforward halakhah, while Tosafot's
resulted in several elaborate and confusing oqimtot without a clear
bottom-line halakhah.

Now then, this doesn't mean I'm my own poseq. I DO have several rabbis
I direct my questions to. My whole Occam's Razor preference is mostly
just in theoretical limud, and not in ma'aseh. It also determines
whose halakhic opinions I follow, which rabbi I ask. I'm not pasqening
for myself, but instead, I choose my own poseq based on whose answers
I know will make sense to me. (Also, one of my rabbis is excellent for
being able to answer the same question in different ways, knowing
which of his students will accept what kind of answer. This rabbi of
mine knows me very well, and knows how to cherry-pink for me the
opinion that he knows I'll be able to accept. He has many students
from many backgrounds, and so he knows how to rule differently for
different people.)

And most any opinion, there's *someone* out there recent who pasqens
by it, as long you're willing to look beyond the Mishnah Berurah. For
me, for example, Rabbis Yosef Messas and Moshe Malka of Morocco (who
held that women have no obligation to cover their hair anymore) are
quite reliable, being both very recent and quite eminent. I consider
Moroccan rabbis to be no less legitimate than Eastern-European ones;
others will disagree, but I consider them to be just as "accepted" as
the Mishnah Berurah. So I'm not bothered by my relying on these
Moroccan rabbis. (Well, actually, I'm NOT relying on them, since I'm
not a married woman. But if I were one ... )

Speaking of Rabbi Messas, Rabbi Michael Broyde discusses him (and
quotes him at length too) in his recent article on hair covering:
http://www.traditiononline.org/news/_pdfs/0095-0180.pdf

> Should one consider doing away with Hilchos Yichud on this basis as well?
> R' Isaac Balbin

The difference with yihud is that it is a lo plug rabanan. The laws of
yihud are not a general application of the prohibition of hirhur /
hana'ah. Instead, they are a specific and explicit gezera that was
instituted. Therefore, my whole Occam's Razor preference does not
apply. By contrast, however, I've seen no recording of an explicit lo
plug gezera made against exposed hair. Now, the Gemara seems to
understand hair-covering as d'oraita, but it would appear, if I
understand correctly, that many rishonim nevertheless understood
hair-covering as an issue of d'rabanan or minhag or some such - dat
yehudit instead of dat moshe.

> There was a recent Psak
> that a blind man may use his hands to determines how a woman "looks" if
> that is important to him being able to determine that she is attractive to
> him for the purposes of marriage.
>
> R' Isaac Balbin

That was Rabbi Yuval Cherlow, my rosh yeshiva at Yeshivat Hesder Petah
Tiqwa. I'd have to ask him to be sure, but IIRC I believe his heter
was based on the presumption that for this blind man, feeling people's
face is normal for him, and he gets no hana'ah from it. I'm not sure,
however, if he permits this only for the sake of shiddukh/marriage, or
if he permits blind men to feel women's faces in general. I.e., does
Rabbi Cherlow, like Rabbi Weinberg on qol isha, require a real
pressing need or hefsed? I don't know, but I think that in any case,
his primary basis for heter was that for the blind man, feeling a
woman's face is normal and not sexual.

> You quote R' Henkin's book below. Please re-read the section on (for
> example) the length of a skirt. Based on your thesis, there should not be
> such a shakla v'tarya. Today, it is commonplace for women to wear tight
> jeans and very short skirts. As a result *most* of us (!) don't have hirhur
> and the shok should be redefined.
>
> R' Isaac Balbin

I do believe that there should NOT be such shakla v'tarya about
tzniut. There is a case of a rabbi recently (within the past few
decades) prohibiting aliyah, because the Terumat ha-Deshen says that
there is no parnassah in Israel. Rabbi Haim David Halevi responded
that you cannot pasqen for 20th-century Israel based on a 15th-century
source. I feel the same way about the laws of tzniut; you cannot
determine what causes hirhur / hana'ah today based on what caused
these 500 years ago, or even 100 ago.

Neverthless, I would in fact prohibit tight jeans and short shorts.
After all, the express purpose of these is to cause hirhur /
hana'ah!!! The very reason a woman wears a bikini, for example, is to
cause hana'ah in men!!! Therefore, hergel cannot possibly mitigate the
issur. Hergel only works if it's just stam what people do, as in the
mimetic tradition of "Rupture and Reconstruction". But if the very
intention of the scanty-clothing is to cause hirhur, then hergel
cannot possibly mitigate it.

> Many people subscribe to statistics that the slightest intimacy
> between (unmarried) males and females today leads to the bedroom.
>
> R' Isaac Balbin

That's simply not true in my experience. In my own experience, having
attended a public high school, those who wish to have premarital sex
will have it regardless of intimacy between men and women, and those
who do not wish to have premarital sex will avoid it regardless of
intimacy. There are different kinds of unmarried individuals, who all
have VERY different desires and expectations. In my entire circle of
friends in high school, I don't know of a single person who had
premarital sex, because none of us were the kinds who wanted to have
it. We all had plenty of intimate social relationships with female
peers, but premarital sex was simply something we weren't seeking. In
my senior year, one of my friends had a girlfriend, and not long after
graduation, the two were married. This friend of mine knew exactly
what he had to do if he wanted to have sexual relations. Anything
extramarital was not an option.

In other words: I think that today, most everyone is so habituated to
sexuality, that the most important factor is not hirhur / hana'ah
anymore, but rather, your express and explicit intent and desires. My
friends who avoided sex had the same hirhur / hana'ah and hergel as
those who were having sex all the time. The difference between us was
NOT the degree of intimacy or habituation with the opposite sex. The
difference was rather, whether or not one consciously desired to have
premarital sex or not. For those in my circle of friends in high
school, premarital sex was simply not morally conscionable. We very
consciously and deliberately eschewed premarital sex, not for lack of
opportunities.

The rise in premarital sex is due NOT, I believe, to greater exposure
to the opposite sex. Rather, I believe, the issue is that society has
accepted premarital sex as acceptable and legitimate. It is not the
hirhur / hana'ah or hergel that is to blame; instead, I believe, it is
the lack of basic moral censure that is to blame.

Therefore: if we want to reduce premarital sex, I think the most
important thing to do today is NOT to dress more tzenua or have fewer
social relationships between men and women. This will do nothing. The
solution instead, I believe, is to foster a moral environment in which
people have firm moral principles against premarital sex.

Every day, a person might have plenty of desire to steal, but he
refrains from stealing because it is wrong, period. The objects to
steal are all in plain sight; there is no tzniut, and there is lots of
hirhur / hana'ah. What stops his theft is not concealing the objects,
hiding them from sight, but rather, his moral principles. Nowadays, we
must approach tzniut the same way, I believe. Everything is already in
sight, and we are used to it. What must be fostered is a refusal to
act on the exposure of sexuality, the same way one refuses to act on
the exposure of objects on store shelves.

How do we foster such an environment? First, it'd be nice if
television shows didn't glorify premarital sex so much. More tzenua
billboards would be nice as well. But besides that, I think children
need to be taught that premarital sex is simply not a moral option, is
simply not legitimate or conscionable. Parents need to have clear and
absolute moral principles, and inculcate them effectively. (Easier
said than done, perhaps. I'm not a parent, so what do I know?)

> Where do Chazal define a "platonic" woman?
> R' Issac Balbin

Okay, nowhere; for Hazal, no such thing exists. After all, Rambam says
women could only go outside once or twice a month!! But I still think
my basic principle applies: the more intimately two people know each
other, the more carefully one must guard against hirhur / hana'ah,
because less hirhur / hana'ah will more easily lead to sexual
relations. Two strangers on the street aren't going to have relations
just from looking at each other in the eye, but a married couple
conceivably might.

> I wonder why the Rambam according to your thesis
> should not have absolved homosexual males from all tznius issues relating
> to women? Lo Plug?
>
> R' Isaac Balbin.

That's a very interesting question, and I've never thought about it.
Perhaps homosexuals are just so absolutely abnormal, compared to
healthy individuals, that to permit them to act publicly with women
would be poresh min ha-tzibur? That is, in a Talmudic society where
men and women have NO social relationships AT ALL outside marriage, to
permit homosexuals to freely and unrestrictedly associate with women
publicly would just be outrageously divisive and obscene to the
public? It might be technically defensible, based on the technical
laws of tzniut, but even so, societally, it's just too obscene and
divisive.

Furthermore, to permit homosexuals to act in this way might perhaps be
seen as condoning other homosexual acts as well? That is, once you
start giving heterim to homosexuals based on their lack of hana'ah /
hirhur with women, perhaps the homosexuals will wrongly assume that
therefore, there is a heter to have relations with men too? They'll
wrongly believe that they can do whatever their sexuality tells them.
You've given them one heter based on their sexuality for women, so
they'll assume there are additional heterim too, based on their
sexuality for men.

Michael Makovi

<<MSS <ssv...@gmail.com>:
> And this is only logical, one needs
> guidance in "how to learn", in what is a "good" sevara and what is a
> "bad" sevara. This type of knowledge is only through mesorah.

I disagree. I have heard enough people who have been in yeshiva for
many years come out with a krum sevara.

Part of the problem is how to distinguish good logic from bad logic.
Obvious those who are very krum believe themselves to be very logical.

I would argue the opposite that learning mathematics is a good start for
thinking logically. Either something can be proven or not.
I know of universities that use math grades in acceptance of students not
because of the necessity of math in that subject but because it shows a
logical mind

-- 
Eli Turkel

On Wed, Feb 10, 2010 at 12:51 PM, Eli Turkel <elitur...@gmail.com> wrote:
> <<MSS <ssv...@gmail.com>:
>> And this is only logical, one needs
>> guidance in "how to learn", in what is a "good" sevara and what is a
>> "bad" sevara. This type of knowledge is only through mesorah.
>
> I disagree. I have heard enough people who have been in yeshiva for
> many years come out with a krum sevara.

So what is your "fix"? More "book knowledge"? Obviously (at least to
me!) one needs a mentor or in other words. Mesorah.

> Part of the problem is how to distinguish good logic from bad logic.
> Obvious those who are very krum believe themselves to be very logical.
>
> I would argue the opposite that learning mathematics is a good start for
> thinking logically. Either something can be proven or not.

And here lies your mistake. Torah is not like math. There is 70 facets
to Torah, there are multiple ways to 'mitaher the sheretz', etc. To
train people in that there is only one type of "logical" sevara, like
math does, is to do them a disservice when it comes to Torah study.

> I know of universities that use math grades in acceptance of students not
> because of the necessity of math in that subject but because it shows a
> logical mind

As explained above, this might actually be a drawback in terms of
being able to grasp Torah sevaros, which have a far greater range of
subtleness - comparable to analog and as opposed to math's binary
choice of true answer or false answer.

KT,
MSS

> And here lies your mistake. Torah is not like math. There is 70 facets
> to Torah, there are multiple ways to 'mitaher the sheretz', etc. To
> train people in that there is only one type of "logical" sevara, like
> math does, is to do them a disservice when it comes to Torah study.

In fact the gemara and tosafot were not happy with R. Meir being able to
mitaher the sheretz in 70 ways. I was brought up that learning gemara requires
a clear analytical mind and not pilpul of 70 ways to learn the gemara.

There is a famous story of Lewin (now a famous lawyer and frequent advocate
of O causes). When he first started law school he was thrown out of class
for using gemara logic which did not amuse the professor.
So using your logic learning gemara is also a poor preparation for the
hi tech world.


-- 
Eli Turkel


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